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IntroductionTOWARDS A BETTER GOVERNANCE IN THE EU?
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
The 10th EUROFRAME1 Conference on economic policy issues in 
the European Union was held in Warsaw on 24 May 2013. The Confer-
ence topic was: “Towards a better governance in the EU?”. Twelve of 
the papers given at the Conference are released in this issue of the 
Revue de l’OFCE/Debates and Policies.
The euro is a unique experience in modern economic history. Can 
a single currency be shared between countries with different cyclical 
situations, structural problems and economic strategies? Is a single 
currency consistent with independent domestic fiscal policies? In 
1992, EU countries answered ‘yes’ to these questions by signing the 
Maastricht Treaty. Starting from then, euro area governance was char-
acterized by independent domestic fiscal policies however constrained 
to fulfil several criteria (public deficit below 3% of GDP, public debt 
below 60% of GDP), a single monetary policy entrusted to an inde-
pendent central bank, the absence of public debt guarantee and fiscal 
solidarity between member states. 
This framework was a failure. Prior to the crisis, disparities widened 
between member states (MS), northern countries taking advantage of 
fixed exchange rates to implement policies aiming at gaining competi-
tiveness and increasing external surpluses, at the cost of strong wage 
and social austerity and low growth, while southern countries were 
taking advantage of low interest rates to enjoy a strong growth, based 
on housing bubbles and leading to an unsustainable external deficit. 
The European Commission and the MS were not able to implement a 
satisfactory economic policy. The European Commission pursued 
1. EUROFRAME is a network of ten independent European research institutes: WIFO (Austria), 
ETLA (Finland), OFCE (France), DIW and IFW (Germany), ESRI (Ireland), PROMETEIA (Italy), 
CPB (Netherlands), CASE (Poland), NIESR (United Kingdom).Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 132 (2014)
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak10endless efforts against countries with higher than 3% of GDP deficits 
without seeing that the danger was coming from rising external defi-
cits in Southern countries and more generally from financial and 
housing bubbles. 
The world financial crisis was followed in Europe by a sovereign 
debt crisis in euro area countries, when financial markets realised that 
these debts were no more safe assets. Investment funds’ fears and 
speculation from many financial bodies widened interest rates 
disparities in Europe and weakened the single currency notion, since 
now euro area companies do not borrow at the same rate depending 
on their location.
European institutions and MS states tried to tackle the crisis in 
setting up new rules and institutions: 
— Fiscal discipline was strengthened through the six-pack, two-
pack and the fiscal compact. But we may argue that the current 
crisis is not due to fiscal indiscipline. The measures and mecha-
nisms introduced since the beginning of the crisis strengthen 
rules lacking economic rationale and prevent from imple-
menting appropriate fiscal stabilization policies. They will 
probably be unenforceable.
— Member states were constrained to fulfil the Stability Pact, 
through implementing fiscal austerity policies from 2011, in a 
situation of economic recession and mass unemployment. 
These policies brought the economic recovery underway to an 
end and plunged the euro area in depression again in 2012-13. 
Southern economies reduced their external imbalances, 
although through falls in domestic demand and output, and 
large increases in unemployment rates. Today these countries 
seem to be deprived of any economic and social dynamism. In 
2013, the euro area had lost almost 10 percent of GDP due to 
the crisis, without the EU institutions recommending any 
economic recovery strategy, outside fiscal austerity and liberal 
structural reforms, strategies which have failed so far to bring 
the euro area out of the crisis. 
— The surveillance of MS economic policies was strengthened and 
broadened through the introduction of a first European 
semester and of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, 
without any true MS economic policy coordination. 
— Solidarity mechanisms between MS were introduced (EFSF, 
EFSM, ESM), the central bank intervened (SMP – securities 
market programme) or announced it would be ready to do so if 
needed (OMT programme). But the price of solidarity was high 
Towards a better governance in the EU?: Introduction 11for countries agreeing to receive support from the Troika, and 
this did not restore public debts unicity in the euro area.
— EU institutions now advocate further steps towards federalism 
in banking or fiscal areas (automatic transfer mechanisms, EU 
common unemployment insurance system).
In May 2013, when the EUROFRAME Conference was held, the 
euro area seemed to be saved, speculation had calmed down, but 
growth had not resumed and southern economies were remaining 
depressed without clear improvements prospects. Was the euro area 
saved at the expense of member states? 
A variety of analyses were expressed at the EUROFRAME Confer-
ence, like in the EU debate:  
— According to some authors, Europe should stick to the original 
Treaty, abolish solidarity mechanisms, prevent the Central bank 
to buy MS government bonds, make it compulsory for govern-
ments to issue bonds on financial markets. But is this consistent 
with the single currency? Do markets have expertise in macroe-
conomic areas? Should euro area countries be considered as 
countries without monetary sovereignty and issuing risky 
public bonds? 
— Other authors consider that Europe should move towards a 
federal Europe, where European authorities would be respon-
sible for fiscal policy at least for the stabilisation component, 
but also more in more in incentives and allocation functions 
(redistribution being so far not considered). This requires more 
democratic instances in the EU and possibly some form of polit-
ical union. But can countries with different economic 
conditions, different economic and structures, be managed 
centrally? The euro area is too heterogeneous. Can each county 
agree to submit its domestic social and economies choices to 
European trade-offs? 
— Some authors consider that public debts should become safe 
assets again, guaranteed by the ECB, within a real economic 
policy coordination process within MS, targeting explicitly full-
employment and the reduction of imbalances in the area. Is 
such a co-ordination a myth? Can a country agree to modify 
explicitly its economic policy objectives so as to help improve 
its partners’ economic situation? Is the lack of trust between EU 
countries too strong to allow each MS to guarantee its partners’ 
public debts? 
— Last, according to some other authors, a single currency cannot 
be shared by too heterogeneous countries; unconditional debt 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak12guarantee will be refused by Northern countries, even though it 
is a prerequisite to maintain euro area unity; Europe is unable to 
organise a common but differentiated strategy; that differentials 
accumulated in terms of competitiveness require large exchange 
rate adjustments in Europe. Exchange rates variations should 
remain possible to reflect disparities between MS: strong 
exchange rate falls in southern countries, strong rises in 
northern countries. Each country should face their own respon-
sibilities: Northern countries will have to raise domestic 
demand; Southern economies will have to use their competi-
tiveness gains to rebuild an export-oriented sector. 
Therefore, the advocates of the single currency have to make a 
choice. Can governance in the euro area be designed in a way which 
would strengthen the economic robustness of the area, would give MS 
the rooms for manoeuvre needed within a coordinated economic 
strategy, albeit forbidding both excessive competitiveness gains and 
excessive rises in debts or deficits? How to strengthen the economic 
and monetary union between remaining heterogeneous economies? 
How to bring the economic and financial crisis to an end, with the 
implementation of a euro area governance while allowing member 
states to follow economic policies adapted to their needs? 
EU governance
In “The Fiscal or Bailout Union: Where Is the EU/EMU’s Fiscal Inte-
gration Heading?”, Marek Dabrowski criticises the view according to 
which closer fiscal and political integration is a condition for the 
common currency to survive. The author recalls that the EU is based 
on the principle of subsidiarity. The author refuses fiscal federalism, 
eurobonds or lender of last resort facility, which would lead to moral 
hazard behaviour. The author advocates a return to the Maastricht 
principles:  enforcing fiscal rules, no bail-out and market discipline.
The paper by Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak: “Redemp-
tion?”, recalls that, before, during and after the crisis, euro area 
governance was not satisfactory. The paper shows that the problem is 
not a lack of fiscal discipline in Europe, but general drifts in financial 
capitalism and an inappropriately designed euro area economic policy 
framework (non-guarantee of public debts, no real economic coordi-
nation, and liberal strategies to impose lower social public expenditure 
and structural reforms). EU member states should not be requested to 
pay for past sins through austerity measures, and should not 
strengthen fiscal discipline through rules lacking economic rationale. 
The paper criticizes recent proposals made with a view to improve euro 
Towards a better governance in the EU?: Introduction 13area governance (redemption fund, European debt agency, fiscal feder-
alism). European public debts should become safe assets again, and 
should not be subject to financial markets’ assessment. The paper 
advocates for a full guarantee of government bonds for the member 
states commit to an economic policy coordination process, which 
should target GDP growth and coordinated reduction of imbalances.
The paper by John FitzGerald: “The new EU governance arrange-
ments” recalls that the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact 
were not effective before the crisis. They did not prevent some MS to 
maintain an economic strategy whose drawbacks were revealed by the 
crisis. Some drawbacks of euro area governance were corrected since 
the beginning of the current crisis. However John FitzGerald is critical 
on the methods used to estimate potential output and how they are 
used to assess MS fiscal policies. The author considers that when output 
is significantly below or above potential, a counter-cyclical policy 
should be undertaken at the euro area level, but also that in normal 
times, member states may be able to choose their own fiscal policy. 
The paper by Paolo Onofri and Tsvetomira Tsenova: “Engine for 
European growth and stability” explains that EMU faces a critical 
trilemma: a slow death by asphyxiation, a sudden collapse or a new 
building yard for EMU, which supposes an efficient implantation of 
the banking union, a grace period to enable peripheral countries to 
restructure and contribute to the European recovery, and institutional 
reform to allow public debts to become again risk-free assets.
Fiscal policy in the EU: Some Assessments 
In the paper “Primary balance and debt projections based on 
estimated fiscal reaction functions for euro area countries”, Martin 
Plödt and Claire Reicher use fiscal rules based on estimated fiscal 
policy reactions functions to project the path of public debt and 
primary balances for bigger euro area countries. The paper shows that 
Italy will need an extremely high primary public surplus to succeed to 
rapidly reduce its debt/GDP ratio; the situation is less worrying for 
Germany, Spain and France. A more rigid fiscal rule like the “1/20” 
rule may destabilise the economy, as restrictive fiscal policy may 
increase the debt ratio in the short time. The required policy strongly 
depends on the potential growth projections, which is problematic for 
some countries like Spain (or Ireland or Greece).
The paper by Matti Viren: “How different are the fiscal policy 
effects? Assessing the importance of cyclical situation, policy coordination, 
composition of policy measures and country specific features” uses different 
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak14methods to estimate fiscal policy effects. It appears that fiscal multi-
pliers depend on countries, are larger for bigger than for smaller 
countries, larger also during economic recessions, and larger for euro 
area generalized policies, especially for smaller countries. These effects 
are to be taken into account when a fiscal coordinated policy in 
considered. 
The paper on “Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: is the 
sooner really the better?” by Christophe Blot, Marion Cochard, 
Jérôme Creel, Bruno Ducoudré, Danielle Schweisguth, and Xavier 
Timbeau gives a survey of the recent literature which rediscover, after 
the monetarist, rational-expectations, DSGE models counter-revolu-
tions, that the fiscal multiplier is positive, is higher in periods of high 
unemployment and low level of capacity utilisation, higher when a 
zero-lower-bound constrains monetary policy, higher for expenditures 
than for taxes. Using a small model of euro area countries, where the 
multiplier varies according to the output gap, the authors show that 
implementing large fiscal austerity policies in a depressed economic 
context is costly and inefficient. It would have been better to postpone 
fiscal consolidation in the euro area until a period where MS output 
gaps are less negative. However we can note that such a strategy would 
require a strong confidence between the MS, the ECB and financial 
markets: the ECB would have to accept to guarantee MS public debts, 
financial markets would have to refrain from speculating on MS 
commitments to reduce their debt in the future.
Governance and Banking issues
The paper by Maylis Avaro and Henri Sterdyniak: “Banking union: 
a solution to the euro zone crisis?” analyses this new project 
expected to help to solve the euro area crisis. The banking union 
would break the link between the sovereign debt crisis and the 
banking crisis, by asking the ECB to supervise banks, by establishing 
common mechanisms to solve banking crises and to guarantee 
deposits. The article expresses the fears that banking union is a new 
and uncontrolled step towards more technocratic federalism. Struc-
tural choices on the European banking system will be left to the ECB. 
Banks' solvency and ability to lend would depend primarily on their 
capital ratios and thus on financial markets' sentiment. The links 
between the government, firms, households and domestic banks 
would be cut. The paper suggests that banking union should be 
accompanied by the introduction of a tax on financial activity and by 
isolating retail banking activity from risky activities. 
Towards a better governance in the EU?: Introduction 15The paper by Ewa Miklaszewska, Katarzyna Mikołajczyk and 
Małgorzata Pawłowska: “Do safe banks create a safe system? Central 
and Eastern European banks’ perspective” describes banks’ situation in 
the CEE-5. In the CEE-5, banks remained in the traditional model of 
banking intermediation, they were not strongly hit by the financial 
crisis and did not need fundamental restructuring. Nevertheless, the 
banking union will establish complex new rules and regulatory bodies, 
which may increase moral hazard behaviour, bank concentration, 
away from the CEE stable and healthy banking model. 
Macroeconomic issues
Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä, in: “Euro – How big a difference: 
Finland and Sweden in search of macro stability” compare the 
economic developments in Finland (which in the euro area) and Sweden 
(which decided not to join the euro area). It appears that Sweden has 
achieved a better price stability improvement and a better resistance to 
the global shock in 2009-10, due to its independent monetary regime. 
Nevertheless, part of the recent bad performance of the Finnish 
economy is due to a specific factor: the decline of the Nokia cluster. 
The paper by Hubert Gabrisch and Karsten Staehr: “The Euro Plus 
Pact: Competitiveness and external capital flows in the EU coun-
tries” analyses the relationship between competitiveness, trade 
balances and capital flows. Contrary to the prevailing opinion 
according to which competitiveness differentials generate differentials 
in trade balances which should be financed by capital flows, the paper 
gives econometric results showing that there is no obvious causality 
between competitiveness and current accounts, and conclude the 
opposite: countries attracting external capital flows in a monetary 
union will see increases in their wages and prices, and consequently 
competitiveness losses and current account deficits. This leads the 
authors to be critical about the surveillance of unit wage costs intro-
duced in the euro plus pact. Does this mean that wages should have 
risen in Spain (to lower domestic companies’ profitability) and that 
wages should have decreased in Germany?
The paper by Margit Schratzenstaller: “Reform Options for the 
EU’s System of Own Resources” shows that fiscal procedures currently 
used to build the EU budget lead each member state to account for their 
financial rewards only instead of supporting projects benefiting the 
whole EU. This could be corrected via allocating own resources to the 
EU. The paper discusses which taxes could become immediately EU 
based (financial transactions tax, financial activities tax, flight tax, tax 
on carbon dioxide emissions, tax on energy, CIT, VAT).
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak16Our conclusion
The financial crisis and the debt crisis are major challenges for the 
euro area. There is clearly a need to improve euro area governance. 
Several mechanisms have been introduced since 2010. They failed so far 
to bring the euro area out of recession: they widened disparities between 
member states and among citizens. Europe has become unpopular, is 
seen more and more as running blind and inappropriate austerity poli-
cies, undermining social protection, under technocratic and distant 
governance. We do not think that European construction should be 
abandoned, that it should be weakened in abandoning the single 
currency. But Europe should strengthen as a “champion of world 
governance”, against the domination of finance, promoting the social 
model, and taking the leadership against climate change and favouring 
environmental transition. This cannot be done as long as Europe 
remains a low growth area, leaving southern economies in recession. 
The implementation of a new governance in the euro area requires both 
institutional changes (public debts should become safe assets again, 
economic policies should be truly coordinated) and new targets: growth, 
employment, social standards. This requires restoring a certain degree of 
confidence and solidarity between member states and citizens; 
launching new European big projects, like social Europe or green Europe, 
economic recovery in southern economies, catching up in central and 
eastern countries. Further steps towards a political union may be taken 
only once peoples’ confidence in Europe has been restored. 
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Part 1

FISCAL OR BAILOUT UNION
WHERE IS THE EU/EMU’S FISCAL INTEGRATION HEADING?1
Marek Dabrowski
CASE
The European debt crisis triggered a debate on the lacking components of
the EU and EMU integration architecture. Many believe that a common
currency requires closer fiscal and political integration as a condition for its
survival. This opinion is not necessarily supported by the experience of other
monetary unions, especially those created by sovereign states. On the other
hand, the current EU integration architecture already contains several elements
of fiscal union. Furthermore, in several important policy areas such as financial
supervision, defense, security, border protection, foreign policy, environmental
protection, and climate change, the centralization of tasks and resources at the
Union level could offer increasing returns to scale and a better chance to
address pan-European externalities. This applies to the entire EU, not only to
the Eurozone. 
Each variant of fiscal integration must be based on sound foundations of
fiscal discipline. Market discipline, i.e., the danger of sovereign default,
supplemented by clear and consistently enforced fiscal rules is the best solution
to this problem. Unfortunately, since 2010, the “no bail out” principle has been
replaced by a policy of conditional bailout of governments in fiscal trouble. Some
proposals, such as eurobonds or the lender of last resort to governments, go even
further in this direction, and threaten to build a dysfunctional fiscal union. 
Keywords: monetary union, common currency, fiscal union, European Union, Eurozone, EU budget, fiscal
federalism, fiscal discipline
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 10th EUROFRAME Conference on
Economic Policy Issues in the European Union on Towards a better governance in the EU? in
Warsaw, May 24, 2013. The current version largely benefits from discussions held at this
conference and from post-conference comments provided by Joshua Aizenman, Jorgen
Mortensen, Luca Barbone, Markku Kotilainen, Charles Wyplosz and Guntram Wolff. However,
the author accepts sole responsibility for the content and quality of this paper as well as the
presented opinions, conclusions and recommendations which reflect his personal views and not
necessarily those of CASE.
e-mail: Marek.Dabrowski@case-research.euRevue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 132 (2014)
Marek Dabrowski20The sovereign debt crisis on the periphery of the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) and the danger of at least a partial
disintegration of the Eurozone has brought back a debate around
the lacking components of the European integration. This debate
has emerged on various occasions in the past, for example, during
the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty and before launching the
EMU (late 1980s and 1990s) or during work on the so-called
Constitutional Treaty in the first half of the 2000s. One of its
dimensions is related to the role of fiscal integration, particularly
within the common currency area (CCA). Furthermore, most
participants of this debate assumed, in our opinion, correctly, that
greater fiscal integration would also mean more political feder-
alism at the European level (including its institutional dimension
like a greater role for the European Parliament) because fiscal
policy historically belonged to the core responsibilities of sover-
eign nations and their democratically elected legislatures. 
In particular, the debate on the Euro project has continuously
asked the question of how much political federalism and fiscal
centralization is needed to ensure sustainable monetary integra-
tion. The argument about a “twin” integration, i.e., a monetary
integration going hand in hand with a political one, have been
raised in academic debate by both advocates of the common
currency (who consequently proposed to advance political union
or at least the so-called economic government – see e.g. De
Grauwe, 2006; Alphandéry, 2012) and its skeptics who have
doubted whether truly federal solutions might ever be feasible in a
Europe dominated by the tradition of sovereign nation states (e.g.
Feldstein, 1997, 2012). The same approach is very much present in
the official document on a “Deep and Genuine EMU” published by
the European Commission (2012), which proposes directions of
deeper economic, fiscal and political integration seen as a remedy
to the Eurozone financial and economic crisis. 
Yet, when one looks more closely at both the empirical experi-
ence of various monetary unions and the theory of an optimum
currency area (OCA), the “twin integration” argument becomes
less obvious; at least it deserves careful consideration before being
accepted as a priori paradigm. It appears that the debate on the
Fiscal or bailout union: Where is the EU/EMU’s fiscal integration heading? 21interrelation between monetary and political integration/fiscal
federalism has often been too general and superficial and lacking
sufficient clarity to be instrumental for discussing and elaborating
concrete institutional solutions. In particular: 
— It tends to overlook those elements of a fiscal union which
are already in place in the European Union (EU) and the
EMU institutional architecture, of which there are quite a
few. 
— It is one-sided in the sense that it concentrates on the role of
fiscal union as the safeguarding mechanism of successful
monetary integration while it disregards other potential
rationales for fiscal integration such as the implementation
of common policies and projects at the EU level, the provi-
sion of European public goods, or safeguarding the Single
European Market (in particular, its financial market
segment). 
— Most suggestions of further fiscal integration are rather
general and do not specify which particular elements and
mechanisms should be added to the existing integration
architecture and how those new elements can ensure a
greater sustainability of monetary integration. 
— It lacks a sufficiently broad comparative and historical
perspective. For example, the frequently used comparison is
with the US but most of the arguments overlook the process
of historical evolution of the US federation. Other historical
and contemporary experiences of monetary unions, hetero-
geneous in their economic and political architecture and
operational details (see e.g., Deo, Donovan and Hatheway,
2011), are rarely analyzed. 
— It frequently ignores elementary lessons which can be drawn
from both the theory and practice of fiscal federalism, espe-
cially in respect to the danger of moral hazard and free riding
behavior arising from having the wrong incentives in place. 
This paper is going to fill in at least some of the above-
mentioned gaps and discuss the rationale for a pan-European fiscal
union and its various components in a more systematic way. In
particular, we are going to analyze the following issues:
Marek Dabrowski221/ The definition of a fiscal union and identification of its various
components
2/ The interlinks between a monetary union and fiscal union, in
particular, the extent to which the stable monetary union
requires far-going fiscal integration
3/ Other arguments in favor of fiscal integration (other than the
interlinks between monetary and fiscal union) 
4/ The size of the EU budget, its revenue sources, and decision
making mechanisms
5/ The mechanism of fiscal discipline based both on market incen-
tives and formal fiscal rules
6/ Practical conclusions to the debate on fiscal integration within
the EU and EMU (including the question of which elements of
fiscal integration should apply only to members of the EMU
and which to the entire EU)
We start by defining a fiscal union (Section 1) and then we
analyze the interrelations between monetary and fiscal unions
(Section 2), which are some of the central issues investigated in
this paper. This is followed by a discussion of other potential argu-
ments in favor of closer fiscal integration, besides those justified by
a common currency (Section 3). The next three sections analyze
the size of the EU budget, its structure and the mechanism of its
adoption (Section 4), its revenue sources and EU tax policy
(Section 5) and institutional setup within the EU executive body,
i.e. the European Commission (Section 6). Section 7 addresses
another key issue of the EU/EMU fiscal federalism, i.e., the mecha-
nism of fiscal discipline at the national level. Finally, Section 8
presents the conclusions of our analysis. 
1. Various practical meanings of fiscal union
Unfortunately, there is no single and clear-cut definition of a
fiscal union in economic literature. More interestingly, many of
the authors who advocate building a fiscal union within the euro
zone (e.g., Marzinotto, Sapir and Wolff, 2011) do not offer an
explicit definition. In the current debate on the causes of the Euro-
pean debt crisis and possible remedies, various practical meanings
of fiscal union are assumed by individual authors depending on
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ular issues their analyses focus on. Thus, in various proposals
related to changes in EU/EMU governance architecture, the notion
of fiscal union may involve: 
— a higher degree of centralization of fiscal resources at the
Union level;
— the development of European revenue sources for the EU
budget (instead of the contributions of member states); 
— a harmonization of taxation/ entitlements within the EU/
EMU;
— a mechanism of fiscal discipline at both the Union and
national levels, including the mechanism of orderly sover-
eign default;
— the build up of Union-wide insurance mechanisms against
financial turbulences (bailout facilities), including a debt
mutualization mechanism;
— the creation of institutions with fiscal authority on a supra-
national level (for example, creating an EU/EMU Ministry of
Finance).
In our opinion, all of these proposals constitute elements of
fiscal union, which can be defined, in very broad terms and for the
purposes of this particular analysis, as the integration of national
fiscal policies at the EU/ EMU level. 
However, such a general definition does not determine a priori
which degree and forms of fiscal integration can be beneficial for
the EU/EMU as a whole and individual member states and can help
avoid financial distress in future or minimize its negative impact.
In the subsequent sections we will try to discuss arguments both in
favor and against various dimensions of fiscal union and analyze
the degree of complementarity between them. 
2. Interrelations between monetary and fiscal union
In the debate on the current debt and financial crisis in the
EMU, both supporters and opponents of the Euro project agree it
must be accompanied by a fiscal and political union in order to
survive. However, while the former (e.g. Wolff, 2012; De Grauwe,
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Feldstein, 1997; 2012) doubt it will ever happen due to a long
historical tradition of sovereign nation states in Europe. 
Unfortunately, the arguments in favor of political and fiscal
integration as the condition for the monetary union’s sustain-
ability are rarely provided. More frequently, especially in the
current crisis-dominated hot debate, they are taken as given. As a
result, the claim for political and fiscal union sounds more like a
creed rather than something based on well-founded academic
arguments.3 
Furthermore, a closer examination of the interlinks between
monetary and fiscal union on both theoretical and empirical
ground provides us with a more nuanced picture. 
According to the OCA theory as developed by Mundell (1961)
and McKinnon (1963), which serves as the key theoretical frame-
work for analyzing the economic rationale of a monetary union,
fiscal policy can cushion the consequences of asymmetric shocks
in cases where free mobility of production factors (labor and
capital) is not sufficient to do so. 
However, this part of OCA theory may be interpreted in two
ways: either as the retention of fiscal capacity and sufficient fiscal
buffers in territories participating in CCA to enable them to
respond to idiosyncratic shocks in a decentralized way (in the
absence of monetary accommodation) or the necessity to arrange
centralized fiscal transfers between respective territories. The first
interpretation was behind the original design of the Maastricht
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (see Mortensen,
2004; De Grauwe, 2006). The second one seems to dominate in the
post-2010 debate (e.g., Wolff, 2012) and the official proposals of
reforming the EMU’s governance architecture (e.g., European
Commission, 2012). 
2. De Grauwe (2013) presents himself as a skeptic of the common currency project in 1990s.
However, as dismantling the Eurozone now would mean …profound economic, social and political
upheavals throughout Europe, he is in favor of building a fiscal union to supplement the lacking
component of monetary integration. 
3. De Grauwe (2006), who offers an in-depth discussion on interrelations between monetary
and political/fiscal union, and Aizenman (2013), who underlines the importance of a banking
union (with its fiscal implications) for the stability of a common currency, are prominent
exceptions here. 
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monetary unions also provides us with mixed results. It is true that
most historically known CCAs have matched with the territory of
sovereign states, either unitary or federal. Furthermore, most
historical episodes of monetary unification followed political
unification, which was in most cases involuntary, being the result
of war, conquest, colonization, etc. Nevertheless, there are also
examples of the voluntary monetary union of sovereign states, i.e.
when a common currency unit and common central bank are
established, but are not accompanied by a meaningful delegation
of political sovereignty in other areas (like fiscal policy) to a supra-
national entity and building a political superstructure.4 
For example, the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) or Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(CEMAC) have virtually no political or fiscal integration but they
have used a common currency (the CFA franc) since 1945, i.e., for
almost 70 years. Only at the end of the 1990s did member coun-
tries of both monetary unions start to develop other segments of
economic integration, i.e., custom unions, common markets and
some soft forms of supranational macroeconomic policy coordina-
tion and fiscal surveillance, following the EU/EMU experience.
However, the pace of those integration processes is rather slow,
especially in the case of CEMAC. Nevertheless, both monetary
unions have proved sustainable so far in spite of numerous asym-
metric shocks (see IMF, 2013 for a contemporary analysis of the
WAEMU challenges), divergent macroeconomic trends, violent
political conflicts (both internal and regional), limited trade and
financial integration, etc. 
Other contemporary examples of monetary unions with no or
weak political integration components include the Eastern Carib-
bean Currency Union and the Common Monetary Area in
Southern Africa. 
If we broaden our definition of monetary union by including
permanently fixed exchange rate regimes (against other currency
4. Please note that in the contemporary world, no country enjoys full sovereignty and each
form of international cooperation (explicit or implicit) involves some limitations on national
sovereignty. 
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monetary “federalism” has not been accompanied by the political
and fiscal one. This concerns, in first instance, the period of the
international gold standard in the second half of the 19th century
and the beginning of the 20th century, when most independent
(and sometimes politically antagonistic) countries shared the same
monetary rules and, in fact, remained in a quasi-monetary union
(see Eichengreen, 1998; Cesarano, 2009). 
Summing up, monetary unions between sovereign states or
within relatively loose political federations or confederations are
not a new phenomenon and the EMU is not as unique a historical
case as suggested by some authors. 
For instance, Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung (2011, p. 26) claim
that “The euro area is the first case in the history of monetary unions
where monetary policy-making is centralized under one central bank
while fiscal policy-making is decentralized in the hands of the national
governments of the member states. This institutional framework is new
for economists and policy-makers alike.” 
Somewhat surprisingly, the European Commission (2012, p. 2)
presents a similar opinion: “The EMU is unique among modern mone-
tary unions in that it combines a centralised monetary policy with
decentralised responsibility for most economic policies, albeit subject to
constraints as regards national budgetary policies. Unlike other mone-
tary unions, there is no centralised fiscal policy function and no
centralised fiscal capacity (federal budget)”. Perhaps these are just
examples of “Europe’s centrism” in the perception of economic
history and contemporary experience. 
What may be more important but is rarely explicitly discussed,
the EMU seems to be unique in terms of the depth of its monetary,
financial and trade integration and the sophistication of its finan-
cial sector,5 which makes it different from monetary unions in
Africa and the Caribbean region. Also, the scale of international
capital flows has increased in recent decades as compared to the era
of the international gold standard. 
5. These arguments have been raised by Aizenman (2013). The European Commission (2012)
also makes reference to the negative consequences of the “renationalization” of the financial
sector and the financial market within the EMU as a result of the financial crisis. 
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and contemporary lessons of other monetary integration projects
cannot be ignored and can broaden perspective of the debate on
the future of the EMU. Unfortunately, most of the available
comparative analyses concentrate on comparing the EMU with the
US, sometimes selectively and not always with due attention to the
historical evolution of the US federation. Today’s United States of
America represent a mature and quite centralized form of federa-
tion but it took almost two centuries to get to this stage
(Aizenman, 2013). Looking back, until the 1930s, the US was much
less politically, fiscally and financially centralized.6 
While the comparison of EMU with the US has some merit due
to their similar sizes and development levels, the experiences of
other federal states, sometimes less centralized fiscally than the US
(for example, Canada or Switzerland – see Bordo, Markiewicz and
Jonung, 2011; Wolff, 2012), may broaden the debate on the
perspectives of EU/EMU fiscal integration, not to mention the
experience of monetary unions of sovereign states, which seem to
be the most relevant to this debate but which are largely ignored. 
3. Arguments in favor and against fiscal integration
Even if a monetary union does not necessarily require the exis-
tence of a fiscal union as discussed in Section 2, there may be other
arguments in favor of closer fiscal integration within the EU and
EMU, such as pooling resources to carry out common policies and
provide supranational public goods. This leads us to the theory of
fiscal federalism which helps us understand “which functions and
instruments are best centralized and which are best placed in the sphere
of decentralized levels of government” (Oates, 1999, p.1120). 
Thus, the discussion about the perspective of closer fiscal inte-
gration in Europe should start from a functional analysis aimed at
identifying those policy areas and public goods where the central-
ization of competences and resources could either offer increasing
returns to scale or help address cross-border externalities.7 
6. A comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of the evolution of fiscal federalism in the US
since the Revolutionary War is presented by Henning and Kessler (2012).
7. The examples of such analyses are provided by Berglof et al. (2003) and Wyplosz (2007).
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ized is beyond the agenda of this analysis, we can mention some
policy areas where a transfer of competences and resources to the
European level offers potential benefits. Financial market regula-
tions and supervision, pan-European deposit insurance and crisis
resolution mechanisms in the case of bank failures seem to be the
number one candidates in the sphere of economic policy. And
such an integration has obvious fiscal consequences in terms of the
greater centralization of public resources at the European level. 
Interestingly, the idea of a banking union” has broad support in
the context of the debate on strengthening the Eurozone institu-
tional architecture and is seen as an important measure to save the
common currency (see e.g. Aizenman, 2013; European Commis-
sion, 2012). However, in our opinion, its main rationale relates to
completing the single market of financial services, which will face
a continuous danger of fragmentation and renationalization (espe-
cially in a time of financial distress) as long as regulatory and
supervisory power and crisis resolution resources remain in
national hands. For this reason, the “banking union” should not
be limited to EMU members (the biggest EU financial center, the
City of London, is located outside the Eurozone) and should not
necessarily engage the European Central Bank (ECB) whose juris-
diction is limited to the EMU.8
Some authors (e.g. De Grauwe, 2006; Wolff, 2012) also suggest
conducting supranational countercyclical fiscal policy based on the
findings in fiscal federalism’s literature which tend to assign this
function to the federal level (see Oates, 1999; Begg, 2009; Bordo,
Markiewicz and Jonung, 2011). Leaving aside the discussion on the
effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal measures (especially discre-
tionary ones) in smoothing the business cycle in an open economy
and against various political traps (see Dabrowski, 2012), one may
agree that they have more of a chance to work at the supranational
level than the national level due to collective action problem, the
risk of free riding and cross border “leakages” of demand
(Dabrowski, 2010). On the other hand, it would require building a
much bigger fiscal capacity at the European level (probably in the
8. Another argument against mandating the ECB with the banking supervision task relates to
its potential conflict with the price stability mission (see Cukierman, 1996). 
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tax, social transfers and other expenditure responsibilities. 
Not only is such a far-going fiscal centralization politically
unrealistic in any foreseeable future (also within the EMU), but it
may also be economically dysfunctional. First, it can contradict the
basic principle of fiscal federalism, i.e. assigning responsibilities to
the level of government which can most effectively carry out a
given task. Taking into consideration the internal political,
economic, social and cultural diversity of the EU, the optimal
degree of its fiscal centralization may be lower than other “mature”
and more homogenous federal states. Second, taking into consider-
ation the remaining huge productivity differences across the EU
centralization of social and income policies (one of the most
frequent federal mandates which is often the reason for the
substantial size of federal budgets and their countercyclical
capacity) may lead to the excessive convergence of labor and social
costs and, as a result, make the labor market even more rigid than
it is now. 
For example, Wolff (2012), who supports the idea of moving
part of the countercyclical fiscal policy from the national to the
Eurozone level, including the creation of a Eurozone budget in the
range of 2% of GDP, recognizes the risks associated with building a
single unemployment insurance system within the Eurozone.
Some risks are also seen by Dullien & Fichtner (2013), who strongly
advocate such a common unemployment insurance scheme.
In most historical cases, the countercyclical role of the federal
budget has come as a result of the prior centralization of various
responsibilities: public pension systems, unemployment benefits,
deposit insurance, federal infrastructure projects, and general
public services (which include defense, public order, foreign policy,
public health, education, justice administration, federal taxation,
etc.), rather than building explicitly countercyclical fiscal facilities. 
Interestingly, in the debate on a “Deep and Genuine EMU,” the
political appetite for transferring more responsibilities (and accom-
panying resources) from the national to the Union level seems to
be very limited apart from the idea of a “banking union”.9 Instead
9. Which also raises a lot of resistance at the national level, especially those components
which may involve fiscal redistribution (a European deposit insurance system or single
resolution mechanism). 
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would provide member states with automatic but temporary fiscal
transfers in the case of adverse idiosyncratic shocks (repaid in
“good” times), a kind of a countercyclical insurance mechanism
(Wolff, 2012; European Commission, 2012). 
This is a highly controversial idea10 founded on some doubtful
if not naïve assumptions. The first question is how often EMU
economies experience asymmetric business cycles and suffer from
idiosyncratic supply shocks which, according to the OCA theory
(see Section 2) can provide justification for such transfers.11
Second, if transfers are to be neutral over the medium term as
expected in those proposals it means an implicit assumption of a
perfect regularity and symmetry of business cycles, which is far
from the contemporary reality. Third, it underestimates difficulties
with the ex ante identification of a given phase of the business cycle
and the character of the shock (supply vs. demand, asymmetric vs.
symmetric). Finally, it ignores the political economy and politics of
any such redistribution mechanism which most likely will make
transfers permanent rather than temporary and repayable. 
If we go beyond the economic policy sphere we can find more
cases of potential benefits coming from centralizing decision
making and pooling fiscal resources at the European level. This
may relate to, for example, defense and security policy (see Briani,
2013), the protection of external borders, common consular
services, environmental policy and many others. 
However, the economic rationale for the centralization of
certain new functions will always have to be confronted with polit-
ical considerations such as national sovereignty concerns (Begg,
2009), the interests of the incumbents at the national level12 and a
limited appetite for cross-border fiscal redistribution.13 As a result,
10. See the critique of Gros (2012), who argues that redistribution mechanisms in federal states
such as the US may help decrease income disparities between regions rather than cushion
asymmetric shocks. In his opinion, the US banking union seems to be the most effective
instrument for addressing asymmetric shocks. 
11. Contrary to some popular views, current account imbalances between Eurozone countries
cannot be considered sufficient evidence of idiosyncratic supply shocks.
12. Examples include political reluctance to build European institutions of financial
supervision or the trade unions’ resistance to the creation of European air traffic control
13. Buiter (2013) argues that a similar reluctance to cross-regional redistribution is observed
within national states in Europe, resulting in secessionist tendencies in some of them. 
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iarity enshrined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU). According to this principle, the functions of higher levels of
government should be as limited as possible and should be subsid-
iary to those of lower levels (see Mortensen, 2004). 
It is also worth noticing that not all currently existing common
EU policies necessarily meet the test of optimal assignment of
functions and resources as suggested by the theory of fiscal feder-
alism. This concerns, in first instance, the Common Agriculture
Policy (CAP), which represents a clear case of overregulation
leading to market distortions and resource mismanagement.14 
4. The size of the EU budget and its major components
In spite of some extreme opinions on the total absence of fiscal
integration within the EU/EMU (e.g. Bordo, Markiewicz and
Jonung, 2011 or Aizenman, 2013), there are already several compo-
nents of genuine fiscal union in place, i.e., the EU budget, the
newly created off-budget bailout facilities, the European Invest-
ment Bank (which plays several quasi-fiscal functions), the EU’s
own revenue sources, some harmonization of national indirect
taxes, fiscal rules and their surveillance. Ironically, the quasi-fiscal
operations of the ECB since May 2010 (see Dabrowski, 2012) also
add to the complex picture of fiscal federalism in the Eurozone. 
The size of the EU budget has oscillated around 1% of the EU’s
Gross National Income (GNI) for a long time and its own revenues
are not allowed to exceed 1.23% of the EU’s GNI.15 Its expendi-
tures must be closely matched by revenues. The EU is neither
allowed to borrow nor accumulate budget surpluses (the latter
must be returned to member states). However, in the Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020, there will be a possi-
bility to move unspent money between budget lines to finance
other underfunded commitments in a given fiscal year. 
Some proposals of a countercyclical Eurozone budget include its
capacity to borrow on the financial market (Wolff, 2012).
However, to be accepted by financial markets as a credible
14. See Bureau (2012) on CAP evolution and remaining challenges. 
15. See http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/financing/fin_en.cfm#other
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revenue collection powers (i.e., the right to introduce federal taxes
– see Section 5) or obtain guarantees of national governments (debt
mutualization – see Section 7). 
The EU budget in its current structure is dominated by cross-
country transfer programs such as the CAP, cohesion and struc-
tural funds, and foreign aid, plus the costs of functioning EU
institutions. Financing European public goods such as research or
environmental programs plays a secondary role (see Swidlicki,
Kullmann and Persson, 2012 for a detailed analysis).
This is the result of a strong path dependence, i.e., the impact of
past decisions which, in turn, resulted from the necessity to reach a
compromise on some key integration steps. For example, the
Cohesion Fund was a by-product of negotiations on the Maastricht
Treaty in early 1990s, the price of convincing less economically
advanced member states to back the idea of the EMU and address
their concerns that fiscal discipline required by the Treaty changes
could result in insufficient investment in public capital (see
Mortensen, 2004; OECD, 2007). The adoption of the MMF requires
a unanimous decision by all member states,16 which additionally
narrows the room for any radical changes in the budget size and its
expenditure structure. 
The dominance of cross-country transfers makes net donor
countries additionally reluctant to increase the EU’s budget size,
which was clearly demonstrated during political negotiations on
the MFF for 2014-2020. On the other hand, the net recipient coun-
tries, especially those from Southern and Central and Eastern
Europe, are interested in continuing transfers on the previous or
even increased levels. In some cases, net transfer inflows have
approached 5% of their GDP (Heinen, 2011). 
The above picture has changed with the creation of the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010, which was replaced
16. Formally the MFF is subject to co-decision procedure of the Council (representatives of all
member states) and the European Parliament. Usually the European Parliament is in favor of a
larger EU budget but the effective veto power of each individual member state in the Council
makes its bargaining position weaker. The adoption of an annual EU budget is also subject to co-
decision but requires only a qualified majority in the Council (instead of unanimity as in the
case of MFF), which gives the European Parliament more room to influence the eventual
decision. 
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the sovereign debt crisis in several Eurozone countries. The ESM’s
lending capacity is EUR 500 billion, and the combined lending
ceiling of EFSF/ESM is set at the level of EUR 700 billion (ESM,
2013), i.e., ca. 5 and 7% of Eurozone’s annual GDP respectively.17
The EFSF and ESM have substantially increased the fiscal power of
the EU institutions in respect to EMU countries. 
If one looks for historical comparison, in peace time, the US
federal budget amounted to 2-3% of GDP until the beginning of
the 20th century (Figure 1) and started to grow substantially only
after the Great Depression in the 1930s. However, unlike the EU
budget, it was concentrated on the provision of typical federal
public goods such as general government services and national
defense, with almost no redistribution and transfers. 
17. However, the maximum EFSF/ESM lending capacity cannot be mechanically compared
with the size of EU regular budget because the former represents a one-off stock granted by the
member countries and the latter – regular annual flow. 
Figure 1. US total federal spending as a % of GDP, 1792-2013
Source: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_1792_2013USp_13s1li011mcn_F0f_Spending_
In_20th_Century
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Although formally its “own resources” form 99% of the revenue
of the EU budget,18 only the so-called “traditional own resources”
(i.e. 75% of customs duties on imports from outside the EU and
sugar levies19) can be considered a sort of “federal” taxation. The
two other “own resources”, i.e. from value added tax (VAT) and the
one based on GNI are calculated according to complicated
country-specific formulas. “Other revenue” includes taxes on sala-
ries of EU staff, contributions from non-EU countries to certain
programs, and fines, for example, on companies for breaching EU
competition law. In addition, some net donor member states (the
UK, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, and Austria) enjoy various
kinds of rebates. 
Summing up, most of the EU budget revenue comes from the
financial contribution of member states, an amount that was indi-
vidually negotiated in the process of adopting a MFF (which
requires unanimity of all member states). Any substantial increase
in the size of the EU budget in the future beyond the current range
of 1% of GNI will probably require change in these proportions,
i.e. developing direct revenue sources such as pan-European taxes.
In turn, this will have to increase the role of the European Parlia-
ment (see Section 6). 
At this stage of the debate on the EU/EMU fiscal federalism, it is
difficult to predict which kind of “federal” taxes may emerge in the
future. Most likely, it may be new forms of indirect taxation on
activities having a strong cross-border spillover such as a financial
transaction tax or a carbon tax.20 Interestingly, the proposals for
using the Eurozone budget as an instrument of countercyclical
fiscal policy and accommodating asymmetric shocks discussed in
Section 3 (e.g., Wolff, 2012; European Commission, 2012) assume
the fiscal contribution of member states rather than federal taxes. 
Looking for historical comparison, the US federal government
had very limited tax power (collection of import tariffs and part of
excises – see Henning & Kessler, 2012) until the adoption of the
18. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/financing/fin_en.cfm#other
19. The remaining 25% goes to national budgets to compensate for the cost of collection. 
20. The debate on economic and social rationale of such taxation is beyond the agenda of this
paper. 
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opportunity to introduce federal income taxation. 
The EU acquis communautaire also includes a certain degree of
harmonization of national taxation. This relates to indirect taxes
such as the VAT and excises and involves setting minimum and
maximum rates, rules of adopting reduced rates and exemptions,
principles of taxation in cross-border trade, etc. However, the
purpose of these regulations is the elimination of the Single
Market’s internal barriers rather than the revenue considerations
of the EU budget. 
The same concerns the ongoing debate on the potential harmo-
nization of direct taxation within the EU, especially corporate
income tax (CIT).21 On the one hand, this is an attempt to elimi-
nate cross-border obstacles for businesses and citizens and ensure an
equal playing field across the Single European Market and get rid of
“unfair” or “harmful” tax competition.22 On the other hand, advo-
cates of tax competition among various tax jurisdictions underline
its role in supporting the competitiveness of the entire common
market and putting a disciplining pressure on public finances at the
national and subnational levels (see e.g., Issing, 2013). 
The existing federal states represent various degrees of harmoni-
zation of subnational tax rules – from high (as in Germany) to rather
limited (as in the cases of the US and Canada) (Vaillancourt, 1992). 
6. Institutional setup of the EU/EMU fiscal federalism
As discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 7, the EU/EMU “federal”
prerogatives are shared, in various proportions, among the Euro-
pean Parliament, Council and European Commission. Within the
European Commission, individual commissionaires and director-
ates-general (DGs) deal with various aspects of EU fiscal federalism.
This concerns, among others, DG for Budget (responsibility for EU
budget), DG for Economic and Financial Affairs (surveillance of
member states fiscal policies), DG for Taxation and Custom Union,
and others. 
21. See Zodrow (2003) for an overview of the earlier stage of this debate. 
22. See http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/
index_en.htm
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and policies to the European level, creating more European taxes,
initiating new cross-country transfer programs, etc. would have to
lead to the modification of the current power balance in favor of
the European Parliament, at the cost of national legislatures and
executives, and the Council which represents national govern-
ments. The role of the European Commission would also have to
increase accordingly, however, under the democratic control of the
European Parliament. 
From this point of view, the new names of administrative
bodies as suggested by some authors (e.g., Marzinotto, Sapir, and
Wolff, 2011 who propose creating a Eurozone finance ministry)
have a rather symbolic character. (Currently this role is performed
by the DG for Economic and Financial Affairs). In some cases, these
suggestions disregard the principles of collective responsibility of
the European Commission and the proper balance between EU
executive and legislative bodies. 
7. Fiscal discipline vs. fiscal solidarity in times of distress
Fiscal discipline is very important for currency stability and,
more broadly, financial and macroeconomic stability in any
country/ territorial entity. However, it becomes critically
important within federations, confederations and closely inte-
grated economic blocks due to intensive cross-border spillovers
and contagion, more opportunities to free ride at the cost of neigh-
bors, and the moral hazard problem (expectation of bailout). Thus
fiscal discipline should be considered an important common
public good for the entire EU but even more importantly, within
the EMU due to the obvious negative impact of fiscal imbalances
on currency stability.23 
Fiscal discipline may be ensured by market mechanisms (danger
of sovereign default) and formal fiscal rules (formal constraints), or
a combination of both. In turn, fiscal rules can be divided into
fiscal targets and fiscal procedures, which are either imposed by a
23. Interestingly, the high level of public indebtedness in the EMU (92.9% of GDP in 2012) and
the danger of sovereign default in several EMU member states has not had a negative impact on
euro stability so far (see Dabrowski, 2012). 
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by both (Eyraud and Gomez Sirera, 2013). 
The EU/EMU mechanism of fiscal stability has been based on
both market discipline and fiscal rules. The former was built
around the “no bail out” clause in Art. 125 of the Treaty of the
Table 1. General government net lending/borrowing
In % of GDP
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
EU -0.9 -2.4 -6.8 -6.5 -4.4 -4.2
Eurozone -0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.2 -3.7
Austria -1.0 -1.0 -4.1 -4.5 -2.5 -2.5
Belgium -0.1 -1.1 -5.6 -3.9 -3.9 -4.0
Bulgaria 3.9 2.8 -0.6 -3.7 -1.7 -0.1
Croatia -0.5 0.1 -2.5 -3.2 -3.0 -1.2
Cyprus 3.5 0.9 -6.1 -5.3 -6.3 -6.3
Czech Republic -0.7 -2.2 -5.8 -4.8 -3.3 -4.4
Denmark 4.8 3.3 -2.8 -2.7 -2.0 -4.2
Estonia 2.8 -2.3 -2.0 0.4 1.7 -0.2
Finland 5.3 4.3 -2.7 -2.8 -1.1 -2.3
France -2.8 -3.3 -7.6 -7.1 -5.3 -4.9
Germany 0.2 -0.1 -3.1 -4.2 -0.8 0.1
Greece -6.8 -9.9 -15.6 -10.8 -9.6 -6.3
Hungary -1.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 8.0 2.0
Ireland 0.1 -7.3 -13.8 -30.5 -13.1 -7.6
Italy -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.3 -3.7 -2.9
Latvia 0.9 -7.4 -7.2 -6.5 -2.2 1.3
Lithuania -0.5 -2.8 -8.3 -5.5 -3.7 -1.4
Luxembourg 3.7 3.2 -0.8 -0.9 -0.2 -0.8
Malta -2.3 -4.6 -3.7 -3.6 -2.8 -3.3
Netherlands 0.2 0.5 -5.6 -5.1 -4.4 -4.1
Poland 0.4 -1.5 -4.8 -5.2 -2.3 -1.1
Portugal -3.2 -3.7 -10.2 -9.9 -4.4 -6.4
Romania -2.6 -4.2 -6.2 -5.1 -2.8 -0.7
Slovakia -1.6 -2.0 -8.0 -7.7 -5.1 -4.3
Slovenia 0.3 -0.3 -5.5 -5.4 -5.6 -3.2
Spain 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.6 -10.8
Sweden 3.6 2.2 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7
UK -2.8 -5.0 -11.3 -10.0 -7.8 -7.9
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2013.
Marek Dabrowski38Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the ban on debt
monetization by the ECB (national central banks in the case of
member states which have not yet introduced the euro) – Article
123 of the TFEU. Fiscal rules have been imposed by Article 126 of
the TFEU, the accompanying Protocol No. 12 and the EU’s
secondary legislation, i.e. the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
They include numeric criteria on the maximum fiscal deficit and
debt level (the so-called Maastricht criteria) backed by administra-
tive and financial sanctions for breaching them, i.e., the Excessive
Deficit Procedure (EDP). 
This mechanism proved inefficient as demonstrated by high
deficits and a rapidly growing public debt burden (Tables 1 and 2)
and the danger of insolvency faced by several EMU member states
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, perhaps Slovenia)
since 2010. 
Financial markets have never seemed to take the “no bail out’
clause seriously, as demonstrated by very low yield spreads prior to
the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, in spite of big differences in
the fiscal positions of individual countries.24 And they proved right
because this clause was de facto suspended with the adoption of the
first financial assistance package to Greece and building a tempo-
rary (EFSF) and then permanent (ESM) bailout facility (see
Section 4). Before the first rescue program for Greece, in 2008-2009,
the EU provided the so-called balance-of-payment support to three
non-EMU member states, Hungary, Latvia and Romania. Thus the
“no bail out” principle has been replaced by a policy of conditional
bailout (financial assistance in exchange for a country’s commit-
ment to fiscal adjustments and necessary reforms). 
Fiscal rules imposed by the TFEU and SGP also did not ensure
sufficient fiscal discipline. They were frequently breached (some-
times by a large margin) and no financial sanctions were ever
adopted. Even in the short one-year testing period prior to admis-
sion to the EMU, when each candidate country has to demonstrate
24. There are also other possible interpretations of very low spreads such as ex ante expectations
of fiscal consolidation in countries with higher deficits and debts based on rapidly decreasing
borrowing costs, the potential impact of EU fiscal rules and the impact of a lax US monetary
policy which has led to abundant global liquidity (see Dabrowski, 2012; Issing, 2009). However,
these interpretations do not necessarily contradict the hypothesis on the low credibility of the
“no bail out’ clause. 
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worked. Most EMU candidates missed either the debt or the deficit
criterion, or both, but were nevertheless admitted. This was the
case with Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
Table 2. General government gross public debt
In % of GDP
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
EU 59.3 63.7 74.2 79.9 82.6 86.8
Eurozone 66.5 70.3 80.1 85.7 88.2 93.0
Austria 60.2 63.8 69.2 72.3 72.8 74.1
Belgium 84.0 89.2 95.7 95.6 97.8 99.8
Bulgaria 18.6 15.5 15.6 14.9 15.4 17.6
Croatia 32.9 29.3 35.8 42.6 47.2 53.7
Cyprus 58.8 48.9 58.5 61.3 71.1 85.8
Czech Republic 27.9 28.7 34.2 37.9 41.0 45.9
Denmark 27.1 33.4 40.7 42.7 46.4 45.6
Estonia 3.7 4.5 7.1 6.7 6.0 9.7
Finland 35.2 33.9 43.5 48.7 49.2 53.6
France 64.2 68.2 79.2 82.4 85.8 90.2
Germany 65.4 66.8 74.5 82.4 80.4 81.9
Greece 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.3 156.9
Hungary 67.0 73.0 79.8 81.8 81.4 79.2
Ireland 24.9 44.2 64.4 91.2 104.1 117.4
Italy 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.3 120.8 127.0
Latvia 7.8 17.2 32.9 39.7 37.5 36.4
Lithuania 16.8 15.5 29.5 38.4 39.4 41.2
Luxembourg 6.7 14.4 15.3 19.2 18.3 20.8
Malta 60.7 60.9 66.5 67.3 70.0 71.6
Netherlands 45.3 58.5 60.8 63.4 65.7 71.3
Poland 45.0 47.1 50.9 54.8 56.2 55.6
Portugal 68.4 71.7 83.7 94.0 108.4 123.8
Romania 12.7 13.6 23.8 31.1 34.4 38.2
Slovakia 29.4 27.9 35.6 41.0 43.3 52.1
Slovenia 23.1 22.0 35.1 38.7 46.9 52.8
Spain 36.3 40.2 54.0 61.7 70.4 85.9
Sweden 40.2 38.8 42.6 39.4 38.6 38.3
UK 43.7 51.9 67.1 78.5 84.3 88.8
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2013.
Marek Dabrowski40Not surprisingly, after adopting the euro, member states’ incen-
tives to follow the EU’s fiscal rules became even weaker. As most of
them breached the rules in the early 2000s, including the two
biggest EMU members (France and Germany), no effective enforce-
ment mechanism of the SGP could be expected. Furthermore, the
coalition of “bad boys” led to a substantial softening of GDP in
2005 by adding several exemptions which could justify non-
compliance with the TFEU and SGP. 
The same kind of coalition (and political economy mechanism
behind it) seems to continue after the 2008/2009 global financial
crisis, despite the serious reinforcement and strengthening of
formal fiscal rules, especially within the EMU. The latter concerns
both the “preventive” and “corrective” arms of the SGP (which
now include automatic and meaningful sanctions) and other EU
secondary legislation which obliges EU member states towards
enhancing their national fiscal rules and institutions either
through constitutional changes or equivalent legislation. The new
fiscal rules are backed by the new intergovernmental Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the reformed fiscal rules in
practice remains unclear. The SGP provisions continue to contain
numerous exemptions and ambiguities related, in first instance, to
the ex-ante estimation of potential output and other characteristics
of the business cycle. In addition, most of the EU and EMU
member states continue to be subject to the EDP,25 which makes
them reluctant to impose peer pressure on other “brothers in
trouble.” As a result, the Commission’s deadlines to bring coun-
tries’ fiscal positions back under the TFEU and SGP targets are
frequently postponed and no financial sanctions have been
adopted yet. 
Summing up, the EU and EMU have moved definitively from a
“no bail out” principle to a conditional bail out policy with a
parallel attempt to strengthen formal fiscal rules of disputable effi-
ciency (Figure 2). 
25. 15 member states in mid-2013. Between 2009 and 2012 this number frequently
exceeded 20. 
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Eurozone’s fiscal union seems to go even further in this direction.
The European Commission (2012) suggests the creation of a Euro-
pean Redemption Fund, an idea originally developed by the
German Council of Economic Advisors, which means a step
further towards a conditional bailout policy as compared to the
current solutions. On the other hand, the European Commission
(2012) would like to further increase its prerogatives to monitor
national budgets, including some kind of veto power in respect to
national budget decisions.26 This would make EU fiscal rules
increasingly intrusive and rather incompatible with the dominant
political and legal architecture of the EU (a sort of limited federa-
tion or confederation).27 
Some authors suggest even more, i.e., moving from conditional
towards unconditional fiscal and monetary bailout policies. Their
two main proposals are: debt mutualization and creation of a
lender of last resort (LOLR) facility for governments. 
Debt mutualization should be achieved by issuing Eurobonds,
which would be jointly guaranteed by EMU members. The first
Figure 2. Evolution of fiscal arrangements within the EU/EMU
Source: Author’s own analysis.
26. Since 2011 the procedure of the European Semester has been in place, which is a kind of
“soft” coordination and monitoring mechanism of the economic and fiscal policies of EU
member states (discussion of draft national budgets and accompanying economic policy
assumptions). 
27. Referring to Eyraud and Gomez Sirera’s (2013) classification of arrangements aimed at
constraining fiscal policy’s room for maneuver of sub-federal entities, this would mean moving
from the fiscal rules imposed by the center (the current regime) to direct controls by the center. 
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Marek Dabrowski42time this proposal was analyzed publically soon after launching
the euro in Giovannini et al. (2000) report. The main concern at
that time was the creation of an integrated and liquid financial
market within the Eurozone. The idea came back at the end of
2000s and early 2010s, in the context of the global and European
financial crisis, this time with a clear intention to help countries in
trouble. Some of those proposals can still be considered a form of
conditional bailout, e.g., the Blue Bond proposal of Delpla & von
Weizsaecker (2010). Others represent either an unconditional
bailout or a bailout with very weak conditionality (see e.g., Soros,
2012; De Grauwe, 2013). 
The LOLR proposal calls for the unlimited and unconditional
commitment of the ECB to purchase debt instruments issued by
Eurozone governments in case of market distress (see e.g. Bofinger
and Soros, 2011; Layard, 2012). 
Both proposals have been justified on the grounds of arresting
the irrational behavior of financial markets, avoiding cross-
country contagion, and helping governments that are temporary
illiquid but fundamentally solvent survive. Unfortunately,
assumptions and intentions behind those proposals are often
naïve (as they tend to overestimate the fiscal sustainability of some
Eurozone countries), difficult to operationalize in practice (distin-
guishing illiquidity from insolvency28), and largely ignore the
moral hazard problem. In addition, the idea of the LOLR to govern-
ments is deeply flawed and based on dubious theoretical
foundations. It confuses, intentionally or unintentionally, the
governments with commercial banks (Dabrowski, 2012). If taken
seriously it means abandoning central bank independence which
has been considered as a basic institutional guarantee of price
stability in the world of fiat currencies. 
Unfortunately this part of the debate on the EU/EMU fiscal feder-
alism either ignores or wrongly interprets other countries’ lessons,
including those of the US. The US federal authorities have not
bailed out any state since the 1840s and this has created one of the
strongest incentives for states to adopt their own guarantees of fiscal
28. Greece is an extreme case which received its first aid package in May 2010 on the
assumption it was illiquid but solvent. Soon this assumption had to be revised, leading to
sovereign debt restructuring in 2012. 
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disciplining rules in their constitutions and secondary legislations
but none of them has been imposed by the federal government.
Similarly, counties and municipalities cannot expect a bailout from
either the state or federal government. Thus the danger of default
serves as the strongest incentive to put state and municipal finances
in order (Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung, 2011; Henning and
Kessler, 2012). The similar “no bail out” practice governs the Cana-
dian federation (Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung, 2011). 
On the other hand, those federal states which failed to ensure
the fiscal discipline of their subnational governments and
provided them with bailouts (such as the examples of Argentina
and Brazil discussed in the analysis of Bordo, Markiewiczand
Jonung, 2011) have suffered serious fiscal and monetary stability
problems at the federal level. 
Some advocates of Eurobonds (e.g. De Grauwe, 2013) refer to
the early US experience in 1790, when the then-US Secretary of the
Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, convinced Congress to pool state
debt from the time of the Revolutionary War and assume federal
responsibility for its redemption (matched by the assignment of
import duties and part of excise taxes on alcohol to the federal
budget), which led to building the foundation of fiscal federalism
in the US. Yet this comparison is flawed as correctly pointed out by
Gros (2010) because there is a large political difference between
pooling responsibility for debt accrued during the common war on
independence (the case of US) and the debt accumulated as a result
of imprudent national fiscal policies and excessive welfare states in
peace time (the case of the European debt crisis). 
8. Conclusions
The European debt and financial crisis in the early 2010s trig-
gered a debate on the lacking components of the EU and EMU
integration architecture. The frequently expressed opinion is that
the very existence of a CCA requires a more advanced stage of fiscal
and political integration between their members. Consequently,
the sustainability of the common currency depends on how
quickly progress in this area can be accomplished. 
Marek Dabrowski44However, an analysis of both historical and contemporary expe-
riences with monetary unions, especially those initiated by
sovereign states, gives a more nuanced picture. In some cases, inte-
gration has been limited to the adoption of a common currency/
common monetary standard and has not been followed by fiscal
and political integration. Despite this deficit, monetary union can
work successfully for several decades. Also the OCA theory does
not provide an unquestionable argument in favor of the necessity
to complement monetary integration with the centralization of
fiscal resources. Thus the question of how much fiscal and political
integration is needed to save the Euro project requires further
discussion based on a more fact-based comparative analysis and a
less emotional approach. 
On the other hand, the current integration architecture of the
EU/ EMU already contains several elements of fiscal union, for
example, the EU budget and off-budget bailout facilities, the EU’s
own revenue sources, harmonization of indirect taxes at the
national level, substantial cross-country transfers, and fiscal rules
and their surveillance. Furthermore, in several important policy
areas such as financial supervision, defense, security, border
protection, foreign policy, environmental protection, and climate
change, the centralization of tasks and resources at the Union level
could offer increasing returns to scale and a better chance of
addressing pan-European externalities. These are not necessarily
related to a common currency and, in most cases, the potential
benefits of further integration will not be limited to the Eurozone
but will cover the entire EU. Thus the debate on fiscal and political
union cannot be limited to EMU members. 
Ideally, reforming European fiscal federalism should involve all
EU member states and should use the community method rather
than concluding new intergovernmental agreements formally
outside the EU (the latter leads to decreasing transparency and
effectiveness of EU governance). 
A functional analysis based on the theory of fiscal federalism can
provide a useful tool in the exact specification of those policy areas,
which are the best candidates for integration at the EU/EMU level.
However, in each case, the economic rationale of potential centraliza-
tion must be confronted with political constraints and the principle
of subsidiarity, the basic constitutional rule governing the EU. 
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tional level, this would have to lead to a larger EU budget,
exceeding the current level of ca. 1% of EU’s GNI. If this happens,
it will have an impact on revenue sources and the decision making
process. More fiscal centralization will require the introduction of
European taxes, and the increasing political power of the European
Parliament, at the cost of individual member states, whose veto
power in EU budget process will have to be reduced. 
Harmonization of national taxation is a separate issue related to
the Single European Market rules rather than EU budget and fiscal
power of EU governing bodies. Here the attempt to create an equal
playing field for business activity and eliminate cross-border
barriers must be balanced against the rationale of tax and regula-
tory competition between member states. 
However, regardless of how far the future process of fiscal inte-
gration within the EU and EMU will progress, it must be based on
sound foundations of fiscal discipline at all government levels. As
national budgets play and, most likely, will continue playing the
most important role in the entire EU budget system, ensuring
prudent national fiscal management seems to be the number one
challenge, especially in the context of the sovereign debt crisis
experienced by several member states. 
Historical experience demonstrates that market discipline, i.e.,
the danger of sovereign default, supplemented by clear and consis-
tently enforced fiscal rules, is the best solution to this problem.
And this was the founding principle of the EMU at the time of the
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. Unfortunately, it was changed
in 2010 when the “no bail out” principle was replaced by condi-
tional financial assistance to countries in fiscal troubles,
accompanied by building a permanent bail out facility within the
EMU. This was the result of giving in to financial market pressure
and fear of sovereign default and the resulting financial contagion,
including the potential disintegration of the Eurozone. The latter
proved unjustified: the de facto default of Greece in the spring of
2012 did not result in its exit from the CCA.29 
29. Similarly, the default of Detroit in July 2013 did lead to exit of this city from the US dollar
monetary area. 
Marek Dabrowski46The parallel effort to strengthen the fiscal rules imposed by the
EU secondary legislation and the new intergovernmental Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union cannot compensate for a weakening market disci-
pline, especially since national policymakers are not enthusiastic
to internalize those rules in practice. As far as most member states,
including the largest ones, experience problems with meeting the
TFEU and SGP fiscal targets, the peer pressure mechanism assumed
in the SGP and surveillance procedures (including the European
Semester) will not work effectively. 
Unfortunately, several proposals floated in the name of
building “genuine” economic and monetary union with a strong
fiscal component (such as Eurobonds, LOLR or centralizing Euro-
zone funds and providing member countries with temporary fiscal
transfers) could lead to weakening market discipline even further.
And they could not be compensated by even more intrusive
control of national budgets by the European Commission or other
EU governing bodies as suggested in some proposals. 
If implemented, such proposals will lead to building a dysfunc-
tional fiscal union which encourages moral hazard behavior by
both national authorities and financial markets. Economic history
provides us with numerous examples of dysfunctional fiscal feder-
alism, which resulted in deep fiscal imbalances on the federal level
and currency instability. These are the lessons which must be taken
very seriously in the debate on the future of European integration,
especially its fiscal component. 
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REDEMPTION?1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE
The economic crisis which started in 2008 led to a strong rise in public debts.
The sovereign debt crisis in euro area southern countries broke the unity of the
euro area and weakened the “single currency” concept. The paper shows that
this situation is not due to a lack of fiscal discipline in Europe, but to drifts in
financial capitalism and to an inappropriately designed euro area economic
policy framework. Public debts homogeneity needs to be resettled in Europe.
European public debts should become safe assets again, and should not be
subject to financial markets’ assessment. EU Member States should not be
requested to pay for past sins through austerity measures, and should not
strengthen fiscal discipline through rules lacking economic rationale. The paper
deals with recent proposals made to improve euro area governance (redemption
fund, European Treasury, eurobonds, public debt guarantee by the ECB). The
paper advocates for a full guarantee of government bonds for the Member States
who commit to an economic policy coordination process, which should target
GDP growth and coordinated reduction of imbalances. 
Keywords: EU fiscal policy, EU governance. 
The 2008 crisis led to a strong rise in public debts, by around
30 percentage points of GDP in terms of Maastricht debt for the
euro area, 50 percentage points for the UK, 45 for the US, 60 for
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Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak52Japan (Table 1). At the end of 2013, almost all euro area countries
will run higher than 60% of GDP public debts. This is also the case
for the UK, Japan, and the US.
There is no specificity in the euro area as a whole. However,
public debts rose very strongly in some countries: Ireland (by
100 percentage points), Greece (by 70 percentage points), Portugal
and Spain (by 55 percentage points). 
Over the crisis, monetary policies have become strongly expan-
sionary, with central banks’ interest rates having been cut down to
almost 0. In view of the depth of the recession, markets expect
interest rates to remain durably low, and hence long-term interest
rates have fallen (Figure 1). Thus, the 10-year government bond
rate decreased from 4.6% in 2007 to 1.8% in 2012 in the US, from
5% to 1.9% in the UK, from 1.7% to 0.8% in Japan, despite the rise
in public deficits and debts. In the euro area, interest rates fell also
in Germany (from 4.2% to 1.5%), in France (from 4.3% to 2.6%),
but financial markets fearing or betting against sovereign debt
default in Southern economies requested exorbitant interest rates,
Table 1. Public debts in 2007 and 2013
% of GDP
Gross debt, Maastricht definition Net debt
2007 2013 2007 2013
Germany 65 80 43 49
France 64 95 36 73
Italy 103 133 91 117
Spain 36 95 18 67
Netherlands 45 75 27 45
Belgium 84 100 73 83
Austria 60 75 31 51
Greece 107 176 86 123
Portugal 68 128 50 90
Finland 35 58 -73 -52
Ireland 25 124 0 89
Euro area 66 95 43 68
United Kingdom 44 94 26 74
United States 64 105 44 82
Japan 183 243 81 144
Sources: European Commission DG-ECFIN, AMECO, autumn 2013; OECD, Economic Outlook, December 2013.
Redemption? 53i.e. on average in 2012: 5.5% for Italy, 5.9% for Spain, 6.3% for
Ireland, 11% for Portugal, 22.9% for Greece. Markets are self-
fulfilling; these requested interest rates weighing on public
finances stability and economic growth. They break the unity of
the euro area, and destroy the “single currency” notion: a Spanish
company cannot borrow at the same rate as a French one. The
interest rates that European countries have to pay are now condi-
tional to financial markets fears or speculation.
Should States pay back their past sins by a redemption period?
How to re-establish public debt homogeneity within the euro area?
Should States aim to bring debts back to their pre-crisis levels? How
to stop the rise in public debts? The answers to these questions
depend on the diagnosis made on the roots of the crisis: is the crisis
due to a general lack of fiscal discipline, to drifts in financial capi-
talism or to a euro area inappropriate framework? Section 1
criticises the lack of fiscal discipline diagnosis. Section 2 deals with
the drawbacks of the euro area framework. Section 3 discusses the
reforms introduced since the beginning of the crisis: Fiscal Pact,
European Semester, ESM, OMT, consolidation strategy. Section 4
deals with the different recent proposals made with a view to bring
the debt crisis in euro area countries to an end: more federalism, a
Figure 1. 10-year government interest rates
In %
Source: Financial markets, Datastream.
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Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak54European redemption fund, a European Treasury, eurobonds,
public debt guarantees by the ECB. It is difficult, not to say impos-
sible, to have simultaneously solidarity and autonomy. We
advocate for a full guarantee of government bonds for the MS who
commit to an economic policy coordination process, which should
target GDP growth and coordinated reduction of imbalances.
1. A lack of fiscal discipline? 
In order to assess public finance management before the crisis,
one must go back to 2007. According to the OECD assessment
released in the June 2008 Economic Outlook, the euro area output
gap was nil in 2007; most euro area countries were close to poten-
tial output. Euro area inflation was stable at 2.1% per annum; the
euro area unemployment rate had come down to 7.4%. In autumn
2012, the OECD revised its assessment: the euro area was now
considered to have been running at over full capacity in 2007 with
a positive output gap of 3.3%. But in 2007, there was no element
on which such an assessment could be based; there was no sign of
such imbalances.
Table 2 shows that in 2007, most Member States (MS) were
running a primary government surplus, i.e. a 1.9% of GDP surplus
for the area as a whole. France and Portugal were the only coun-
tries running a primary balance slightly below the level requested
to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio. The euro area primary balance
stood 1.8 percentage point above this level. In fact, some countries
like Spain, Ireland, and even more Greece benefited from very low
interest rates as compared to their robust GDP growth. Their public
debts were stable, but this was fragile, because it was relying on the
spread between interest rates and GDP growth. The crisis led to a
strong and rapid deterioration in government balances, but this
deterioration results from the fall in output. Current public deficits
do not reflect pre-crisis structural fiscal imbalances. 
In 2012, the depth of the recession made it difficult to estimate
potential output growth, if this concept makes any sense, and
hence to assess structural government balance levels. According to
the EC estimates, euro area potential output growth would be 0.5%
only per year in 2012-13 and the euro area output gap would be
-2.3%. All countries except Germany still have to make fiscal
Redemption? 55efforts in order to meet the objective of structural budgets in
balance (Table 3). According to us, under the assumption that the
financial crisis did not affect potential growth, the output gap is
around -11 percentage points of GDP; the objective should be to
run a primary structural budget in balance, which will be sufficient
to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio, if the interest rate equals (or is
lower than) the nominal GDP growth rate. Under the assumption
that countries will be able to recover half of the output loss due to
the crisis (Table 3, column 4), only Spain and Ireland need to make
budgetary efforts, while most MS (Germany, Italy, Greece) run
excessive structural balance surpluses. The priority is to recover the
output lost since the beginning of the crisis. Euro area countries are
in a better fiscal position than the US and Japan. The euro area
does not suffer from past insufficient fiscal discipline. The roots of
the crisis lie in the drift in the wage/profit shares in value added
and in the rise in inequalities which have led some MS to increase
government deficits to support output. Deficits have risen since
Table 2. Public debt stability in 2007
 
Government 
balance,
% of GDP
Primary 
government 
balance, 
% of GDP
Net debt, 
% of GDP
Real interest 
rate less trend 
GDP growth, 
Percentage 
point
Stability gap, 
Percentage 
point
Germany 0.2 2.7 42.5 2.0 1.8
France -2.7 -0.2 35.7 0.3 -0.3
Italy -1.6 3.1 87.1 0.9 2.3
Spain 1.9 3.0 17.7 -2.5 3.4
Netherlands  0.2 1.8 27.8  0.2 1.7
Belgium -0.1 3.6 73.1 0.0 3.6
Austria -1.0 1.0 31.4 0.1 1.0
Greece -6.8 -2.3 82.4 -2.8 0.0
Portugal -3.2 -0.6 49.7 0.5 -0.9
Finland  5.3 4.7 -72.6 0.1 4.8
Ireland  0.1 0.7 -0.3 -4.0 0.7
Euro area -0.7 1.9 40.1 0.3 1.8
United Kingdom -2.8 -0.8 28.3 -0.3 -0.7
United States -2.9 -1.0 48.0 -0.6 -0.7
Japan -2.1 -2.1 80.5  0.9 -2.2
Explanatory note: the stability gap is measured as the difference between the primary government balance and the
balance required to stabilise debt (net debt*long-term interest rate corrected from trend growth). 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, 2008/1 and 2012/2, authors’ calculations.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak562008 because of the magnitude of the crisis and of the inappro-
priate euro area economic policy framework.
A single monetary policy for countries where GDP growth rates
and inflation rates structurally differ inevitably generates imbal-
ances. Before the crisis, disparities had been growing in the euro
area between two groups of countries implementing unsustainable
macroeconomic strategies: Northern countries (Germany, Austria,
and the Netherlands) implemented neo-mercantilist strategies
which allowed them to accumulate competitiveness gains and
large current surpluses, while Southern economies were accumu-
lating large current account deficits due to robust growth strategies
boosted by negative real interest rates (Deroose et al., 2004;
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2007). The economic policy framework of
the Maastricht Treaty was unable to prevent the rise in imbalances
which became unsustainable when the crisis burst.
In 2007, several euro area countries were running large current
account surpluses (Table 4): The Netherlands (8.1% of GDP),
Table 3. Government balances in 2012
% of GDP
Gov. balance* Structural balance* (EC)
Primary 
balance*
Structural pri-
mary balance**
Germany 0.1 0.1 1.9 3.0
France -4.8 -3.6 -2.4 0.0
Italy -2.9 -1.3 2.3 5.3
Spain -8.0 -6.0 -4.5 -0.7
Netherlands -4.0 -2.7 -2.8 0.1
Belgium -3.4 -2.7 0.3 2.0
Austria -2.5 -2.4 -0.8 1.0
Portugal -6.5 -4.8 -2.4 0.9
Finland -2.2 -0.8 -1.5 2.5
Ireland -8.1 -7.6 -5.2 -1.2
Greece -7.0 -1.2 -2.1 5.6
Euro area -3.4 -2.3 -0.7 2.1
United Kingdom -8.6 -4.7 -5.8 -2.6
United States -9.3 -7.4 -5.6
Japan -9.5 -8.6 -6.7
*Corrected for one-off measures.
**Authors’ estimates. Assumption: Countries will be able to recover half of the output loss due to the crisis.
Source: European Commission, Winter Forecasts, European Economy, February 2013.
Redemption? 57Germany (7.9%), Finland (4.9%), Belgium (3.5%), and Austria
(3.3%), while other countries were running large deficits: Portugal
(8.5% of GDP), Spain (9.6%), and Greece (12.5%). The 230 billion
euros surplus in Northern economies initiated and financed the
180 billion euros deficit in Mediterranean countries. There is a rela-
tionship in the euro area, between one the one hand “Germany-
Netherlands-Austria” and on the other hand “Spain-Portugal-
Greece” which is similar with the “United States” versus “China”
relationship at the world level and involves similar unsustain-
ability. It raises the same question: how to convince “virtuous”
countries to spend more and increase their real exchange rates so
that “sinner” countries can reduce their external deficits without
depressing domestic output? The financial crisis put the debt accu-
mulation process to an end. 
2. The euro area drawbacks
The single currency suffers from seven original sins, which are
difficult to correct:
Table 4. Current account balances in 2007
 Billion euros % of GDP
Luxembourg 3.8 10.1
Netherlands 48.6 8.1
Germany 192.1 7.9
Finland 7.3 4.9
Belgium 12.8 3.5
Austria 9.1 3.3
Denmark 1.6 0.7
Italy -27.7 -1.7
France -43.0 -2.2
Slovenia -1.6 -4.6
Slovakia -2.8 -4.7
Ireland -10.1 -5.3
Portugal -16.0 -8.5
Spain -105.1 -9.6
Greece -33.4 -12.5
Total 39.4 0.4
Source: IMF.
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currency between countries with different economic situa-
tions and independent economic policies. The single
currency entails introducing precise, well-defined and
binding constraints, solidarity mechanisms or economic
policy coordination. How to prevent otherwise the emer-
gence and persistence of imbalances between some countries
running large external deficits and some others running
large surpluses? How to handle such situations?
— These mechanisms cannot consist in rigid numerical rules
enshrined in a Treaty (such as: public deficits should not
exceed 3% of GDP, public debts should not exceed 60% of
GDP, structural government budgets in balance in the
medium-term). These mechanisms must be both soft (the
objectives should be agreed between countries accounting
for the current economic context) and binding (everyone
must comply with decisions agreed in common). But how
may governments with necessarily different interests and
analyses reach agreement on economic policy strategies?
How to convince a country to change its economic policy in
order to meet common rules? 
— The rules of the game should have been set by clearly consid-
ering all possibilities of symmetric or specific shocks,
accounting for different objectives. What should be done if a
country wishes to build current account surpluses? What
should be done after a common or a specific shock? How to
define the nature of the shock? But no such rules were settled
and it is difficult for rules to fit all situations. For instance, no
one could imagine in 1997 a situation where monetary
policy would not be able to cut nominal interest rates, where
public debts would have risen due to banking rescue pack-
ages, etc. 
— On the one hand, there cannot be unconditional solidarity
between countries with different social and economic
systems. For example, Northern countries may refuse to
support Southern countries, blaming them for not having
undertaken the necessary structural reforms, for having let
imbalances grow and for being unable to meet their commit-
Redemption? 59ments. On the other hand, such solidarity is a prerequisite
for the single currency to be guaranteed. 
— According to the EU Constitution, the ECB is not entitled to
finance directly governments (Article 123, TFEU); financial
solidarity between MS is forbidden (Article 125, TFEU). Thus,
each MS has to borrow on financial markets without any
guaranteed support from a central bank acting as a “lender of
last resort”. This raises the risk that some MS may not be able
to fulfil their commitments and may default. MS public debt
is no longer a safe asset. Financial markets started to realise
this from mid-2009. After the experience of the Greek
default, they requested unsustainable interest rates to coun-
tries in difficulty, which increased further their difficulties.
— Euro area MS are now under financial markets’ judgement
and they do not control anymore their interest rates unlike
Anglo-Saxon countries or Japan. But financial markets have
no macroeconomic expertise, they are – and know that they
are – self-fulfilling. However, Northern countries refuse a
collective guarantee of MS public debts. They consider that
the discipline imposed by financial markets is necessary. But
disparity among interest rates is arbitrary and costly. In the
long term, for instance, a country like Italy, with a 2
percentage points interest rates spread with France, would
pay financial markets a premium of around 2.4% of GDP as a
guarantee to an alleged default risk. 
— The 2007-2009 crisis is a deep crisis of financial capitalism,
which would have requested a strong policy response from
governments to reduce the weight of finance and the reli-
ance on public and private debts, to implement a
macroeconomic strategy aiming at full employment (see
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2009). But European authorities
have denied any questioning of the pre-crisis strategy. This
strategy is based on three postulates: the power of national
governments should be reduced and handed over to Euro-
pean authorities; fiscal policies should be paralysed; growth
should be sought through liberal structural reforms. This
strategy has not delivered so far: the euro area remains in
depression. 
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The EC strategy has consisted so far in four pillars:
1) Strengthening fiscal discipline
The Commission persists in saying that the functioning of
single currency requires structurally budgetary positions in
balance. On 29 September 2010, the Commission released a set of
six directives (the Six-Pack) aiming at “strengthening economic
governance”, in other words the SGP fulfilment, without ques-
tioning the relevance of the latter. The Six-Pack contents were
involved in the Fiscal Pact, ratified on 2 March 2012. 
This Pact is a new step forward from liberal views against
Keynesian economic policies and from EU authorities against
domestic fiscal policies. Article 3.1 states that: “The budgetary posi-
tion of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.
This rule shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural
balance of the general government is lower than 0.5% of GDP. The
MS shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective
medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will
be proposed by the Commission […]. The MS may temporarily
deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path
towards it only in exceptional circumstances. A correction mecha-
nism shall be triggered automatically in the event of substantial
deviations from the adjustment path. The mechanism shall
include the obligation to implement measures to correct the devia-
tions over a defined period of time”.
Thus, running budgetary positions close to balance is
enshrined in the Pact although it has no economic rationale. The
true “golden rule of public finances” justifies on the contrary that
public investment is financed through borrowing, since invest-
ment expenditure will be used over many years. Besides,
households, insurance companies, financial institutions wish to
own public debt. If the desired public debt stands at around 80%
of GDP and if nominal GDP grows by around 3.5% per annum (i.e.
by 1.75% in volume and 1.75% in prices), it is justified to run a
public deficit of around 2.8% of GDP. Besides, a public deficit is
necessary when it allows reaching a satisfactory demand level
leading to the highest output level not accelerating inflation, at a
real interest rate close to GDP growth. There is no guarantee that
Redemption? 61running a government budget in balance is optimal. Since coun-
tries do not control anymore interest rates and exchange rates,
they need degrees of freedom in the conduct of their fiscal policy. 
The Pact requests MS to converge rapidly towards this objec-
tive, at a pace defined by the Commission, without accounting for
the cyclical context. A temporary deviation would be allowed in
case of exceptional circumstances, if “the deviation from the refer-
ence value results from a negative growth rate or from a cumulated
fall in output over a prolonged weak period of growth as compared
to the potential growth rate” but corrective measures should be
taken rapidly. The Commission refuses to recognise that most euro
area countries have been in such a situation since 2009, and
persists to require the implementation of policies intended to cut
rapidly deficits. 
The Pact is based on the structural deficit notion, i.e.: “deficit
corrected from the cyclical component, excluding one-off and
temporary measures”. But measuring such a deficit is problematic,
especially in the event of strong macroeconomic shocks. In prac-
tice the estimates and methods of the Commission will have to be
used. But they have two drawbacks. First, these estimates are
always close to observed output, since the methods used consider
as structural the fall in capital resulting from the investment fall
during the crisis: this underestimates the cyclical deficit and will
impose pro-cyclical policies. This will oblige MS to implement pro-
cyclical policies, as we could observe since 2010.
Second, the estimates vary strongly over time. Hence, potential
output estimates for 2006 were revised substantially downwards in
2008. In spring 2007, the Commission estimated that there was a
negative output gap of 1% in France in 2006, i.e. the French
economy was operating at below its potential. France had not yet
reached back its potential output level since the 2002-2005 slow-
down. Estimated potential growth for 2008 was 2.3%. In autumn
2011, the Commission considered that France had in 2006 a
significantly positive output gap of 2.3% and that potential growth
in 2008 was 1.6%. The French economy was therefore at a peak of
activity. The potential output level estimate for 2006 was revised
downwards by 3.3%. For 2012, what is the French output gap? The
Commission (spring 2013) estimates it at -2.8%, implying that, due
to the crisis, the French potential growth rate decreased from 2% to
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did not affect potential growth, then the output gap is -8%. With
the Commission's estimates, the French structural government
deficit is 3.1% of GDP in 2012 and therefore France should pursue
at least four years of budgetary efforts of around 0.75% of GDP per
annum. These efforts will weigh on GDP growth and the 1.2%
potential growth estimate will probably be validated. With an
output gap estimate of -8%, the structural deficit is only 0.5% of
GDP, well below the 2.4% of the “true golden rule”; clearly, the
objective today should be to support output so that it reaches its
potential level.
According to paragraph 3d, the structural deficit target can be
lowered to 1% if debt stands below 60% of GDP. Let us consider a
country with GDP growing by 2% per year and inflation rising by
2% per year. If this country runs permanently a 1% of GDP deficit,
its debt will come down to 25% of GDP. But nothing guarantees
that the macroeconomic equilibrium may be ensured with a priori
set values: government debt = 25% of GDP; deficit = 1% of GDP. 
According to article 3.2, MS should introduce in their constitu-
tion the balanced budget rule and an automatic correction
mechanism if the public balance deviates from its target, or, if this
cannot be done, a binding and permanent correction mechanism.
The correction mechanism must be based on principles proposed
by the Commission. Thus, unenforceable, vague and lacking
economic rationale rules would have to be enshrined in the
Constitution. 
MS will have to set up independent institutions in charge of
verifying that the balanced budget rule and the adjustment trajec-
tory path are met. This is one more step towards full technocratic
management of fiscal policy. Will these independent institutions
be entitled to question the fiscal rule or the adjustment path if they
do not match the cyclical needs of the economy? 
Article 4 repeats the rule according to which public debts
should come down below 60% of GDP. This rule was already part
of the SGP, but the Commission could not impose it. Thus, a
country running a higher than 60% of GDP debt ratio will have to
reduce this ratio by at least one twentieth of the gap with 60% each
year. This rule assumes that a 60% of GDP ratio is optimal for and
Redemption? 63can be reached by all countries. But in Europe, countries like Italy
or Belgium have run for a long time public debts of 100% of GDP
(without mentioning Japan where it has reached 200% of GDP),
without imbalances because these debts correspond to high
domestic households savings (see also Box 1). However, for a
country with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90% and a nominal growth of
3% this implies that the public deficit is less than 1.115% of GDP.
Hence this does not introduce additional constraints in the
medium-term as compared to the balanced budget target. 
Box 1.  A Keynesian perspective
From a Keynesian perspective, a certain level of debt and deficit are
necessary to ensure that demand equals potential output. 
If y = g + d + cy –σr + kh, with y, GDP, g public deficit, d, private
demand, r, real interest rate, h, public debt, full stabilisation implies
that in the short-run: g = –d + σr 
If this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, there is no
link ex post between the deficit and the output gap. Let us note also that,
in this case, g, government borrowing, is considered as structural
according to the OECD or the EC methods, which makes no sense. 
In the long run, g = 0 and h = –(d – σr)/k 
The long-term public debt level is not arbitrary, but depends on
private agents’ wishes: debt must equal desired debt at the optimal
interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the growth rate. 
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like: g = g° –λ y – μ(h – h)
cannot be proposed, since it would not allow for full stabilisation and
since the government cannot set a debt target regardless of private
agents’ saving behaviour. 
According to article 5, a country under an EDP will have to
submit its budget and its structural reform programmes for
approval to the Commission and the Council who will also exert
surveillance on their implementation. This article is a new weapon
to impose liberal reforms to MS populations. A country under an
EDP has to follow the expected adjustment path for its nominal
deficit. Therefore it has to implement all the more restrictive poli-
cies than domestic growth is low.
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matically adopted unless there is a qualified majority against them,
the country concerned not voting. Thus, in practice, the Commis-
sion will always have the last word. 
The Treaty does not introduce effective economic policy coordi-
nation, i.e. an economic strategy using monetary, tax, fiscal and
wage policies to reduce economic imbalances in the MS and to
come closer to full employment.
The Pact obliges MS to run quasi-automatic fiscal policies,
prohibiting any discretionary fiscal policy. But the latter are needed
to reach full stabilisation. Let us assume that the tax rate is 50% and
that the propensity to spend is 1; then the multiplier equals 2. If
private spending falls by 10 ex ante, GDP will fall by 20 and the
public deficit will rise by 10 without active fiscal policy response.
An active expansionary policy, which increases public spending by
10, leads to the same public deficit, but prevents the output fall.
This is prohibited by the Pact, which is based on an implicit but
wrong theory: automatic stabilisers must play, but discretionary
fiscal policies to support growth should be prohibited. 
According to the Pact, each country should run restrictive
measures without accounting for the domestic economic situation
and policies in the other MS. The Pact assumes implicitly that the
Keynesian multiplier is zero, that restrictive policies have no
impact on GDP. If we consider the situation in early 2013, this
implies that all countries should run austerity policies even if their
public deficits are due to insufficient output levels following the
burst of the financial bubble. Also, the Pact may impose austerity
policies in Europe for a long time, which will impede euro area
growth and will increase imbalances in the most vulnerable MS. 
The Commission has been pursuing its efforts to control
domestic policies, and has been trying since November 2011 to
have two new directives adopted (the Two-Pack). According to the
first one, the Commission would be entitled to criticise euro area
MS budgets before they are passed by the Parliament, and could
publicly ask for budget amendments. Fiscal policies’ supervision
will be permanent for MS under an EDP. Countries could be
requested to introduce Independent Budget Committees; budgets
should be based on independent macroeconomic forecasts.
Redemption? 65According to the second directive, the Commission will be entitled
to put a MS under strengthened surveillance and the Council could
impose it to request financial support. 
Some economists and even ministers in Germany or the Nether-
lands requested that a country not fulfilling the SGP may be
condemned by the European Court of Justice. Fiscal policy would
be submitted to the judiciary power. Other voices requested that
the concerned country may be deprived of structural funds or
voting rights. The ECB president had suggested that a EU Commis-
sioner be responsible of public finances in the euro area and may
control MS budgets. 
So there is a strengthening of binding and without economic
rationale fiscal rules, inconsistent with macroeconomic gover-
nance needs. This is a failure of today’s EU construction: better
economic policies coordination is necessary, but a strict numerical
constraint on public deficit levels is not economic policy coordina-
tion and goes in the wrong direction.
2) Improving economic policy coordination
In 2011 a first “European semester” was introduced, during
which MS present their fiscal plans and structural programmes to
the Commission and the European Council, who both give their
opinion before the vote in their national parliament in the second
semester of the year. Such a process could be useful if the objective
was to define an agreed economic strategy, but, in fact, this
semester increases the pressure on each MS to implement austerity
measures and liberal reforms. No agreed plans to reduce imbal-
ances between MS or to support growth have been implemented in
2012 or 2013.
The Six-Pack allows the Commission to exert surveillance on
the excessive macroeconomic imbalances in each country by
following a scoreboard of relevant variables (competitiveness,
external current account, public and private debts). A Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) has been introduced.
Recommendations will be sent out to countries running imbal-
ances. Fines may be decided. So far the Commission does not
recommend coordinated strategies to support growth or to reduce
imbalances. Until 2013, countries are criticised for running exces-
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November 2013, for the first time, the external surpluses of
Germany and Luxembourg were questioned by the Commission. 
In June 2012, the Growth and Jobs Pact could be seen as re-
orientation of the European Strategy, but it was not included in the
EU major policies. A 120 billion euros amount is mentioned, i.e.
1% of euro area GDP, but these measures apply to an undefined
time period, while fiscal consolidation policies amount to 2% of
GDP per year. The European Council decision in January 2013 to
cut the EU budget (in percentage of GDP) brought the hope of
fiscal expansionary measures to an end. 
3) Implementing some degree of financial solidarity
Financial solidarity has increased progressively since the begin-
ning of the crisis, despite the reluctance of Northern economies,
especially of Germany. However, solidarity remains conditional
and limited. In 2013, three mechanisms are in place.
The European Stability mechanism (ESM) launched in
October 2012 introduces some degree of financial solidarity
between the MS, but this solidarity is limited and has a very high
price. The ESM can lend up to 500 billion euros. It may lend to
governments or buy public debt on primary and secondary
markets. Countries may benefit from the ESM if they have adopted
the Fiscal pact and have fulfilled it. The ESM support will be condi-
tional: a country needs to commit to fulfil a drastic fiscal
adjustment programme imposed by the Troika, and will therefore
lose all domestic fiscal autonomy and have to accept a long
austerity period. The Greek example shows that this type of plan is
not the way out of the crisis. The solidarity which is being imple-
mented does not consist in donations but in loans.
The ESM debt will be considered prior to private ones. Public
bond issuance should involve a collective action clause, i.e. in case
of default, stated by the Commission and the IMF, the country will
be entitled to agree with creditors on a change in payment condi-
tions, the agreement applying to all creditors if a majority agrees.
Euro area government debts will become speculative as was the
case for developing economies, and will not be considered
anymore as a safe asset by financial institutions. The interest rate
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Why build the euro area to reach such a situation? 
On 29 June 2012, it was agreed in the case of Spain that the ESM
will be allowed to intervene to recapitalise banks, to abandon its
status of preferred creditor and to help a country which makes the
necessary efforts, but is still under financial markets’ attack, by a
simple agreement “memorandum”.
On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a purchasing bonds
programme on the secondary markets, for short-term bonds (1-3
years), the so-called OMT (outright monetary transactions). No
quantitative ceiling has been set. The ECB does not set a target in
terms of acceptable interest rate spreads. The ECB announces that
it will not be a preferred creditor in order to show that it takes the
same risks as private creditors. But the ECB interventions will be
subject to strict conditionality. Countries will have to agree on an
adjustment programme with the Commission and the European
Stability mechanism, the programme being coordinated by the
IMF. The ESM will support the country through buying bonds on
the primary market. Supported countries will have to make
commitments in terms of fiscal consolidation and structural
reforms. Since the bonds concerned have short-term maturities,
the ECB will be able to stop buying them if the countries
concerned do not fulfil their commitments.
Financial markets’ fear was self-fulfilling: markets were afraid
that Spain would default. Thus, they were refusing to lend to Spain
or were requesting high interest rates, which was reinforcing
default risks. Since these rates were also applying to companies,
this was contributing to deepen the recession in the country. In
putting no ceiling to its interventions, the ECB reassured markets
on default risks in the concerned countries, on the risks of a euro
area break-up. The ECB broke the spiral of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions, so that finally it did not have to intervene. Lower interest
rates can help to boost activity. Conversely, countries will have to
pursue severe austerity policies. The ECB imposes its views on the
economic strategy to be implemented. It requests product and
labour markets structural reforms; the full commitment to govern-
ment balance targets despite the recession; the rapid
implementation of the Fiscal Pact. There is a risk that austerity
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remain durably in crisis. 
Although the OMT has not been used in practice, the simple
fact that it exists has been sufficient to reduce substantially interest
rates spreads to (considering the Dutch rate as a benchmark)
1.65 percentage points for Spain and 1.75 percentage points for
Italy in January 2014. But this decrease in risk premia remains
fragile. The cost of financial markets’ distrust remains heavy (more
than 2 percent of GDP for Italy). The euro area remains in perma-
nence under the threat of financial markets’ renewed defiance after
election results or the release of a fiscal imbalance.
Moreover some German economists (see Doluca et al, 2012)
consider that the ECB has gone beyond its mandate in committing
itself to support public debt in some countries, that this is not an
incentive for countries to implement the necessary reforms, and
that the ECB should focus strictly on price stability. 
In practice transfers between euro area banks are done through
the Target 2 system balances. If a country runs a current account
deficit which is not financed by capital inflows, or if it suffers from
Table 5. 10-year government interest rates
February 2012 February 2013 May 2013 January 2014
Greece 40.8 11.1 9.6 7.9
Portugal 12.3 6.9 5.5 5.1
Spain 5.05 5.15 4.2 3.7
Italy 5.5 4.45 3.9 3.8
Ireland 7.8 3.1 3.45 3.2
Belgium    3.65 2.3 2.05 2.35
France 2.95 2.2 1.85 2.2
United Kingdom 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.8
Sweden 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.4
United States 2.0 1.95 1.85 2.8
Austria 2.85 1.9 1.7 2.1
Netherlands 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.05
Finland 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.95
Germany 1.9 1.6 1.35 1.75
Japan 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7
Source: Financial markets.
Redemption? 69capital flights, its banks will have an imbalance which they will be
able to finance through borrowing from the ESCB. Conversely,
countries running surpluses become lenders to the ESCB. However,
this system does not work directly for public debts, since govern-
ments have the obligation to issue debt on markets, and at
markets’ conditions. On the one hand, this mechanism guarantees
automatic financing of national banking systems; questioning it
more or less significantly would make the euro fragile, either
through introducing debt ceilings by country or higher refi-
nancing interest rates for banks in some countries. This
mechanism compensates money transfers between banks of
different countries inside the area. On the other hand, this mecha-
nism leads countries running surpluses to use their surpluses for
not very productive purposes, while Northern countries could use
their surpluses to finance foreign direct investment, or to lend to
Southern euro area countries or countries outside the euro area. It
is their choice not to do so.
4) Fiscal austerity in the euro area
In 2012, the output gap remained significantly negative in all
euro area countries. At the euro area level, the estimates varied at
Table 6. Net position in the Target 2 system
In billion euros
October 2012 November 2013
Germany 719 544
Netherlands 118 59
Luxembourg 109 103
Finland 61 67
Slovenia -4 -2
Cyprus -10 -8
Belgium -39 -10
Austria -40 -42
Portugal -70 -61
France -46 -60
Ireland -91 -57
Greece -108 -50
Italy -267 -211
Spain -380 -264
Source: ECB.
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the OECD and -11% for OFCE. At the beginning of 2013, the
Commission estimated euro area potential GDP to have grown by
around 0.5% per year since 2009 (see EC Winter 2013 forecast).
Such estimates suggest that Europe has no other choice but accept
low growth and high unemployment. But there is no explanation
as to how supply factors would have induced such a reduction in
potential growth. If the only explanation is: “potential growth was
affected by effective growth”, then a growth recovery would lead to
higher potential growth. Hence the potential growth concept has
no meaning and is not useful for the conduct of economic policy.
Notwithstanding economic developments since the beginning
of the 2007 crisis, the Commission pursues its strategy: requesting
MS to maintain restrictive fiscal policies, independently of the
economic situation, and to boost growth by structural reforms.
Although this strategy failed to deliver, the Commission refuses to
change its orientations, even though partly due to them, growth
has fallen. Euro area GDP was forecast to grow by 1.8% in 2012
according to the Spring 2011 EC forecasts but turned out to fall by
0.6%; for 2013, GDP was forecast to grow by 1.3% in the Spring
2012 EC forecast, versus -0.4% in the Spring 2013 forecast (see
Table 7). It may also be noted that the EC has revised downwards
once again potential growth estimates in the recent period, for
instance for 2012: from 1.1% according to the Spring 2011 fore-
cast, to 0.8% one year ago and 0.3% in the Spring 2013 forecast. No
explanations are given for these revisions which are very surprising
as many MS did undertake the required structural reforms
supposed to increase their potential growth. 
Table 7. Euro area GDP growth forecasts, according to DG ECFIN Forecasts
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Spring 2011 1.8 1.6 1.8
Autumn 2011 1.9 1.5 0.5 1.3
Spring 2012 1.9 1.5 -0.3 1.0
Autumn 2012 2.0 1.4 -0.4 -0.1 1.4
Winter 2013 2.0 1.4 -0.6 -0.3 1.4
Spring 2013 2.0 1.4 -0.6 -0.4 1.2
Source: European Economic Forecast, European Economy, European Commission.
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Commission (and of the Troika as concerns Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal), all euro area MS have implemented fiscal consolidation
policies starting from either 2010 or 2011. According to our esti-
mates based on pre-crisis trend output and on the latest EC
Forecast, these policies amount on average to around 1.7% of GDP
in 2011, 2.0% in 2012 and 1.1% in 2013 (see Table 8). From 2010
to 2014, the cumulated negative fiscal impulse will reach about
24.5% of GDP in Greece, 14% of GDP in Portugal, 12% in Ireland
and in Spain. Fiscal tightening weighs mainly on the expenditure
side: 80% at the euro area level, with two exceptions, Belgium and
France, where tax increases are more substantial. 
Table 9 shows the impacts of the tightening fiscal plans as
described in Table 8, using a small model. The model accounts for
the “direct impact” of these policies, on the basis of domestic
multipliers (slightly above 1 for the larger economies). It also
accounts for the impact through external demand of fiscal plans
announced in the euro area countries, the UK, the US and Japan
Table 8. Fiscal impulses
In % of GDP 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total Spending Receipts
DEU 1.5 -1.4 -1.2 -0.4 0.0 -1.5 -1.4 0.1
FRA -0.5 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 -0.8 -6.0 -2.1 3.9
ITA -0.7 -1.2 -3.3 -1.2 -0.7 -7.1 -5.5 1.6
ESP -2.6 -2.2 -4.3 -2.2 -0.7 -12.0 -11.2 0.8
NLD -0.6 -1.3 -1.8 -1.7 -1.4 -6.8 -4.2 1.6
BEL -1.3 -0.1 -1.9 -0.7 -0.4 -4.4 -1.4 3.0
AUT 0.3 -1.7 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 -2.5 -2.0 0.5
PRT 0.8 -6.1 -3.5 -3.7 -1.8 -14.3 -12.4 1.9
FIN 0.1 -1.9 -0.9 -1.7 -0.8 -5.2 -3.8 1.4
IRL -3.8 -2.0 -2.1 -3.0 -1.3 -12.2 -12.5 0.2
GRC -8.4 -6.8 -4.5 -2.5 -2.2 -24.4 -17.5 6.9
EUZ -0.7 -1.7 -2.0 -1.1 -0.8 -6.3 -4.5 1.8
GBR -1.8 -2.7 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3 -7.0 -5.9 1.1
USA 0.1 -2.0 -1.1 -2.1 -1.2 -6.3 -4.1 2.2
JPN 0.4 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -2.0 -1.2 -1.0 0.2
Explanatory note: Fiscal impulses are calculated as changes in structural primary balances, based on pre-crisis trend
GDP growth. 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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be affected as these restrictive policies will not improve strongly
debt ratios. The cumulated negative GDP impact would reach 8.0
percentage points for the euro area, but 16 percentage points in
Spain, 17 percentage points in Portugal, 32 percentage points in
Greece. The ex-ante favourable impact of restrictive fiscal policies
on public balances would be strongly reduced by this depressive
effect. The public debt-to-GDP ratio would increase in many coun-
tries, due to the strong fall in output.
Countries having to implement restrictive fiscal policies suffer
from large output falls and high unemployment. In such circum-
stances, government deficit targets are not met, which will justify
additional restrictive measures, etc. Each quarter, governments are
required to introduce additional austerity measures, mainly cuts
in social and public expenditures, which depress consumption
and activity.
Before the crisis, the development of neo-classical or DSGE
models at the expense of old Keynesian models, in particular in
Table 9. Fiscal impulse impacts on GDP, public deficit, and public debt 2011-2013
GDP growth in %
Public 
balance
% of GDP
Public 
debt
% of GDP
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 2014 2014
DEU 1.2 -1.7 -1.6 -0.7 -0.2 -3.0 +0.2 +2.6
FRA -0.7 -2.4 -2.2 -1.9 -0.8 -8.0 +1.6 +2.2
ITA -0.9 -1.8 -4.0 -1.6 -1.0 -9.3 +2.6 +3.8
ESP -3.1 -3.2 -5.65 -3.0 -1.1 -16.1 +4.8 -0.7
NLD -0.55 -1.3 -1.8 -1.7 -1.2 -6.3 +3.6 -3.2
BEL -1.0 -0.5 -1.8 -0.85 -0.5 -4.7 +2.0 -2.2
AUT 0.35 -1.9 -0.7 -1.0 -0.1 -3.4 +0.8 0.0
PRT 0.4 -6.7 -4.4 -4.2 -2.0 -16.9 +6.7 +2.1
FIN 0.0 -2.0 -0.9 -1.7 -0.8 -5.4 +2.3 -2.6
IRL -3.1 -2.0 -3.0 -2.6 -1.2 -11.9 +7.4 -9.7
GRC -9.2 -7.9 -9.5 -3.1 -2.6 -32.3 +9.9 +12.6
EUZ -0.7 -2.25 -2.9 -1.4 -0.8 -8.0 +2.3 +0.7
GBR -2.15 -3.5 -1.0 -1.45 -1.7 -9.8 +2.6 -0.2
Explanatory note: The fiscal impulses, as shown in Table 7, reduce euro area GDP growth by 0.7% en 2010, …,
0.8% in 2014. In 2014, the cumulated impact on euro area GDP is -8.0%; the public balance is improved by
2.3 percentage points of GDP, but the debt/ratio increases by 0.7 percentage point. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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the fiscal multiplier is very low, even in a rather closed economy,
in the order of 0.5 in the short-term and nil after 2-3 years. In
many of these models, restrictive policies do not have any detri-
mental impact on output, thanks to three assumptions (see also
Creel et al., 2005). Households anticipate that a permanent decline
in public expenditure will reduce their taxes in the future and
therefore they immediately increase their consumption, which
offsets the decline in public expenditure (Barro-Ricardian effect).
Sometimes, the expected decline in taxes leads households to
anticipate that labour supply (and then GDP) will increase: the rise
in consumption is higher than the cut in public spending, which
induces a negative multiplier. The economy is always operating at
full capacity, or very close to it, thanks to price flexibility and
monetary policy: a decline in output would induce a strong fall in
inflation, and then a strong decline in interest rates which
supports activity.
The crisis has shown that the output level depends on the
demand level, that a strong decrease in demand, like in 2008, is
not offset by automatic mechanisms. Economists (and interna-
tional institutions) have re-discovered that the Keynesian
multiplier is large, in the order of 1 to 1.5; that the multiplier is
larger in a situation of high unemployment than when the
economy operates at full capacity (but why implementing a fiscal
stimulus in a full employment situation?); that the multiplier is
higher for public consumption, investment and social transfers
than for tax cuts.2
In the historical expansionary-fiscal consolidation episodes,
described by some economists, restrictive fiscal policies where
accompanied by elements which are not available today for euro
area MS, such as exchange rate depreciation, interest rates cuts,
increase in private borrowing thanks to financial deregulation, or a
strong rise in private demand due to economic shocks (such as
joining the EU). 
In a depressed economic situation, restrictive fiscal measures
have no impact on inflation and interest rates. Barro-Ricardian
2. See repentance papers: Coenen et al. (2012); Holland and Portes (2012); IMF, World Economic
Outlook (October 2012); Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
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households’ incomes, since liquidity constraints are heavy on
firms and households, since banks will not lend massively to
private sectors in a low-growth/high uncertainty situation, and
since austerity strategies imply that governments consider that
potential output growth will be durably lower, which contributes
to depress investment. There is no certainty that risk premia will
decrease since public debt ratios will not decrease substantially and
since fiscal policies implemented make the euro area fragile and
worries markets. In a depressed situation, high unemployment
puts downwards pressure on wages, which lowers households’
incomes and thus their consumption. Low wages do not strongly
increase profits because the fall in demand induces overstaffing.
Higher profits do not induce firms to invest, given the weakness of
production perspectives. No country benefits from competitive-
ness gains if the depression hits the whole area. 
In his 13 February 2013 letter,3 Olli Rehn, the vice-president of
the European Commission refuses to recognise that fiscal multi-
pliers are stronger than the Commission considered. He pretends
that the euro area depression results more from the high interest
rates imposed by financial markets than from the restrictive fiscal
policy imposed by the EC. It is difficult to see how this can apply to
the French case or, outside Europe, to the US for instance. In any
case, the EU authorities have not taken the strong measures needed
to restore the unity of MS debts. Olli Rehn refuses to recognise that
consolidation policies should be stopped in times of economic
recession, even if he accepts that they can be slowed down. He
does not see that the increase in public debt may be necessary if
the private sector wants to reduce its debt. Austerity policies failed
to reassure financial markets. Structural reforms have not offset the
impact of consolidation policies. Olli Rehn claims that current
restrictive policies will enhance medium-term growth, but the risk
is that the euro area never ends with the current depression and
never reaches this medium term. 
Policies aiming at reducing the social security system are
socially and economically dangerous. They increase households’
savings rates. It is a paradox that the crisis caused by financial
3. See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/rehn/documents/cab20130213_en.pdf
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retirement and health insurance purposes. It would be disastrous
for Europe that the European authorities use the threat of financial
markets to impose on citizens restrictive economic policies, liberal
reforms and substantial social spending cuts.
In addition, there is big risk that fiscal austerity undermines the
effort required to support future growth (research, education,
health, infrastructure, family policy), to enhance the growth
potential, to help the European industry to maintain current activ-
ities and develop innovative and green sectors.
Can fiscal exit strategy ignore the causes of the crisis? The crisis
is due to growth strategies based on downwards pressure on wages
and social benefits. The fall in demand was offset by competitive-
ness gains in neo-mercantilist countries, by rising financial and
real estate bubbles and households borrowing in Anglo-Saxon and
Southern Europe countries. The failure of these two strategies has
forced to use public deficits to support growth. Reducing public
deficits requires the implementation of another growth strategy
based, on the one hand on wages and social incomes distribution,
on the other hand on a new industrial policy, on implementing
and financing investment geared towards an environmentally
sustainable economy. Before the crisis, public finances also
suffered from tax evasion and tax competition. Restoring public
finances requires to combat tax evasion and tax havens, to raise
taxes on the financial sector, on higher incomes and wealth.
3.1.  Towards a real and deep economic and monetary union? 
The proposals made by the Commission in November 2012 in A
blue print for a deep and genuine monetary and economic and monetary
union suggest new steps towards federalism: 
— “All major economic and fiscal policy choices by a MS should
be subject to deeper coordination, endorsement and surveil-
lance process at the EU level”. The possibility of different
economic or social strategies is forgotten or prohibited.
— The needs for strengthened fiscal discipline and for ex ante
fiscal coordination are asserted. But, after the fiscal pact,
what remains to be coordinated since all fiscal policies have
to be run in autopilot mode?
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programmes payments to MS not taking the corrective
action that the Commission requires. 
— The euro area could have a fiscal power to absorb asymmetric
shocks (with is rather ironic once national governments
have been deprived of the ability to implement specific fiscal
policies). 
— The EMU could be entitled to support structural reforms, i.e.
to have a “convergence and competitiveness instrument”,
within the pseudo “golden rule” framework, i.e. balanced
budgets. A country could sign an agreement with the
Commission, according to which it would implement struc-
tural reforms (concerning, according to the Commission, the
performance of labour and products markets, the efficiency
of the public sector, employment and social inclusion, ...)
and would therefore get a financial reward from other MS.
But can we imagine that a country would get subsidies in
order to abolish its minimum wage, or its public pensions
system? Can we imagine that France would have to pay to
subsidise the implementation of such measures in Spain or
in Italy? Can we even imagine a country to agree to finance
vocational training or education programmes in another
MS ?4  
— The Commission wants to be able to oblige a MS to revise its
national budget or to change its budget execution. 
— The Commission considers the possibility for the euro area
to have its own resources and to issue bonds.
— Short-term debts (Eurobills) could be mutualised under a
EMU Treasury.
— A common European Redemption Fund (ERF) could be intro-
duced to amortise public debts, with strict conditionality
(see below). 
— The role of the vice-president of the Commission in charge
of economic and social affairs in the euro area should be
strengthened; he will be in charge of the euro area Treasury;
4. Faced with the reluctance of many MS, the European Council of 19-20 December 2013
indicated that these “mutually agreed contractual arrangements” will be concluded between
voluntary MS; they will not introduce obligations for non-participating countries; they will not
become an income equalization tool.
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ment, the Euro-Group should be strengthened. 
— The proposal to issue euro-bonds guaranteed by all MS or by
the ECB has not been considered. Germany refuses to make
unlimited and unconditional commitments to support the
other MS. But how to strengthen the euro area without such
commitments?
Many questions remain: 
— Can we imagine all major economic and social decisions
being made at the EU level, by the Commission without
accounting for national votes and debates? Such a denial of
democracy would rapidly be sanctioned by citizens through
votes in favour of anti-European parties. 
— Can we image a federal power able to account for domestic
specificities in a Europe made of heterogeneous countries?
Can we imagine a single policy implemented in different
countries? Or different policies implemented through a
central process? These are probably two impossible ways. 
We do not think that EU powers should be strengthened as long
as the EU works as it currently does, as long as the EU does not
implement a growth strategy, as long as it remains focused on
liberal structural reforms, on public expenditure cuts and on
absurd public finance criteria. EU institutions must show first that
they can implement an efficient strategy before peoples and MS
agree to enlarge their power. 
3.2. Can the Euro be achieved? A recent French proposal.
The French “Economic Analysis Council” (Conseil d’analyse
économique, CAE, 2013) recognises the euro area institutional weak-
nesses, but believes that this can be addressed by increasing its
technocratic, federalist and liberal features. 
Hence, the CAE proposes to set up an independent European
Fiscal Committee. The latter would coordinate national committees,
would set limits to MS public government deficits, and so would be
a new technocratic institution which would reduce further MS
autonomy. The CAE does not find it useful to specify the objective
of the Committee: a growth strategy or the arbitrary norm of the
Fiscal Treaty? This Committee should alert the European Court of
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proposals should be validated by a euro area European Parliament.
The CAE recognises that fiscal consolidation policies have
strong recessive effects, before suggesting looking for growth
through structural reforms, albeit recognising that such measures
are “politically costly”. This is the strategy which has failed to
deliver over the last 12 years. Labour market rigidity is of course
responsible for weak growth. The CAE naively proposes that each
worker in each country can “freely” choose a European employ-
ment contract, more flexible than the domestic one, in exchange
of a European unemployment insurance, which would come on
top of the national unemployment insurance. This proposal lacks
realism. The CAE proposes to introduce a transfer system between
countries, built on the difference between the unemployment rate
of each country and their structural rate of unemployment. But
how will the structural rate of unemployment be assessed? 
The CAE proposes to offset the balanced budget requirement by
setting up a euro area budget, which could be allowed to run
cyclical imbalances. But how will it work in the case of specific
shocks? The lessons of the 2007-2009 crisis are not drawn: MS
should be able to let automatic stabilisers play and to make discre-
tionary decisions, without having a constraint based on a
structural balance impossible to measure, without having to wait
for European financial support based on non- measurable concepts
(structural deficit or structural unemployment).
3.3. Another federalist view
Aglietta and Brand (2013) recall that a State must have the
ability to monetize its debt. The euro area must go back to the prin-
ciple: one currency, one State. Rather than the dissolution of the
euro, they offer a fiscal and political union in Europe. The euro
area needs to organize fiscal transfers and to put an end to autono-
mous fiscal policies. They propose to create a European Fiscal
Institute (EFI): a “chimera” involving parliamentarians and offi-
cials from European countries. They assign two contradictory roles
to the EFI. The EFI would implement an anti-crisis policy (expan-
sionary fiscal policies in Northern countries, European investment
in Southern countries); the EFI would coordinate fiscal policies
“according to a criterion of public debt long term consolidation”.
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implemented each year. The EFI would manage the MS common
policies. But the extent of these common policies is unclear. “The
EFI should deal with the content of the fiscal union, so with poli-
cies to achieve a sustainable consolidation of public finances”, as if
fiscal policy was restricted to consolidation. “We must commit to a
medium-term programme to keep public finances on a sustainable
path… Fiscal consolidation requests two decades”. The authors
recognise that fiscal policy should have a stabilising role, but they
draw no consequences of this role for the fiscal policies framework.
They do not give evidence that a common budgetary policy can be
implemented between countries with different economic situa-
tions and strategies. 
Later, the authors offer another mechanism: in each MS, an
independent fiscal committee will assess the sustainability of fiscal
policy; these committees would work in harmony with the EFI.
Domestic fiscal policy would be based on a five-year law with
macroeconomic assumptions provided by the fiscal committee.
The EFI would assess the consistency of national projects. The
European Parliament would make binding recommendations. The
EFI would publish public debt ratings to financial markets (which
is inconsistent with the proposal according to which the ECB
should guarantee MS public debts). It is difficult to understand
who would be the ultimate decision-maker between the EFI, the
European Parliament and national Governments. The project is
based on a myth: a European body could set fiscal policies for each
MS, even if these policies must be differentiated.
The ECB would intervene to set an upper limit on the interest
rate on the public debt of countries in difficulty. The authors
propose to differentiate monetary policy by country, but they do
not provide the differentiation criteria: would a country in reces-
sion with a large public debt have a lower interest rate (to support
its activity and to reduce its debt burden) or a stronger rate (to
facilitate government bonds selling)? Is differentiation possible if
public debts are guaranteed? Finally, the authors propose to issue
eurobonds with an insurance premium to impose high-risk coun-
tries to pursue a consolidation strategy and to reward low-risk
countries for the protection they bring to others. The rate will
depend on fiscal adjustment progresses. There again, there is no
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should a country be punished for running a fiscal deficit in times
of recession?
3.4. Towards fiscal federalism?
Since the Fiscal Pact prevents in theory MS to implement stabili-
sation fiscal policies, some economists and the Commission have
proposed to implement at the European level a system of transfers
between MS to ensure that countries in good economic situation
finance the MS in depression (see European Commission, 2013). In
the spirit of these promoters, this system should avoid permanent
transfers, each country should alternatively be paying or receiving
transfer. Some (like Enderlein et al., 2013) propose to base these
transfers on output gap differentials, since, for a given country, the
sum of output gaps is nil, by construction, over a long time period,
forgetting that it is a vague concept, with a questionable and vari-
able over time measurement: should there be refunds whenever
the Commission revises its estimates? Should a country in depres-
sion wait for European funds to support its output and,
meanwhile, run a restrictive pro-cyclical policy? Some propose the
unification of unemployment allowance systems, since they are
pro-cyclical public expenditure, but national systems are currently
very diverse and are often managed by social partners. The unem-
ployment concept should be standardised (what about vocational
training, disability pensions, or early retirement beneficiaries?). A
country having made efforts to reduce its unemployment rate will
refuse to pay for high unemployment rates countries, and will
blame the latter for not having undertaken the necessary reforms.
Others propose transfers between countries based on differences in
unemployment rates levels or variations: this raises the same prob-
lems. The proposed transfers are generally of small size and vanish
if depression is widespread. According to us, MS do no need fiscal
federalism, but they need to regain full freedom to undertake stabi-
lization fiscal policies.
4. Redemption? 
Public debts in advanced economies have strongly risen during
the crisis (Table 1). This results from the depth of the crisis itself
Redemption? 81and not from over-expansionary fiscal policies which would have
been implemented before or during the crisis, except in the case of
Greece. There is no reason to exert redemption for implemented
policies. The rise in public debts was implicitly desired (by house-
holds who wish to own safe assets, who do not want to bear
financial markets risks while companies wish to deleverage), it is
useless to try and reimburse debt as long as the factors which have
caused the debt to rise remain. Given the current interest rates
levels on public debt for major countries, it cannot be said that the
public debt level induces any rise in interest rates.
The rise in public debt increases the risk that public finances
will be under financial markets supervision in the years to come.
But this supervision is not satisfactory: financial markets have no
macroeconomic perspective; they are pro-cyclical (they will
impose efforts in bad times); their opinions are self-fulfilling which
they are aware of; they do not try to incorporate all relevant piece
of information, but mainly the piece of information which are “in
the mood of time”; they are schizophrenic, they request consolida-
tion and growth policies at the same time. They have their own
judgement on the needed appropriate economic policy, but is this
necessarily the relevant one? There is a big risk that MS set the
objective of trying to escape financial markets’ surveillance in
cutting too rapidly and too massively government borrowing
which would postpone the economic recovery indefinitely. MS
ability to run active fiscal policies will be reduced. What would
have happened if countries had refused to rescue banks in 2009, in
order to avoid them to borrow on financial markets? Can financial
markets be given the responsibility to assess public debt sustain-
ability and the usefulness of public deficits? 
Two strategies can be implemented today. We advocate for a
first strategy: the possibility to run fiscal stabilisation policies
should be maintained (or rather re-established), monetary policy
should remain expansionary, public debt guarantee by the ECB
should allow to bring interest rates down to 2% in all euro area
countries; wages should be increased in countries where the wage
share in value added has substantially decreased; specific measures
designed to support both public and private investment, as part of
the environmental transition should be implemented. The debt-to-
GDP ratio will fall thanks to growth recovery.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak82The second strategy consists in setting a binding agenda in
terms of debt-to-GDP ratios with a view to bring the ratios back to
their pre-crisis levels (see IMF, 2010). This raises three issues: it
requests a substantial negative fiscal shock, which will be substan-
tial in the first years in order to be in line with the requested
strategy, but such a shock leads GDP to fall which leads debt to rise
(see Box 2). The debt reduction path is inconsistent with short
term fiscal stabilisation needs, and may lead the commitment to be
out of reach, or at a very high cost. There is no guarantee that the
final debt ratio target, set a priori, is consistent with macroeco-
nomic equilibrium. 
Box 2.  The public debt norm in the short run
Let us consider an economy in a Keynesian situation. Output is deter-
mined by demand as: y = g + c(1–t)y, where t is the tax rate. Debt varies
as:h = h0 + g – ty. If g falls by 1, y falls by 1/1–c(1–t). A restrictive policy
will lead the debt ratio to rise if: h0 / y0 > (1–c)(1–t).
For instance if c=0.5 et t=0.5, h0 = y0 = 100, cutting the public deficit
by 1 will lead output to fall by 1.33 (from 100 down to 98.67), ex post the
deficit will fall by 0.33. Debt will fall down to 99.67. The debt-to-GDP
ratio will rise from 100% to 101%. In the short term the debt-to-GDP
ratio cannot be cut through a restrictive policy.         
The German Council of economic experts (2012) suggested the
introduction of a European Redemption Pact, i.e. to set a redemp-
tion fund (RF) in order to guarantee the repayment of the share of
the debt above 60% of GDP. Countries where debt exceeds 60% of
GDP (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, France, Malta
and the Netherlands), at the exception of countries under an
adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal), would
place in the redemption fund the share of their debt over 60% of
GDP and, in counterpart, would transfer tax revenues allowing for
a debt repayment over 25 years. France, for instance, would thus be
able to transfer a debt share amounting to 27% of GDP, transfer-
ring revenues of 1.3% of GDP. Countries would transfer guarantees
to the fund, like some part of their gold resources. Moreover, they
would have to implement structural reforms programmes. This
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interest rate below current market rates (the authors consider a 4%
interest rate, which is pessimistic since France borrowed in
February 2013 at 2.3% for 10-year government bonds). Besides,
countries should commit to the Fiscal Pact, i.e. bring rapidly their
structural deficit to 0.5% of GDP. Thus the debt ratio would rapidly
fall: in 2035, it would stand at 58.5% in Belgium (against 97%
today), 53.5% in France (against 88%), 50% in Germany (against
82%), 60% in Italy (against 120%). However, countries would
commit to strongly restrictive policies in 2012-2015, amounting
to, according to the authors’ calculations, 6.3% of GDP for Spain,
4.2% for France, 4% for the Netherlands.
The paper assumes that the Pact will allow interest rates to fall,
as compared to a catastrophic basis scenario, where countries
would implement similar austerity measures, while markets would
continue to request high interest rates. Thus, it can be claimed that
RF would have expansionary effects as compared to the cata-
strophic basis scenario. But it does not draw any lesson from the
effects on past austerity policies on output, assuming implicitly
that the fiscal multiplier is nil. What will happen if MS are unable
to cut the public deficit by as much as initially requested, due to
the impact of these generalized restrictive policies on growth and
on fiscal revenues? The German Council of economic experts’
paper does not consider the possibility that Europe goes through
economic slowdown episodes in the next 25 years, which may
require to soften restrictive policies and to abandon the Fiscal pact.
What would happen then with the redemption pact? MS fiscal
policies would have to negotiate their fiscal policy with the RF, in
addition to the Commission and Council monitoring. During the
RF existence, the coexistence of national debts with the RF debt
will allow speculation on the capacity of individual MS to fulfil
their commitments.  
The Pact does not question the factors which led public debts to
rise. Are these sins that MS have to pay for? Or were these increases
necessary because of the economic crisis? And how to be sure that,
in some future, another crisis will not require public deficits and
higher public debts?  
We do not see what a redemption pact would add to the fiscal
pact, since the fiscal pact already implies public deficits to be cut to
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falls below 60% of GDP, which, assuming a potential nominal
growth rate of 3% per year would already lead the debt-to-GDP
ratio to converge towards 33%.
On December 2012, the Commission Communication (2012)
envisages the creation of such a fund, although its annex 3 criti-
cizes its principle (in particular, a temporary fund cannot solve a
structural issue: the integration of euro area government bond
markets). On 12 march 2013, nevertheless, the EU parliament
agreed to vote the “Two-Pack” in exchange of a commitment of
the European Commission to settle a high level experts group to
assess the feasibility of such a European Redemption Pact. There is
a risk that new a priori constraints on fiscal policies are thus added. 
4.1. The eurobonds and debt agency proposals 
The euro area needs to choose between two frameworks: relying
on markets to implement fiscal discipline or introducing measures
to re-establish the unity of public debts. The first option has several
drawbacks: maintaining interest rates spreads in Europe for an
undefined time period, undermining the impact of fiscal policies
and letting financial markets play an excessive role. On the one
hand, Europe would declare that: the Greek case was an exception,
from now on, no euro area country will default. On the other
hand, it would rely on markets to judge how serious this commit-
ment is. The second option can be implemented in two ways:
either through an ECB guarantee of always refinancing public
debts or by issuing eurobonds. It requires an issue to be settled first:
according to which criteria and up to which level can a MS public
debt be guaranteed by its partners? Several projects have not
entirely made a choice between the two frameworks. 
The simplest solution consists in introducing a European debt
agency (EDA) which would be in charge of issuing a common debt
for all euro area countries. This debt would be guaranteed by all
euro area countries; it would be considered as a safe asset by finan-
cial markets; it would be very liquid, with a wide market, hence it
could be issued at low interest rates. The difficult point is that the
EDA council would supervise domestic fiscal policies and would be
entitled to deny financing too lax countries, which would then
have to issue bonds on markets. The EDA would raise the same
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would be the democratic and economic legitimacy of its Council?
How would the EDA decide that a country runs an excessive deficit,
if the country considers that such a deficit is necessary to support
activity (like in Germany and France in 2002-2005) or to rescue
banks? Would it implement strict rules (a country would be entitled
to loans from the EDA up to 60% of its GDP) or softer ones? The
EDA would benefit neither virtuous countries (which have no diffi-
culty to get financing) nor countries in difficulty, which the EDA
would refuse to finance and which would have to issue domestic
bonds, without any European guarantee, without any potential
financing from the ECB, in other words risky assets, bearing a high
interest rate. The EDA makes sense only if it accepts to consider all
public debts, but then what to do against lax countries? 
Delpla and von Weisäcker (2010) have suggested the introduc-
tion of a “blue debt, collectively issued and guaranteed, with a
ceiling at 60% of GDP”. Each year, national parliaments will have
to vote on new public debt issuance (which means that the
German parliament would have to agree on the French deficit for
instance and vice versa). Each MS would also be allowed to issue a
red debt under its own responsibility. Since such a red debt would
bear a high interest rate, this would be a strong disincentive to
issue public debt above 60% of GDP. This proposal would generate
permanent tensions between euro area MS if each country has to
make judgements on their neighbour’s deficits. It is almost similar
to the EDA proposal and does not account for economic stabilisa-
tion needs. The 60% level is arbitrary and breached in 2013 by 10
of the original euro area MS (except Luxembourg and Finland). The
gap between blue and red debts would allow financial markets to
speculate in permanence. De Grauwe (2012) suggested than each
country would have to pay a different interest rate on its blue debt,
according to its debt level, as if public debt was always a sin which
must be punished. 
Palley (2011) suggests creating a European public finance
authority, which would issue eurobonds and lend to governments.
Thus, a limited part of the debt would be mutualised. The ECB
would be able to buy such bonds in order to influence the interest
rate level. The euro area Council of finance ministers would decide
on debt issuance. What would be the assessment criteria? Besides,
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to financial markets’ moods.
Schulmeister (2013) suggests introducing a European Monetary
fund (EMF) which would finance member states though issuing
eurobonds guaranteed by the MS and the ECB. The EMF would
maintain long-term interest rates slightly below GDP growth. Each
MS financing would not be subject to a numerical constraint, but
would be decided within the EMF by the MS Finance ministers.
The same questions may be raised again. This project hands over to
finance ministers the responsibility of agreeing on public deficit
targets for each country, which is problematic (what should be
done in case of macroeconomic strategies divergences between
countries?), not democratic (each finance minister would impose
to its national Parliament the fulfilment of the target set at the
European level), difficult to implement (what to do in case of a
specific or global shocks?).
4.2. Can the single currency contradictions be overcome? 
For developed countries, the system which worked until 1999
lied on unity between the government, the central bank and
commercial banks. The central bank is the lender of last resort for
the government and banks. The government guarantees banks; it
can issue unlimited public debt. This debt is considered as safe and
benefits from as low as possible market interest rates. Of course this
unity was to some extent undermined by the independence of the
central bank, which could have generated conflicts between the
government (caring about supporting output or specific spending)
and the central bank (caring about maintaining low inflation).
These conflicts could have led public finances to become unsus-
tainable (see, for instance, Sterdyniak et al., 1994). But such
situations did not occur before 2007. They did never question
government solvency. 
The introduction of the euro area led to a particularly difficult
situation. On the one hand, countries need to run more active
fiscal policies because they have lost control over their interest
rates and exchange rates. It can also be added that, since 1973, the
macroeconomic equilibrium has been requiring a certain level of
public deficit and debt. Each country needs to run some
equilibrium government deficits. The 2007 crisis strengthened this
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imbalances in one country affect the other countries of the area.
Therefore excessive deficits (or surpluses) should be avoided. What
is acceptable in the national framework where some “instinctive”
solidarity prevails is no more acceptable at the EU level, where
citizens from Northern countries have no spontaneous solidarity
with unemployed people in Southern economies, where most EU
citizens have no solidarity with Spanish, Irish, UK or Cypriot
banks. Last, financial markets’ functioning makes it necessary for
public debts to become safe assets again, while at the same time
Northern countries deny to give unlimited guarantee to their
partners. Europe is also paralysed by the German constitutional
court decision, which forbids any guarantee not expressively
agreed by the German Parliament. 
The solution adopted so far by Europe, i.e. the Fiscal pact
consists in ensuring solidarity to countries agreeing to implement
an absurd fiscal rule: keeping structural deficits below 0.5% of
GDP. But such a target is not optimal, and there is no certainty that
it can be reached.
Euro area countries should be able again to issue safe sovereign
debt, at an interest rate controlled by the ECB. They should be able
to run a public deficit in line with their macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion needs. 
Public debt mutual guarantee by the ECB or by eurobonds must
be entire for countries accepting to submit their economic policies
to a coordination process. Therefore the procedures implemented
since 2010 should be reviewed and their aims should be modified. 
Economic policy coordination cannot consist in fulfilling auto-
matic rules (like the SGP rules), and so a coordination process needs
to be organised between MS. Coordination should target GDP
growth and full employment; it should account for all economic
variables; countries should follow an economic policy strategy
allowing to meet the inflation target (at least to remain within a
target of around 2%), to meet an objective in terms of wage devel-
opments (in the medium-run real wages should grow in line with
labour productivity), in the short-run adjustment processes should
be implemented by countries where wages have risen too rapidly,
or not sufficiently; increases or cuts in social contributions may be
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announce and negotiate their current account balance targets;
countries with high external surpluses targets should agree to lower
them or to finance explicitly industrial projects in Southern econo-
mies. The process should always reach a unanimous agreement on
a coordinated but differentiated strategy. As shown in Box 3, it is
not so easy to define such a strategy. Public deficits resulting from
this process should be financed through debt issuance guaranteed
by all euro area countries and by the ECB. The Treaty needs to
maintain an effective process in the event where no agreement is
reached. In that case, the new debt issued by countries outside the
agreement would not be guaranteed, but such a case should never
occur. Europe’s survival requires that the European project
becomes popular again, therefore is a source of growth, social prog-
ress and solidarity. It is only within this framework that
institutional progresses could be made.
Box 3.  Fiscal policy in a closed or in an open economy
1) Let us consider first a closed economy. The IS equation is:,
y = g + d – σr with y, the output gap, r, the interest rate (in difference
with the rate of growth), d, private demand, g, public demand. The
optimal fiscal policy after a purely demand shock is therefore to main-
tain: g = –d and r = 0. The government balance should offset private
demand shocks.
If households are Ricardian and offset any increase in the public
deficit by lowering their consumption, then the economy cannot be
stabilised: 
y = g + d – σr  with  d = d0 – λg  and  λ = 1
The same applies if markets request excessive risk premia: 
y = g + d – σr  with  r = r0 + μg  and  μ > 1/σ
Households’ or markets’ expectations on fiscal policies being ineffi-
cient are then self-fulfilling.
2) Let us now consider an open economy. The equilibrium in the
goods market and the trade balance are written as: 
y = g + d – σr + b   b = n(y* – y) –nδ (w – s – w*)+ b0,
with w, the wage level, s the exchange rate.
The country should have a trade balance target, bI. A small country in
the world does not have to worry about its partners’ balance. It should
therefore implement:
g = –d –bI   w – s = w* + (b0 – bI) /nδ
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public spending and the level of its wages, either through exchange rate
depreciation or through a period of high unemployment.
3) Let us now consider a monetary union with two countries. The
model is written as:
y1 = g1 + d1 – σr + b
y2 = g2 + d2 – σr – b
b = n(y2 – y1) + nδ (w2 – w1)
In the event of a domestic demand shock, each country must be able
to stabilise domestic output using fiscal policy. If the interest rate is at
its optimal level, fiscal stabilisation is a better strategy than monetary
policy, as the shock is specific. If demand is excessive in Spain, Spain
should implement a restrictive fiscal policy rather than having the ECB
raising its rate, implying that Germany would need to run an expan-
sionary fiscal policy.
The problem is the compatibility between the current account targets
of the two countries. If country 1 targets a trade surplus, while country 2
aims at maintaining full employment, this leads to the pre-2007 crisis
situation: Germany cut domestic wages and demand in order to reach a
certain level of external surplus, which meant that Spain had to raise its
domestic demand.
d1 = –bI ;  d2 = bI ; w2 – w1 = bI / nδ.
No equilibrium can be reached if Spain wishes to run a current
account in balance.
Conversely, a country can choose to run a trade deficit, imposing his
partner to run a surplus which needs to be offset by a restrictive fiscal
policy.
Fiscal policy coordination is required, but trade balances (and not the
public deficit) should be the target and the wage level would be the
instrument.
4) Let us now consider a monetary Union consisting of two countries
in the world. The model is written as:
y1 = g1 + d1 – σr + b1
b1 = n(y2 – y1) + m(y* – y1) + nδ (w2 – w1) + mδ(w* – s – w1)
y2 = g2 + d2 – σr + b2
b2 = n(y1 – y2) + m(y* – y2) + nδ (w1 – w2) + mδ(w* – s – w2)
Let us assume that country 1 wishes to run some trade surplus. It will
therefore cut domestic wages. Its trade surplus will be achieved on the
rest of the world and on country 2. Country 2 will therefore have to
choose between running permanently a certain deficit and lowering its
domestic wages. This contributes to insufficient demand at the world
level. 
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THE NEW EU GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS
John FitzGerald1
The Economic and Social Research Institute
Until the economic crisis hit in 2008, the euro area operated
with a single set of fiscal rules – the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). In the first decade of operation of EMU the rules were
broken by Germany but this breach did not threaten the stability
of the euro area. However, this set of rules did not prevent the crisis
occurring in 2008 and it did not prove adequate to manage the
subsequent fall-out for governments and EU institutions. 
Since the crisis, a series of additional rules and directives have
been implemented, both by national governments and by the euro
area. These new rules have been developed in a period of crisis and
they have been implemented relatively quickly to deal with
specific aspects of the crisis. However, they were not subjected to
an extensive evaluation process, nor were they based on a compre-
hensive analysis of the long-term needs of the euro area. Thus,
while they address some current problems, they leave others unad-
dressed. It is also unclear how relevant these rules will be in
guiding the day to day operation of policy in the euro area if, and
when, it reaches calmer waters.
The current crisis in the EU has varied origins. Both Ireland and
Spain complied with the Stability and Growth Pact rules up to the
beginning of the crisis. The impending problems in these two
countries were manifested in large and growing current account
deficits, which were the counterpart to exceptional levels of
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John FitzGerald94investment in domestic property markets (EUROFRAME, 2006;
Conefrey and FitzGerald, 2010). When these bubbles burst there
were catastrophic effects on the banking system in the two
countries. In turn, the resulting collapse in these two economies
resulted in huge deficits appearing in the public finances, even
though they had been in surplus prior to the crisis. With the
benefit of hindsight, instead of merely observing the SGP rules,
these two economies should have run increasing government
surpluses in the middle years of the decade to keep actual output
closer to potential and prevent a bubble occurring. Even more
important, rigorous regulation of the domestic financial systems
would have minimised the risks to these economies from a
property bubble. Thus the SGP rules, which concentrated on the
public finances, did not prevent the crisis in Ireland and Spain. It
was only in the case of Greece that the origins of the crisis lay in a
disguised contravention of the SGP rules.2
In the run up to the crisis the SGP rules themselves posed a
different set of problems, especially in the case of Ireland and
Spain. O’Leary (2010) looked at the advice proffered by the EU
Commission and the IMF over the period to 2008. He found that
the dangers inherent in the Irish situation were not adverted to by
the international oversight teams. The fact that Ireland was
obeying the “speed limit” of the SGP meant that they could not
give Ireland a speeding ticket. In this case rules, which did not
cover all sources of danger, were part of the problem rather than
part of the solution; they restricted the scope of external oversight.
This experience should be part of any analysis of the new set of
policy rules that the EU has adopted. In the future, undue focus on
a specific set of fiscal policy rules could obscure dangerous develop-
ments elsewhere in the economy.
The key elements of the additional set of rules put in place in
the euro area over the last few years relate to the public finances of
individual member states and the process whereby national
budgetary policy is formulated and implemented. A number of
changes have been made which make national budgetary processes
more transparent. These changes also provide for enhanced powers
2. In the case of Portugal there was an earlier problem with government borrowing which was
being addressed when the crisis in the world economy erupted. 
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programmes. The focus of these rules is primarily on limiting
government borrowing and reducing current levels of indebted-
ness to return economies to a long-term sustainable level of debt. 
While most of the attention is focussed on the fiscal rules, the
new macro-economic imbalance procedure does focus on a range
of indicators of problems other than the public finances, in partic-
ular on the current account. However, the breath of these
indicators and the absence of a framework for prioritising may
make the procedure relatively ineffective. If all member states are
simultaneously in breach of one or more of the many indicators
these breaches are not going to serve as an effective wake-up call to
policy-makers. 
The EU Commission has begun a procedure to consider the
position of Germany, which has a large current account surplus.
However, it remains to be seen how this turns out. Because the
indicators of imbalances are backward looking, and because of the
time that the procedure would take to implement, it may well be
the case that the problems that this imbalance highlights could be
over before any remedial action is taken.
What the new rules ignore is the desirability of taking counter-
cyclical fiscal action where the euro area economy is operating
significantly above or below its potential. While it is clear that
counter-cyclical fiscal policy was neither appropriate nor possible
for countries such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland or Greece in the
current crisis, at the level of the euro area it would have been desir-
able in the period 2010-13 to implement a euro area fiscal stimulus
(in ’t Veld, 2013). Even if, as some would argue, the level of govern-
ment indebtedness was too high in the euro area to allow this to
happen in this crisis, in the future, when debt levels have fallen,
the implementation of a euro area counter-cyclical fiscal policy
would be appropriate. However, the new rules do not provide a
mechanism to produce co-ordinated counter-cyclical fiscal policy
action at the level of the euro area, should the euro area economy
be operating well below or above potential.
A further significant problem with the current EU governance
arrangements on fiscal policy is the defective nature of the meth-
odology used to estimate potential output and the related
John FitzGerald96structural deficit in individual countries, key concepts in assessing
fiscal stance. These concepts have been enshrined in law but their
definitions are subject to much debate. 
The official EU methodology uses a production function, with a
very simplistic model of the labour market, to derive the labour
input into that production function. However, for potential output
to be sustainable there should simultaneously be equilibrium in
key markets – on the current account (the goods market), in the
labour market (full employment consistent with stable inflation),
households should have adjusted their consumption (and savings)
so that their debt to income ratio is sustainable, companies should
be operating at the minimum of their long run average cost curve
and the housing market should also be in long-term equilibrium.
The government accounts must then be on a sustainable path
when the economy is in equilibrium – e.g. in balance or showing a
small surplus. In the EU approach to modelling potential output
these equilibrium conditions are not necessarily all guaranteed or
imposed. In fact, in many cases the measure of potential output
defined by the EU methodology would not be consistent with
equilibrium in some or even most of these other markets.
In the approach currently used by the EU to estimate potential
output a particular definition of labour market equilibrium is used
which purports to estimate the level of unemployment consistent
with an absence of inflationary pressures. In the EU methodology a
Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment (NAWRU) is
derived using a filter process. This approach gives much more
weight to recent observations so that, in times of high unemploy-
ment, it produces a NAWRU that is also high. The method for
calculating the NAWRU leads to exceptional volatility in the
number arrived at. The estimate of potential output for 2008
which is produced by this methodology today is dramatically
different from that which it produced for 2008 when applied in the
years 2007 or 2008. As such, it is not a good yardstick for deriving
robust policy recommendations. In the standard EU approach no
attempt is made to use a structural model of individual country
labour markets and no attempt is made to derive the equilibrium
labour input consistent with optimising behaviour by firms. This
latter approach would be likely to provide a more stable bench-
mark for policy-making.
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that today it suggests that the permanent level of unemployment
in Ireland is well above 10 per cent of the labour force. When these
estimates for the NAWRU are used in the production function to
estimate potential output, they suggest that the Irish economy is
today operating above potential.3 On this basis the structural
balance of the government sector is estimated using a fairly simple
model relating potential output to government borrowing.
In the case of Ireland, if action were taken today to eliminate the
structural deficit, defined in this way, the surplus on the current
account of the balance of payments would rise to over 11 per cent
of GDP (Bergin et al., 2013). Such a rate of deleveraging by the
private sector would not be a stable long-term equilibrium.4
If the structural balance is to play a significant role in guiding
policy a more suitable methodology for estimating it will need to
be developed. The methodology will need to take account of the
specificities of individual countries. However, this would inevi-
tably make oversight difficult for the EU Commission. The current
situation involves a single simple model that is reasonably trans-
parent. Once the idiosyncrasies of individual economies are
modelled the process will be less transparent, even if it is more real-
istic. The problem would then be that much more reliance would
have to be put on the expertise and judgement of those estimating
the potential output and structural balance, something that will
inevitably result in discussion and controversy. There would be no
clear “right” answer. However, this would more appropriately
reflect the challenges of developing appropriate fiscal policy
responses to ever changing economic circumstances across many
different economies.
3. In the Irish Stability Programme Update, April 2013, the Irish department of Finance refer to
this result as counterintuitive. In the Irish Stability Programme Update published in the 2004
Budget they provide a detailed critique of the methodology highlighting the volatility in the EU
Commission estimates of the NAWRU.
4. It would also trigger action by the EU Commission under the macro-economic imbalances
procedure.
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We have learned to our cost that EMU has changed the environ-
ment for economic policy-making; the scope for inappropriate
policy in one country to damage its EMU partners is much greater
than was the case in the pre 1999 era. This has necessitated the
development of new rules to guard against such negative externali-
ties. These rules have now been developed to deal with what, we
hope, are the exceptional circumstances of the last five years.
However, many commentators believe that EMU will require a
move towards a fuller fiscal union in the future if it is to survive.
It remains an open question how much of the recent crisis was
attributable to EMU. The fact that countries such as Estonia and
Latvia outside the euro area suffered from the crisis at least as
severely as Ireland, Spain and Portugal inside EMU, suggests that
the causes of the crisis were more complex than the mere existence
of EMU. However, what EMU did was to enhance the dangers to all
members of the EMU from a crisis in one or two member states. 
If the new rules, and the advent of banking union, are
successful in restoring the euro area economy to sustainable
growth and if they prevent future economic and financial crises,
then it is not clear to me that we need to go down the road of a full
fiscal union. It seems possible that, in calmer times in the future,
individual member states may be able to choose their own fiscal
policy stance, provided it does not put the common good at risk.
However, in times when output in the euro area economy is
significantly below or above potential, the failure to implement a
counter-cyclical fiscal policy at the level of the euro area would be
a loss. A more decentralised approach would avoid the major polit-
ical problems that fiscal union would involve and also avoid the
problem of providing an appropriate level of democratic account-
ability for such a fiscal union.
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“A relationship, I think, is like a shark. You
know? It has to constantly move forward or
it dies. And I think what we got on our
hands is a dead shark. ”
Woody Allen, “Annie Hall” (1977)
1. A creative crisis?
The groundbreaking of the original building yard for the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) dates back to 1970 with the Werner
Plan envisaging the gradual introduction of a single currency in
member states of the European Union. The dollar and oil crises of
1971-1973 imposed a suspension to the construction process of
almost ten years, followed by another decade of “learning by trial
and error” within the European Monetary System (EMS), an alter-
native governance framework for defying costly exchange rate risk.
The real final steps for the introduction of the Euro were enacted
only several years after the multiple crises brought up by the break-
down of the EMS in the beginning of the 1990s. 
1. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
views of the Bulgarian National Bank and the European System of Central Banks. 
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Paolo Onofri and Tsvetomira Tsenova102In a nutshell, the launch of the euro and its underpinning insti-
tutional infrastructure were held back by one crisis, while
accelerated by another one, the latter also being uplifted by the
euphoria of German unification. Now the question is whether the
current crisis would break the EMU of the European Union (EU) or
deepen it. Furthermore, the worldwide encompassing nature of the
current economic and financial crisis turns rescue by external
events or by further welfare-enhancing widening of the Union
unlikely. The experience during the past six years of crisis leads us
to believe that the EMU is facing a critical trilemma: either a slow
death by asphyxiation, or sudden collapse, or initiation of a new
building yard for the EMU in particular and EU in general.
2. A backward view
But let us first remind ourselves of how we arrived at this point
of a “do or die situation”. In August 2007 the Euro area’s interbank
market was frozen with fear, rightfully justified by counterparty
default risk stemming from exposure to US mortgage-backed secu-
rities, which were previously classified as risk-free. The ECB was the
first to react by fully satisfying interbank demand for liquidity
becoming virtually its sole provider. The next year revealed that
this is not a temporary episode of a “financial markets turmoil”, as
initially downplayed in ECB´s official communication, but a
deeply rooted structural problem encompassing the financial
sector, real economy, state finances and governance in the euro
area, as well as globally. New problems were constantly surfacing
prompting the recurrent re-evaluation of risks and downward
adjustment of expectations for future prospects. Banks in countries
like Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium with considerable
private savings and efficient liquidity management heavily reliant
on global financial innovation happened to be worst affected.
Fighting simultaneously deep and persistent recession, as well as
strengthening the banking system through bank recapitalisations
strained government finances leading to the emergence of sover-
eign debt vulnerabilities in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and
more recently Spain and Slovenia. 
When growth is missing for a considerable period of time, the
hope about the future prospects, which nourishes economic
Engine for European growth and stability 103activity and social consensus, is replaced by heated discourse on
fair redistribution of scarce sources of incomes. In the US context,
the public support to the financial sector during the initial phases
of the crisis brought more hostility and scrutiny towards the
banking sector. In the euro area’s governance framework, the great
danger is to intensify the discussion on burden sharing and limits
to solidarity to a point where the general public starts doubting the
viability of the single currency. 
The current governance framework revealed problems in terms
of incentive compatibility. It could neither prevent imprudent
accumulation of debt above the 60 per cent target, nor could it
avoid core countries benefiting both from installing doubts in
their solidarity and commitment to the Euro project, and from
enjoying too low sovereign debt rates. The latter being justifiable
only on the grounds of “flight to quality” given the perceived
instability of the euro as a currency. 2 A prolongation of such
perverse incentives could solely produce some short-term Pyrrhic
victories and defeats. 
Another governance issue was the confrontational way in which
the sovereign debt crisis was approached in 2010 which, as a conse-
quence, could have been pushing the EMU into a bad equilibrium
for both debtor and creditor countries. From a political point of
view, the euro enthusiasm could be lost and replaced by euro scep-
ticism, which might become a true obstacle for finding agreement
for necessary reforms, to starting a new building so to say. And
what is a new building worth for if its inhabitants are living afflu-
ently but in mistrust and bitter arguments with each other? 
3. Other irreversible small steps or a leap forward?
In the process of this new building, the EU governance institu-
tions and member states’ leaders could distract themselves from
the main challenge, namely improving the EU’s growth potential.
Furthermore, in a general equilibrium framework with rational
expectations, partial default risk and circular feedback effects
between economic decisions of governments, banks and the wider
2. Note that even countries exemplary on fiscal prudence such as Germany had debt to GDP
ratio of over 80% in 2012; the Netherlands and Austria were at 70 per cent debt to GDP ratio.
Paolo Onofri and Tsvetomira Tsenova104economy, any fiat currency, including the euro, is as good as the
economies behind it, as well as the credibility of governments as
ultimate guarantee providers (see Shubik, 1999; Tsomocos, 2003
and Tsenova, 2013). Banks and other financial intermediaries are
central in the transmission of monetary policy, aimed at affecting
both prices and real output, while at the same time they can
generate their own real effects. The central banking authority with
the key tasks of providing price and financial stability (see
Goodhart, 2010) should be able to have all necessary monetary
and macro-prudential tools to install the right incentives for banks
to smoothly transmit monetary policy, hence to support growth
and stability (see Calomiris, 2011). 
Given the global structural transformation induced by the
crisis, the EU would be better relying also on own home-grown
solutions, inclusive of prudent financial system, production,
consumer markets and welfare enhancing internal trade. World
trade growth could not go on at the pre-crisis rates for decades (see
Khazin 2008). There is a persistent drive for more safety, transpar-
ency and fairness within the different banking systems with the
natural consequence of reaching a less efficient in the short run,
but more sustainable and prudent livelihood. There are underlying
movements for future import substitution with home manufac-
turing. In addition, there are indications for re-industrialisation in
the US also enhanced by its recent energy independence.3 
The evolution of euro area’s prospects delivered by its gover-
nance institutions could be observed from the views of the
professional forecasters depicted on Figure. The long-term output
growth forecasts indicate the equilibrium level towards which
output would converge, after the impact of initial conditions and
shorter-term shocks had vanished and structural policies directed
towards the medium-term had become fully effective. They also
represent indicators of credibility or ability of responsible institu-
tions to enhance economic efficiency and welfare. Apparently the
euro area has been on a declining path of long-term natural rate of
growth ever since 2001: from 2.7 per cent in the first half of 2001
3. See for example “In U.S., Steps Toward Industrial Policy in Autos” by Steve Lohr, 19 May
2008, New York Times and “US manufacturers “reshoring’ from China” by Ed Crooks, Financial
Times, 24 September 2013.
Engine for European growth and stability 105the median long-term growth is at 1.7 per cent in 2013. The last
two quarters of the sample have seen further deterioration in the
whole distribution. The lower confidence interval of the distribu-
tion (5-th percentile) even reached 1 per cent. One wonders how
would the euro area manage to function without a pivotal break-
through in governance. 
In June 2012 there were first promising signs that the euro insti-
tutions would be starting on a road towards the latter alternative of
the above trilemma, a new building yard for EMU. This road may be
hard, but it is the only viable option to which Europe is bound in its
shared destiny, as declared by Mrs Merkel in her speech to the
German Parliament in June 18, 2012: “we are convinced that
Europe is our destiny and our future”. Later in July the President of
the ECB Mario Draghi clarified and confirmed the full institutional
commitment to the euro by all stakeholders with the statement
“the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And
believe me, it will be enough”.4 In September the same year this
Figure. Long-term output growth expectations in the euro area
(cross-sectional probability distribution)
In %
Source: Survey of professional forecasters.
4. Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB at the Global Investment Conference in
London, 26 July 2012.
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Paolo Onofri and Tsvetomira Tsenova106commitment statement was supported by announcing the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT) which proved to be fully incentive
compatible, because of preventing self-destructive behaviour
creating doubts in the irreversibility and unity of the euro area, and
calming financial markets without even being used so far. 
A systemic crisis could be overcome by a considerable change in
the system of governance, taking into account not only the desired
objective to be achieved for the functioning of the EMU in the
“new normal” times, but also the orderly transition towards that
aim. It would be really misfortunate if the target could never be
achieved in practice and the euro area would be stuck indefinitely
in a deflationary liquidity trap of misery, with inadequate infla-
tion, meagre output and credit growth, because of mutual mistrust
leading to dogmatism and inflexibility in implementing the
systemic changes. Given the demanding times, in which we live,
the construction of the new institutions must be more ambitious
than those in 1999.
The objective is set at creating a Banking Union and all its under-
pinnings with the broader purpose to weaken the feedback effects
between the sovereign debt of the member states and banks holding
that debt in order to guarantee the continuous smooth monetary
transmission and safeguard the deposits of the population. In a
press release, the European Council provided a firm commitment
for this on 29 June 2012: “We affirm that it is imperative to break
the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” It seems that
since then only a gradual progress is being made. 
The pace of building the new institutions might eventually turn
out to be insufficient to pull Europe out of the current Long Reces-
sion. The Single Surveillance Mechanism (SSM) is expected to be
operational only at the beginning of 2015. In the meantime, the
Asset Quality Review (AQR) of the 130 banks to be supervised by
ECB is likely to be conducted without having constructed a
uniform definition of the Non-Performing Loans (NPL). The AQR
will be followed by stress tests to be released in the second half of
2014. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has not been fully
agreed upon yet. The direct recapitalisation of banks by ESM is no
longer envisaged, and the single resolution authority is still under
discussion. Not to mention the European Deposit Insurance
system and the necessary common guarantee fund. 
Engine for European growth and stability 107The main background obstacle is the fear by some member
states that a Banking Union might work as a Trojan horse, i.e. a
disguised way of bringing up a Fiscal Union and mutualisation of
member states’ debt, or, at least, sprouts of them. Moreover, in
designing the transition to the new institutions there is undue
emphasis on problems of moral hazard or free-riding, i.e. that in
expectation of support from the others, weaker member states
would behave irresponsibly generating risks for themselves and the
system. Avoiding such problems is important, but we should not
forget that meeting the currently unprecedented global challenges
and exiting the Long Recession on a sustainable growth trajectory
requires immense effort, taking of risks, strong confidence and a
leap of faith. One could wonder how Europe would have devel-
oped if the Marshall Plan was not implemented to avoid problems
of moral hazard and free-riding. 
It is clear that the full process of implementation of the Banking
Union will be a long one, which is consistent with the EU’s
implicit rule of taking small but irreversible steps. The issue is that
this strategy might be too slow and inappropriate for the current
challenges. Indeed, a breakthrough from an institutional point of
view seems to be necessary in order to eradicate those self-fulfilling
negative expectations that locked Europe in such a bad equilib-
rium. Furthermore, a U-turn is needed in the implementation of
the rules to allow much more flexibility to help single countries to
get out of the recession. Deep structural reforms are not easily
implemented while the economy is imploding, and that is why the
European Council decided in 2003 not to enforce the Treaty law
for the persistently breached deficit rules by France and Germany
even if that was not a period of general crisis.
The numerous reasonable discussions on how to avoid the next
crisis should not distract our focus from agreeing on real opera-
tional measures to emerge from the current one, and by doing so
avoiding the perilous options of asphyxia or a sudden breakdown
mentioned above. The only implicit measure that seems to be
followed in the EU to prevent the current crisis from further deteri-
oration is to allow countries in difficulties both on growth, and on
budget deficit not to enact more austerity in order to take care of
the negative effects of past austerity on the government budget. As
previously stated, we need governance not only for the normal
Paolo Onofri and Tsvetomira Tsenova108times, but also for crisis times: extra ordinary governance. In fact,
the potential growth in EMU will remain subdued as long as sover-
eign debts and banking systems’ problems do not find a solution.
For instance, in connection with the AQR process and the conduct
of stress tests a coordinated solution at the European level on the
NPL (perhaps through a European bad bank) could help not only
peripheral countries, but also boost internal EU trade reversing the
process of credit crunch, goods and financial markets fragmenta-
tion, thus enhancing the welfare of the European citizens. 
The member states’ current accounts have strongly improved
mainly in the peripheral countries as a result not only of higher
growth of exports, but also due to substantial decline of their
imports. This cannot be considered the “new normal” for Europe;
it is, instead, a result of fragmentation of the financial markets
with corresponding reduction of capital movements, which
required adapting the current account to the new size of the
foreign financing. 
The EMU governance should aim at eradicating the currently
observed market fragmentation, thus enabling the peripheral coun-
tries to become the new engine of growth in Europe. According to
the Prometeia international model, a one-percentage point of GDP
shock on domestic demand in the peripheral countries (Ireland,
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) would produce an increase of
EMU’s GDP of 0.39 per cent. The same shock on German domestic
demand would generate an increase of 0.26 per cent. 
4. Epilogue
Summing up, the future prosperity of the EMU depends on its
governance successfully resolving two main challenges. Firstly,
letting the engine of European growth re-start through speedy and
efficient implementation of the Banking Union, as well as
providing a grace period to enable peripheral countries to restruc-
ture and positively contribute to the European recovery. Secondly,
implementing institutional reform to ensure the safety of govern-
ment debt to provide risk-free assets necessary for the financial
industry in an ageing European society. 
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PRIMARY BALANCE AND DEBT PROJECTIONS 
BASED ON ESTIMATED FISCAL REACTION 
FUNCTIONS FOR EURO AREA COUNTRIES
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher1
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We project the path of the public debt and primary balances for a number
of countries in the euro area under a fiscal rule based on a set of estimated fiscal
policy reaction functions. Our fiscal rule represents a fiscal analogue to a well-
known monetary policy rule, and it is calibrated using country-specific as well
as euro area-wide parameter estimates. We then forecast the dynamics of the
fiscal aggregates under different convergence, growth, and interest rate
scenarios and investigate the implications of these scenarios in projecting the
future path of fiscal aggregates. We argue that our forecasting methodology may
be used to deliver insights into the medium-run effects of different fiscal policy
rules and to provide some early warning of future fiscal pressures.
Keywords: fiscal rules, fiscal policy, euro area, forecasting.
The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the
European sovereign debt crisis have brought the implementation
of fiscal rules to the fore of many policy discussions. In several
countries, a clear constitutional agreement concerning targets for
or restrictions on fiscal aggregates has been proposed in order to
ensure sustainable government finances. The German “debt brake”
1. We thank Jens Boysen-Hogrefe, Catherine Mathieu, Dennis Snower, Tim Schwarzmüller,
Maik Wolters, workshop participants at the IfW, and participants at the 2013 EUROFRAME
conference in Warsaw, Poland for helpful discussions and suggestions. All errors are our own.
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Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher114is one example of a fiscal rule; Snower, Burmeister, and Seidel
(2011) propose another fiscal rule which would allow for a high
degree of anti-cyclical policy and a nonzero long-run debt ratio.
For any proposed fiscal rule, it is important to develop projections
about the future path of the public debt and primary balances, in
order to understand the effects that such a rule might have. In this
paper, we project the path of the public debt and primary balances
in four large euro area countries, based on a fiscal rule calibrated to
an estimated fiscal reaction function under a set of different
consolidation scenarios. We argue that our forecasting method-
ology could be used to compare the future paths of fiscal
aggregates implied by different fiscal rules and to provide an early
warning of impending pressure to run large primary surpluses.2
We start by formulating a fiscal rule where the primary balance
automatically adjusts to the output gap and to the public debt. This
rule represents a fiscal analogue to a well-known monetary policy
rule, and it corresponds with a set of estimated fiscal reaction func-
tions presented by Plödt and Reicher (2014). These estimated fiscal
reaction functions are compatible with other estimates from the
empirical fiscal policy literature.3 We then set up a forecasting
model which consists of the fiscal rule, a law of motion for the
debt, and a simple multiplier relationship between the primary
balance and output. Based on the forecasting model, we simulate
the projected debt and primary balance paths of Germany, Italy,
Spain, and France following different specifications of the fiscal
rule. We find that a fiscal rule that encourages a strong reduction in
debt levels within twenty years would result in substantial pressure
for Italy to run large primary surpluses. Germany, Spain, and
France face less pressure in this regard. For countries such as Spain,
the transition from primary deficits to primary surpluses would
occur gradually. As to be expected, a stronger than expected
growth scenario results in less pressure to run large primary
surpluses, while a weaker than expected growth scenario or a
higher than expected interest rate results in worse fiscal pressure.
2. We define a “fiscal reaction function” as a positive description for how fiscal policy may
behave, while we refer to a “fiscal rule” as a normative constraint on the conduct of future fiscal
policy. We focus on fiscal rules calibrated to resemble a set of estimated fiscal reaction functions.
3. See, for example, Girouard and André (2005) on the cyclicality of fiscal policy and Afonso
and Hauptmeier (2009) on the response of fiscal policy to the debt.
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effects of this particular type of a fiscal rule and at providing some
early warning of future fiscal pressures according to the desired
degree of fiscal consolidation, which is important since fiscal
consolidation itself has macroeconomic effects. The forecasting
methodology that we set up in this paper may also serve as a frame-
work to analyze the effects of other types of fiscal rules, in
conjunction with previous studies. While we leave a detailed anal-
ysis of the revised SGP to future work, we compare our results with
the debt paths implied by that Pact. We find that our fiscal rules
promote a slower rate of consolidation than the SGP at the outset,
while allowing for a strong rate of consolidation in later periods.4
In this vein, our positive forecasting methodology might also facil-
itate the implementation of a normative fiscal rule and enhance
the credibility of a country’s commitment to it.
1. Specification
Following the specification of fiscal reaction functions in Plödt
and Reicher (2014), our fiscal rule allows for a response of primary
balances to fluctuations in output and to the previous period’s
end-of-period debt-GDP ratio Bt-1/Yt-1. The output response of the
fiscal rule, governed by the coefficient a, reflects the automatic
adjustment of the primary balance to the output gap due to auto-
matic stabilizers along with any other systematic anti-cyclical
policy actions typically undertaken by individual governments.
For instance, if the change in the output gap is minus one percent
following a recession, the primary balance would fall by a times
the fall in output. The debt response of the fiscal rule, governed by
c, reflects the systematic response of the primary balance to the
debt-GDP ratio. Here, we model our rule based on the version of
the fiscal reaction function estimated by Plödt and Reicher (2014)
in first differences, such that:
4. See Barnes, Davidsson, and Rawdanowicz (2012) for a practical evaluation and critical
discussion of the revised SGP, which may encourage a very low steady-state debt ratio.
Additionally, Barnes, Davidsson, and Rawdanowicz (2012) assume that the future path of
output is exogenous, while we assume that output is endogenously determined through a
simple multiplier mechanism. In fact, we have faced significant problems with stability and
existence in simulating the effects of the debt path target under the revised SGP, to the extent
that fiscal multipliers significantly deviate from zero.
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where gt is the potential growth rate of the economy. We focus on
such a parsimonious rule because it captures the twin objectives of
fiscal policy to stabilize output and to stabilize the debt level. Béné-
trix and Lane (2013) and others look at more extensive fiscal
reaction functions, finding some response of the government
balance to the financial cycle. Since we assume that the financial
cycle (and also inflation and interest rates) are exogenous in our
model, we instead use a relatively simple fiscal rule in order to
focus on the issues related to different consolidation speeds.
While the proposed rule of Snower, Burmeister, and Seidel
(2011) is specified in levels, we find in Plödt and Reicher (2014)
that a specification in levels (with a proper allowance for
persistence in residuals) and a specification in first differences both
deliver similar coefficients to each other. Both specifications indi-
cate that fiscal impulses have a high degree of extrinsic persistence.
In practical terms, this set of results implies that the debt-GDP
ratio has a unit root or a near-unit root. This persistence needs to
be taken into account when making forecasts or designing alterna-
tive fiscal rules which resemble past behavior. We use the
specification in first differences because it is more parsimonious
than the specification in levels, and small refinements on our spec-
ification lead to a gradual transition toward more contractionary
fiscal policy in the medium run. As Barnes, Davidsson, and
Rawdanowicz (2012) point out, a specification in levels without an
allowance for a slow transition, such as a “1/20” rule, would force a
sharp contraction of fiscal policy upon impact. Seemingly minor
issues related to the specification of a fiscal rule can yield vastly
different policy prescriptions when put into application.
In addition to our baseline rule, we also consider a rule of the
form:
(2)
The additional term  equals the excess debt ratio, 
∆
1
̅
− ,
∆
1
̅
− .
Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 117i.e. the extent to which the debt-GDP ratio in the previous period
exceeds the critical level bCR. Following Snower, Burmeister, and
Seidel (2011), we set bCR to 0.6 to reflect the 60 percent debt limit
laid out by the SGP. The coefficient dCR captures the degree to
which the primary balance is expected to incrementally adjust in
response to the excess debt ratio, in order to bring the long-run
debt-GDP ratio back below its critical value.
2. Calibration of the fiscal rule
We base our calibration on the estimates presented by Plödt and
Reicher (2014) of a fiscal reaction function that corresponds with
the fiscal rule (1). The estimates are based on yearly data from the
European Commission’s AMECO database, extended with data
from the OECD for Italy and Spain. Most time series begin in the
late 1960s or early 1970s and always end in 2007, in order to allow
us to focus on fiscal policy before the Great Recession. We use
country-specific estimates as well as a panel estimate based on an
unbalanced panel of all euro area countries excluding Luxembourg.
We estimate (1) using two-stage least squares to deal with the
possible endogeneity of output. Please see Plödt and Reicher (2014)
for all details concerning the data and estimation procedure.
Table 1 contains the estimated coefficients governing the fiscal
reaction function for our subset of countries. The panel estimates
indicate a relatively strong average reaction of primary balances to
the business cycle for the euro area, with a response of the primary
balance to the output gap between 0.4 and 0.5. Primary balances in
the euro area also respond strongly, on average, to past debt levels,
with a coefficient of about 0.09. Responses for individual countries
vary, with Germany showing an especially strong degree of fiscal
consolidation in response to the debt and France showing a partic-
ularly strong degree of anti-cyclicality in fiscal policy. Italian fiscal
policy, meanwhile, is nearly acyclical, and it responds moderately
to the debt level. It is worth noting that estimates at the country
level come with a considerable degree of noise, and so we consider
the euro area estimates as well, since these estimates potentially
provide useful information about the conduct of fiscal policy at
the country level.
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher118We start with the estimated fiscal reaction functions as a base-
line. We then vary the degree in our rule to which normal fiscal
policy must be augmented by consolidation when the debt-GDP is
above a certain ratio. By doing this, we can see the extent to which
different required degrees of fiscal consolidation in levels result in
different debt and output paths. These different possible versions
of our rule represent a starting point for thinking about this issue,
and they do not represent the final word on this issue.
3. Forecasting methodology 
We set up a simple framework for medium-run projections
under different assumptions regarding the coefficients governing
the fiscal rule as well as regarding a handful of key parameters. To
do this, we first derive the counterfactual level of output that
would prevail in the absence of meaningful fiscal policy. We
assume that output is related to the primary balance and to the
baseline level of output through a simple multiplier relationship.
Then, based on the fiscal rule and the law of motion for debt, we
jointly derive the equilibrium primary balance, level of debt, and
level of output through time. By comparing the paths of these
objects under different sets of assumptions, we can understand the
role which different assumptions may play in affecting the likely
future path of fiscal policy.
3.1. Deriving the baseline level of output
To account for the endogeneity of output, we derive a “zero-
fiscal” baseline level of actual and potential output featuring no
debt or primary net lending or borrowing. Zero-fiscal output is the
Table 1. Estimation results for a fiscal reaction function in first differences
Country const. c a
Germany -0.006 (0.004) 0.526 (0.171) 0.470 (0.353)
Italy -0.001 (0.003) 0.129 (0.079) 0.074 (0.317)
Spain 0.001 (0.002) 0.026 (0.049) 0.629 (0.203)
France -0.004 (0.002) 0.216 (0.092) 1.039 (0.390)
Panel 0.000 (0.001) 0.087 (0.021) 0.443 (0.110)
This table corresponds to table 5 in Plödt and Reicher (2014).
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 119level of output that would prevail in the absence of any fiscal inter-
ventions. We assume that zero-fiscal output is exogenous to the
fiscal policymaker.
First, we assume a simple multiplier relationship, where output
is equal to zero-fiscal output Y*t plus the effects of the primary
balance Pt mediated through a multiplier m, such that:
(3)
Similarly, potential output is equal to zero-fiscal potential
output Y*t plus the effects of the long-run (potential) primary
balance Pt mediated through a multiplier m, such that:
(4)
where Pt is given by the formula:
(5)
where ιt and πt equal the assumed trend interest rate and trend
inflation rate, respectively.
We calculate zero-fiscal actual and potential output in this
manner through 2014, based on forecasts published by the Euro-
pean Commission. We then calculate the zero-fiscal log output
gap, which is equal to log(Y*t /Y*t). We assume that in the years
beyond 2014, the zero-fiscal log output gap is equal to 0.8 times its
previous value, and that zero-fiscal potential output grows at its
trend rate gt. We then calculate the path of zero-fiscal output Y*t
implied by these two laws of motion. This value is used as an input
into the next step.
3.2. Forecasting the primary balance and output level
Equations (2) and (3) jointly determine the equilibrium fiscal
balance in the years after 2014. By combining the two equations
and using our forecast values of Y*t, we generate our forecast value
of Pt  which satisfies the condition:
(6)
 *
∗  .
( ̅ )
( )( ̅ )
,
=
1
( ∗ ) , aY
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher120where:
(7)
We assume that the white noise process εt is set to zero in the
future. Given a value of Pt from (6), we calculate Yt using (3).
Finally, we calculate the end-of-period debt stock using the law of
motion:
(8)
We iterate through these steps beginning in 2015 (the year in
which we assume the fiscal rule to take effect) and then for every
following year in the subsequent two decades.
4. The effects of different fiscal rules
4.1. Specification of convergence scenarios
We first simulate the path of the debt-GDP ratio and the
primary balance-GDP ratio under our rule in first differences using
potential output as a structural indicator, for both country-specific
and euro area-wide fiscal rule coefficients. We then conduct an
exercise to see what role the choice of different coefficients dCR on
the excess debt level may play, for a range of realistic values for
that coefficient in conjunction with the euro area-wide fiscal rule
coefficients. We argue that the choice of dCR faces a tradeoff
between medium-run debt stabilization and the desire for an
accommodative fiscal policy path in the medium run. We choose
coefficient values of dCR that are in line with the euro area-wide
estimates of Plödt and Reicher (2014). Estimates for individual
countries of dCR are not available due to the limited experiences of
many individual countries above the 60 percent threshold.
We always assume a debt criterion of bCR = 0.6 and a fiscal
multiplier of m = 0.9. We allow the other parameters to vary. We
calibrate our other parameter values to reflect the recent experi-
ences of the countries in question. For the baseline values of 1+gt
and 1+πt  we use the geometric mean of gross growth in potential
GDP and in the GDP deflator over the period 1999-2012, which
includes periods both before and after the crisis. In the same vein,
=
1
̅
. b
=
( )
( )
. 
Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 121we assume that the trend interest rate it equals its mean over the
period 1999-2012. Table 2 summarizes the baseline calibration. We
investigate the effects of different assumptions regarding these
quantities in the subsequent section.
Figures 1 through 4 show the projections for Germany, Italy,
Spain, and France, respectively, under four calibrations of the
fiscal rule. For each of these figures, we plot the path of the debt-
GDP ratio in the upper left panel and the path of the primary
balance-GDP ratio in the upper right panel. Projections for real
GDP are displayed in the bottom panel of each figure. In addition,
we compare the implied debt paths with those given by a simple
“1/20” rule according to the Fiscal Compact. We have attempted
to compute paths of the primary balance and of output which
would support the “1/20” debt path. Unfortunately, for high debt-
multiplier combinations such as those encountered in our simula-
tions, we find that such paths do not in general exist. The main
problem lies in that the debt-GDP ratio consists of two parts – a
debt part and a GDP part. Above a certain debt threshold, an
attempted fiscal contraction actually raises the debt ratio on
impact, through multiplier effects on output. For realistic param-
eter values, a strict adherence to the “1/20” debt path in fact leads
to explosive oscillations in output, the primary balance, and the
level of the debt. We hope to address this important issue in future
work related to the design and implementability of fiscal rules,
restricting our current exercise to a simulation of a primary
balance rule calibrated to past data.
     
Table 2. Baseline calibration of additional parameters
Country (1+gt) (1+πt) (1+ιt)
(1+ιt)
(1+πt) (1+gt)
Germany 1.0129 1.0089 1.0440 1.0216
Italy 1.0069 1.0207 1.0493 1.0210
Spain 1.0235 1.0274 1.0463 0.9950
France 1.0155 1.0180 1.0433 1.0092
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher122Figure 1. Projections for Germany under fiscal rule
Implications of different designs of the fiscal rule
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, solid line: EA-wide
estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 2). Blue, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.005
(scenario 3). Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.01 (scenario 4). Black, dotted line: "1/20" rule.
Figure 2. Projections for Italy under fiscal rule 
Implications of different designs of the fiscal rule
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, solid line: EA-wide
estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 2). Blue, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.005
(scenario 3). Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.01 (scenario 4). Black, dotted line: "1/20" rule.
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Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 123Figure 3. Projections for Spain under fiscal rule
Implications of different designs of the fiscal rule
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, solid line: EA-wide
estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 2). Blue, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.005
(scenario 3). Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.01 (scenario 4). Black, dotted line: "1/20" rule.
Figure 4. Projections for France under fiscal rule 
Implications of different designs of the fiscal rule
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, solid line: EA-wide
estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 2). Blue, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.005
(scenario 3). Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR=0.01 (scenario 4). Black, dotted line: "1/20" rule.
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Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher124In our current simulations, we distinguish between the
following different scenarios in terms of the design of the fiscal rule:
1. Country-specific estimates for the pre-crisis response to the
business cycle a and to debt growth c (see Table 1). The debt
level correction factor dCR is set to zero. This baseline
scenario is intended to illustrate a fiscal rule based on the
individual characteristics of each euro area country’s fiscal
policymaking process.
2. Euro area-wide estimates for the pre-crisis response to the
business cycle a and to debt growth c (see Table 1). The debt
level correction factor dCR is set to zero. This scenario allows
for a comparison between the fiscal policy paths implied by
country-specific fiscal policy and an average euro area-wide
fiscal policy process.
3. Euro area-wide estimates for the pre-crisis response to the
business cycle a and to debt growth c (see Table 1). The debt
level correction factor dCR is set to 0.005, which is within the
confidence bands presented by Plödt and Reicher (2014).
4. Euro area-wide estimates for the pre-crisis response to the
business cycle a and to debt growth c (see Table 1). The debt
level correction factor dCR is set to 0.01, which is double the
value from the previous scenario.
4.2. Results for different convergence scenarios 
Projections for all four countries suggest a high sensitivity of the
path of the debt-GDP ratio to small changes in dCR over a twenty-
year forecast horizon, with the larger differences coming later in the
horizon. Projections for Germany (Figure 1) suggest that a fiscal rule
calibrated to scenario 1 or scenario 2 would result in a rapid stabili-
zation of the debt-GDP ratio at a level near 80 percent (scenario 1)
or 70 percent (scenario 2). The difference between these two debt
paths comes about because Germany would be expected to reduce
its primary surplus more rapidly under scenario 1 than under
scenario 2 in response to a rapid fall in the debt-GDP ratio early
during the forecast period. Increasing dCR from zero to 0.005
(scenario 3) would result in a debt-GDP ratio of about 65 percent in
twenty years, while increasing dCR to 0.01 (scenario 3) seems suffi-
cient to reduce the debt-GDP ratio to below 60 percent within the
next twenty years. All four scenarios imply a path for the primary
Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 125surplus that does not exceed three percent of GDP, with longer-
term primary surpluses all relatively close to their current values.
For Italy, the different fiscal rule scenarios would imply a much
wider range of variation in the paths of future debt and primary
balances (Figure 2). Scenarios 1 and 2 would result in a debt-GDP
ratio in twenty years’ time of about 120 percent and 110 percent,
respectively, with a primary surplus stabilized at about three
percent of GDP. The future path of the debt-GDP ratio is extremely
sensitive to dCR. A value of 0.005 (scenario 3) would reduce Italy’s
debt-GDP ratio to about 80 percent in twenty years, and a value of
0.01 (scenario 4) would result in a debt-GDP ratio below 60 percent.
However, both of these rules would require a primary surplus ratio
of about five percent and over six percent of GDP, respectively.
Were Italy to credibly reduce its debt-GDP ratio below 60 percent in
twenty years, it would require an ambitious degree of fiscal
austerity in the medium term. Note that the medium-run debt-GDP
ratio implied by scenario 4 would be relatively close to the ratio
based on a simple “1/20” rule, with the “1/20” rule requiring a more
aggressive rate of debt reduction in the shorter run.
Projections for Spain (Figure 3) all point toward a persistently
high debt-GDP ratio in the medium run, as Spain must first slow
the growth in its debt-GDP ratio before actively working to reduce
it. Scenarios 1 and 2 would result in a debt-GDP ratio which would
level off at about 120 or 110 percent, respectively, in twenty years.
Even with larger consolidation coefficients (scenarios 3 and 4), the
debt ratio does not fall below 60 percent within twenty years,
although it begins to fall rapidly in the later years. Spanish fiscal
consolidation is accomplished at first with a slow move toward
small primary surpluses from large primary deficits. While Italian
fiscal consolidation faces challenges from the size of the surpluses
required to significantly reduce the debt-GDP ratio, Spanish fiscal
consolidation faces fewer challenges along that particular dimen-
sion. Under all four scenarios, Spain would be allowed to run
substantial primary deficits in the short run.
Projections for France (Figure 4) depend strongly on assump-
tions regarding dCR. Projections without an explicit level
component (scenarios 1 and 2) seem to result in debt-GDP ratios
which stabilize around 90 or above 100 percent of GDP, respec-
tively. Under scenario 3, the debt-GDP ratio remains near
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher12685 percent after twenty years, while under scenario 4, the debt-
GDP ratio falls to nearly 70 percent. While none of these scenarios
results in a debt-GDP ratio below 60 percent, scenario 4 results in a
significant reduction of the debt-GDP ratio. Scenario 4 would
require a primary surplus ratio of about three percent of GDP in the
medium run while allowing for short-run deficits.
Altogether, based on the four scenarios, a debt reduction coeffi-
cient dCR of 0.01 would substantially set the debt ratio onto a
sustained downward path in all four countries. For two of the four
countries, the debt ratio would not reach 60 percent after twenty
years, although it would fall significantly from current levels. For
Italy, such a degree of consolidation would come at the cost of a
primary balance in excess of six percent of GDP, which is extremely
high compared with historical experience for advanced countries.
For the other three countries, consolidation would not have nearly
such drastic implications for the primary balance. For France and
especially Spain, consolidation would happen gradually, with a
slow transition from primary deficits to primary surpluses occurring
over several years. Differences in the level of real GDP are relatively
minor across scenarios, with Italy again being the main exception.
Here, the medium-run level of real GDP under scenario 4, would be
around 2 percent smaller than under scenario 1.
5. Effects of growth and interest rate scenarios
5.1. Specification of growth and interest rate scenarios
To illustrate the relationship among fiscal policy, growth, and
interest rates, we first note that the law of motion (8) implies the
following law of motion for the debt-GDP ratio:
(9)
where 1+gt equals the gross growth rate of output Yt /Yt–1. In order
to maintain a constant debt-GDP ratio, the primary balance ratio
must be given by:
(10)
=
( )
( )( )
− , 
( )
( )( )
.
Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 127Based on equation (10), the primary balance ratio necessary to
maintain a stable debt ratio is increasing in the debt ratio and
interest rates and decreasing in inflation and growth.
Based on the logic of equation (10), we quantitatively evaluate
three additional scenarios, using scenario 1 as a baseline. To the
degree that different growth and interest rate scenarios affect the
constraints faced by governments, future fiscal policy must adjust to
accommodate these realities. The additional scenarios are as follows:
5. Scenario 1, but with potential growth 0.5 percentage points
higher than previously projected.
6. Scenario 1, but with potential growth 0.5 percentage points
lower than previously projected.
7. Scenario 1, but with trend interest rates 1 percentage point
higher than previously projected.
Given the obvious uncertainty particularly with regard to long-
run growth paths, scenarios 5 through 7 might offer some informa-
tion about the robustness of the fiscal policy projections under
scenario 1.
5.2. Results for different growth and interest rate scenarios
Figures 5 through 8 examine the effects of these three different
scenarios in comparison with scenario 1. In all four cases, as
expected, a higher growth projection results in a somewhat lower
debt-GDP ratio with a somewhat lower primary surplus. A lower
growth projection results in a somewhat higher debt-GDP ratio
with a somewhat higher primary surplus. The effects are somewhat
larger in absolute terms in countries with a higher debt ratio, such
as Italy, and somewhat smaller in countries such as France and
Germany. As with lower growth, a higher interest rate also affects
the future path of fiscal policy in all four countries. Not surpris-
ingly, a higher interest rate will result in a higher debt-GDP ratio
and a higher primary balance required to stabilize that ratio. Again,
the effects of higher interest rates are larger in absolute value for
countries with a higher debt level, with a one percentage point
higher interest rate pushing the Italian primary surplus by the end
of the forecast period up toward a level close to four percent of
GDP. This is in the absence of any meaningful consolidation in
debt levels. In contrast, a higher interest rates only marginally
affects countries’ future path of real GDP.              
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher128Figure 5. Projections for Germany under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, dashed line: Growth
projections 0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 5). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage
points lower (scenario 6). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 7).
Figure 6. Projections for Italy under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, dashed line: Growth
projections 0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 5). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage
points lower (scenario 6). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 7).
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Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 129Figure 7. Projections for Spain under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, dashed line: Growth
projections 0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 5). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage
points lower (scenario 6). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 7).
Figure 8. Projections for France under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Black, solid line: Country-specific estimates of a and c, no correction factor (scenario 1). Red, dashed line: Growth
projections 0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 5). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage
points lower (scenario 6). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 7).
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Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher130Scenarios 5 through 7 reflect the effects of different growth and
interest rate outcomes on countries under a situation where they
do not seek to consolidate the debt-GDP ratio to a level below
60 percent. To the extent that this remains a goal, we evaluate
three more analogous scenarios taking this goal into account.
Under these three scenarios, we start with scenario 4 (the euro
area-wide fiscal rule with a consolidation coefficient dCR of 0.01) as
a baseline. These scenarios are as follows:
8. Scenario 4, but with potential growth 0.5 percentage points
higher than previously projected.
9. Scenario 4, but with potential growth 0.5 percentage points
lower than previously projected.
10.Scenario 4, but with trend interest rates 1 percentage point
higher than previously projected.
These scenarios enumerate the constraints faced by policy-
makers who wish to significantly reduce their debt levels under
different possible growth and interest rate outcomes.
Figures 9 through 12 describe the different paths of the debt-
GDP ratio and primary balance-GDP ratio under scenarios 8
through 10 against a baseline of scenario 4. As expected, a higher
growth rate again puts less pressure onto fiscal policymakers to run
primary surpluses, while a lower growth rate or higher interest rate
would result in higher primary surpluses required to reduce the
debt. Under all of these scenarios, the debt-GDP ratio follows a
similar path relative to scenario 4, for all four countries. What
differs is the primary balance required to support these debt paths.
In Germany, Spain, and France, the primary surplus required to
support these debt paths remains below four percent of GDP
throughout the forecast horizon. For Italy, the situation is
different. Scenario 4 already requires a primary surplus above six
percent of GDP at its peak. A more favorable growth path
(scenario 8) would result in primary surpluses below those under
scenario 4, though still in excess of five percent of GDP at its peak.
A less-favorable growth path (scenario 9) or interest rate path
(scenario 10) would put yet more pressure on Italy to run
extremely large primary surpluses. To the extent that governments
face constraints against running such large primary surpluses, Italy
may experience difficulties in implementing a fiscal rule that
features strong consolidation in the level of debt if potential
growth were to fall below its baseline rate.    
Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 131Figure 9. Projections for Germany under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR = 0.01 (scenario 4). Red, dashed line: Growth projections
0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 8). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage points lower
(scenario 9). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 10).
Figure 10. Projections for Italy under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR = 0.01 (scenario 4). Red, dashed line: Growth projections
0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 8). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage points lower
(scenario 9). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 10).
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Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher132Figure 11. Projections for Spain under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR = 0.01 (scenario 4). Red, dashed line: Growth projections
0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 8). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage points lower
(scenario 9). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 10).
Figure 12. Projections for France under fiscal rule
Implications of different macroeconomic projections
Green, solid line: EA-wide estimates of a and c, dCR = 0.01 (scenario 4). Red, dashed line: Growth projections
0.5 percentage points higher (scenario 8). Blue, dashed line: Growth projections 0.5 percentage points lower
(scenario 9). Green, dashed line: Interest rate projections 1 percentage point higher (scenario 10).
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Primary balance and debt projections for euro area countries 1336. Conclusion
We have explored a number of different scenarios regarding the
future path of fiscal policy in four major euro area countries using
a simple and flexible fiscal rule, based on the past behavior of fiscal
policy. This rule features a strong degree of anti-cyclical fiscal
policy, consolidation in debt growth, and possibly consolidation
in debt levels. Our results with respect to different fiscal rules indi-
cate that subtle differences in the debt level consolidation
coefficient dCR may have large effects on the path of the future
debt-GDP ratio over a horizon of twenty years. For countries such
as Italy, a high rate of debt consolidation would come at the cost of
an extremely high ratio of the primary surplus to GDP. For
Germany, Spain, and France, consolidation in the debt level
toward the 60 percent cutoff would not require such large primary
surpluses. In all four countries, under the rule that we analyze,
consolidation would occur incrementally, so that a rapid increase
in primary surpluses does not occur at the outset.
The level of the primary surplus needed in order to stabilize and
reduce the debt ratio varies positively with the interest rate and
negatively with the growth rate of real GDP. However, even if
potential growth were to improve by 0.5 percentage points per
year, a rapid pace of consolidation in Italy would still require a
primary surplus ratio above five percent of GDP. Under a variety of
growth and interest rate assumptions, Germany, Spain, and France
would still require a primary surplus below four percent of GDP.
We caution that our results assume away any other fiscal policy
shocks or business cycle shocks. Our forecasts, therefore, should be
viewed as a rough guide as to the characteristics of different consol-
idation scenarios based on past behavior, rather than as providing
a full set of stochastic confidence intervals.
A useful set of extensions to our exercise would be to compare
our results with those from alternative fiscal rules, in order to illu-
minate the tradeoffs policymakers face when choosing the form of
a fiscal rule. Our attempts to simulate the “1/20” rule indicate that
a poorly-designed rule might actually destabilize the economy at
worst or be unenforceable at best. We believe that given that a
fiscal rule is desired, a flexible, simple rule that substantially resem-
bles past behavior would be more likely to succeed. Our results also
indicate that an accurate reading of the potential growth rate in
Martin Plödt and Claire Reicher134the economy may help to produce significantly more precise
projections of future primary balances. The accurate estimation of
potential growth is a particular issue in countries such as Spain (as
well as Ireland and Greece). The difficulty of measuring potential
growth and the level of the output gap in real time may lead to
misleading inferences regarding future fiscal pressures.
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It is well-known that estimates of fiscal policy effects differ a lot. In this
paper we try get some idea of the magnitude of these differences and the under-
lying reasons for these differences. In the European Monetary Union we face
wide cross-country differences in fiscal institutions and key fiscal parameters,
some of which may also vary over time (business cycle). Moreover, these effects
may also depend on trade spillover effects and thus on the extent of policy coor-
dination. Our empirical analyses make use of data for 15 EU countries, mainly
for the period 1970-2011. The results clearly indicate that fiscal multipliers are
much larger during economic recessions. By contrast, the policy coordination-
effects appear to be more homogenous, although it turns out that small coun-
tries may benefit more from coordination. Still, cross-country differences seem
to dominate these average features of the results. 
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 Fiscal policy in the EU faces a number of challenges. In the
first place there are longer run pressures due to ageing and to the
competition from countries such as China with low wage rates and
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Matti Viren136seemingly abundant labor reserves. Second, several structural
problems in terms of the function of the labor markets, production
of public services and changing the industrial structure of the
economy have hindered economic growth. Finally, the recent
financial crisis has shown the vulnerability of the fiscal position of
several EU countries due to problems of banking crisis, loss of
competitiveness in the foreign trade, and an inability to control
public expenditures and revenues. 
We often pretend that we know pretty well how fiscal policies
affect the economy, but if we spend some time in figuring out what
are really the right values we easily find some problems. Although
a simple Keynesian textbook model seems to give an unambiguous
answer we have keep in mind that even that model provides
different set of results depending on openness of the country,
exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy not to speak
about possible capacity constraints in terms of labor and capital.
Government budget constraint makes also a lot of difference even
in the case where we do not literally demand a balanced budget.
The case becomes much more complicated if we consider intertem-
poral extension of the model and deal with expectations and
beliefs. Another sort of complications is caused by possible time-
invariances of basic relationships. The effect of policies can be very
different in the case of normal times and great depressions when
consumers and firms face more stringent budget and liquidity
constrains due to rationing e.g. in the labor market. So even
without the possibility of things like debt neutrality we would end
up with a large menu of possible values for fiscal parameters (see
e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2010) as a useful summary of the basic
models and their properties). 
It is not only the economic environment which makes the
difference. Also the way of modeling the fiscal policy transmission
mechanism shows up in the results. The most striking example is a
prototype DSGE model into which the debt neutrality property is
typically imposed. Even though we may soften the impact of debt
neutrality in the short run this property dominates in the long-
run. Thus it is really no point of using a DSGE model to evaluate
the size of the fiscal multiplier unless one wants just to demon-
strate the properties of some specific model. Other models are not,
of course, free of this kind of a priori constraints. Already the way in
How different are the fiscal policy effects? 137which long-run growth is modeled is important. In other words
the question is, do we only model deviations from equilibrium
growth path or actual growth. 
Clearly, we need up-to-date estimates of the effectiveness of
fiscal policy in different countries and different times. As for the
size of the multipliers, we have several estimates which at least
point roughly to the same direction; see Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Romer and Romer (2010),
Coenen et al. (2010), Barro and Redlick (2011). Of these, Romer
and Romer (2010) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) represent the
two extremes whereas the others come close to one in the short
run and converge to zero in the long run. Because the underlying
models are so different, this comparison is not fair but even so the
truth is that the differences are strikingly large. This is also
confirmed by a recent meta data study by Gechert and Will (2012). 
It is more difficult to say whether the multipliers are time-
invariant. Then at least from a single country perspective the most
compelling question is, whether the fiscal multipliers are the same
in booms and recessions. We already have quite fair amount of
evidence that the multipliers are not constant; see Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012) for striking differences between boom and
bust values. Ilzetzki et al. (2011) and Corsetti et al. (2012) provide
ample evidence of violations of invariance, especially in terms of
exchange rate arrangements, level of debt and financial crises. It is
also evident that the composition of taxes and spending can make
a big difference Alesina and Perotti (1997) as can the manner in
which the fiscal actions are carried out (gradual or one-for-all
changes in relevant policy parameters; see IMF, 2010; Broadbent
and Daly, 2010).
Another issue that remains largely unexplored concerns policy
coordination: how much of a difference does it make if certain
types of policies are pursued in several countries instead in a single
country? Of course we know something of the consequences of
policy coordination (see e.g. Branson et al., 1990; Canzoneri and
Minford, 1988; Kehoe, 1987-1988; Oudiz and Sachs, 1984; Rogoff,
1985) for some key references and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2010) for a
nice summary of basic results), but we know little of the empirical
facts. This is mainly due to the difficulty of evaluating the benefits
from coordination. We would really need a multi-country model
Matti Viren138to obtain the relevant estimates. Unfortunately, we have relatively
few models that can be used for this purpose. In this study we
tackle this problem by using (in addition to a multi-country struc-
tural model) a set of reduced form models that include cross-
country dependencies. 
Thus far, the EU has not attempted fiscal coordination in the
strict sense – there are no directives telling the member states how
fiscal policy is to be set as part of some annual “plan” – albeit we do
have what the European Commission (2002) describes as “weak co-
ordination” via the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG).
There are also rules on budgetary balances laid out in the SGP
(described by the European Commission (2002) as “strong co-ordi-
nation”). The BEPG has no legal force and relies on peer pressure
for the achievement of budgetary balance. In contrast, the SGP has
in principle some coercive powers but in fact no penalties have
been imposed despite a deluge of breaches, and the whole pact has
become a dead letter. The new 2011 Treaty (European Union,
2011) on stability, coordination and governance promulgates a
definite change in the degree of coordination (even though it
cannot be characterized as coordination but rather an attempt to
speed up convergence) and creates the potential for a full conver-
gence of fiscal policies. This treaty may also signal a convergence to
a fiscal union in which government debt would be common to the
union and some taxes could be federalized. 
Here, we do not consider these presumably remote possibilities
but concentrate instead on more technical findings on effects of
coordinated fiscal policy effects. When we do this, we have to use
historical data to estimate the relevant parameters. And then we
have a problem which sounds like the Lucas critique. It boils down
to questions such as: can we assume that the historical data just
reflect purely non-coordinated fiscal policies in different countries
and can we assume that the structure and parameters of the
models is invariant in terms of the degree of policy co-ordination.
These are tough questions and it is not at all obvious that the
answer is yes. 
All in all, the contribution of the paper is in the joint analysis of
asymmetries in fiscal multipliers and policy coordination. Thus, we
want to extend the single-country analysis towards an open-
economy setting. In addition to these issues, also the nature of
How different are the fiscal policy effects? 139cross-country differences (e.g., small vs. large countries) is scruti-
nized in the paper. Several different models are used to ensure that
the results are not just model-specific. Model comparisons may also
tell something about the level of uncertainty that is caused by the
choice of the particular model. We try to get a reasonably good idea
of the range of values of the relevant fiscal policy effects. If nothing
else, this range may be used in assessing the nature of optimal poli-
cies in the Brainard uncertainty framework (Brainard, 1967). In the
empirical analysis, we use data even up to 2012 and thus we can
control the effects of the recent financial and debt crisis. 
The structure of paper is straightforward. In section 1, we scruti-
nize the simple VAR model estimation results, mainly to quantify
the cross-country differences and possible cyclical asymmetries
(1.1), then make use of the multi-country model of the NIESR
called NiGEM to examine the dependence of multipliers on
country size and coordination (1.2), after which we use the IMF
(2010) model to compare different consolidation strategies and
also to scrutinize the asymmetry and coordination effects within
this model (1.3). Finally we use the simple structural equations
(reaction functions) for different fiscal variables to test for the
asymmetry (invariance) property. Some concluding remarks follow
in section 2. 
1. Empirical analyses
1.1. Time-series analysis  
In analyzing the nature of asymmetry and coordination effects
we used a set of slightly differing models to ensure that the results
are reasonably robust in terms of model specification. As pointed
out above, first we use relatively simple three-variable VAR models.
Then we turn to the NiGEM multi-country model, to estimate the
multipliers and scrutinize the effects of policy coordination. As an
alternative to NiGEM we employ the recent IMF model (IMF, 2010)
which is also used in Stehn et al. (2011) with the data from Devries
et al. (2011). To examine the asymmetry issue, we also estimate a
set of simple nonlinear (threshold) models for main fiscal variables
from the data set of EU countries (using the same approach as in
Mayes and Viren, 2011). 
Matti Viren140As a start, we specify and estimate a simple VAR model that has
been used e.g. in Viren (2000). Our aim is not so much to get new
multiplier estimates but rather to get an idea of the nature and
magnitude of cross-country differences in fiscal policy transmis-
sion mechanisms. For this purpose, we estimated a three-variable
VAR with output growth (DY), the real interest rate (RR) and the
deficit-GDP ratio (DEF). Impulse responses were computed by the
Cholesky decomposition (using variables the above ordering). The
panel-data-based IRF values for 10 periods are presented in Figure 1
(estimates are based on annual data from EU15 countries for the
period 1971-2011). We also estimated the models for each single
country and computed average values for the impulse response
functions. In the latter case, the results were virtually identical to
the results illustrated in Figure 1; to save space we do not show
them here. 
By and large, the IRFs make sense in indicating that fiscal
contraction does indeed reduce output substantially, though the
multiplier appears to be less than one. On the other hand, a one
percentage point (positive) shock to GDP growth increases the
surplus to GDP ratio by more than a half percentage point in the
short run. It is interesting to compare the IRFs over countries, espe-
cially because they appear to differ hugely for certain variables.
This is especially true for the effect of government surplus/deficit
on GDP growth. The average value of the correlation coefficients is
practically nil (0.011). Slightly higher values are obtained for the
correlations for real interest rate effects on output growth (0.145)
Figure 1. Selected impulse responses from panel data  
Response to Cholesky One SD Innovations ± 2 SE
These are derived from a three-variable VAR that is estimated from cross-country panel data. The data consist of
15 EU countries and cover years 1971-2011. 
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How different are the fiscal policy effects? 141and real interest rate effects on government deficit (0.269) but only
for the impulse responses of government deficit to output growth
do we see reasonable similarity (the average value of IRF correla-
tions is 0.779).
Clearly, the results tell us that fiscal policy transmission mecha-
nisms do indeed differ widely as they reflect deeper differences in
fiscal institutions, fiscal rules and structure of the economy. Again
this fact emerges in the end of section 1.4 (Figure 8). 
As for the sizes of the fiscal multipliers, they appear to be rela-
tively small and time-variant. In this respect they are quite similar
to those in Corsetti et al. (2012) who in summarizing their evidence
point out “Output multipliers are virtually zero in our baseline”
(p. 533). Indeed, when we estimate the value from the panel data
representation for Δy > 0, the maximum value of the cumulative
response multiplier is only 0.11. But when we scrutinize the nega-
tive values of output growth, Δy < 0, the corresponding maximum
value of the multiplier is actually 1.18, which is obviously close to
the “standard” value.2,3
1.2. Multi-country model simulations 
To assess the importance of policy coordination for policy effec-
tiveness we used the NiGEM multi-country model to compare the
effects of different fiscal policy actions in the single country setting
and in the case of collective policy action.4 In the simulations
public consumption was first increased in all EU countries in an
un-coordinated way (country-by-country). 
In all cases the coordinated fiscal expansion produces an almost
twice as large increase in output as does an uncoordinated fiscal
expansion in the form of an increased volume of government
consumption (Figure 2). As expected we find that, with uncoordi-
2. See Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2010) for more extensive comparison. 
3. In comparing fiscal multipliers, we have to be somewhat cautious because some of them are
based on the level of income, some on the growth rate of income and some on output gap
which itself can computed in several different ways.  
4. NiGEM is an estimated quarterly New-Keynesian macro model for almost all OECD
countries and country blocks outside OECD (NIESR (1999). In evaluating the effects of fiscal
policy, an obvious analytical framework is provided by (structural) VAR models (see Blanchard
and Perotti,2002; Dalsgaard and De Serres,1999; Viren, 2000 and Ilzetzki et al., 2011). But
because we concentrate here on the policy coordination problem, structural multi-country
models are more convenient. 
Matti Viren142nated policy actions, small countries are not able to achieve much
(mainly because of import leakage).
The multiplier values for uncoordinated fiscal policy effects in
small countries are generally only about 0.5. For large countries,
the values exceed unity but only slightly. The average value for all
countries is 0.72 (with four lags) and 0.63 (with eight lags), and the
average maximum value is 0.85. With coordinated policies, there is
not much difference between small and large countries; the
average multiplier value is 1.25 (with four lags) and 1.17 (with
eight lags), and the average maximum value is 1.46. This
represents an improvement for all countries, but especially for the
smaller ones. The multiplier values (in the coordination case) are
in fact quite close to the values obtained by Cohen and Follette
(1999) with the US FRB/US macroeconomic model.5 By and large
Figure 2. Maximum effects of a one per cent increase in public consumption 
on GDP with and without policy coordination
In %
        Source: NiGEM model simulations. 
5. The Cohen and Follette (1999) value for US data (with four lags) was 1.23 which may be
compared with our average EMU10 value of 1.25. When the tax rates were set to zero in the
FRB/US model the multiplier increased to 1.35, which indicates how much (or how little)
automatic stabilisers will affect the multiplier. Interestingly the multiplier value of 1.25 implies
a relatively small marginal propensity to consume. Assuming the average tax rate is 0.4 we come
to a marginal propensity to consume of about 0.3 only (or 0.4 if we account for imports).
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How different are the fiscal policy effects? 143they agree with the more recent DSGE model predictions (see
Coenen et al., 2010 and Freeman et al., 2009). The Coenen et al.
(2010) paper compares the results for different models while the
Freeman et al. (2009) paper mainly compares the results for
different countries using the IMF multi-country model. 
The values are a bit higher than the original SVAR values
obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (1999), which are close to one.
More recent analyses by Ilzetzki et al. (2011) with data from 45
countries find values which clearly encompass our predictions
(their multiplier values are very different for closed and open econ-
omies as well as for fixed and flexible exchange rate countries). The
multiplier values in the uncoordinated case are, of course very low
(suggesting that the marginal propensity to spend out of income is
very low and the income elasticity of imports is very high), but
even for coordinated fiscal policies the multipliers are not particu-
larly high, although they clearly indicate fiscal policies
effectiveness. Note also that for coordinated policies the output
effect diminishes more rapidly than for coordinated policies.
The effect of an increase in public consumption on government
deficits is almost equally clear. Deficits increase, but because
output also increases the effect on the deficit-GDP ratio differs
from the pure deficit effect. The values for various countries are
surprisingly different, reflecting the differences in output effects.
In other respects, it is difficult to know why the country results
differ so much (the country size and the public sector size do not
seem to explain the magnitudes of the output and deficit effects).
As noted earlier, gains from coordination seem to be much
larger for small countries (Figure 4) whereas large countries may
manage well without coordination because of their higher multi-
plier values (Figure 3). This accords of course well with the text-
book analysis of fiscal policy (the same result is obtained by Ilzetzki
et al., 2011). This country-size relationship obviously creates
different incentives for small and large countries vis-à-vis policy
cooperation and has interesting political economy implications for
fiscal policy.   
So far, we have considered only public consumption but the
picture for direct taxes is very similar. Coordination makes great
difference in output effects but the results are less clear for the
Matti Viren144Figure 3. Country-size and effectiveness of fiscal policy 
                Multiplier vs GDP 
Values on the y-axis represent short-run (4-quarter) multipliers. GDP values (x-axis) are for year 2000. 
Figure 4. Country-size and benefits of coordination 
              Coordination vs GDP 
The y-axis indicates the ratio between the multipliers with coordinated and uncoordinated fiscal policies. 
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How different are the fiscal policy effects? 145deficit-GDP ratio. The problem is with the output effects. When
taxes are increased, output and income decrease, which eliminates
part of tax revenues and – ceteris paribus – increases the deficit-GDP
ratio because of lower output. 
When dealing with fiscal policy simulation, an obvious ques-
tion is what happens to interest rates. The answer provided by the
NiGEM model is “not very much’. Thus, imposing the inflation
targeting assumption for monetary policy produces only a five
basis-point increase in long rates, with coordinated policies. In the
case of uncoordinated policies, the result is virtually nil. This latter
result obviously contrasts sharply with all the theory on credibility
and peso effects (but not necessarily with empirical evidence; see
e.g. Alesina et al., 1992). The problem is that (with all models) it is
difficult to account for direct expectations and portfolio effects.
This weakness may also be crucial with regard to the assessment of
policy coordination effects within the EU.
The implication of these results is interesting. On the one hand
they show that it is the small countries that have most to gain from
policy coordination. However, one can reverse the argument and
say that the other countries have the least to lose if it is small coun-
tries which do not achieve a high level of coordination.
Historically, coordination among the EU countries has been fairly
weak except for the countries that track the Deutschemark. There
will therefore have to be a considerable change in behavior if this is
to occur in future. The (old and new) SGP may have only a limited
effect here since limiting the size of deficits is only part of the
problem. Indeed it is only when fiscal policy is not coordinated
that this is likely to be a problem, as such anomalies occur mainly
when small countries experience asymmetric shocks. Of course,
small countries may have comparative advantage with other poli-
cies, take for instance wage policy. 
1.3. The composition of fiscal policy measures  
Now, we turn to the IMF (2010) model, which is basically a
simple reduced form equation where the dependent variable is
output growth and the right-hand-side variables consist of fixed
country and time effects as well lagged output growth and fiscal
consolidation indicators constructed separately for tax-based
consolidation programs, spending-cuts-based programs and
Matti Viren146combined consolidation programs. All of these are expressed in
terms of GDP. One might argue that these data are more reliable
than the conventional measures, based on the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance.6 This model has been estimated by several
authors and institutes (e.g. Stehn et al., 2011, and Alesina and
Ardagna, 2012) using OECD data for 1979-2009. Using the original
model as a point of reference, we write the estimating equation as: 
Δyt = a0 + a1Δyt-1 + a2Δyt-2 + a3Fiscalt + a4Fiscalt-1 + a5Fiscalt-2 
+ fixed time and cross-section effects + ut , (1) 
where y denotes log GDP, and Fiscal the size of fiscal consolidation
– either in the form of taxes, spending cuts, or in total – all in terms
of GDP. The set of equations is estimated in a panel data setting
with a fixed effects specification. In the reported versions all
country coefficients are set equal. 
This set of equations was also re-estimated in our study with the
most recent data set, 1970-2011, and the corresponding impulse
responses are illustrated in Figure 5. As pointed out in the intro-
duction, the most controversial result clearly comes from this set
of impulse response functions: taxes hurt much more than
spending cuts. Obviously, there are several reasons for this striking
result, ranging from monetary policy effects to labor markets,
importance of foreign trade and so on (see Alesina et al., 2012).
Here we are not, however, interested in challenging the basic
results but in extending the testing equation to the open-economy
setting in which several countries pursue (in a coordinated
manner) similar fiscal policies and, further on, where the cyclical
asymmetries are allowed to affect the estimates. 
Equation (1) as such does not allow us to analyze the effects of
policy coordination because the use of fixed effects makes foreign
output exogenous. The nature of this effect comes clear when we
compare the estimated fixed time effects with World GDP repre-
sented by the combined sum of sample country GDP’s. Correlation
between these two time series is as high as 0.94! Quite clearly, the
fixed time effects correspond to the (omitted) World GDP! Of
6. These two alternative measures are compared by Guajardo et al. (2011). They find several
weaknesses in the conventional measure and also that the measure may have a biased tendency
to produce expansionary output effects for fiscal consolidation.
How different are the fiscal policy effects? 147course, World GDP is not exogenous but equals the sample coun-
tries’ GDP, so that we can respecify the basic model (1) as
equation (2):
Δyt = a0 + a1yt-1 + a2Δyt-2 + a3ΔyW,t-1 + a4Fiscalt + a5 Fiscalt-1 
+ fixed effects + ut  
with yW,t-1  = Σbiyit-1, (2)
where the bi’s are country weights. The estimation results for equa-
tions (1) and (2) are reported in Table 1. A comparison of tax and
spending simulations (impulse response functions) is shown in
Figure 6. 
The qualitative nature of results in terms of different consolida-
tion strategies remains the same as with the simple fixed effects
model, although the numerical values are somewhat different. But
the interesting feature in these results is the outcome for policy
coordination. As can be seen from Figure 5, policy coordination
pays off; the long-run impact of consolidation is slightly more
Table 1. Estimation results with cross-country data 1970-2009
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Δy-1 0.509 0.479 0.487 0.558 0.498 0.482 0.490
(7.83) (7.57) (7.81) (7.53) (7.81) (7.62) (7.77)
Δy-2 -0.122 -0.073 -0.086 -0.238 -0.099 -0.089 -0.108
(1.46) (1.30) (1.50) (3.94) (1.70) (1.59) (1.87)
Fiscal -0.337 -0.632 -0.298 -0.557 -0.245 -0.618 -0.277
(1.86) (3.18) (2.86) (2.25) (1.55) (3.11) (2.45)
Fiscal-1 -0.016 -0.456 -0.166 -0.062 0.082 -0.419 -0.057
(0.54) (2.00) (1.24) (0.24) (0.58) (1.87) (0.48)
Fiscal-2 0.223 0.130 0.235
(2.04) (0.69) (2.05)
Δyw-1 0.378 0.403 0.402 0.402
(3.51) (1.62) (1.62) (1.61)
R2 0.706 0.689 0.686 0.370 0.352 0.346 0.351
SEE 1.332 1.363 1.372 1.883 1.393 1.365 1.381
DW 1.95 1.96 1.95 1.76 1.93 1.58 1.93
Fiscal spend tax total tax spend tax total
Fixed effects cf+tf cf+tf cf+tf cf cf+tr cf+tr cf+tr
Cf. Indicates fixed cross-section effect, tf fixed time effect, and tr in turn indicates random time effect. ΔyW is the
growth rate of World GDP. Numbers inside parentheses are t-ratios. The dependent variable is the growth rate of
GDP. In constructing the World variable, we used GDP weights although equal weights did make a dramatic diffe-
rence. D|Δy<0 equals 1 if output growth is negative. All estimates are (nonlinear) Least Squares estimates.
Matti Viren148than two times bigger for coordinated policies – both with tax or
spending-cut policies. In this respect, the results are quite similar
to the NiGEM model results.  
Figure 5. Effect of fiscal policy coordination on GDP
   In %
Values are based on equation (2).
Source: Author’s estimates 
Figure 6. Effect of spending cuts and taxes on GDP
  In %
Source: Author’s estimates
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What about asymmetry with the IMF model? We tried to get an
answer by using a simple threshold model structure that entitled
two regimes for the fiscal consolidation effort, depending on
whether GDP is increasing or decreasing. That is illustrated with
simple threshold-type model estimates that are reported in Table 2.
We use both a very simple single threshold for zero output growth
rate, a multiple threshold with “corridor” between zero and 2 per
cent output growth rates and, finally, a smooth transition
threshold model (3) where the smoothing is done by a simple
logistic function.7 The parameters are selected so that they mini-
mize the sum of squared residuals. 
Δyt = a0 + a1Δyt-1 + a2Δyt-2 + a3Fiscalt + a4Fiscal*(1/(1+e(-a5Δyt – a6)))  
+ fixed time and cross-section effects + ut , (3)
The result of these tests is strikingly clear. In “normal times”
consolidation hurts very little whereas in economic depression the
costs are very high irrespectively of the way consolidation is
carried out. In fact, the coefficients of the linear “Fiscal” terms are
not even statistically significant in the simple threshold specifica-
tion, which also reflects the fact that in “good times” fiscal
consolidation may not become overwhelmingly costly (in very
good times (column 4), the cost is practically nil). Although the
empirical evidence on asymmetry is not very compelling, here it
nevertheless points in the same direction as the results of previous
analyses and other analyses in this paper. 
In our final attempt to measure the cyclical sensitiveness of
fiscal policy parameters we estimate fairly simple deficit reaction
equations from cross-country data. Here we deal with the
following common specification for a set of fiscal variables (defi-
cits, expenditures and revenues): 
def/y = b0 + b1def-1/y-1 + b2Δy- + b3Δy+ + b4r + b5D-1/y-1 + u      (4)
where def refers to the general government balance metric (positive
values for surpluses and negative for deficits), D refers to ratio of
general government debt to real GDP, y, and r the real interest rate
(government bond yield minus inflation); u is an error term.
7. Those values (0, 2.0) minimize the sum of squares. 
Matti Viren150Equation (1) provides a characterization of fiscal behavior so that it
reflects both automatic stabilizers and possible fiscal authorities’
reactions. This kind of equation is often used in cross-country
comparisons (see e.g. Mélitz, 1997; Buti and Sapir, 1998) because
the main differences can be expressed by some key parameters that
can be easily estimated. (4) is a straightforward example of a
threshold model, where, in this case, the threshold is applied to
the growth rate of GDP Δy. Thus, we have two regimes according to
Δy (for positive (and negative) values of output growth denoted by
Δy+ (and Δy- )); here it is assumed that only the coefficient of the
output growth variable changes with a regime shift. 
This set of equations is estimated from data for EU15 countries
for the period 1971-2011(2012). The basic features of the data are
illustrated in Figure 7.8 The results for different definitions of defi-
Table 2. Analysis of cyclical sensitivity of parameters
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δy-1
0.475
(7.50)
0.465
(7.48)
0.459
(9.31)
0.449
(9.82)
0.442
(7.02)
0.475
(7.04)
Δy-2
-0.085
(1.46)
-0.065
(1.16)
-0.084
(1.83)
0.045
(1.61)
-0.071
(1.20)
-0.186
(3.13)
Fiscal -0.064(0.52)
-0.256
(1.36)
-0.116
(1.04)
-0.358
(2.05)
-1.180
(3.27)
-1.783
(6.98)
Δyw-1
0.386
(3.72)
Fiscal* D|Δy<0* -0.647(1.81)
-1.428
(3.04)
-0.641
(3.36)
-0.471
(2.11)
Fiscal* D|Δy>2 0.455(2.22)
Fiscal*ST 1.353(2.98)
2.523
(7.88)
R2 0.680 0.695 0.690 0.697 0.695 0.416
SEE 1.382 1.348 1.161 1.347 1.349 1.814
DW 1.95 1.97 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.68
Fiscal spend tax total total total total
Fixed effects cf+tf cf+tf cf+tf cf+tf cf+tf cf
The data and the notation is the same as in Table 1. D|Δy<0 equals 1 if output growth is negative. ST denotes thes-
mooth transition threshold that here takes the form: (1/(1+exp(-66Δy -0.005))). In equation (4), the two multiplica-
tive terms are clearly different from zero (x2 = 24.18 (0.000)).
8. As expected, we see a positive relationship between government balance (surplus) and
output growth and, similarly between indebtedness and real interest rates. The data also shows a
negative relationship between indebtedness and GDP growth (possibly even a nonlinear
relationship between these variables). 
How different are the fiscal policy effects? 151cits as well as of expenditures and revenues are reported in Table 3,
which presents a comparison of linear and nonlinear models both
terms of deficits and other fiscal variables (revenues and expendi-
tures). The equations are estimated by OLS or GLS (Generalized
Least squares to account for cross-country differences in error vari-
ances), with Nonlinear Least Squares (to account for the threshold
in terms of output growth) and GMM (Generalized Method
Moment to account for the dynamic panel effects).   
Table 3. Evidence of Changing  Fiscal Behavior
Δy Lagged def/y debt-1 r
R2/ 
SEE
DW
F(Wald)
Estimator
J-stat
0.466
(11.02)
0.821
(28.82)
0.022
(5.52)
-0.064
(2.18)
0.785
2.006
2.10 GLS
def/y 0.464(8.22)
0.744
(7.48)
0.028
(5.10)
-0.106
(2.52)
0.789
2.032
2.00 OLS
def/y *) 0.396(6.69)
0.797
(16.61)
0.029
(4.62)
-0.142
(3.06)
0.851
1.661
2.03 OLS
def/y **) 0.643(9.56)
0.578
(3.36)
0.006
(0.38)
0.115
(0.75)
0.741
2.340
2.29 OLS
exp/y -0.579(12.06)
0.815
(13.55)
-0.017
(2.13)
0.121
(3.22)
0.932
1.850 2.11 OLS
rev/y -0.091(3.02)
0.867
(38.11)
-0.003
(0.80)
0.050
(2.18)
0.976
1.111
1.64 OLS
Δy|Δy <0     Δy|Δy >0
def/y 0.741(5.34)
0.327
(2.90)
0.750
(7.98)
0.025
(4.21)
-0.104
(2.52)
0.792
2.017
2.06
0.073 OLS
def/y *) 0.983(4.76)
0.265
(3.74)
0.795
(16.94)
0.028
(4.42)
-0.141
(3.11)
0.856
1.636
2.09
0.009 OLS
def/y 0.776(11.21)
0.405
(8.03)
0.536
(4.22)
0.060
(3.40)
-0.257
(2.12)
..
2.683
GMM
30.9
Cyclically adjusted data
defa/ŷ 0.282(2.89)
0.027
(0.60)
0.826
(24.74)
0.018
(4.78)
-0.062
(1.79)
0.778
1.845
2.11
0.033 GLS
defa/ŷ 0.182(1.51)
0.108
(1.42)
0.767
(9.05)
0.026
(5.19)
-0.057
(1.09)
0.782
1.780
2.02
0.654 OLS
defpa/ŷ 0.308(2.08)
0.127
(1.40)
0.750
(8.24)
0.027
(4.90)
0.092
(1.73)
0.741
1.929
1.97
0.393 OLS
expa/ŷ -0.081(0.75)
-0.136
(1.65)
0.906
(13.93)
-0.029
(3.58)
0.047
(1.07)
0.917
1.725
2.12
0.880 OLS
reva/ŷ 0.117(1.84)
-0.130
(3.78)
0.840
(34.41)
0.008
(2.25)
0.033
(1.45)
0.970
1.137
1.87
0.006 OLS
def denotes government balance in the sense of net lending (thus positive values represent surpluses), Δy the growth
rate of GDP, ŷ trend GDP, exp government expenditures, rev government revenues, and debt general government
debt (all three in relation to GDP). r is the real interest rate in terms of government bond yields. “a” denotes cyclically
adjusted data in def, rev and exp (for details of the adjustment procedure, see AMECO data base). defpa denotes
cyclically adjusted primary deficit. OLS (GLS) denotes panel least squares (generalized least squares) estimator with
fixed cross-section effects, and GMM the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator with first differences. 
The sample period is1971-2011 expect for *) when the sample period is 1971-1998 and **) when the sample period
is 1999-2011. Data source: AMECO data base. The cyclically adjusted data cover 1971-2012. F (Wald) gives marginal
significance values for an F test of the parameter restriction b2 = b3.
Matti Viren152We use both the conventional deficit-GDP ratio and the ratio of
cyclically adjusted deficit (and other fiscal variables) to trend GDP,
ŷ. The cyclically adjusted deficit gives an idea of the overall stance
of fiscal policy, although it is difficult to specify the appropriate
cyclical adjustment. It can be computed after the event but the
policy stance is a forward looking concept that depends on a fore-
cast of what the trend is likely to be over the medium term –
something that often turn out to be wide of the mark. Even so, we
use a well-established definition rather than entering the debate,
especially since it is this definition that is used in the official EU
discussions about the stance of policy (more precisely, the change
in cyclically adjusted primary deficit relative to trend (or potential)
GDP, which is used as an indicator of fiscal consolidation). Simi-
Figure 7. Relationship between key variables in the panel data 
The data cover the period 1971-2012. 
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How different are the fiscal policy effects? 153larly, while interest payments are a function of the overall stance,
they too vary over the course of the cycle, with the fluctuations in
interest rates and outstanding debt.
The main implications of the results can be summarized as
follows. Fiscal policy seems to respond strongly to business cycles.
Thus, the deficit elasticities with respect to output growth appear
to be around 0.3-0.6 for a one-year horizon (more than that
obtained by e.g. Melitz, 1997). But what is perhaps more
important, there appears to be strong evidence of asymmetric
cyclical behavior in government deficits. The effects of output on
deficits seem to differ depending on the business cycle phase: they
appear to be much stronger in contractions (falling output) than in
expansions. The hypothesis of equal coefficients over the business
cycle phases can be rejected.9 The rejection is also clearly revealed
in Figure 8, which illustrates the country-specific nonlinear coeffi-
cients of the output variable for deficit, expenditures and revenues
(the figure is based on single-country estimates of equations (3)).
The cross-country differences are indeed large which may also
explain why some of the key parameters in (3) cannot be estimated
with high precision. 
 This combination of asymmetry and large cross-country differ-
ences pose serious challenges for common policy, as well as for
policy coordination. Policy cannot be based solely on mean values
of the cross-country data; and the whole distribution of country
values must to be taken into account. Needless to say, this makes
all coordination efforts very difficult because simple rules are no
longer very useful (for more details, see Mayes and Viren, 2011).
The different cyclical effects show up in both revenues and
expenditures. Revenues seem to behave quite asymmetrically in
contractions and expansions. Thus, when output increases, reve-
nues increase less than trend output, whereas in recessions
revenues decrease markedly more than does trend output. This
may partly reflect pro-cyclical tax policy – taxes are lowered in
good times in response to higher tax incomes. With expenditures,
there is no clear pattern of cyclical behavior except that the
changes seem to be smaller than the changes in GDP. The direct
9. The (possibly nonzero) threshold estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure was
close to zero, so those results are not reported.
Matti Viren154effect of interest rates on deficits can be clearly discerned. The
effect is particularly strong for net lending, but it also shows up in
the primary deficits. The net lending effect obviously follows from
the direct interest expense effect, whereas the primary deficit effect
presumably reflects the need for an offsetting increase in revenues.
More interestingly, the effect of government debt also turns out to
be both significant and “correct” in sign and magnitude. Larger
debt leads to some correction in the form of lower deficits. 
We do however have to be cautious in interpreting these results,
as the reverse impact of the fiscal balance on output has not been
taken into account in the estimation on the grounds that it occurs
with a lag (while the effect of growth on the deficit is contempora-
neous). Omission of expectations effects raises another caveat.
Figure 8. Country-specific nonlinear coefficients of output growth 
in the deficit equation 
Values are GLS estimates from equation (3) for individual countries with cyclically adjusted AMECO data for 1971-
2012. 
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How different are the fiscal policy effects? 1552. Concluding remarks
Country differences, asymmetry of key policy parameters and
size of possible policy coordination effects pose some clear chal-
lenges for fiscal policy. The problems may be particularly
important in the presence of downward pressures of the economy.
Policy needs to be asymmetric itself in order to counteract the
slide. Put simply, downside threats require much stronger policy
reactions. 
Policy coordination may pose smaller problems, but still small
and large countries are clearly in different positions in terms of
common policies. Regarding fiscal policies, large countries have
always an advantage because of larger multipliers while small
countries may achieve such values only with coordinated policies.
This does not of course mean that policy coordination would
simply be a matter of country size: clearly other country character-
istics and political economy issues also matter. 
It is very hard to characterize the effects of fiscal policy with a
single value of fiscal multiplier, and the difference between some
polar values is very large so that policy uncertainty in Brainard
sense may question attempts to pursue ambitious policies. Policy
coordination surely affects the values of fiscal multiplier, at the
same time increases overall uncertainty of the true parameter
values and increases pressures to much more ambitious policies.
There would even be temptation to use fiscal policies in an exces-
sive amount. 
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FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
 IS THE SOONER REALLY THE BETTER?
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Recent evidence has renewed views on the size of fiscal multipliers. It is
notably emphasized that fiscal multipliers are higher in times of crisis. Starting
from this literature, we develop a simple and tractable model to deal with the
fiscal strategy led by euro area countries. Constrained by fiscal rules and by spec-
ulative attacks in financial markets, euro area members have adopted restrictive
fiscal policies despite strong negative output gaps. Based on the model, we
present simulations to determine the path of public debt given the current
expected consolidation. Our simulations suggest that despite strong austerity
measures, not all countries would be able to reach the 60% debt-to-GDP. If fiscal
multipliers vary along the business cycle, this would give a strong case for
delaying austerity. This alternative scenario is considered. Our results show not
only that delaying austerity would improve growth perspectives and would not
be incompatible with public debt converging to 60% of GDP.
Keywords: public debt, fiscal multipliers, growth
Between the late 1970s and the outbreak of the global finan-
cial crisis, many economists and policymakers denied fiscal policy
a role in stabilising output. After a long period of fiscal (or
Keynesian) dominance in Western economies, until stagflation
arose in the 1970s, monetary policy was finally considered as the
most effective and flexible tool to dampen business cycle in theRevue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 132 (2014)
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Except under exceptional circumstances (the case of a liquidity
trap), the consensus seemed to be that fiscal multipliers were low
(i.e. below unity). Some empirical papers even argued that expan-
sionary fiscal consolidation might occur when fiscal restriction was
mainly based on expenditures cuts rather than on tax increases
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996, Perotti 1996 or Afonso, 2010).2
Although these views were partly reversed in 2009 when the finan-
cial turmoil led industrial countries in the deepest recession since
the Great Depression, the Keynesian revival rapidly faded away.
European countries reversed their fiscal policy stance in 2010-2011
and engaged in fiscal contraction although output gaps were still
strongly negative. Austerity measures were first implemented in
Spain, Ireland and Greece. They followed the outbreak of the Greek
crisis and were fueled by fears of a possible sovereign default. Since
2011, austerity has been generalised in most euro area countries. As
shown by De Grauwe and Ji (2013), austerity programmes were
partly driven and intensified by financial market pressures. Until
recently, the economic models used by the European Commission
relied on the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis assigning only a
minor role to fiscal policy. Despite growing literature emphasizing
that fiscal multipliers may not be low, the European Commission
forecasts clearly illustrated the view that consolidation would not
be very costly or, if it were, only temporarily.3
Besides, existing fiscal rules constrained the use of fiscal policy.
The 3% of GDP deficit ceiling for public deficit was breached in
2009 under what was deemed to be exceptional circumstances. But
in 2010, almost all euro area economies started to recover and the
European Commission decided to launch excessive deficit proce-
dures. Consolidation was then endorsed by the European
Commission and approved by the Council. Although early fears of
1. See Allsopp and Vines (2005) or Angeriz and Arestis (2009) for a detailed description and
criticism of this “consensus”.
2. This view was however debated notably by, e.g., Creel et al. (2005).
3. Resorting to a narrative approach, IMF (2010) challenged the view that fiscal consolidation
might be expansionary and found multipliers significantly above unity. De Cos and Moral-
Benito (2013) argue that estimates of the real effects of pure fiscal contractions, when
endogeneity issues have been rigorously corrected for, point to negative figures. Finally,
Christodoulakis (2013) reviews the real costs of fiscal contraction in Greece and pledges for a
slowdown in fiscal retrenchment. 
Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: Is the sooner really the better? 161a possible double-dip were expressed (e.g. OFCE, 2011), the
strategy of synchronized front-loading austerity was amplified in
2012 and 2013. 
The efficiency of such a strategy was debated. It regained
momentum with new views on the size of fiscal multipliers and
was reinforced by disappointing performance of the euro area. The
literature which has re-emerged since 2009 reached two main
conclusions:
1. The multiplier is higher in “times of crisis” (in the short term
or as long as the crisis lasts).4 “Times of crisis” mean periods of
high unemployment and/or wide output gap. Another symptom
may be a situation where safe long-term interest rates are very low
(i.e. negative in real terms), suggesting a flight to safety (radical
uncertainty) or a liquidity trap (expectations of deflation). Two
theoretical interpretations are consistent with these manifestations
of the crisis. Firstly, price expectations are moving toward defla-
tion, or radical uncertainty makes it impossible to form an
expectation, which is consistent with very low safe interest rates
and leads to the paralysis of monetary policy. Or secondly, more
economic agents (households, firms) are subject to short-term
liquidity constraints, perpetuating the recessionary spiral and
preventing monetary policy from functioning. In one case or
another, fiscal multipliers are higher than in normal times because
the expansionary fiscal policy (resp. restrictive) forces the
economic agents to take on debt (resp. shed debt) collectively
instead of individually.
2. The multiplier is higher for expenditures than for taxes. The
argument in normal times is that higher taxes act as a disincentive
whereas spending cuts act as an incentive on labour supply. In a
small open economy, when monetary policy also induces real
currency depreciation, fiscal contraction can increase activity, a
result advocated by supporters of fiscal discipline. But in times of
crisis, in addition to the fact that multipliers are high, the logic
applicable in normal circumstances is reversed. The reluctant use
of taxes, because of disincentive effects, and the preferred spending
cuts do not produce the expected effects in an economy with
4. Parker (2011) recalls that this view dates back, at least, to Keynes “General theory” and he
calls it the “(old) Keynesian view”.
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tations of a recession or of deflation that act as disincentives,
which is another factor behind high multipliers.
Starting from this literature, it clearly appears that front-loaded
austerity can be an ill-designed strategy. The economic and social
costs can indeed be very high. It logically calls for an alternative
strategy where it would be optimal to delay consolidation until
economic growth has resumed. Implementing austerity measures
when the output gap is close to zero may reduce consolidation
costs and may also mitigate the requirements for a negative fiscal
stance since all or part of the deficit would be already reduced
thanks to automatic stabilizers. 
The aim of this paper is first to assess the impact of fiscal consol-
idation on European economies. To this end, we present the results
from simulations based on a simple reduced-form model repre-
senting 11 euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain). The model takes into account the most recent evidence on
the size of fiscal multipliers. We adopt a flexible approach where
the fiscal multiplier varies according to the business cycle. By
doing so, we do not only highlight the costs of implementing
austerity when the output gap is negative but we also seek for alter-
native and less costly strategies to reduce public debt. We define a
simple algorithm to search the optimal dynamic fiscal stance in
order to minimise the cost of austerity while seeking to reach a
60% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2032, in accordance with existing fiscal
rules in the euro area.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the first section,
we review the literature on the fiscal multiplier. The main features
of the model, which is used for simulations, are presented in the
second section. The third section analyses the actual path of
consolidation and shows that it is ill-designed. Finally, the fifth
section analyses and discusses the consequences of delaying fiscal
contraction.
1. Fiscal multiplier in times of crisis: a short overview
During the Great Recession, most industrial countries have
implemented fiscal stimulus packages aiming at stabilising the
Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: Is the sooner really the better? 163business cycle. But the fiscal stance was then rapidly reversed with
most EMU countries rapidly engaging in a fiscal consolidation
strategy. Therefore, the instrument of fiscal policy has been used
intensively since the onset of the crisis. This naturally raises the
issue of the efficiency of fiscal policy; hence, it questions the value
of fiscal multipliers which lay at the heart of the assessment of the
output costs or benefits of consolidation. 
An abundant literature has recently discussed not only the
value but also the stability of fiscal multipliers.5 Economists from
the IMF (IMF, 2012; Blanchard and Leigh, 2013) recognized that
their hypothesis on the value of fiscal multipliers were certainly
underestimated, which explained why the economic forecasts
during the 2008 crisis often turned wrong. Their reassessment
showed that fiscal multipliers have ranged from 0.9 to 1.7 since the
Great Recession. Having values above unity indicates clearly that
fiscal consolidation is costly. As a consequence, a gradual and
smooth fiscal consolidation process is certainly preferable to a
strategy of fast and sharp reduction of public imbalances. The size
of the fiscal multiplier appears a crucial issue in the current
context. Moreover, a recent literature has highlighted that this size
is path-dependent, as well as instrument-dependent (see Parker,
2011, for a survey of measurement issues and Michaillat, 2012, for
a theoretical rationale).
Corsetti, Meier and Müller (2012) explain that in “times of
crisis” more and more economic agents (households, firms) are
subject to very short-term liquidity constraints, thus maintaining
the recessionary spiral and preventing monetary policy from func-
tioning. The value of the multiplier may reach 2 in times of crisis
whereas it is supposed to be closer to 0.5 in normal times. Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012), corroborate the idea that the
multipliers are higher in recessions than in periods of expansion.
These authors argue that the impact of a shock on public expendi-
ture would be 4 times higher when implemented during an
economic downturn (2.5) than in an upturn (0.6). This result has
been confirmed for the US data by Fazzari et al. (2012) and by
Mittnik and Semmler (2012), but Owyang et al. (2013) do not find
such evidence with a dataset encompassing the entire 20th
5. Some parts of this literature review draw on Heyer (2012).
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Baum and Koester (2011) and conceptualized by Creel, Heyer and
Plane (2011) in a simulated model drawing on French data. Karras
(2013), studying a panel of 61 countries, both developed and
developing, between 1952 and 2007, concludes that the fiscal
multiplier is twice as large during downswings than expansions. 
The stance of monetary policy also matters. Hall (2009)
concludes that the size of the multiplier doubles and is around 1.7
when the real interest rate is close to zero (zero lower bound),
which is characteristic of an economy undergoing a downturn, as is
the case today in many developed countries. This view is shared by
a number of other researchers, including DeLong and Summers
(2012), Erceg and Lindé (2012), OECD (2009), and Boussard et al.
(2012). It was also highlighted in some recent theoretical work,
notably by Carrillo and Poilly (2013), Christiano et al. (2011),
Woodford (2011). When nominal interest rates are blocked at the
zero lower bound, anticipated real interest rates rise. Monetary
policy can no longer offset budgetary restrictions and can even
become restrictive, especially when price expectations are anchored
on deflation.
Coenen et al. (2012) analyse the instrument-dependence of the
effectiveness of fiscal policy. On the basis of 8 different macroeco-
nometric models (mainly DSGE models) for the United States, and
4 models for the euro area, they show that the size of many multi-
pliers is large, particularly if public expenditures and targeted
transfers are used. The multiplier effects exceed unity if the
strategy focuses on public consumption or transfers targeted to
specific agents and are larger than 1.5 for public investment. For
the other instruments, the effects are still positive but range from
0.2 for corporation tax to 0.7 for consumer taxes. This finding is
also shared by the European Commission (2012), which indicates
that the fiscal multiplier is larger if fiscal consolidation is based on
public expenditure, and in particular on public investment. These
results confirm those published about fiscal stimulus by the
OECD (2009), Creel et al. (2009), Burriel et al. (2010), and Baum
and Koester (2011). Without invalidating this result, a study by
Fazzari et al. (2012) nevertheless introduced a nuance: according to
6. Owyang et al. (2013) find some above-unity fiscal multipliers only for Canada. 
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higher than that observed for taxes only when the economy is at
the bottom of the cycle. This result would be reversed if the
economy were closer to full-employment.
Furthermore, in their specific assessment of the US economy,
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), highlight a high value for the fiscal multiplier
for public investment (1.7), i.e. higher than for public consump-
tion.7 This is similar to the results of Freedman et al. (2009).
In the recent literature, only a few papers seem to break the
consensus among economists on the size of fiscal multipliers. For
instance, after examining 107 fiscal consolidation plans,
conducted in 21 OECD countries over 1970-2007, Alesina and
Ardagna (2010) and Alesina et al. (2012) conclude, first, that the
multipliers can be negative and, second, that fiscal consolidations
based on expenditure are associated with minor, short-lived reces-
sions, while consolidations based on taxation are associated with
deeper, more protracted recessions. These findings raise two
critiques. First, Alesina et al. (2012) usually emphasize rather
substantially the experiences of fiscal restraint of some Scandina-
vian countries or Canada which are highly specific (planned entry
into the European monetary system and financial liberalisation in
Scandinavian countries, unexpected increases in oil and gas
receipts for Canada) and cannot be easily generalized. By the way,
when these experiences are included within a larger dataset
including all experiences of fiscal restriction (or expansion), no
strong results emerge. Second, the empirical work of Alesina et al.
(2012) suffers from an endogeneity problem in the measurement
of fiscal restraint. Once De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) correct for
this problem, fiscal contractions give… contractionary effects. The
notion of a narrative record of fiscal impulse also helps to avoid
this endogeneity. For example, in the case of a real estate bubble
(and more generally in cases of large capital gains), the additional
tax revenues from real estate transactions result in a reduction in
the structural deficit, as these revenues are not cyclically-based (the
elasticity of revenues to GDP becomes much higher than 1). So
7. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) also show, using VAR estimates performed with a dataset of 44
countries, that the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the exchange rate regime, quite
consistently with the properties derived from Mundell-Fleming models. 
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with the housing bubble) and with a reduction in the structural
deficit: thus, it strengthens artificially the argument that reducing
the public deficit may lead to an increase in activity, whereas the
causality is actually the reverse.
Beyond Alesina et al.’s contributions, Corsetti et al. (2013a,
2013b) have studied the incidence of public debt growth (and
possible sovereign defaults) on the fiscal multiplier. Through the
“sovereign risk channel”, fiscal multipliers would tend to be
smaller when sovereign risk (or public debt) is high than other-
wise.8 Müller (2013) draws on this argument to oppose the self-
defeating approach that Gros and Maurer (2012) and Holland and
Portes (2012) attributed to current European fiscal austerity. Denes
et al. (2013) and Bi et al. (2013) rather oppose Corsetti et al.’s
conclusions. The former attribute the effectiveness of fiscal policy
to a clear management of public finances in the short, medium
and long run: the success of a fiscal stimulus is dependent on the
policy regime and on the confidence by the public that a change in
the policy regime would lead the fiscal stance to change as well.
The latter share a similar view, although they broaden the determi-
nants of a successful fiscal consolidation to the public debt level, to
fiscal consolidation duration, likelihood and composition. 
Apart from the contributions by Alesina, Corsetti and their
colleagues, a relatively broad consensus has emerged: a policy of
fiscal restraint is preferable in periods of expansion, but is ineffec-
tive and even pernicious when the economy is at a standstill; if such
a policy were to be enacted during a downturn, then tax increases
would be less harmful to activity than public spending cuts.
Taking these views into consideration is crucial to assess fiscal
consolidation episodes: The higher the value of the multiplier, the
costlier is fiscal consolidation. Such an assessment should rely on a
careful analysis of the economic, financial and monetary context.
Looking at the situation of euro area economies in 2012 certainly
gives credit to the hypothesis of a high multiplier. Monetary policy
rates have indeed rapidly decreased to the zero lower bound. The
unemployment rate has reached record levels in the euro area. For
8. Using a dataset of EU-26 countries, Vranceanu and Besancenot (2013) find empirical results
in line with Corsetti et al’s analysis.
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It is not always easy to disentangle between countries resorting to
consolidation based on expenditures cuts or tax increases. Finally,
the synchronization of fiscal consolidation across countries may
also certainly tend to raise the value of the multiplier.
This hypothesis is confirmed when taking together 2011 and
2012, years of very strong fiscal impulses. Figure 1 compares, on
the one hand, changes in the output gap from end 2010 to 2012
(on the x-axis) and, on the other hand, the cumulative fiscal
impulse for 2011 and 2012 (y-axis), based on OECD Economic
Outlook data. We obtain the short-term impact of fiscal consolida-
tion. Figure 1 depicts this relationship, showing a close link
between fiscal restraint and economic slowdown.
For most countries, the “apparent” multiplier is less than 1 (the
lines connecting each of the bubbles are below the bisector, the
“apparent” multiplier is the inverse of the slope of these lines).
Figure 2 refines the assessment. The changes in the output gap are
corrected for the “autonomous” dynamic of the closing of the
output gap (if there had been no impulse, there would have been a
Figure 1. Fiscal impulses 2011-2012 and changes in the output gaps
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 91, June 2012. The year 2012 is a projection (OFCE forecast October 2012). The
area of the bubbles is proportional to real GDP in 2011 ($ PPP).
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same rate as in the past) and for the impact of each country’s
budget cutbacks on the other partners through the channel of
foreign trade. The bubbles in this chart therefore replace the
bubbles in Figure 1, integrating these two opposing effects, which
are evaluated here while seeking to minimize the value of the
multipliers. In particular, because the output gaps had never been
so large, it may be the case that they are closing faster than in the
past 30 or 40 years, which would justify a more dynamic counter-
factual and therefore higher fiscal multipliers.
Austria and Germany are exceptions. As these two countries
enjoy a more favourable economic situation (lower unemploy-
ment, better business conditions), it is not surprising that the
multiplier is low there. Despite this, the “corrected apparent”
multiplier is negative. This follows either from the paradoxical
effects of the incentives, or more likely from the fact that monetary
policy is more effective and that these two countries have escaped
the liquidity trap. But the correction provided here does not take
into account any stimulus from monetary policy.
In the United States, the “2011-2012 corrected apparent” multi-
plier reaches 1. This “corrected apparent” multiplier is very high in
Greece (~ 1.5), Spain (~ 1.3) and Portugal (~ 1.2). This suggests that
if the economic situation deteriorates further, the value of the
multiplier may increase, exacerbating the vicious circle of austerity.
For the euro area as a whole, the “corrected apparent” multi-
plier results from the aggregation of “small open economies”. It is
thus higher than the multiplier in each country, because it relates
the impact of fiscal policy in each country to the whole area and
not only to the country concerned. The aggregate multiplier for
the euro area also depends on the composition of the austerity
packages, and more especially on the countries where the measures
are being implemented. However, the biggest negative fiscal
impulses take place in areas where the multipliers are highest or in
the countries in deepest crisis. The result is that the aggregate
multiplier for the euro area is 1.3, significantly higher than the
multiplier derived for the US.
A comparison of the fiscal plans for 2011 and 2012 with the
economic cycle in those years yields a high estimate for the fiscal
Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: Is the sooner really the better? 169multipliers. This confirms the dependence of the multiplier on the
cycle and is a serious argument against the austerity approach.  
2. Short description of the model and calibration
The simulations are done with a macroeconomic model that
combines structural and reduced-form non-linear equations. An
exhaustive presentation of the model and its calibration is avail-
able in the appendix of iAGS 2013 Report.9 It is a simple reduced-
form equation model to analyse complex supply and demand
mechanisms that can be heterogeneous across countries. In
contrast with DSGE models which are linearised around a single
equilibrium, our model notably allows for variable fiscal multi-
pliers over the business cycle. Indeed, the value of the fiscal
multiplier is endogenous and determined according to the size of
the output gap. The parameters of the model are calibrated to allow
the analyses of various scenarios. It is far more tractable than DSGE
models and given the current context, it may better capture the
Figure 2. Fiscal impulse 2011-2012 and adjusted changes in the output gap
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 91, June 2012. The year 2012 is a projection (OFCE forecast October 2012). The
area of the bubbles is proportional to real GDP in 2011 ($ PPP).
9. http://www.iags-project.org/documents/iags_appendix2013.pdf. 
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tural hypotheses regarding agents’ behaviour (representative
rational agent), hypotheses which are today largely debated.10 By
the way, it may be more consistent with recent empirical develop-
ments regarding the size of fiscal multipliers. It enables to reflect
more accurately the current economic situation which may be
better described by a Keynesian environment. Yet, the model is
also sufficiently tractable to allow for alternative hypotheses. It is
easy to modify the parameters defining the fiscal multiplier and to
account for New Classical hypotheses where fiscal policy has only
a limited impact on output. Hence, this kind of model is helpful to
shed some lights on the effects of various economic policy shocks
according to a given set of transparent hypotheses. 
The key features of the model are the following: 
— It allows for an explicit representation of the main euro area
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. An
aggregated euro area is also computed.
— On the demand side, an open economy aggregate demand
function is represented, with fiscal and monetary policy,
external demand (a channel for intra EU interdependencies)
as well as exogenous shocks on the output gap (the gap
between actual and potential GDP). The equation is written
as an error-correction model. It may also take into account
possible long run effects of macroeconomic policies such as
long term fiscal policy, debt-related threshold effects and
hysteresis on potential output. The stabilization of the
economy stems from adjustments in the long-term interest
rates and competitiveness, which have feedback effects on
the output gap. The stabilisation may then hinge on private
demand (through interest rates adjustment and monetary
policy) and on external demand (through the decrease in
relative prices). The calibration allows to simulate standard
hypotheses as well as alternatives, checking the dependence
of results on different sets of hypotheses. Furthermore, the
size of fiscal multipliers is allowed to vary along the business
10. These issues are notably discussed by Fagiolo and Roventini (2012).
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possible when the economy hits the zero lower bound (ZLB). 
— External demand is modelled using a bilateral trade matrix
representing interdependencies between countries. The
trade matrix is also used as a basis for imbalances analysis. 
— We model prices by a generalized Phillips curve relating
current and expected inflation to the output gap, imported
inflation and other exogenous shocks. Expectations can be
modelled as adaptive (backward-looking) or rational
(forward-looking).
— A Taylor rule sums up monetary policy, except under the
zero lower bound. 
— Changes in the short term monetary policy rate are then
passed through the long-term interest rates. Hence,
according to the expectations theory, the long-term interest
rate for German public bonds is set equal to the expected
sum of future short term interest rates (Shiller, 1979), with
short-term interest rates set by the (European) central bank.
The long-term public rate for Germany is considered risk
free, and long-term public rates for other countries include a
risk premium that is set exogenously. We also temporarily
set exogenously the long-term rate for countries that entered
the EFSF to account for a lower interest rate on debt refi-
nancing. Finally, for each country the long-term interest rate
on private bonds is equal to the public one plus a risk
premium that is set exogenously.
— The stance of monetary policy remains expansionary as long
as the euro area aggregate output gap is negative and if infla-
tion is below the 2% target. In case of a negative idiosyncratic
demand shock, the convergence to the potential growth rate
hinges partly on the effect of common expansionary mone-
tary and on a competitiveness effect. Due to hysteresis effect,
the output level may be permanently affected by a negative
demand shock. But trend growth will always converge to an
exogenously set path. The hypothesis regarding long run
growth rates are presented in table A1 in the appendix.
— We call ~yc , the gap between the log of real GDP Y of country
c, and a baseline trajectory for the output growing at a
constant growth rate. A distinction is then made between
C. Blot, M. Cochard, J. Creel, B. Ducoudré, D. Schweisguth and X. Timbeau 172potential GDP and this baseline. This gap is noted y*c . Then,
yc  is the output gap of country c, i.e. the difference
between ~yc  and y*c . The real GDP growth rate is given by
potential GDP growth and the output gap.
— The public balance separates interest payments, cyclically-
adjusted balance and cyclical components, in order to prop-
erly assess the fiscal stance, i.e. the part of fiscal policy which
is under the direct control (discretion) of current govern-
ments. We then derive public debt projections for euro area
countries.
 The structural primary surplus evolves according to the fiscal
impulse (which is set exogenously, at levels given by Stability
programmes, except otherwise stated) and to changes in taxes due
to variations in the gap between potential output and the baseline.
A permanent downward shift in potential output relative to the
baseline entails a permanent fall in taxes, hence a permanent fall
in the structural primary surplus. The average interest rate on debt
varies according to the long-term nominal interest rate on newly
issued public bonds. The average maturity of public debt is
assumed to be constant. The inverse of average maturity gives the
share of debt refinanced every year. Public debt (in % of nominal
GDP) varies according to its usual law of motion. 
We introduce a state-dependent fiscal multiplier, in accordance
with the consensus mentioned in the former section of the paper.
The fiscal multiplier μt is modelled as follows:
The value of the multiplier is maximal in very bad times,
whereas it is minimal in very good times (see Figure 3). We define
normal times as economic states in which the output gap stands
between -1.5% and 1.5%. In that case, we set the ex ante instanta-
neous fiscal multiplier to 0.5 for large countries (Germany, France,
Italy and Spain), and to 0.3 for other countries, accounting for the
fact that fiscal multipliers are generally smaller for small open
If  then   
if  then  
if  then  
if  then ⁄ ∗  
if  then ⁄ ∗  
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output gap is larger than 1.5%, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal
multiplier linearly decreases down to 0 when the output gap
reaches 6%. In bad times, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier
increases as the output gap deteriorates. We set its maximum value
between 1 and 1.3 when the output gap reaches -6% (Table 1).  
Drawing on exogenous fiscal impulses, we compute an effective
fiscal impulse, representing the ex ante11 cumulative real effect of
current and past fiscal impulses at time t. We retain 7 lags to
account for the possibility of long lasting effects of fiscal impulses
Table 1. Fiscal multipliers
DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL GRC PRT IRL AUT FIN
Fiscal multiplier µ0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.5
Maximum multiplier 
µmax
1.0 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Figure 3. Example of the value of the multiplier according to the output gap
Note: μmax = 1.3, μ0 = 0.5, μmin = 0, ymin = -6%, yinf = -1.5%, ysup = 1.5% and ymax = 6%. Values are illustrative and
may vary across countries.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
11. It is an ex ante multiplier in the sense that it does not take into account monetary policy
effects and external trade feedback effects on GDP following a fiscal impulse.
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impulse that occurred k years ago, we can write:
Equation (1) ensures that the fiscal impulse impact depends on
the fiscal multiplier which prevailed when the fiscal impulse
occurred. We also assume that EFI can take into account long run
effects of fiscal policy. It is the case if ψα = Σ7k=0 ψk ≠ 0, since in that
case EFI is not necessarily null in the long run. The long run impact
of a sequence of fiscal impulses is then computed using the accu-
mulation of fiscal impulses times the multiplier (Equation (2)); the
long run impact on potential GDP is: μα.ΣFIt .
3. The costs of fiscal consolidation
We use our model to simulate the path of output gap and
public debt according to the consolidation plans. The aim is
twofold. First, we assess the cost of consolidation, in terms of the
Figure 4. Effective fiscal impulse in normal times with μt = 0.5 following a positive 
fiscal impulse
 1% of GDP
Source: Authors’ estimates.
(1)
 
(2)  
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well as the time needed for output gaps to get back to zero provide
insights on the consequences of austerity. Second, as the aim of
implemented consolidation measures is to bring back the debt-to-
GDP ratio to 60% by 2032, which is the horizon of the 1/20th debt
rule incorporated in the revised SGP and in the Fiscal Compact, we
pay attention to the ability of member states to reach this target,
and to comply with existing fiscal rules. A full discussion on the
rationale of this objective goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is
indeed not clear that there is a need for some or most euro area
countries to consolidate. A significant part of the deficit may be
cyclical. Besides, it must be stressed that it does not match any
theoretical definition of fiscal sustainability12 nor does it corre-
spond to the equilibrium value for public debt. This may only be
seen as an institutional objective that euro area members have to
comply with.
The first six columns of Table 2 report the public debt and the
structural balance respectively in 2012, 2017 (5-year horizon) and
2032 (20-year horizon). The cumulated fiscal impulse for 2013-2015
sums up the short-term fiscal stance in the euro area as it cumulates
forecast variations in structural primary government spending and
taxes.13 We report the average annual growth rate of real GDP for
2013-2017 and 2018-2032, and the sovereign interest rate spread
vis-à-vis Germany in 2013-2015. A description of the main under-
lying hypotheses is given in the Appendix.
Table 2 reports how tough austerity will be all over the euro
area: between 2013 and 2015, all member states except Germany
and Finland will improve their cyclically-adjusted primary public
deficit by at least 2% of GDP. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece
will make even stronger efforts. This highly contractionary fiscal
stance will make it ever harder to achieve an output gap at or above
12. The issue of public debt sustainability is theoretically and empirically unsettled, between
promoters of investigating the statistical properties of public finances' variables on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, promoters of investigating the macroeconomic incidence of
public finances (Bohn, 2007, calls it “a return to economic thinking”). Stated briefly,
sustainability refers to the ability of the general government to pay back the domestic public
debt. This ability depends on the future available scope for spending cuts and tax hikes, but also
on future economic growth.
13. Government spending is net of interest payments and spending and taxes are adjusted for
cyclical variations. 
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crisis until 2019 (Austria, Finland), 2020 (Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Portugal) or 2021. Meanwhile, the aggregate euro area
output gap will reach -4.8%. Hence, the cumulated fiscal impulse,
starting already from negative output gaps and associated large
fiscal multiplier effects, will lead to gloomy growth prospects for
the euro area. Germany and Austria will be exceptions, since they
will face almost no further real cost with their forecast fiscal
strategy thanks to milder consolidation plans. 
Regarding public debt-to-GDP ratios in 2032, the simulations
suggest that even though some countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland
and Greece) do not reach the 60% threshold, debt ratios are
substantially lowered. For instance, Greece would halve its debt
ratio and Ireland's debt would decrease by 35 percentage points of
GDP between 2017 and 2032. Nevertheless, the social costs as well
Table 2. Baseline scenario
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumu-
lated fiscal 
impulse
(% of 
GDP)
Average 
annual 
growth
Maxi-
mum 
negative 
output 
gap 
reached
Sove-
reign 
rate 
spread to 
Germany
2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2015
2013-
2017
2018-
2032
2013- 
2032
2013-
2015
Germany 82 67 26 0.3 0.9 1.8 -0.3 1.4 1.3 -0.7 0.0
France 90 91 52 -1.4 -0,2 0,2 -2.9 1,9 2.2 -6.8 0.0
Italy 127 109 18 0.3 2.4 5.5 -2.1  1.6 1.4 -6.5 0.7
Spain 86 101 83 -3.7 -2.1 -2.2 -4.3  1.7 2.3 -9.7 0.8
Netherlands 69 68 48 -2.9 -0.8 -0.8 -2.9 2.0 2.1 -2.8 0.0
Belgium 100 91 38 -0.9 0.6 1.8 -2.2  2.1 2.1 -4.3 0.2
Portugal 119 133 79 -2.8 -0.8 0.7 -4.7  0.9 1.8 -10.1 1.2
Ireland 118 140 105 -5.0 -2.4 -2.3 -5.7  1.0 2.6 -10.9 1.0
Greece 177 199 93 -0.6 1.3 3.0 -7.5 0.2 2.5 -17.1 1.1
Finland  53 45 8 0.2 0.1 1.9 -1.3 2.4 2.2 -1.9 0.0
Austria  75 68 40 -2.5 -0.3 0.3 -1.9 1.7 1.6 -0.9 0.0
Euro area  94 88 43 -1.0 0.3 1.2 -2.2 1.6 1.8 -4.8 0.3
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
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unrealistic. Christodoulakis (2013) shows that fiscal austerity in
Greece has been self-defeating. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Belgium, austerity measures planned would indeed require struc-
tural primary surpluses above 3% of GDP for many years, which
has rarely been achieved in history of fiscal consolidation. 
Besides, our simulations show that the long-run debt-to-GDP
ratio in many euro area countries is astonishingly low: 26% in
Germany, 18% in Italy, even 8% in Finland. There is no reason to
consider that this figure is consistent with preferences in these
countries notably because public bonds are highly demanded on
financial markets, especially "risk-free" bonds like German Bunds.
Consequently, this outcome questions the relevance of fiscal
austerity in these countries. The baseline scenario may then go too
far in terms of fiscal sustainability. To sum up, this scenario
considers fiscal restrictions that go beyond the requirements of
fiscal sustainability. Debt sustainability is a relative concept which
should not be assessed regardless of the cost of achieving it.
Consolidation also goes beyond the requirements of EU fiscal rules
– for a country under an excessive deficit procedure, the minimum
improvement in public finances per year is an increase of 0.5% in
the cyclically-adjusted balance – and, undoubtedly, beyond the
social resilience of European citizens. 
We introduce a first variant where we consider a strict imple-
mentation of current fiscal rules, and we compute a sequence of
fiscal impulses over 2015-2032 that allows to reach the 60% target
in each member state, assuming that fiscal impulses for the years
2013 to 2015 remain unchanged. Thus, we aim at gauging if all
countries can reach the public debt target in 2032. For countries
which already achieved this threshold, we implement positive fiscal
impulses after 2015 so that debt-to-GDP is equal to 60% in 2032.
For simplicity, we set fiscal impulses at -0.5 or +0.5 depending on
the gap vis-à-vis the target: the fiscal impulse is negative (resp. posi-
tive) if actual debt is above (resp. below) the target. The cumulated
fiscal impulse is larger than in the baseline scenario for countries
which cannot achieve 60% in this scenario, whereas it is lower for
the other countries. Comparisons between the baseline scenario
and this variant, based on structural balances and average annual
growth rates, indicate the costs or gains of sticking to the debt
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sustainability is crucial for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
since they do not reach this targeted debt level in the baseline
scenario, whereas the question of the costs of fiscal retrenchment
is crucial for countries which go beyond EU fiscal legislation
requirements in the baseline scenario. 
Results are reported in Table 3. Striking results are threefold.
First, two countries – Ireland and Greece – are still unable to achieve
the debt-to-GDP target. It does not preclude fiscal sustainability per
se, but it entails further social unsustainability of public finances:
the fiscal stance over 2013-2032 produces a cumulative fiscal
impulse which is highly negative and twice as high (in absolute
values) as in the baseline scenario. Such a fiscal stance is entirely
unrealistic and inefficient: economic growth in the medium-run
would be lowered substantially, and the maximum negative output
gap would be even larger. This outcome ensues from the high value
of the fiscal multiplier when the output gap is strongly negative,
from inertial processes in economic growth once hysteresis is intro-
duced, and from the relatively insufficient decrease in real interest
rates, since these two countries suffer from low or negative inflation
rates until 2020. 
Second, Spain and Portugal achieve the debt target in 2032, but
under substantially more restrictive fiscal stances. Fiscal adjust-
ment under such conditions seems unrealistic and unreasonable:
between 2013 and 2017, both countries would experience slower
economic growth than in the baseline, hence postponing until
2025 (Portugal) and 2027 (Spain) the return to a zero output gap.
Third, countries with public debt levels below the debt target in
2032 have fiscal leeway and then implement expansionary fiscal
policies:14 indeed, the cumulated fiscal impulse improves by
2.7 percentage points in Germany, 1 in France, 4.2 in Italy, 5.7 in
Finland and 1.4 in Austria in this variant compared to the baseline
scenario. Despite fiscal leeway and relatively high fiscal multipliers
in the short run, the net gain in terms of economic growth is
however very small. The reason lies in trade interactions within the
14. An alternative scenario would have been to suppose that these countries pursue a neutral
fiscal policy. But the difference with the scenario where they adopt expansionary fiscal policy to
reach the 60% in 2032 would have been very small.
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by the large real difficulties resulting from the implementation of a
more restrictive fiscal stance in Southern countries and Ireland.
Besides, countries that implement expansionary fiscal policies have
a small output gap. The fiscal multiplier is then lower.
4. No pain, more gain: the case for delaying consolidation
The previous results show unambiguously that fiscal consolida-
tion is costly. The output gap is strongly reduced by austerity and
in some countries it would reach record low levels. Besides, for all
euro area countries, it will take time to recover from the crisis since
the output gap would not close until 2020. This is the consequence
of past, current and future consolidation measures. But even coun-
tries that would reach the 60% debt ratio without additional fiscal
Table 3.  Can the 60% target be reached in 2032 and what are the costs
in terms of growth?
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumulated 
fiscal 
impulse
(% of GDP)
Average 
annual 
growth
Maximum
negative 
output gap 
reached
2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2032
2013-
2017
2018-
2032
2013- 
2032
Germany 82 68 60 0.3 -0.1 -1.8 2.4 1.5 1.3 -0.7
France 90 89 60 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -1.9  2.3 2.1 -6.8
Italy 127 109 60 0.3 1.4 0.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 -6.5
Spain 86 104 60 -3.7 -1.3 1.3 -8.2 1.3 2.2 -9.8
Netherlands 69 68 60 -2.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.0 2.1 2.0 -2.8
Belgium 100 91 60 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 2.3 2.1 -4.3
Portugal 119 137 60 -2.8 -0.1 3.7 -8.2  0.4 1.8 -10.2
Ireland 118 144 71 -5.0 -1.7 5.2 -13.7  0.5 2.5 -11.0
Greece 177 206 84 -0.6 1.9 8.9 -15.5 -0.4 2.3 -17.3
Finland  53 46 60 0.2 0.1 -4.3 3.4 2.5 2.2 -1.9
Austria  75 69 60 -2.5 -1.2 -1.7 -0.5 1.8 1.6 -0.9
Euro area  94 89 61 -1.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 1.7 1.8 -4.9
Sources: Eurostat, iAGS model.
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countries.
The most negative consequences are borne by Spain, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland. These countries are those where the fiscal
multiplier is the highest. The cost of austerity is then amplified and
the effectiveness of consolidation, i.e. the ability to stick to the
objectives settled in the European fiscal rules, is reduced. There is
clearly a trade-off in the short term between economic growth and
debt and this trade-off strongly hinges on the value of the fiscal
multiplier. The higher the multiplier, the costlier consolidation
and the smaller the public debt decreases. This trade-off raises the
following question: is there an optimal situation where the same
objective for public debt ratios may be reached while reducing
output losses? If countries had the opportunity to delay austerity
measures, they would benefit from higher growth, but what would
be the consequences on debt? It is likely that the output gap would
close more rapidly, hence implying lower values for the fiscal
multiplier. By taking advantage of this time-varying feature of
multipliers, it would be possible to optimize the effectiveness of
fiscal consolidation. In order to compute such a variant, we seek
for each country separately the date at which it would be optimal
to start consolidation. This date may be different across countries
as it depends on the initial conditions. It must be stressed that for
each country, the simulations are done everything else equal and
notably given the fiscal impulses in the other countries. Optimiza-
tion is then partial as there may be feedback effects, which are
ignored here. Besides, we keep interest rates spreads constant rela-
tive to the baseline scenario. This is clearly a strong hypothesis as
part of the rise in sovereign yields spreads may be explained by fear
of default. Then, frontloading austerity was perceived as the only
way to convince financial markets that countries care about fiscal
sustainability. Yet, we advocate that delaying fiscal austerity
should go along with institutional arrangements ensuring that due
measures will be taken in the future. The case for constant spreads
may for example be warranted by the central bank playing the role
of lender of last resort for sovereigns.
We consider a (small, permanent and negative) fiscal impulse at
a certain year (and no fiscal impulse for any other year), and then
we run the model and calculate the decrease in the public debt-to-
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2013 and 2032 and for each country. The algorithm is simple: given
the assumption of a homogeneous initial debt-to-GDP ratio across
countries, given the timeframe for reducing debt to 60% of GDP
(20 years), and given a maximum fiscal impulse of Imax=±0.5, it is
possible to select the timing of the first fiscal impulse based on the
maximum efficiency of fiscal impulse. Figure 5 suggests that when
the fiscal multiplier is constant, austerity is more efficient (in terms
of debt reduction) when the negative fiscal impulse is done in the
first period (frontloading strategy). Implementing a 1 percentage
point fiscal impulse in 2013 would lead to decrease by nearly
20 percentage points the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2032. When
the fiscal impulse is implemented in 2021, the debt ratio is only
11 percentage points lower in 2032 than in 2012. Since the fiscal
impulse is small, this is an approximation of the first derivative of
debt to GDP ratio 20 years from now relative to impulse in any year
from now. If the model is linear (no hysteresis and constant fiscal
multiplier), then, debt reduction is independent of initial condi-
tions and derivatives are independent of the size of the impulse.
Things get more complicated when we consider time-varying
multipliers, hysteresis effects and different initial conditions.
Figure 6 is based on a business cycle-dependent multiplier and
includes negative output gaps described above as initial conditions
to the system. In such a model and for given initial conditions,
multipliers are higher than a given critical value for which it is
equivalent to implement fiscal restriction now or one year later, for
a given amount of debt reduction. Thus postponing the negative
fiscal impulse by one year or more may be more efficient for debt
reduction (backloading strategy). For Germany where the output
gap was close to zero in 2012, there is no gain in postponing fiscal
consolidation. The maximum impact of consolidation is given
when consolidation starts in 2013. However, for Greece, starting
consolidation in 2013 gives poor results in terms of public debt
reduction. The output gap is indeed strongly negative and the
value of the fiscal multiplier is high. A fiscal impulse implemented
in 2013 would thus have a strong negative impact on output. The
negative feedback effect on the cyclical public deficit would miti-
gate the decrease in public debt. For Greece, a 1 percentage point
fiscal consolidation would decrease public debt in 2032 by less
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would be 2017 as the fall in the public debt ratio would reach
nearly 13 percentage points in 2032. Using this algorithm for each
euro area country, we obtain the year when it is optimal to start
fiscal consolidation. 
Figure 5. Debt reduction in 2032 for a 1.0 fiscal impulse on a given year
Constant multiplier, no hysteresis
Figure 6. Debt reduction in 2032 for a 1.0 fiscal impulse on a given year,
non linear model
Cycle-dependent multiplier and hysteresis
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Spain
Finland
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Spain
Finland
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Fiscal consolidation in times of crisis: Is the sooner really the better? 183Following the dynamics shown on Figure 6, the afore-
mentioned algorithm states that fiscal impulses should not start in
2013 in most countries. The necessary sequence for debt reduction
would thus follow a pattern of no impulse before the inflexion date
and an impulse equal to Imax after the inflexion date, as long as
necessary to reduce debt to 60% of GDP in 2032. Table 4 indicates
the optimal date to start fiscal consolidation. 
It may happen – as we describe below – that the debt target
cannot be reached through this process. In this case, we compute
the Imax which would allow reaching the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio.
We show that in the case of a large negative output gap, post-
ponement is more effective to reduce public debt, because of the
high current value of the fiscal multiplier. Accordingly, we find
that there are 6 countries where it would be better to delay consoli-
dation (Table 4). The effectiveness of consolidation would be
increased in so far as time would be given for growth to recover.
Such a strategy implicitly boils down to a 2-step approach. It
stresses that it is first needed to let the cyclically-adjusted deficit be
reduced in line with the closing of the output gap. Once the output
gap is closed, it becomes more effective to undertake fiscal consoli-
dation per se, i.e. the requested reduction of the structural deficit.
Thus, for Greece, it would be more effective to start consolidation
in 2017. For France, Spain and Ireland, it would be better to imple-
ment a neutral fiscal policy until 2016. Finally, for the Netherlands
and Portugal, debt reduction would be optimized if consolidation
started in 2015.
Comparing Table 4 to Table 2, we show that delaying fiscal
consolidation leads to a higher average growth in 2013-2017 in
concerned countries, and also for the euro area as a whole (2.4%
for 2013-2017, against 1.7% without delaying the adjustment).
Greece is again the country which would benefit the most from
delaying fiscal consolidation. Yearly average growth would be
4.5 percentage points higher between 2013 and 2017. Then, as the
output gap would close more rapidly, the average growth would be
slightly lower from 2018 to 2032. It must be stressed again that
postponing consolidation in these simulations would lead to
achieve the same debt target, relatively to the situation where
consolidation is only spread over time, with a cumulated fiscal
impulse that would be only half as large. This is extensively
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austerity less painful since it is postponed until the multiplier
reaches a lower value. Considering this argument, we may also
argue that forward looking financial markets would also consider
that it is more efficient to consolidate later. Then, if they worry
about fiscal sustainability and public debt default, it is not clear
whether interest rate spreads would necessarily increase. Further-
more, it may be needed to enforce the credibility of postponed
austerity by appropriate institutional arrangements. The ECB
should notably play a crucial role. As reminded by De Grauwe
(2012), countries in monetary union are more prone to speculative
attacks, which strengthens the argument for central banks in
monetary union being lender of last resort for sovereigns. Simi-
larly, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland combine a gain of 0.5 to
0.6 percentage point of growth on average over the same period
Table 4. Is it more appropriate to postpone the start of fiscal adjustment?
Public debt
 (% of GDP)
Structural balance
(% of GDP)
Cumu-
lated 
fiscal 
impulse
(% of 
GDP)
Average 
annual growth
Maximum
negative 
output 
gap 
reached
Starting 
date 
of fiscal 
impulses 
(sign 
of FI)
2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2032
2013-
2017
2018-
2032
2013-
2032
Germany 82 74 60 0.3 -1.3 -1.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 -0.7 2013 (+)
France 90 86 60 -1.4 -1.2 -0.8 -1.1  2.8 2.1 -4.0 2016 (-)
Italy 127 107 60 0.3 -0.7 1.3 1.9  2.4 1.3 -3.0 2013 (+)
Spain 86 95 60 -3.7 -4.0 2.4 -7.3  3.1 1.9 -5.7 2016 (-)
Nether-
lands 69 72 60 -2.9 -2.1 -1.6 -2.1 2.3 2.0 -2.1 2015 (-)
Belgium 100 90 60 -0.9 -1.3 -0.5 0.1  2.7 2.0 -3.2 2013 (+)
Portugal 119 116 60 -2.8 -1.7 1.9 -3.3  2.4 1.6 -3.3 2015 (-)
Ireland 118 123 78 -5.0 -5.1 2.7 -8.0  3.2 2.2 -4.7 2016 (-)
Greece 177 141 60 -0.6 -0.3 2.8 -1.5 4.1 1.9 -7.1 2017 (-)
Finland  53 56 60 0.2 -2.3 -2.8 1.8 2.6 2.2 -1.3 2013 (+)
Austria  75 72 60 -2.5 -1.6 -1.4 -0.9 1.7 1.6 -0.9 2013 (-)
Euro area  94 88 60 -1.0 -1.6 -0.1 -0.7 2.4 1.7 -2.9
Sources : Eurostat, iAGS model.
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in their structural deficit. For France, average growth would be
0.2 percentage point higher compared to the situation where
consolidation is spread over time. This improvement would stem
from the better prospects of trade partners within the euro area. It
remains to be said that this mild improvement would give a net
gain of 0.5 percentage point in comparison with the baseline situa-
tion where the French government sticks to its current fiscal
commitments.
For Austria and Germany, the second variant would not entail
significantly less consolidation. On the one hand, those countries
would benefit from a stronger growth in the rest of the euro area.
But, on the other hand, interest rates would be higher as a result of
a relative tightening of monetary policy, through the Taylor rule.
For Germany, real interest rates would on average amount to 1.7%
when consolidation is delayed in all other euro area countries
against 1% in the scenario where current commitments are
fulfilled.
5. Conclusion
Drawing on a reduced-form model of most euro area member
states, we assess the costs of the frontloaded strategy endorsed by
governments, under the auspices of the European Commission, in
terms of economic growth and also in terms of fiscal sustainability.
Beyond clarifying the failure of this strategy, we discuss an alterna-
tive scenario built upon simulations based on the same reduced-
form model. We suggest that keeping a debt ratio target of 60% by
2032 and postponing fiscal consolidation would be almost
optimal. As a matter of fact, in most countries, long-term sustain-
ability of public finances would be fulfilled while in the short run,
economic growth would be higher.
The reduced-form model, though it departs from optimal
control modelling, includes major features of the so-called New
Consensus (New Classical) school: (partly) forward-looking expec-
tations by consumers, firms and financial markets, a Taylor rule to
describe monetary policy setting, the introduction of risk premia
on public or private bonds, reliance on the disputable concept of
“output gap” and a zero-lower-bound to describe non-linear mone-
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used in large international institutions like the European Commis-
sion, we achieve new results as regards the appropriate pace of
fiscal consolidation in the euro area. Two assumptions are
important: fiscal multipliers vary along the business cycle, in
accordance with an abundant literature which we review, and
hysteresis effects maintain the real GDP fall vis-à-vis its potential.
The introduction of a delayed consolidation in the euro area
certainly goes beyond the letter of the European treaties; neverthe-
less, this backloading strategy would significantly alleviate the
social consequences of the crisis as it would reduce unemploy-
ment. For this strategy to be fully effective, a strong commitment
by governments to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios in the future is a
necessity: debt reduction must be planned, but only once the
output gap has substantially decreased, therefore limiting the costs
of consolidation. Governments should pay attention to the size of
fiscal multipliers and to the level of the output gap or the unem-
ployment rate before implementing restrictive fiscal policies.
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Simulations begin in 2013. To do so, we need to set some
starting point values in 2012 for a set of determinant variables.
Output gaps for 2012 come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts.
Potential growth for the baseline potential GDP is based on
Johansson et al. (2012) projections (see Table A1). Concerning
fiscal policy and budget variables, the main hypotheses are as
follows:
— The public debt in 2012 comes from the European Commis-
sion’s autumn 2012 forecast;
— We use the ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for fiscal balances in
2012; 
— We use the European Commission’s autumn 2012 forecast of
interest expenditures for 2012; combined with ECLM-IMK-OFCE
forecasts of output gaps in 2012, and model estimates of the
cyclical part of the fiscal balance, it gives the structural primary
balance for 2012;
— Fiscal impulses come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for
2013 (Table A2). For 2014-2015, we use fiscal impulses implied by
the Stability and Growth Pact reported in the “Assessment of the
2012 national reform programme and stability programme” for
each country.
— Sovereign spreads come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for
2013-2015 (see Table A3). We made the hypothesis that the ECB
programme of unlimited debt buying on the secondary market
(Outright Monetary Transactions) is effective and achieves its goal
to bring down interest rates for Italy and Spain. Regarding coun-
tries relying on the ESM for debt financing, we assume that Ireland
will get direct access to financial markets as of 2014, Portugal as of
2015 and Greece as of 2016.    
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In %
 
Public debt Fiscal 
balance
Structural 
primary 
balance
Interest 
expenditures
Output gap Potential 
growth
Source European Commission
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE
European 
Commission
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE
Germany 81.7 -0.2 2.7 2.4 -1.0 1.3
France 90.0 -4.4 1.2 2.6 -6.2 2.0
Italy 126.5 -2.5 5.8 5.5 -5.5 1.3
Spain 86.1 -7.4 -0.7 3.0 -8.5 2.0
Netherlands 68.8 -4.4 -0.9 2.0 -2.8 2.0
Belgium 99.9 -3.5 2.6 3.5 -4.8 2.0
Portugal 119.1 -5.5 1.7 4.5 -6.1 1.5
Ireland 117.6 -8.0 -1.0 4.0 -7.4 2.2
Greece 176.7 -6.7 4.8 5.4 -14.1 1.9
Finland 53.1 -0.9 1.3 1.1 -2.1 2.2
Austria 74.6 -3.0 0.1 2.6 -1.1 1.6
Sources: European Commission, ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts.
Table A2. Fiscal impulses
In % of GDP
 2013 2014 2015
Germany 0.0 -0.3 0.0
France -1.8 -0.6 -0.5
Italy -2.1 0.0 0.0
Spain -2.5 -1.2 -0.6
Netherlands -1.2 -1.2 -0.5
Belgium -0.8 -0.6 -0.8
Portugal -2.9 -0.6 -0.2
Ireland -1.8 -2.1 -1.8
Greece -3.9 -2.7 -0.9
Finland -1.3 0.0 0.0
Austria -0.9 -0.3 -0.6
Sources: ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts.
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on public debt
In %
 2013 2014 2015
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0
France 0.1 0.0 0.0
Italy 1.3 0.8 0.0
Spain 1.5 0.8 0.0
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 0.0
Belgium 0.5 0.1 0.0
Portugal 1.4 1.2 1.0
Ireland 1.4 1.5 0.0
Greece 1.4 1.2 0.9
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sources: ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts.
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BANKING UNION: A SOLUTION 
TO THE EURO ZONE CRISIS?1
Maylis Avaro
ENS Cachan
Henri Sterdyniak
OFCE
In June 2012 European Council launched the banking union as a new project expected
to contribute to solve the euro area crisis. Is banking union a necessary supplement to
monetary union or a new rush forward? A banking union would break the link between
the sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis, by asking the ECB to supervise banks, by
establishing common mechanisms to solve banking crises, and by encouraging banks to
diversify their activities. The banking union project is based on three pillars: a Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), a European Deposit
Guarantee Scheme (EDGS). Each of these pillars raises specific problems. Some are related
to the current crisis (can deposits in euro area countries facing difficulties be guaranteed?);
some other issues are related to the EU complexity (should the banking union include all
EU member states? Who will decide on banking regulations?), some other issues are related
to the EU specificity (is the banking union a step towards more federalism?); the more
stringent are related to structural choices regarding the European banking system. Banks'
solvency and ability to lend, would depend primarily on their capital ratios, and thus on
financial markets' sentiment. The links between the government, firms, households and
domestic banks would be cut, which is questionable. Will governments be able tomorrow
to intervene to influence bank lending policies, or to settle specific public banks? An oppo-
site strategy could be promoted: restructuring the banking sector, and isolating retail
banking from risky activities. Retail banks would focus on lending to domestic agents, and
their solvency would be guaranteed by the interdiction to run risky activities on financial
markets. Can European peoples leave such strategic choices in the hands of the ECB?
Keywords: Banking union, European Construction.
1. Preliminary drafts were presented at the 6th International Conference of the Centre
d’Etudes Monétaires et Financières (CEMF) and the International Economic Policy Institute
(IEPI), Sovereign debts, economic policies and bank reforms, Dijon (December 2012), at the Thematic
Meeting of the French Economic Association (AFSE), The Crisis of EMU: theoretical issues and
prospects for economic policy, Orléans (May 2013), at the 10th EUROFRAME Conference on
economic policy issues in the European Union, Warsaw (May 2013), at the Euro memorandum
meeting, London (September 2013), at the AIECE meeting, Brussels (November 2013). We thank
all participants for their comments. We particularly thank Anne-Laure Delatte for her careful
reading and helpful suggestions. All remaining errors are our own. 
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ways to solve the public debt crisis in the euro area. This crisis
revealed the drawbacks in the euro area organisation; they led to a
rise in imbalances between euro area countries from 1999 to 2007;
they did not allow the implementation of a common economic
strategy after the 2008 financial crisis. The 28-29 June 2012 Euro-
pean Council was a new attempt from European bodies and
member states to solve the euro area crisis. A new project emerged:
the banking union, which was more precisely defined at the 13
December 2012 Summit. Is banking union a necessary supplement
to monetary union or a new rush forward? 
The current crisis is originally a banking crisis. Prior to the crisis,
European banks had fed the rise in the financial and housing (espe-
cially in Spain and Ireland) bubbles; they had invested in risky
investment or in hedge funds in the US;2 they were making a
significant part of their profits on financial markets, but were
risking their own funds. They experienced significant losses due to
the 2007-2009 crisis and the burst of the bubbles.3 Governments
had to come to their rescue, which was particularly costly for
Germany, the UK, Spain, and, above all, for Ireland.4 The euro area
sovereign debt crisis increased banks’ difficulties; public debts
which they held became risky assets. A dangerous resonance
appeared between the difficulties of public finances and those of
the banks of the same country. Doubts on public debt weaken
national banks which generally own a certain amount of govern-
ment bonds; markets consider that governments will have to
rescue domestic banks, which increases the fears on governments’
solvency and on capacity to support domestic banks (Pisani-Ferry
and Wolff, 2012). Mistrust grows in an uncontrollable vicious
circle. Last, the debt crisis destroyed the euro area unity and the
2. Euro area banks’ foreign assets in US dollars reached 4 trillion dollars in 2008, four times the
figure for US banks’ assets in European currencies (Baba et al., 2009). 
3. Their writedowns related to US dollar-denominated non-bank assets are estimated at 423
billion dollars between 2007 and 2009 (McGuire and Von Peter, 2009). 
4. Between 2008 and October 2012, the approved amounts of rescue packages to financial
institutions reached 5.1trillion euros (40.3% of EU GDP), 365% of GDP for Ireland, 256% for
Denmark, 97% for Belgium. The amounts effectively used reached 1.6 trillion euros (12.8% of
EU GDP), 224% of GDP for Ireland, 66% for Denmark, 32% for Greece (European Commission,
2012 d). 
Banking union: A solution to the euro zone crisis? 197notion of 'single currency': a Spanish company cannot borrow at
the same interest rate as a German one (Figure 1). 
Due to the liberalisation of capital movements, small countries
(Ireland, Iceland and Cyprus) developed banking systems far too
big for their size, and were unable to rescue them. The issue of
banking regulation is addressed at the international level (new
Basel III standards), in the United States (Volker rule and Dodd-
Frank Act) and in the United Kingdom (Vickers’ report). 
In June 2012, the robustness of European banks was once again
questioned. The measures introduced since 2008 to stabilise the
financial system turned out to be insufficient. When Bankia, the
fourth bank in Spain requested a 19 billion euros support from the
Spanish government, concerns on Spanish banks’ balance sheets
strongly rose. The share of bad debts in Spanish banks, whose
balance sheets have been weakened by the burst of the housing
bubble, rose from 3.3% at the end 2008 to 8.7% in June 2012, and
11.3% at the end of 2012 (according to the Bank of Spain). Further-
more, many European depositors reduced their domestic bank
deposits fearing their country could leave the euro area: during the
first half of 2012, bank deposits fell by 5.6% in Greece, 12% in
Ireland, 4.5% in Portugal. From June 2012, this started also to
Figure 1. Interest rates on short-term loans to non-financial companies
In %
Source: ECB.
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Maylis Avaro and Henri Sterdyniak 198occur in Spain: bank deposits declined by 90 billion euros in the
summer (Figure 2). The TARGET 2 system automatically re-lent to
Spanish banks the Spanish deposits held in German banks, but the
ESCB was thus playing a role of guarantee of Southern countries’
banking systems, which could be dangerous and raised the
concerns of German politicians and economists. 
In May 2012, in response to these risks, Mario Monti re-
launched the objective of a European banking union, taking up
projects already in preparation at the DG Internal Market and
Services of the European Commission. Germany was reluctant,
considering that there can be no banking union without a fiscal
union. Even though Angela Merkel acknowledged the importance
of having a European supervision with a supranational banking
authority, she refused that Germany takes the risk of new transfers
or guarantees, without enhanced budgetary and political integra-
tion. However, the banking union project received the support
from the European Commission, the ECB, and several countries
(Italy, France, Spain...), some wishing to accelerate the move
towards a federal Europe, some looking for a lifeline emergency.
Thus, the need for urgent action to save the euro area could have
heavy consequences, with reforms implemented too rapidly,
without fully considering their consequences. 
Figure 2. Bank deposits
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Banking union: A solution to the euro zone crisis? 199The banking union would, according to its proponents, break
the nexus between sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis, by
entrusting bank supervision at the EU level, implementing
common mechanisms for banking crises resolution and for deposit
guarantee, and encouraging banks to diversify their activities and
their loans in Europe. It would help to unify credit and deposit
markets in Europe (see Dai and Sarfati, 2012, Pisani et al., 2012).
Conversely, it would introduce in each country a break between
banks on the one hand, governments and national companies on
the other hand. It would be a new step towards federalism by a new
transfer of competence from the Member States to European
authorities. The project raises again unresolved issues: can there be
an economic and monetary union without a fiscal and political
union? Is there any limit to EU integration? How to take national
differences into account?
Can banking union offset four major drawbacks of the Mone-
tary Union: the absence of a “lender of last resort”, which allows
financial markets to bet on the possible bankruptcy of States; the
absence of rigid solidarity, control or coordination mechanisms
which weakens the single currency; the inability to implement a
crisis exit strategy, which has led several economies to fall and
remain in recession, which weakens further their banking system;
the fact that a single interest rate set by the ECB, with arbitrary risk
premia requested by financial markets, leads to uncontrollable
credit conditions in member countries?
Such a banking union would be based on three pillars: 
— A Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
— A Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
— A European deposit guarantee scheme.
Each of these pillars is subject to specific problems. Some of this
problems are related to the complexity of the functioning of the
EU (Is banking union limited to the euro area or does it include all
EU countries?) some others to the crisis context (should Europe
guarantee depositors against the exit of their country from the
euro area? Should Europe support banks already facing difficul-
ties?), some others linked to the EU specificity (Is banking union a
step towards more federalism? How to reconcile it with national
prerogatives?), finally other problems linked to structural choices
on the functioning of the European banking system (should there
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internationally diversified and integrated to financial markets?
Should banks refocus their activity on their core business, credits
and deposits?).
However on 29 June 2012, the euro area summit agreed that the
Commission would make proposals for a SSM for euro area banks
(European council, 2012b), which was the condition for allowing
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to directly recapitalise
banks, thus breaking the vicious circle. 
On 18 October 2012, the Council launched the legislative work
on a banking union while insisting on the need to strengthen the
surveillance of fiscal policies (six-pack, two-pack, Fiscal Compact),
by the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances and by
increasing incentives for structural reforms. 
On 13 and 14 December 2012, the Council agreed on the SSM,
giving the ECB the full responsibility for the European banks
supervision. This allowed launching the trilogue discussion with
the European Parliament. On 12 September 2013, the European
Parliament agreed to set up the SSM. These powers will be effective
from September 2014.
With regard to the SRM, on June 2013, the Council agreed on
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), proposed by
the EU Commission in June 2012. An agreement with the Euro-
pean Parliament was announced on 20 December 2013. An
intergovernmental agreement on a Single Resolution Board (SRB)
and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) was announced on 18
December 2013, but no agreement has yet been reached with the
European Parliament.
We will analyse the issues and problems of each of these three
pillars, and we will then discuss the future model of the banking
system in the European banking union. 
1. A Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The objective of setting up a single European banking supervisor
is to have an independent and powerful institution supervising
European banks. The arguments in favour of such a supervisor are
the same as for an independent central bank. Banks, like money,
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Banking supervision by an independent supranational authority
prevents national or political factors to influence decisions and
strengthens the credibility of strict rules (Rochet, 2008). An inde-
pendent supervisor will be credible when asserting that not all
banks will be necessarily bailed out in the event of bankruptcy,
which will encourage banks to reduce their risks. This will reduce
the moral hazard of banks otherwise encouraged to take risks under
the insurance of being bailed out by their State. Independence also
ensures shorter delays for the implementation of bankruptcy
procedures, delays that are detrimental to the effectiveness of the
adopted resolution procedure and create the possibility of lobbying
actions limiting the credibility of the overall scheme. The super-
visor should be able to monitor banks in trouble before they
become a threat to financial sector stability. Speculation on bank
failures which has fed the crisis, would be substantially reduced.
Confidence depends strongly on the quality of supervision. Uncer-
tainties about the quality of the banking sector, on its
capitalisation, on the amount of bad debts caused difficulties for
banks to refinance themselves on the interbank market.
The European banking supervisor should facilitate the imple-
mentation of the common scheme of crisis resolution, by acting
both in normal times and in times of crises for the resolution of
bankruptcy procedures. Finally, it will monitor the implementa-
tion of the new Basel III standards. From 1 January 2014, banks
will have to increase the level and quality of their capital: the Core
Tier 1 ratio (comprising core equity: common stock and retained
earnings) should increase from 2 to 4.5% of banks' assets, while the
TIER 1 ratio should stand at 6% at least, versus 4% previously.
The single banking supervision should enable to set up both a
single mechanism of deposit guarantee and a single mechanism for
assistance to banks in difficulty (Véron and Wolff, 2013).
There has been a debate on whether the European banking
authority (EBA) or the ECB should be in charge of the SSM. The
EBA was founded in November 2010 to improve the EU banking
system supervision and is a young institution. It already ran two
series of “stress tests” on banks. In October 2011, Bankia’s tests
results pointed to a 1.3 billion deficit of core capital. Five months
later, this deficit was 23 billion. This weakened the EBA’s credi-
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based in London, and has authority on the British system while the
United Kingdom does not wish to be part of the banking union. 
The ECB lobbied to be entrusted with this task. Hence, Mr
Constancio, Vice-president of the ECB, said on 12 June 2012, that
“the ECB and the Eurosystem are prepared” to receive these
powers; “there is therefore no need to create a new institution”.
Section 127.6 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European
Union,5 quoted at the 29 June euro area summit, makes it possible
to give supervisory authority to the ECB.
Financial stability is already an objective of national central
banks and the latter already had a role in the banking sector super-
vision. In France, for example, the Prudential Supervisory
Authority is responsible for the agreement and supervision of
banks and insurance institutions; it an independent authority, but
remains backed by the Bank of France. 
The European Commission estimated that the ECB has an estab-
lished reputation of political independence. The ECB’s good
knowledge of the interbank market, of liquidity in circulation, of
the situation and reputation of each bank was an advantage over
an independent agency. 
So, the Commission chose the ECB to conduct banking supervi-
sion within a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) including the
ECB and the existing national prudential authorities (European
Commission, 2012 a). The ECB will receive the responsibility of
monitoring missions for all the participating member states’ credit
institutions, regardless of their business model and their size. It
will ensure the implementation of standards for the degree of
leverage, of liquidity, of own funds and it may, in coordination
with the national authorities, impose the constitution of capital
buffer or the introduction of corrective measures as deemed neces-
sary. It will be the relevant authority to approve credit institutions.
It will ensure the coherent application of the EBA single rulebook.
5. Art 127.6 “The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure,
may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer
specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
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thus be responsible for supervising all banks in the banking union,
but it will directly supervise banks with assets amounting to more
than 30 billion euros or at least 20% of GDP of the country where
their headquarters are located, as well as the banks which will
request or receive assistance from the ESM, i.e. 200 banks on a total
of 6 000 banks in Europe (European Commission, 2013c). It will
monitor the supervision of other banks which will be conducted
by national supervisory authorities, who will be accountable to the
ECB. The ECB may decide, at any time, to supervise any credit
institution. The SSM will benefit from the expertise of national
supervisory authorities. The ECB shall have access to all the infor-
mation available to national supervisors. As the ECB is an EU
institution, it will be possible to appeal a decision according to the
principles defined in the European treaties. 
The ECB’s new prerogatives as a single supervisor will have to
take into account the presence of non-euro area countries in the
banking union. Non-euro area EU countries are already repre-
sented in the ECB within the General Council which brings
together all the governors of central banks of the EU. But currently
this Council does not have any power. A fair distribution of powers
between euro and non-euro area countries on European banking
supervision is going to be very delicate within the ECB, this institu-
tion being primarily the Central Bank of euro area countries. So the
European Parliament decided that all countries participating to the
SSM are entitled to the same representativeness within the Council
who will lead the supervision tasks of the ECB. In fact, in January
2014, the UK, Sweden and the Czech Republic already announced
that they will not participate; no non-Euro area EU country has
already decided to join the SSM.
A Supervisory Board (SB) and fully independent services will
have to be created within the ECB to avoid conflict with the mone-
tary policy objective. The SB would have six members from the
ECB (the Chair, the Vice-Chair and four other members) and repre-
sentatives of each national supervisor (which may be the national
central bank or a separate authority). However the Board of Gover-
nors will have a right of veto on all decisions. To ensure the
democratic legitimacy of the process, the Commission claims that
the project ensures “strong accountability safeguards, notably vis-
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Commission, 2012 b). In practice, the ECB will have to present to
the European Parliament the key points of the supervisory board’s
minutes and the appointment of the Chair and of the Vice-Chair
of the Supervisory Board will have to be approved by the Parlia-
ment. The supervisory power of the ECB voted on 12 September
2013 will be fully effective in November 2014, one year after the
entry into force of the texts. 
The Commission claims that the ECB will take no mission from
the EBA, whose mandate in the European monitoring mechanism
was specified (European Commission, 2012b): the EBA should
elaborate a common legal framework for surveillance through a
single rulebook for banking supervision in Europe, including the
countries which would not be part of banking union. It should also
provide the texts of laws that will govern the management of
banking crises in the euro area. It should ensure regular stress tests
on European banks. The EBA may make decisions on the double
majority (group of countries subject to the SSM, group of countries
not subject to it), which in practice gives a right of veto to the UK.
So the EBA existence allows the UK to maintain a link with the
banking union. 
The ECB and the EBA are expected to work closely within the
European Systemic Risk Board, responsible for alerting the Euro-
pean authorities about banking and financial instability risks in
Europe. It is not yet certain that this committee will have an effec-
tive role, in the absence of any established doctrine and of any
strong will.
1.1. Delicate transfers of sovereignty for a single supervision 
The risk is great that entrusting these issues to the ECB is a new
step towards the de-politicisation of Europe. Certainly, the Euro-
pean authorities claim that the ECB will be subject to enhanced
transparency and democratic accountability requirements.
Although the President of the ECB is often heard by the European
Parliament, the Parliament control remains formal; the ECB main-
tains a full independence vis-à-vis national governments and
European institutions. Although a Monitoring Committee is
created, the Governing Council will remain responsible for
banking supervision and monetary policy decisions. Despite the
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authorities, the ECB will make decisions in full independence, and
simply has to “account for” and “reply to parliamentary questions”
but these decisions will not be questionable, as is the case today
with monetary policy decisions.
Will the ECB be able to account for European banks diversity?
The European Parliament says that it will be one of its duties but it
does not explain how financial institutions diversity will be
preserved (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Euro-
pean Parliament, 2012). The single rulebook on which the EBA
works and which must serve as a code of conduct for the ECB advo-
cates a uniform regulation for all European banks. However,
should governance or the capital ratio be the same for a small
German retail bank and a large European banking institution? 
One should have considered a dual system: the ECB would
manage large transnational banks and national regulators would
supervise national and regional banks and would preserve their
specificities. However, national regulators are facing today unequal
risks: they are facing much bigger risks in Southern countries
(Greece, Spain, and Portugal) than in Germany or Finland. A dual
system would have risked accelerating the withdrawal of deposits
from medium-size banks in Southern countries. 
The main point is the objective for the European banking
system: large transnational banks, with cross-border deposits or
credits, with substantial financial markets activities, or national
and regional banks of reduced sizes, well inserted into real
economic activities. 
Banks are encouraged to diversify internationally to reduce
their risks. But the crisis showed the dangers of diversification on
foreign markets where banks are not familiar with.6 Banks lose
contact with domestic firms, which deteriorate the quality of
credit. Local authorities would no longer have dedicated banks.
6. For instance, studying micro-level data on 105 Italian banks over 1993–1999, Acharya et al.
(2002) show empirical evidence of diseconomies of diversification for certain banks which
expand their activities in industries where they face a high degree of competition or lack prior
lending experience. This generates an increase in credit risk of loan portfolios or poor
monitoring incentives.
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supply, which, for many people, is desirable (no political influence
on credit supply), but is dangerous in our opinion: governments
will lose an industrial policy tool that could be used to finance small
and medium size firms, or to promote environmental transition. 
For instance, in the case of the Dexia bank, the opposition
between on the one hand the European Commission and on the
other hand France, Belgium and Luxembourg, has for a long time
blocked the plan to dismantle the bank. This plan includes the
resumption of financing activities of local French authorities of
Dexia by a public bank, created by the cooperation between the
Caisse des dépôts and the Banque Postale. On fair competition
grounds, Brussels questioned the financing of local authorities by
such a bank because Dexia received public aid for its dismantling
plan. This threatens the continuity of the financing of local French
authorities, could block their projects and especially forbid France
to provide specific and secure mechanisms to finance local projects
by local savings. 
Similarly, in October 2012, the French Government rescued the
BPF, Banque PSA Finance, the Bank financing the Peugeot group, in
order to avoid that PSA can no longer provide credit to its
customers. France guaranteed 7 billion euros of PSA bonds and got
a commitment from the BPF’s creditor banks to increase their
loans. Is this compatible with a banking union?
Finally, the French project of a public investment bank (Banque
publique d’investissement, BPI) is problematic in this context. This
bank should provide credit according to specific criteria, linked
with the French industrial policy. The question of the compati-
bility of such a public institution with the banking union will arise.
European banks will have to account for different national regu-
lations on interest income taxation, special deposits regulation or
financing circuit organisation. Is this compatible with the banking
union or does convergence need to be organised? And who will
decide about it? 
In any case, the SSM does not address the question of how to
ensure similar credit conditions in different countries sharing the
same currency but in different economic situations. In the recent
past, equal nominal interest rates encouraged rising debt in coun-
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strongly influenced by risk premia imposed by markets, with no
link to the macroeconomic situation.
It is difficult to assess if there will be (and if there should be) a
Chinese wall between bank supervision and monetary policy (see
Beck and Gros, 2012, for a discussion). The two functions are
closely correlated when the Central Banks provide liquidity to
banks, especially in times of crisis. Some economists (Goodhart,
2000 or Darvas and Merler, 2013) have raised the possibility that
the Central Bank’s role as banks’ supervisor may enter into conflict
with its objective of maintaining price stability. In the future, the
ECB may decide not to raise interest rates, when necessary, in order
to avoid downgrading banks’ financial position. But this problem
is not specific to the SSM implementation; it is always a concern
for monetary policy that a strong interest rise deteriorates the
balance sheet of some financial agents.
One could imagine that the ECB implements diversified macro-
prudential policies imposing higher capital ratios to banks in coun-
tries in economic expansion and lower ratios for countries in
difficulty. But this raises three questions: the macro-prudential
logic will go in the opposite direction of the micro-prudential one;
this implies that banks remain national; the ECB’s strategy is likely
to go in the opposite direction of the economic and fiscal strategy
of the Member State (MS). Will the ECB punish a country running
a too expansionary policy according to the Bank views by
imposing strong capital ratios to its banks? In 2014, for instance, a
MS like France may want domestic banks to increase credit supply
to French firms to support an industrial recovery, but the ECB may
consider this is a dangerous strategy for French banks financial
stability. Diversified macroprudential policies would require a MS-
well-defined coordination of European monetary policy, country-
specific monetary measures and domestic fiscal policies which is
not on the European agenda today.
A common vision on the banking system regulation is a prereq-
uisite to European supervision. An agreement needs to be reached
on crucial questions such as: is it necessary to separate retail banks
from investment banks? Should banks be prevented to intervene on
financial markets for their own profit? Should we promote the
development of public, mutual, or regional banks or on the contrary
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banks to supply credit primarily to households, businesses and
governments of their countries of origin or on the contrary to diver-
sify? Will macro-prudential rules be national or European? On each
of these issues, the MS, the Commission, the ECB, and the EBA may
have different points of view: who will decide? 
Of course, in theory, it would be easier and more legitimate to
rescue banks under a single supervision. But this prospect is hardly
useful in the current crisis, where the problem is to help banking
systems already in trouble in Spain, Cyprus, Ireland, or Slovenia. 
Southern countries’ current difficulties oblige the entire euro
area to a rapid and full centralisation of banking regulation, the
defaults of which may appear in a few years. In our view there is a
major risk that euro area countries agree in emergency to enter a
dangerous path, and that the banking union is as badly analysed
ex-ante as were the single currency, the Stability and Growth Pact,
the Fiscal treaty.
The Cypriot crisis has highlighted the difficulties of a European
supervision. The European banking system is currently highly
heterogeneous. Banks’ balance-sheets-to-GDP ratios differ strongly
among countries (Table 1). In some countries, banks have a signifi-
cant share of deposits from non-residents. Does the SSM need to
make national systems converge or can it accommodate their
diversity? 
The risk is that the banking union leads to conflicting situations
between national strategies on banking and financial matters and
the ECB, either because some countries may wish to keep certain
public or regional features in their banking system, or because
some others will want to maintain their predatory features (to
attract foreign deposits). Economic issues will also arise: will
governments still have the responsibility and the ability to influ-
ence credit policy either according to the real estate market
developments, or to the macroeconomic context? 
In November 2013, ECB undertook a comprehensive assess-
ment of the euro area banking system before assuming its
supervisory tasks in November 2014. The ECB’s note (ECB, 2013)
gives a provisional list of the 123 concerned banks and confirms
that no non euro area country will participate. “The exercise will
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a stress test”. Common methodologies will be developed in these
three areas. The ECB may require corrective action as recapitalisa-
tion, profit retention, equity issuance, assets’ sales. Capital
shortfalls for viable banks should be provided by private capital or,
if private capital is insufficient, by public backstops. After this exer-
cise, the ECB will have a clear view of the situation of the European
banks and will be able to take the responsibility to supervise them.
The process should increase the confidence about banks’ situa-
tions: if some European banks are not in a viable situation, their
case should be resolved in 2014. The limitation (or maybe the
strength) of this exercise is that the ECB is both judge and party.
Table 1. Banks’ consolidated balance sheets-to-GDP ratios
2007 2012
Luxembourg 27.3 20.2
Malta 6.8 7.8
Cyprus 5.8 7.2
Ireland 8.5 6.9
United Kingdom 4.8 4.9
Netherlands 3.8 4.2
France 3.6 3.8
Spain 2.9 3.5
Portugal 2.6 3.4
Austria 3.2 3.2
Germany 3.1 3.1
Finland 1.6 3.1
Sweden 2.5 3.0
Belgium 3.9 2.9
Italy 2.1 2.7
Greece 1.7 2.3
Slovenia 1.2 1.4
Latvia 1.5 1.3
Estonia 1.3 1.1
Poland 0.8 0.9
Slovakia 1.0 0.8
Euro Area 3.2 3.4
Source: ECB.
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depends on its willingness to guarantee them or to respond to
speculative attacks. It must evaluate the size of macroeconomic
shocks that banks should be able to resist, but this size depends on
the ability of the ECB to implement countercyclical policies and
the banks resilience depends on the ECB’s willingness to help them
in a strong recession. So, the ECB evaluation is not neutral; it can
be seen as a commitment to rescue the banks proclaimed healthy.
Box 1.  Banking regulation in the United States
In the US, banking supervision is dual: it adapts to the two types of US
banks: national banks (intervening at the federal level) and State banks
(specific to each State). Supervision is carried out by the Fed and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Federal Reserve
membership is mandatory for national banks and optional for State
banks. In the event of joining, banks must subscribe to their regional
reserve Bank and deposit the corresponding reserves. The Fed is inde-
pendent of the government as it is ultimately accountable to the
Congress which establishes the key macroeconomic objectives for
monetary policy and as members of the Board of Governors and the
Chairman are confirmed by the Congress. The Fed regulates and super-
vises the banks which are members of the Federal Reserve and the Bank
Holding Companies system (12% of commercial banks and through the
BHC 96% of commercial banks’ assets). It sets the level of mandatory
reserves. The FDIC is an independent agency of the federal government
and receives no Congressional appropriations. The five members of its
Board of Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. It is responsible for the supervision of State banks that are not
members of the Federal Reserve System. It is also responsible for bank
bankruptcy procedures resolutions and ensures the continuum of
prudential policy and resolutions procedures.
2. A single resolution mechanism (SRM) 
Until now, within the European Union, the legal provisions
governing bank failures were country-specific. In some countries,
like the UK, banks are submitted to the general code of firms bank-
ruptcy and thus to a judicial procedure. Other countries, such as
France have mixed regimes: an administrative procedure
conducted by the banks’ supervisor coexists with a judicial proce-
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sector (for instance, to involve other banks in the procedure; to
protect the smaller deposits). 
In June 2012, the European Commission proposed to establish a
single resolution mechanism (SRM). This SRM will be based on the
Bank Recovery and Resolution and Directive (BRRD) agreed by the
Council in June 2013, by the trilogue in December 2013, but not
yet formally voted by the European Parliament. The scheme has
five pillars. The first one is to improve prevention by requiring
banks to establish wills, i.e. to provide strategies for recovery, or
even for dismantling, in case of crisis. The second gives the Euro-
pean banking authorities the power to intervene to implement
recovery plans and to change bank managers if the bank does not
meet the capital requirements. The third indicates that, if a bank
fails, national authorities will be able to take control of it and use
instruments of resolution such as the transfer of activities, the crea-
tion of a defeasance bank (a “bad bank”) or the bail-in. The bail-in
tool will give resolution authorities the power to write down the
claims of unsecured creditors of a failing institution and to convert
debt claims to equity. In the event of a bank failure, shareholders
will be affected first, then subordinated claims and, if necessary,
claims of higher categories. These claims could be transferred in
equity. Some liabilities are permanently protected: deposits below
100 000 euros, liabilities to employees, and inter-bank liabilities
with a less than seven days maturity. Others deposits (from individ-
uals or SMEs) could have a specific treatment. National resolution
authorities could also exclude liabilities to avoid contagion or value
destruction in some creditors. The fourth pillar requires MS to set
up a resolution fund, which must amount within 10 years, to 1% of
the covered deposits of all credit institutions, which would have to
finance it. The fund would provide temporary support to institu-
tions under resolution. But the share of losses between ordinary
creditors, privileged creditors and the resolution fund remains
uncertain. According to the fifth, Member States shall ensure that
the institutions maintain, at all times, a sufficient aggregate
amount of own funds and eligible liabilities expressed as a
percentage of the total liabilities of the institution (European
Commission, 2012) to absorb losses. This percentage is estimated to
be at least 10% but will be fixed in 2016 after a recommendation by
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creditors of insolvent banks. The EBA will have to set out the legis-
lative framework for these instruments of resolution. The
administrative body responsible for the resolution at the national
level is left to the discretion of each country: Central Bank, finance
ministry or a specific institution.
On 10 July 2013, the Commission proposed to move further
towards the SRM centralization (European Commission, 2013b).
The ECB would signal banks in difficulty to a Single Resolution
Board (SRB), consisting in representatives from the ECB, the
Commission and the supervisory authorities of the relevant
country). The SRB would propose a resolution procedure, which
would be formally decided by the Commission (as the SRB has no
constitutional existence) and implemented by the relevant
country under the SRB control. If a national resolution authority
does not comply with the decision of the Board, the latter could
address executive orders to the bank in trouble. National resolu-
tion funds would be replaced by a Single Bank Resolution Fund.
Due to the reluctance of some MS, particularly Germany, the draft
adopted by the Council on 18 December 2013 states that the
pooling of national resolution funds will be carried out gradually
in 10 years, from 2015 to 2025. It is only at this horizon that
banks financing or recapitalisation funds will be provided at the
European level. The decision to place a bank under the resolution
procedure will depend on the Resolution Fund Board, where sit
MS representatives (and not of the Commission or the ECB). The
restructuring projects will be developed by the Fund Board,
submitted to the Commission and then to the Council (this proce-
dure is not credible, taking into account the short delay required).
A MS will not be required to provide funds without the approval
of its Parliament. The Fund will be organised by an intra-govern-
ment agreement, i.e. without the European Parliament. This
project faces the reluctance of the European Parliament, which
would have preferred the immediate introduction of the Single
Resolution Fund at the EU level, so that the MS have no more
power in this matter. But, in our view an EU organization cannot
impose expenditures to MS public finances without their agree-
ment, and MS cannot accept to lose any power on their national
banks restructuring. 
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banks may benefit, for their recapitalisation, from funds from the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), set up on October 8 2012.
The ESM will borrow on financial markets at low rates (it aims to be
AAA rated) and will be able to provide financial assistance to the
European countries in difficulty through a European assistance
under a Memorandum of Understanding. It will buy public debt bonds
on primary and secondary markets and will thus contribute to
lower interest rates. It will be able to mobilize 700 billion euros with
80 billion euros being effectively paid-up capital, the rest remaining
available if needed. According to the Treaty establishing the ESM,
the latter will have a status of senior creditor for public debts. When
the European supervisor is in place, the ESM will have the possi-
bility to recapitalise directly euro area banks in difficulty (and, in
this case, it will intervene without the senior creditor status).
Here also, this leaves open the question of the potential inter-
vention of the ESM for banks currently in difficulty. A choice needs
to be made between two strategies: either the ESM only benefits
banks subject to the SSM, which means that the ESM will only
intervene in the next crisis; or the ESM rescues banks currently in
difficulty because of the financial and economic crisis, which
means that the ESM will play a central role quickly.
If this mechanism works effectively, if the ESM supports, recapi-
talises and restructures all European banks in difficulty, it will be a
shareholder in a large number of banks. This would raise the issue
of the management of such participations. Is it the role of the ESM? 
The system introduced remains complicated, with the interven-
tion of the ECB (via the SSM), of the ESM, of the national
authorities of resolution and possibly of the deposit guarantee fund.
Box 2.  Banking crisis prevention and resolution 
in the United States
This European crisis resolution scheme belongs to early corrective
action policies which already exist in other countries. In the United
States, following the savings and loans crisis in the eighties, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was adopted in 1991.
This text establishes a resolution framework structured in two pillars:
early corrective action and resolution at low cost. The first pillar is an
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regulated” (Scialom, 2006): its objective is to decrease the regulators
waiting propensity. Banking supervision and monitoring are done
through two tools: on-site inspections and reporting obligations. The
FDICIA determines the actions of the regulator and banks on the basis of
their capital ratios. When banks fall below established in advance levels
of funds, pre-defined corrective measures are applied. These measures
are: the suspension of bonuses and dividends, a plan for the recovery of
own resources, the obligation to recapitalise, the restriction of deposits
remuneration, the limitation of the payment of the executives’ compen-
sation, a placing under administration or the liquidation if the bank fails
its recapitalisation, the suspension of subordinated debt payments. The
FDIC may decide the bank liquidation if it remained more than 90 days
below the “critical undercapitalization” level. The codification of the
sanctions makes predictable the choice of regulator and prevents
arrangements between the bank and its regulator. The second pillar
means that the method of resolution chosen for a bank in difficulty
shall be the one which minimizes the cost of liquidation for FDIC.
2.1. A not-yet credible crisis resolution scheme
According to Finance Watch (2013), it is not sure that these
dispositions could avoid a full taxpayer protection, if banks remain
interconnected and too big. If a systemic bank is in financial diffi-
culty, it would be difficult to report its losses on other credit
institutions without creating a contagion effect. The scheme would
require first to reduce the banks’ size and to separate financial and
market activities from credit activities. 
A perverse effect of the projected crises resolution scheme is
that the potential involvement of shareholders and subordinated
creditors would make banks’ shares and claims much riskier.
Banks’ reluctance towards the interbank credit and the drying up
of the interbank market will persist; banks will find it difficult to
issue securities and will have to increase their remuneration. Banks
will be subject to financial markets’ appreciation. However, Basel
III standards require banks to link their credit distribution to their
own funds. The risk is that banks are weakened and that credit
supply is reduced, contributing to maintain the zone in recession. 
Aglietta and Brand (2013) clearly approve of shareholders’
involvement: “the best established principle of the market
economy is that it cannot function properly if the threat of bank-
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agents like any other agent? We would prefer a clear separation
between banks playing a quasi-public role (management of
deposits, loans to households, enterprises, public authorities) and
banks with financial market activities, the first would benefit from
a public guarantee directly by their State (and indirectly by the
ECB), the others not. 
The SRM project deprives the national authorities from all
powers. They would be obliged to obey the Single Resolution Board
instructions. The losses of a bank would be supported by all coun-
tries belonging to the banking union, thereby justifying a single
control. According to the project, the Commission and the SRB
would be able to decide to impose a resolution plan to a bank,
without the agreement of the relevant governments. It is an
important step toward European Federalism, which has not yet been
accepted by Germany, for instance, which claimed for more polit-
ical union though a constitutional reform before this hidden step. 
The implementation of the guidelines of this new authority
may be problematic. A banking group in difficulty may be
requested to sell its shares of large national groups. But will
national governments agree to expose a national champion to a
foreign control? As shown in the case of Dexia, the terms of a bank
restructuring can have serious consequences for the countries
where it was operating. Are governments (and citizens) willing to
lose all power in this area?
We cannot agree with the Finance Watch Report (2013), which
writes: “a bank resolution mechanism must not be left in the
hands of politicians, and even less of national interests” as if the
organisation of the banking system was a purely technical matter
and should not depend on economic policy choices made by the
Member States. 
Following the decisions of the 29 June 2012 Summit, Spain
could be the first country where banks would be directly recapital-
ised by the ESM. However, this would not occur before 2014; the
modalities of such a procedure and the impact of the ESM support
on the governance of recapitalised banks still have to be specified. 
The assistance to Spain agreed in summer 2012 foreshadows
what could the European procedure for banking failure resolution
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from Europe to restructure and recapitalise its banking sector. The
29 June 2012 Summit agreed to that request and entrusted this task
to the ESM. The required conditions have been specified in a
Memorandum agreed by the European Council. The document
points out the weaknesses of the Spanish economy: growth
boosted by strong households’ and firms’ borrowing, persistent
external imbalances, a banking sector weakened by the burst of the
financial bubble in 2007, which faces very high interest rates on
the interbank market and implements credit rationing. The EU
assistance is designed to clean up balance sheets of Spanish banks,
which have a large amount of bad debts, to restore credit supply by
allowing the return of Spanish banks on the interbank market and
to improve financial sector’s transparency. 
The assistance programme has three steps: the detailed assess-
ment of the situation and needs of banks; their recapitalisation and
restructuring; the withdrawal of their bad debt in a bad bank,
created for this purpose (the AMC: Asset Management Company).
But the aid is awarded according to two sets of conditions, the first
one concerning banks, the second one Spanish governance. Based
on the results of stress tests, banks must offer recapitalization plans
that will be evaluated by the Spanish authorities, the EBA, the ECB,
the IMF and the European Commission. Banks had to achieve an
equity ratio of 9% in December 2012. The Commission, the EBA
and the ECB can examine the banks having received European aid
and may choose to liquidate an institution they consider too
fragile. The independence of the Central Bank of Spain and its
supervisory power should be strengthened. The Spanish authori-
ties must encourage disintermediation and financing through
markets. Finally, the Spanish Government must reduce public and
external deficits and undertake the structural reforms recom-
mended in the context of the European semester.
The aid was spread into two parts: a first part, a 39.5 billion
euros loan with an average maturity of 12.5 years has been agreed
in December 2012 by the Eurogroup and the ESM to support the
most vulnerable banks. All Spanish banks have run stress tests that
assessed their recapitalisation needs; their results were published in
September. Banks were then classified into four groups. The most
solid (without recapitalisation need) will be in group 0; Banco
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Unicaja are part of this group according to the report by Oliver
Wyman’s firm. The four banks already nationalized by the Fund
for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) are classified in Group 1.
Other Spanish banks are either in Group 2 (for those unable to
recapitalise on their own) or in Group 3 (for those which obtained
a delay until June 2013 to raise capital by themselves). Banco
Popular, MNB and the merged group between Ibercaja, Liberbank
and Caja 3 benefited from a delay until 2014 to recapitalise while
Catalunya Banco, NGC Banco, Banco de Valencia and Bankia must
present a restructuring plan and transfer their unsafe assets to the
bad bank, the Sareb. This institution, created on 1 December 2012,
will be able to buy assets up to 90 billion euros. According to
Fernando Restoy, the FROB president, haircuts applied to the loans
transferred to the bad bank will be 45.5% on average and haircuts
applied to real estate assets will reach 63% (see Birambaux, 2012).
Junior and hybrid debts will be converted into equity or will be
redeemed with a high discount. 
Spanish banks received the second part of 1.9 billion euros for
the recapitalization of the second group of banks in difficulty. The
Commission report from March 2013 (see, European Commission,
2013) is optimistic about the recovery of the sector and does not
expect other recapitalizations for the moment.
This ambitious assistance plan did not receive investors’ full
confidence: Spanish banks soundness is tested via stress tests.
However these stress tests had failed in 2011 to foresee Bankia’s
difficulties: are they really able now to assess the needs of Spanish
banks? Besides, this project monitoring is extremely complex. In
the absence of a European supervisor, Spanish public authorities
are responsible for the resolution: they are supported by the FROB,
the public fund introduced in 2010 to reform the banking sector.
The European Commission, the ECB, the EBA and the IMF monitor
the proper conduct of the proceedings and may intervene on site.
The difficulty of coordination of such an organisation diminishes
the credibility of the project. The drastic recapitalisation that
Spanish banks will have to perform may decrease credit avail-
ability, which will deepen recession in Spain. Spain has benefited
from a substantial drop in the interest rate it has to pay: from 6.5%
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until middle 2013. 
In order to set the bases of the future European banking union,
the European banking crisis management could extend to all Euro-
pean banks balance sheets the withdrawal of bad loans to an Asset
Management Company. Since 2008, the United States has imple-
mented such a measure through their TARP: Troubled Asset Relief
Program, which was intended to clean the financial sector from its
toxic assets. The US Treasury also purchased preferred shares for
205 billion dollars in the benefit of 707 companies, in order to
strengthen financial institutions’ and banks’ own funds. On the
whole 389 billion dollars were mobilized for this project; banks and
other beneficiaries have currently refunded 80% of this amount. 
Note that the Bad bank strategy, which was successful in Sweden
in the beginning of the 90’s, has its dangers. In 1995, the Credit
Lyonnais, owned by the French State, was split into a healthy
entity pursuing the bank activity and a bad bank responsible to sell
all non-performing assets and activities of the Credit Lyonnais
(Blic, 2000). However the pooling of assets within this bad bank
generated a global fall in the value of transferred assets, the sale of
which was an additional cost for taxpayers.
The Cypriot crisis led to the first implementation of the new
method of banking crises resolution. European institutions refused
to go beyond an aid of 10 billion euros to Cyprus, considering that
this would have induced an unsustainable debt. They refused to
help directly a banking system they judge oversized for the
country, badly managed, specialized in money laundering and
securing dubious Russian assets. Thus, the new method has been
implemented: deposits are guaranteed up to 100.000 euros (after
an initial version of the plan, which awkwardly planned to tax
deposits under this level). Shareholders and creditors of Laiki, the
second bank of Cyprus, which will be closed down, lose all their
assets. The amounts of less than 100.000 euros deposits will be
transferred to the Bank of Cyprus. The amount of deposits in
excess of 100.000 euros is frozen and will be refunded according to
the results of the Bank’s assets liquidation (losses are estimated to
be of 60%). Debts and deposits over 100,000 euros at the Bank of
Cyprus, which is restructured, are frozen and will be partly
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bail-in principle); their losses should amount to 40%. 
However, this implementation of the new European scheme of
crisis resolution revealed its weaknesses: banks have faced huge
withdrawals from depositors and were forced to close for several
days. Capital flows controls had to be introduced when banks
reopened. Frozen assets and losses for large deposits have affected
SMEs and some households doing real estate transaction, having
just received an inheritance or saving for their retirement. Above all,
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Eurogroup President, who said that the
model applied in Cyprus corresponded to the future practice of the
banking union, had to step back and pretend that the case of Cyprus
was unique. The Eurogroup and several leaders of the ECB made
similar statements, in full contradiction with on-going projects,
thus weakening the choice of bail-in as the method of resolution. 
3. The European deposit guarantee scheme
The banking union should include a European deposit guar-
antee scheme. A deposit guarantee system protects savers in case of
bank failure by refunding their deposits up to a certain ceiling. It is
one of the sovereign tasks of the State to provide citizens with a
risk free instrument of payment and saving. Customers do not
exactly know their bank’s financial health; the majority of deposi-
tors, with deposits not exceeding a certain amount, cannot be
asked to be interested in that; they are subject to information
asymmetries which, in normal times, promote confidence in credit
institutions. On the other hand, in a banking crisis, information
asymmetries between depositors and towards banks strengthen the
contagion of panic and cause a rush of investors seeking to with-
draw their deposits massively. Then liquidity crises turn into
solvency crises threatening to spillover to the entire banking
system. A bank failure deteriorates stakeholders’ confidence on the
interbank market and decreases credit supply; therefore, it has a
negative impact on the real economy halting activities that depend
on these credits and causing a sudden stop of investments.
However, it is necessary to distinguish between relatively small
deposit amounts, with interest rates incorporating no risk
premium, which must be guaranteed and other deposits, with
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rightfully bear the risk of losses.
The Diamond and Dybvig’s model (1983) shows that a bank run
is an undesirable equilibrium of the deposit contract in which all
depositors panic and withdraw their deposits, even if they would
prefer not to do so, pushing even healthy banks to fail. So a
government deposit insurance which guarantees that the promised
return will be paid to all who withdraw their funds, has a key social
benefit because it allows banks to follow a desirable asset liquida-
tion policy, separated from the cash-flow constraint imposed by
the panic of depositors. 
The harmonisation of the deposit guarantee level in Europe
would avoid that some countries attract deposits from their neigh-
bours by offering a full guarantee of deposits, a strategy
implemented by Ireland during the crisis, knowing that this full
guarantee may have heavy consequences for the population of the
country concerned. On the other hand, given the differences in
standards of living, the share of guaranteed deposits would widely
differ from one country to another.
There were, in 2010, 40 different deposit guarantee regimes in
the 27 EU countries (European Commission, 2010). Depending on
countries, these schemes are managed by the government, by
banks or by both. A group of banks may decide to create a common
private fund to guarantee their deposits according to specific rules
of their choice. EU lawmakers have developed the deposit guar-
antee via several directives: in 1994 [Directive 1994/19/CE] a first
legislative text set a minimum level of guarantee corresponding to
20.000 euros per depositor; it requires that each MS sets up offi-
cially a guarantee fund and that all credit institutions subscribe to
a guarantee scheme. The minimum level of guarantee was raised to
50.000 euros in 2009 and to 100.000 euros on 31 December 2010
[Directive 2009/14/CE]. 
In 2010, the European Commission put forward the idea of a
pan-European deposit guarantee system by 2014 [European
Commission, 2010]. It called for a networking of existing systems
by proposing the establishment of a mutual borrowing facility
between all funds and a gradual harmonisation of procedures. But
the European Parliament and the Council disagreed on how to
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financing rate of funds paid by banks, while MEPs wanted to make
risky banks contribute more significantly via a system of risk
premium. An agreement was reached in December 2013: in each
MS, the target level for ex ante funds of DGS is 0.8% of covered
deposits to be paid by member banks. The target fund level must be
reached within a 10-year period. In case of insufficient ex ante
funds, DGS will collect immediate ex post contributions from the
banking sector, and, as a last resort, they will have access to alter-
native funding arrangements such as loans from public or private
third parties. Bank contributions to DGS will reflect individual risk
profiles. The Commission wishes now to launch discussions on the
establishment of a pan-European guarantee scheme.
It is necessary for the Scheme to guarantee all European banks
because if it covered initially only the strongest large transnational
banks, depositors would rush to guaranteed banks and this would
immediately increase the risk of a euro area break-up. Under the
assumption of a 100.000 euros guaranteed ceiling, the amount of
covered deposits would be 6.655 billion euros (European Commis-
sion, 2011). Compared to 2007 when regulations in Europe
requested a guarantee of 20.000 euros only, the amount of guaran-
teed deposits would be increased by 18% (+ 994 billion euros) and
the number of fully guaranteed deposits by 8% (+ 3 million
deposits) but, in the event of a funding through a levy of a certain
percentage of eligible deposits paid by banks, it would cost banks
815 million euros per year for 10 years on average in the EU which
corresponds to a 4% decrease in their annual profit for 10 years as
compared to 2007. 
The crisis has shown the contradiction between the more and
more internationalised structure of European banks and the
deposit guarantee which remained at the national level. The
problem turned out to be especially acute for countries like Ireland
or Cyprus where banking systems were oversized. This can be
prevented in two ways: setting the deposit guarantee at the Euro-
pean level or, on the contrary, setting limits to the size of each
country's banking sector, to prevent credit bubbles and the accu-
mulation of cross-border deposits, which are source of instability.
The first solution is preferred in Europe today. But the Cypriot
crisis will perhaps reopen the debate.
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finances in the event of bank failure, but in 2013, two issues
remain problematic. According to Schoenmaker and Gros (2012), a
banking union should be created under a “veil of ignorance”, i.e.
without knowing which country exhibits more risks: this is not the
case in Europe today. 
As the risk of a euro zone exit of a MS has not entirely disap-
peared, the question is: what guarantee would be provided by the
banking union for euro denominated deposits in case of a conver-
sion into national currency? A European guarantee on deposits in
euros is needed to prevent the capital flight away from countries
believed to be likely to leave the euro area. But in the current situa-
tion, given the risk that such a guarantee would have to apply for
some countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal or even Spain), it is diffi-
cult to implement due to the opposition of Northern countries. 
The European Commission has not chosen between a uniform
rate of contribution to the guarantee scheme and a variable rate
depending on the risk level of guaranteed institutions. The
majority of countries have a uniform assessment system, but
Canada and France have a variable risk pricing, which tends to
reduce banks’ moral hazard. 
Box 3.  The bank deposits guarantee in the United States
In the US, the deposit guarantee is provided by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), an independent federal agency created
in 1933 by the Glass Steagall Act, whose managers are appointed by the
President of the US and confirmed by the Senate. The FDIC mission is to
maintain public confidence in the US financial system. Almost all US
banks are affiliated with the FDIC even if membership is required only
for the bigger ones. UCITS and other collective funds are not insured.
Deposits are covered up to an individual amount of 100.000 dollars. The
FDIC guarantees more than half of the total amount of deposits in the
US. It also intervenes to limit bank failures: it inspects and controls
directly more than 53.000 banks, of which more than half are in the US.
It has means of resolutions of failures; the most common means is the
sale of deposits and credits to another institution. The FDIC resources
come from premiums by banking institutions and insured savings, and
from the certificates of association signed by the members at their
membership and from earnings on investment in US Treasury bills.
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(Morel and Nakamura, 2000): with capital ratios (Cooke and Tier l
ratios) and a rating (determined according to five criteria: asset-liability
management, asset quality, management quality, results and liquidity),
the FDIC sets the institution's premium. Thus, until late 1995, the
premium of institutions to the guarantee fund varied between 0.09%
and 0.49% of deposits as determined by the FDIC depending on the
risks of each institution. In the 2010-2011 period, 249 banks went bank-
rupt in the US, which divided by three (from 17.7 billion to 6.5 billion)
the reserve available for possible losses of the guarantee Fund. The
current reserve fund represents 0.17% of covered deposits. The FDIC
plans to return to its long-term target, a reserve of 1.35% of deposits
covered by 2018 (FDIC, 2012).
3.1. A European deposit guarantee scheme difficult to settle
The European Commission has worked for several years on the
networking of European Union banking schemes. With the
banking union project being focused on the euro area, the area of
implementation of the guarantee fund remains undetermined; the
harmonisation of existing systems is tricky. If the fund is rapidly
introduced, there is a risk that it will have to deal with Southern
Europe countries’ difficulties, Germany or Finland possibly
refusing to contribute to this fund in order to avoid an increase in
wealth transfers from Northern to Southern Europe. Current proj-
ects do not specify if the fund will be financed by banks’
contributions ex ante or if it will be based on a State guarantee and
banks’ refund ex post. 
Schoenmaker and Gros (2012) propose that the European guar-
antee fund owns a permanent reserve representing 1.5% of covered
deposits (i.e. nearly 140 billion euros). But this would only cover
one or two major European banks’ deposits. The credibility of such
a fund in the event of a bank crisis with contagion risk is therefore
limited. The fund permanent reserves are inevitably small as
compared to the amount of deposits which need to be reimbursed
in the event of a systemic crisis. Only a fund supported by a mone-
tary authority can offer a full and credible guarantee in such an
event. Even if the fund can raise contributions from banks ex ante
in order to be able to intervene in the event of limited problems,
the deposit guarantee will continue to depend as a last resort on
the MS, on the ESM and on the ECB, these being requested to inter-
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problem. The guarantee should be unlimited, but the German
Constitution (and German political opinion) opposes such a guar-
antee. Banks’ contribution might intervene ex post to restore the
level of the guarantee fund and possibly repay the first in line cred-
itors. The difficult point remains to determine who pays for the
guarantee as a last resort, between banks and States, between the
country and the whole EU countries covered by the agreement.
Does this mean that the banking union necessarily requires setting
up a federal Treasury with a European tax (Aglietta and Brand,
2013) to cover this risk? This is probably excessive as the proba-
bility of such an event is very small.
The authority in charge of the fund is not yet settled. The ECB
will supervise the banking system, but it is much more difficult to
dedicate the management of the deposit guarantee scheme to it.
According to Repullo (2000), the deposit guarantee must be sepa-
rate from the function of lender of last resort. Otherwise, there
may be a fear that the ECB uses excessively money creation to
recapitalise banks, so that the monetary policy targets and support
to banks could be in conflict. Therefore a deposit guarantee and
crises resolution authority should be created. It should be separate
from the ECB, which would necessarily have a right to look at
banks behaviour, and would come in addition to the EBA, the ECB
and national regulators. Such an authority was introduced by the
French banking reform in 2013. On the other hand, the ECB
would continue to play its role of lender of last resort. The
viability of such a complicated system is unclear. We think that it
should be stated that the ECB will intervene, if necessary, to guar-
antee deposits in a situation where States or the ESM could not do
so, but that this intervention will only consist in a loan from the
ECB to the bank guarantee fund or to States, which they will have
to repay.
From 1979 to 2000, in France deposits were insured by the so-
called “solidarité de place” mechanism (financial centre solidarity).
In a crisis situation, the Governor of the Bank of France could
“organize the participation of all credit institutions to take the
necessary measures for the protection of the interests of depositors
and third parties, for the proper functioning of the banking system
as well as for the preservation of the reputation of the place”
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mented on one occasion, the bankruptcy of the Al Saudi Bank in
1988 (Goodhart, 1995). In case of a crisis the risk of a bank run
pushes banks to show solidarity and coordinate themselves to
avoid the effective implementation of this solidarity. Following
the introduction of a deposits guarantee fund in 2000, the French
Government chose to no longer mention this banking community
solidarity, considering that the fund organised a permanent soli-
darity. The advantage of the solidarité de place is that it is not
necessary to immobilise funds. Moreover the guarantee is a priori
unlimited and the bank in difficulty could be taken over by
another bank, which could be interested to do so to gain customers
and market shares. But this system only worked for problems in
small banks. 
The Cypriot crisis has shown that the common deposit guar-
antee is not easy to implement as long as the banks’ balance sheets
are not effectively cleaned up, as long as concerns on bank failures
remain and as long as banking systems are not under control in
Europe. The common guarantee can only be the last stage of the
banking union. 
The crisis also showed the limits of the 100,000 euros ceiling.
Some SMEs liquid assets, households’ funds waiting to be re-allo-
cated, etc. have been affected. Euro area countries must choose
between two strategies: offering all depositors the possibility to
have a fully guaranteed (at least in national currency)saving instru-
ment, with no ceiling, but with limited remuneration; or leave
depositors choose their bank, knowing that having funds in some
banks implies some risks which are difficult to assess. Finally, the
European institutions oblige shareholders, creditors and large
depositors of banks in difficulty to pay for the deposit guarantee by
aggregating the cost of this guarantee for the two banks in ques-
tion. Implicitly, they called for the “solidarité de place”, which
means that the European guarantee fund will have only a decora-
tive role. 
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There is no single banking system in the euro area today, but
the juxtaposition of 18 domestic markets strongly divided by legal,
economic, social, historical and tax barriers. There is a European
interbank market and a competitive market for very large firms
financing but retail banking remains mainly national (Table 2).
Entering a domestic market goes through taking over existing enti-
ties. Until now, cross-border movements in own funds have been
rare and of limited size. 
A full banking union would involve direct competition between
all banks in the euro area, on a unified basis. This implies to cut the
links between the borrowers of a country (government, local
authorities, firms and households) and national banks. This
implies that the capacity of a bank to lend depends above all on its
Table 2. Cross-border penetration from EU countries*
In %
2007 2012
Belgium 21 51
Germany 10 11
Estonia 99 85
Ireland 39 29
Greece 23 16
Spain 11 9
France 11 10
Italy 18 13
Cyprus 26 17
Luxembourg 76 67
Malta 37 32
Netherlands 16 9
Austria 22 16
Portugal 23 20
Slovenia 29 29
Slovakia 86 96
Finland 65 67
Euro Area 17 16
* Cross-border penetration via branches and subsidiaries from  EU countries is reported as a percentage of total
banking assets.
Source: Schoenmaker and Peck (2014).
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risk of blindness periods and excessive mistrust periods, which are
usual in financial markets.
One could prefer the opposite strategy: a restructuring of the
banking sector, where retail banks would be isolated from financial
markets, should focus on their core business (credit to local agents,
based on a detailed expertise, to domestic firms, households and
local authorities). Their solvency would be guaranteed first by the
prohibition of risky or speculative operations, and second by the
State, whose debt would be guaranteed by the Central Bank.
Certainly, a bank could be in trouble if its country is in a depres-
sion and if companies or households have difficulty in repaying
their debt, but the State may come to his rescue, especially as the
credits supplied by the bank fit into the domestic economic
strategy.
4.1. The universal bank model in Europe 
A choice needs to be made between two models: the universal
bank or the return to banking specialisation. Will the banking
union impose the separation of retail and investment banks? Will
it prevent banks with guaranteed deposits to intervene on financial
markets for their own account? Will it be a new step towards banks
financialisation or will it signal a return to the Rhineland model?
On the one hand, the crisis has questioned the relevance of the
universal bank model where deposits finance and guarantee
market activities. On the other hand, the crisis has shown the
fragility of specialised institutions which had an insufficient
deposit base and depended heavily on markets for refinancing.
Banks which in normal times used strong leverage effects to
achieve high profitability levels suffered particularly. After the
Lehman Brothers failure, banks such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan
Stanley abandoned the Investment Bank model, affiliated to the
Fed, strengthened their own funds, and can now collect deposits. 
In Europe, the shift towards universal banks induced major
structural changes. The rise in “non-banking” institutions such as
insurance or pension funds (the institutional investors) occurred at
the expense of the banks which had reacted by operating more and
more on financial markets, for their proprietary trading or as inter-
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sector increases contagion phenomena and the spreading out of
the financial crisis into the real economy. According to Paulet
(2000), there is an empirical link between the growing market
share of institutional investors and banking fragility, the former
strengthening the latter.  
The universal bank model, which combines the different
banking activities, has shown a better resilience during the finan-
cial crisis. The heavy losses of markets and investment banks
activities have been offset by their retail bank activities. However,
these losses have reduced banks’ own funds. This link between
banking activities destabilises retail banking activity which is
essential to the financing of the economy. It has also contributed
to the development of suspicion and concern on the strength and
stability of the European banking system. Applying “fair value”
accounting to the whole banks’ balance sheet facilitates the propa-
gation of the crisis: market fluctuations have an impact on credit
supply even if they should obey different logics. Accounting rules
should not be similar for so different activities: short-term for
market activity and long-term for credit supply. The universal bank
balance sheet is thus structurally opaque and fragile.
A better regulation of the EU banking system requires the sepa-
ration within banks of activities with different logics, procedures
and risks (Pollin, 2009, Scialom, 2012). The financial crisis has
affected the core functions of banks (their capacity to supply credit
and to manage means of payments), making it a serious crisis for
the real economy. As in the 1929 crisis, the real economy financing
has been interrupted. Banking regulation must be sought to avoid
the occurrence of such a crisis.
4.2. Should we return to the Glass-Steagall Act? 
As soon as in June 2009, the Obama administration published a
draft for a financial markets reform, the White Paper on Financial
Regulatory Reform. The United States in 2010, and the United
Kingdom in 2012, have decided to implement a separation
between investment and retail banking activities (Chow and Surti,
2011, Kregel, 2011). 
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Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) introduces the
“Volcker Rule” designed to avoid that banks speculate against their
clients. It prohibits banks protected by the FDIC deposit guarantee
to run trading activities for their own account (proprietary trading)
and to own participation in investment funds (hedge funds,
private equity). These activities should be confined to a specific
structure. Subscriptions to investment funds may not amount to
more than 3% of the banks’ own funds. Banks can hold more than
3% of the capital of these funds. But the activities of market-maker
and hedging may remain in the bank. The rule should apply from
April 2014 but the Federal Reserve Board has extended the confor-
mance period until July 2015.7
In the United Kingdom, the Vickers report should be imple-
mented in 2019. Traditional banking activities (deposits and loans
to households and SMEs) will be confined in a specific structure
isolated from markets and investment activities. Transactions on
derivatives, market-making and market interventions will no
longer be made in the same bank as retail activities. However, the
classical bank could engage in some markets activities requested by
customers (exchange rate or interest rate risks hedging). Retail
banking should have independent governance and be separate
legally, in the form of a subsidiary for example.
In Europe, the Liikanen report (Liikanen, 2012) proposed to
separate risky financial activities from traditional banking activi-
ties by splitting banks into two separate entities. It contains five
proposals:
— The own account and financial activities should be included
in a separate legal entity. Activities for own account, posi-
tions on assets or derivatives resulting from markets
activities, unsecured loans to hedge funds, structured invest-
ment vehicles (SIV), investments in capital-risk, should be
separate. This would apply only if assets exceed a certain
7. From June 30, 2014, banking entities holding 50 billion dollars or more in consolidated
trading assets and liabilities will be required to report quantitative measurements. This will
apply to banking entities with at least 25 billion dollars, but less than 50 billion dollars, in
consolidated trading assets and liabilities from April 30, 2016; and to those with at least 10
billion dollars, but less than 25 billion dollars, in consolidated trading assets and liabilities from
December 31, 2016 (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013).
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However, the traditional bank could engage in some markets
activities requested by customers (interest rate and exchange
rate risks hedging). The financial institution will not be able
to be financed by guaranteed deposits. However, the report
does not advocate the introduction of two types of banks so
that retail banks can provide financial services to their
customers. The two banks will be allowed to be in a common
holding, but they will have separate capitalisations.
— Banks must develop banking crises resolution plans
controlled by the EBA.
— Banks must hold a large amount of own funds and junior
debt (which can absorb losses). Banks’ managers will have to
hold junior debt to be concerned by potential losses.
— Own funds requirements should be strengthened,
accounting better for the risk, particularly for market activi-
ties and real estate loans.
— Banks governance should be reformed through accounting
better for risk management, lowering bankers’ compensa-
tion, and tougher sanctions. 
Some European countries have taken the lead without waiting
for the potential introduction of European legislation based on this
report. Thus, in July 2013 France adopted a “law of separation and
regulation of bank activities”, intended to implement François
Hollande’s commitment “to separate the activities of banks that
are useful for investment and employment from their speculative
operations”. 
However, the French government refused to question the
universal bank French model. Speculative activities, narrowly
defined, will not be banned from retail banks, but will have to take
place in a subsidiary.
Thus, the law obliges banks to put in separate bodies their
“without any link with the service to customers” market activities.
Banks can continue to run operations “that are useful for the
economy”. But the notion of utility is not questioned. Is the devel-
opment of financial activities useful? Should non-financial agents
be encouraged to go to financial markets, to use toxic loans, struc-
tured investments, derivatives? Similarly, the customer’s concept
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speculative investment funds. 
Banks have argued that this project could reduce credit avail-
ability. It's a strange argument as credit creates deposits. Banks
would have to lend directly to firms and not through financial
markets or hedge funds. The prohibition of speculative activities
would sharply reduce banks capital requirements.
In theory, activities for own account are prohibited, but the
provision of financial services to customers (risk hedging), the
coverage of the own risk of the establishment (interest rate or
credit risk), market-making activity, the prudent management of
cash and long-term investments remain permitted. Hedge funds
ownership is prohibited, as well as unsecured loans to these funds,
but so-called secured loans are allowed. Packaging and marketing
of structured financial products like derivative products remain at
the level of retail banks. In total, the project isolates only 2% of
banking activity.
Speculative activities must be restricted within an autonomous
financial subsidiary. The latter will not be guaranteed by its parent
(and thus by public authorities), should finance itself inde-
pendently, can go bankrupt, and will need to develop a resolution
scheme showing that its bankruptcy may be borne by creditors. 
However, a prudential control and resolution authority (the
ACPR, Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution) will be settled.
It may prohibit certain activities. The Finance Minister may require
banks to limit the size of market operations carried out by the
parent company.
The ACPR will manage a deposit guarantee and resolution fund
(FGDR). Banks will have to develop a banking resolution plan
which will have to be approved by the ACPR. A bank may be
brought before the ACPR by the Bank of France Governor or by the
Treasury Director-general. The ACPR will be able to remove the
bank managers, to transfer the establishment, to make the FGDR
intervene, to make losses be borne by shareholders or creditors
(subordinate or junior), to ask them to bring new funds, to
prohibit the distribution of dividends, to appoint a provisional
administrator, to suspend managers compensations.
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the Financial Stability Board. It will have the right to increase the
capital requirements imposed on banks to prevent excessive credit
growth or to prevent a risk of instability of the financial system. It
will be able to set standards for the evolution of credit to avoid
increases in assets prices or excessive indebtedness.
The French government refused to prevent banks from having
activities in tax or regulatory havens, but banks will have to
publish a list of their subsidiaries abroad and the amount of their
activities.
This French law may look strange insofar as it addresses issues
which should be no longer under national legislation in two years,
if the banking union is introduced. This law raises once again the
issue of the link between national choices and decisions to be
taken at European level. For example, the law gives the right to the
ACPR to prohibit some too speculative activities, but will this be
enforceable if these activities remain authorized at the level of the
banking union. Will the French Finance Minister still have any
authority on banks in two years?
France is not the only country to have taken the lead. On 6
February 2013 the German government adopted legislation on
separation of banking activities (Trennbankengeset). Retail activities
should be split from the activities for own account when the latter
amount to more than 20% of the balance sheet or more than 100
billion euros; banks will have to deposit a will. This law applies
mainly to the largest two banks: Deutsche Bank and Commerz-
bank. It should be enforced from 2014, but banks will have an
additional one and a half year to proceed to the separation.
In view of these national initiatives and of the Liikanen report,
the Commission of economic and monetary affairs of the Euro-
pean Parliament urged the European Commission to propose a
European legislation for a separation of a Vickers’ type of banking
activities: activities necessary to the real economy must be
protected in a legally independent framework subsidiary. 
4.3. A European regulation proposal 
Under the initiative of the European Commissioner Michel
Barnier, the European Commission proposed on 29 January 2014 a
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supervise financial activities for systemic-sized banks (i.e. about 30
of the 8000 banks in the European Union, representing 65% of
European banking assets). 
This project is more demanding than the Liikanen report or
French or German laws. Like the Volker rule, it prohibits negotia-
tions for own account on financial instruments and raw materials
as well as investments in hedge funds. The supervisory authorities
will have the power to impose banks to separate in a subsidiary
body trading operations (such as market-making, complex deriva-
tives and securitization operations, that would be deemed too
risky, i.e. which induce too big positions financed by leverage). In
our view, it is a shame that this separation is a possibility open to
supervisors and not a strict obligation.
This reform proposal raises strong criticisms from some MS and
banking lobbies. France and Germany claim to have already made
their own banking reform. But the logic of the banking union is
that the same rules apply everywhere. These countries have chosen
to reform banking at the minimum to pre-empt the content of the
European law. This is not an acceptable behaviour at European
level. For the UK, the Barnier’s project opens a way out: the regula-
tion shall not apply to countries where legislation is more binding.
According to the banking union project, the ECB supervises
European banks and the EBA sets regulations and rules of the
supervision. The Commission can be accused to intervene in an
area that is no longer of its jurisdiction. Conversely, the crisis
clearly demonstrated that banking regulations are not only banks’
matters. It is legitimate for political authorities (Commission,
Council and Parliament) to be involved.
 Christian Noyer, Member of the Board of Governors of the
ECB, considered these proposals as “irresponsible”. According to
the European Banking Federation and the French Banking Federa-
tion (FBF), the universal banking model must be preserved. They
criticize the obligation to separate the market-making (including
the firms’ debts market). According to the FBF, this regulation will
“lead to a considerable increase in the cost of debt financing and
risk-hedging services for firms”. However, this requirement could
be waived if banks prove that their interventions in markets do not
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market-maker, provided that they set strict limits on their own
positions; they could provide simple hedge operations, by hedging
themselves. 
Certainly, European banks were right to point out that this
reform comes in addition to the establishment of the SSM, the
SRM, and banks scoring by the ECB. A more coherent schedule
should have been established. 
However, the separation advocated by the project would
increase the credibility of the banking union and of its three
pillars. The establishment of a consistent framework would
simplify the SSM (the ECB should monitor ‘normal’ banking activi-
ties and ensure that speculative activities do not disturb them. The
SRM would gain credibility: the losses from market activities would
not affect banks credit and would not be supported by the
taxpayers. By reducing the risk of failure of retail banks, it reduces
the risk to have to activate the deposit insurance. In this sense,
regulation could become the fourth pillar of the banking union.
However, it will not be discussed before the election of a new
parliament and the establishment of a new Commission. It will
have to overcome the opposition of the big European banks.
4.4. Two European projects? 
On 28 September 2011 the European Commission adopted a
proposal for a directive on a common system of financial transac-
tion tax (FTT). The European directive proposed to tax shares and
bonds transactions at 0.1% and derivative contracts transactions
at 0.01%. The gain was estimated to be 57 billion euros for the
whole EU. 
In the absence of a European agreement, and since August 2012,
France has introduced a FTT, which includes a 0.2% tax on French
shares purchases, a 0.01% tax on cancelled orders within HF trading
in France, a 0.01% tax on naked CDS (which have been prohibited
in France since 1 November 2012). The FTT was expected to raise
1.6 billion euros in full year. However, according to NYSE
Euronext, the amount of securities transactions subject to the FTT
has declined by about 15% in two months. The French FTT does
Banking union: A solution to the euro zone crisis? 235not apply to derivatives and some operators have therefore
switched to this market.
A true FTT, applying to all banks and financial institutions
financial transactions, would have three advantages: it would
reduce the profitability of speculative activities, it would decrease
financial markets liquidity, it would oblige banks to control better
the operations of their market operators.
Eleven EU countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal,
Slovenia, Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, Slovakia and Estonia) plan
to introduce a FTT in the framework of enhanced cooperation. The
European Commission assesses the potential of the tax revenues at
between 30 to 35 billion euros (incorporating a decrease by 15% in
the amount of the transactions). 
Of course, the risk is high that European financial transactions
are relocated in London and Luxembourg, but, in this case, the
euro area will have to react, which will highlight the strategic
differences on financial regulation within Europe. The banking
union will have to choose between being an open area, with no
specific rules, or a relatively closed area, with specific rules. 
Yet the Commission's text is designed to prevent delocalisation:
taxation will apply if one of the parties to the transaction is estab-
lished in a participating country, regardless where the transaction
is made (residency principle) but also if the transaction involves a
financial instrument issued in a participating country (residence
principle). Will the text resist the pressure from banking and finan-
cial lobbies and from the UK? The UK has introduced a legal
challenge against the FTT at the Court of Justice of the European
Union. The French government is proposing a watered down
version of the text that affect buyers of stocks and bonds, and not
financial speculators.
European banks continue to have subsidiaries in tax and regula-
tory havens, particularly in Luxembourg, Switzerland, Guernsey,
Jersey, Bermuda Islands, Cayman Islands… The reporting obliga-
tion (a bank must declare to the tax authorities of its residence
country the financial incomes of their clients) faces opposition
from Luxembourg, Austria, and Switzerland. Europe should widen
the list of tax and regulatory havens countries, should prohibit
European banks and firms to locate profits and operate in these
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financial activities.
On these two issues, the banking union will have to make polit-
ical choices. Who will have this responsibility in Europe? 
4.5. What banks? What credit? 
The problem remains: what financial system does the euro area
need? Should the ability of euro area banks be in a position to
compete more with Anglo-Saxon institutions or should their role
in financing the economy be increased? Should we build a
complex and unenforceable regulation, running behind financial
innovations? It would have been better that the European institu-
tions adopt the clear objective to reduce the weight of finance in
the economy. Some speculative activities should be prohibited;
most speculative activities should be prohibited for the banking
system; they should be confined to specialized institutions, not
guaranteed by the government, their financing cost would be high,
which would reduce their profitability and their operations.
Europe needs a productive and industrial recovery. But it is
necessary to define carefully the nature of this recovery. It must fit
with the ecological transition. Industrial choices that engage
future economic development cannot be left to shareholders, to
financial funds looking for short term profitability, or even to the
large companies’ managers. The society must guide the evolution
of the industry towards green, efficient and innovative techniques,
to promote energy savings, renewable energies, financing urban
renewal and collective transports.
This is the industrial policy in the broad sense which must
ensure productive recovery which should include: 
— a product axis: to promote the production of sustainable
products, compatible with ecological requirements; 
— a planning axis: to collectively define the sectors to promote,
to develop cooperative strategies between large companies
and SMEs, between public and private research. 
— a sectorial axis: to identify areas for the future and to main-
tain the basic economic sectors, which play a structuring role
and which are rich in employment;
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promotion and the training of employees rather than the
financialisation, the business leader and the sprawl of the
income hierarchy. 
This ambitious strategy must be financed by national banks for
sustainable development. They must develop a strong capacity for
prospective; be able to take risks, on industrial, ecological and
employment criteria and have a strong financial capacity both in
equity and credit. Projects may be regional, national or European.
The objective must be to collect a large part of European savings,
rewarded at low but guaranteed rates. These banks must develop
simple and short circuits between household savings and loans to
productive sectors, to local authorities, and to housing. This
project could give another dimension to the banking union.
5. Conclusion
The challenge is huge: the euro area needs a strong banking
system, able to finance growth recovery and to bring the economy
out of the crisis. However, Europe has to make a clear political
choice between two options. 
A liberal option focuses on markets sentiment; banks are firms
like any other firm; they must maximize their profit; they must be
able to intervene freely on financial markets: they must be able to
provide sophisticated investment and hedging tools to their
customers. A unified European financial market will contribute to
the European banking system regulation (see, for instance, Sapir
and Wolff, 2013). However, there is a first risk is that banks chose
market activities which are more profitable than credit supply.
There is a second risk that banks are weakened, suffer from a rise in
the cost of their resources (due to higher risks for their creditors to
loss their claims if the bank runs into difficulty), and need to
reduce their credit activities under the effects of higher capital
ratios constraints. The third risk is that the link kept between
banks and financial markets spreads out financial markets insta-
bility into the real economy banks’ lending capacity would depend
on their solvency, thus on their own funds, and so on markets’
assessment, with the risk of switching from blindness to excessive
distrust periods. 
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specific banking activities (like credit distribution and deposit
management), to isolate them from financial markets, to protect
them by a public guarantee, to allow them to supply credit
according to the needs of the real economy. 
Another choice also has to be done: a European banking system,
unrelated with national agents and states, with open competition
of all banks in the euro area on unified basis; or the persistence of
national systems, which would maintain a strong link with their
territory. Will states be able tomorrow to intervene to influence
banking credit, to rescue banks which are vital for certain sectors of
the economy, to develop specific public banks? These choices
cannot be left to the ECB, which is more concerned with the
proper functioning of financial markets than with the real
economy. These choices should not be hidden by short-term
requirements, like rescuing Spain. They must be the subject of a
democratic debate in Europe. 
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The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the anticipated
long-term impact of the post-crisis regulatory environment on bank stability
and efficiency, with a focus on Central and Eastern European (CEE) banks. The
main research question is whether relatively stable CEE banks, operating in an
unstable global environment, will be negatively affected by post-crisis European
regulatory architecture. To answer this question, this paper analyses how CEE
banks performed in two different periods: the pre-crisis period of dynamic credit
market expansion and the period of global economic slowdown after 2008
crisis. Bank efficiency and performance is measured using DEA methodology,
competitive conditions’ measures (H-statistics) and Z-score index. 
Keywords: banking regulation, bank efficiency, bank competition, CEE banks.
Although the 2008 financial crisis affected the entire world,
for the first time the leading industrialized nations were more
affected than the emerging countries, for whom the crisis was
largely secondary in nature, in this respect making the crisis
unique (IMF, 2010a). However, its long term consequences, both
direct in terms of changing strategies of foreign owned banks, and
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European regulations, are borne by all countries. 
Economic theory provides some contrasting evidence as to the
impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank performance
(e.g. Barth et al. 2004, 2008 and 2010). Furthermore, as noted by
Chortareas et al. (2012) and Delis et al. (2011), most research in this
area concentrates on banking markets in highly developed coun-
tries. Thus this paper concentrates on the long-term impact of
new, post-crisis regulatory architecture, on a relatively homoge-
neous group of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE-5):
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. These
countries have been EU members since 2004, with two of them,
Slovenia (2007) and Slovakia (2009), also in the euro zone. They
are at a similar stage of institutional development, financial and
macroeconomic reform, and banking sector depth (IMF, 2010b).
Before the global crisis of 2008, their banking sector enjoyed rapid
growth, largely due to the increased presence of foreign banks and
the adaptation to the EU legal and institutional framework.
However, the global financial crisis has hampered the dynamics of
CEE banking sectors’ growth. 
Thus the aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussion on
the anticipated long-term impact of post-crisis regulatory and
supervisory architecture, focusing on banks operating in CEE. We
pose the following questions: what were the factors contributing to
the efficiency of CEE banks before the crisis, and consequently,
what will be the long-term impact of the post crisis architecture for
for bank stability and efficiency in CEE countries? The empirical
part of the paper is based on the non parametric Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA) technique, measures of market competition
and bank stability index Z-score, using Bankscope Database. The
paper is organised as follows: the first part describes the foundation
of post-crisis European regulatory and supervisory architecture.
Following this, we discuss its possible consequences on banks in
CEE. Analyzing the impact of the financial crisis on CEE banks, we
present an empirical analysis of CEE bank efficiency before and
after the crisis (2002-2011), using DEA methodology, market
competition measures and Z-score calculations. In the concluding
section we present the anticipated long-term consequences of the
post-crisis regulatory and supervisory architecture on CEE banks. 
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Financial supervision should ensure systemic stability, safety
and soundness of financial institutions, an efficient and trans-
parent way of conducting transactions and financial consumer
protection (Kuppens et al., 2003). To carry out these functions
effectively, its organizational structure must evolve, so that just as
in real life, form follows function (Acharya et al., 2009). Histori-
cally, banks have accepted tight regulations in exchange for
market stability and strong protection, and as a result there were
almost no OECD banking crises till the 1970s (IMF, 2013). Banks
were safe, but inefficient, and losing market share to non-banking
firms. The period of liberalisation and deregulation from the 1980s
aimed at restoring bank profitability and facilitating expansion
and, in consequence, dramatically influenced the scale and
complexity of banking firms. The increasing complexity of banks
and the expansion of conglomerate structures generated synergies
between banking (regulated) business and relatively unregulated
investment activities and offered both new sources of income and
new areas of risk (Allen et al., 2011). In the pre-crisis period, the
dominant source of bank efficiency stemmed from expansion into
new markets, non depository funding and non interest-based
sources of profits (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2009), and the
adoption of new models for conducting banking activities, based
on product synergies, scale and scope benefits and global coverage.
Table 1 demonstrates how dramatically the biggest banks’ assets
have expanded in the deregulation period. 
Changes in bank scale and scope of activities were facilitated by
the new regulatory philosophy, as exemplified by the shift from
the Basel 1 to Basel 2 regulatory framework, where market disci-
pline and bank self-regulation were intended to replace tight
supervision. The 2007-2009 crisis demonstrated that Basel 2 was
built on many optimistic assumptions and incorrect trade-offs,
namely that regulators do not understand the complexity of
banking activities and that tight supervision should be replaced by
market discipline. Moreover, Basel 2 facilitated the growth of the
so called shadow banking system (Masera, 2010). Consequently,
Basel 2 which looked at isolated areas of risk and focused on
partially recognized threats to financial stability, turned out to be
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the subsequent bank systemic failures in major countries. 
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 forced banks and regu-
lators to rethink strategic and competitive issues in banking.
Banks, which for decades had been leaders in global efficiency or
expansion, turned out to be most affected, requiring massive
public stabilization funds and in some cases rescue by direct
government intervention (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2011).
The most frequent restructuring pattern for global banks turned
out to be partial or total nationalization (World Economic Forum,
2010). As a result, large global banks contributed to inflated budget
deficits and dramatically growing public debts in major countries,
posing the danger of systemic risk (Allen et al., 2011). Figure 1 illus-
trates that in CEE, relatively small banks operate in relatively safe
macroeconomic environment (moderately indebted countries).
However, some European countries have inflated banking sectors’
assets, and a limited possibility of further government stabilizing
intervention, due to large budget deficits.
By raising new issues, such as systemic risk and the failure of
market discipline, the 2008 crisis resulted in the adoption of a new
regulatory philosophy: that of strengthening and tightening regu-
latory supervision (Beck, 2010). Basel 3 focused on strengthening
prudential regulations, mostly by requiring more and better capital
Table 1. The largest global banks by assets, $ bln, in selected years
1985 1995 2009
Top banks Assets Top banks Assets Top banks Assets
Citicorp 167 Deutsche Bank 503 BNP Paribas 2 965
Dai-Ichi Kangyo B. 158 Sanwa Bank 501 RBS 2 750
Fuji Bank 142 Sumitomo Bank 500 Crédit Agricole 2 441
Sumitomo Bank 135 Dai-Ichi Kangyo B. 499 HSBC 2 364
Mitsubishi Bank 133 Fuji Bank 487 Barclays 2 235
BNP 123 Sakura Bank 478 Bank of Am. 2 223
Sanwa Bank 123 Mitsubishi Bank 475 Deutsche Bank 2 162
Crédit Agricole 123 Norinchukin Bank 430 JP Morgan 2 032
Bank of America 115 Crédit Agricole 386 Mitsubishi FG 2 026
Credit Lyonnais 111 ICBC 374 Citigroup 1 857
Source: Data for 1985 and 1995: The Economist, 2006; for 2009: The Banker, 2010.
Do safe banks create safe systems? 247and better loss absorption capacities by large banks (BIS, 2010). EU
and US authorities have supplemented Basel 3 by instituting
complex supervisory infrastructures, based on a number of newly
created institutions together with a redefinition of the objectives
and prerogatives of those already in existence (Masciandaro et al.,
2011). The complexity of banking regulation, plus overlapping
prerogatives on newly created institutions, have considerably
increased regulatory costs on banks. Moreover, in the EU, the new
institutional safety net has not been implemented consistently
and has been modified according to changes in macroeconomic
priorities: from financial stability (EBA–based framework) to finan-
cial growth (ECB-based framework), which has led to increased
organisational uncertainty.
2. New European supervisory architecture and the CEE
The New European Supervisory Architecture was constructed
upon three pillars (Masera, 2010 and Masciandaro et al., 2009):
— Macro-prudential supervision, assured by the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). It has no legal personality and is
operationally supported by the European Central Bank;
Figure 1. The size of banking sector (2009) vs. general government debt (2010) 
in selected EU and CEE countries
Source: Based on data from Eurostat and ECB, 2010.
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authorities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), Euro-
pean Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority
(EIOPA) and European Securities and Market Authority
(ESMA);
— National supervisors.
The ESRB is designed to ensure that macro-prudential and
macro-economic risks are detected and dealt with. Risks to the
financial system can arise from the failure of one SIFI, but also
from the common exposure of large financial institutions to the
same risk factors. The main tasks of the ESRB are (Giovannini,
2010 and Beck et al., 2010) to establish adequate procedures to
obtain information about macro-economic risks for financial
stability, to identify macro-prudential risks in Europe, to provide
early risk warnings to EU supervisors and other relevant actors and
to determine how to achieve effective follow-up to warnings/
recommendations.
The EU new institutional regulatory structure of 2010 was based
on the perceived necessity to deal with systemic risk, which entails
considerable costs and regulatory burdens, particularly for coun-
tries where systemic risk is not a major priority, such as CEE.
Moreover, strong macro-prudential regulations are needed if we do
not believe that “strong banks create a strong system”, because of
linkages and global interdependence. However, this view is not
universally accepted, as crisis might be attributed rather to the
problems with bank business models and lack of proper micro-
prudential supervision of large banks (Nier, 2010). 
An even more challenging task was to establish a pan-European
micro-prudential supervisory structure, as the convergence of
supervisory architecture among European countries is very low and
the aim to harmonize the supervisory activities in the EU had to
reconcile with different national objectives and institutional
arrangements (Masciandaro and Quintyn, 2008). The European
Banking Authority has been created as the new micro-prudential
bank regulator, with much stronger prerogatives than that of its
predecessor CEBS (Committee of European Banking Supervisors),
which operated in the period 2004-2010. The aim of EBA was to
“safeguard public values, such as the stability of the financial system,
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depositors and investors” (CEBS, 2010). The EBA had broad compe-
tencies, including preventing regulatory arbitrage, guaranteeing a
level playing field, strengthening international supervisory coordi-
nation, promoting supervisory convergence and providing advice
to the EU institutions in the areas of banking, payments and e-
money regulation as well as on issues related to corporate gover-
nance, auditing and financial reporting.
The main tasks of the EBA were to provide opinions and
develop guidelines, recommendations, and draft regulatory stan-
dards, to contribute to a common supervisory culture, ensuring
consistent and effective application of the EU Acts, to develop
common reporting standards (COREP), including credit, market,
operational, and equity capital adequacy ratios, to prevent regula-
tory arbitrage, mediating and settling disagreements between
competent authorities and taking actions, in emergency situations,
to improve the cooperation of supervisory authorities and to
conduct peer review analyses and to foster depositor and investor
protection by improving transparency and disclosure of informa-
tion. However, EBA turned out to be week in a subsequent clashed
with strong national regulators in the EU and the hopes placed in
its role and authority have not materialized.
The views have been expressed that global financial stability
and cross-border banking cannot be supported by nationally based
supervision. The “financial trilemma’ states that financial stability,
financial integration and national financial policies are incompat-
ible (Schoenmaker, 2011), and hence a single supervisory power
and lender of last resort function should be centralised in the ECB.
There has also been growing recognition that a supervisory system
focusing predominantly on bank safety may actually produce
lower economic growth. Consequently, the ECB seems to be better
equipped to prevent banking contractions and to stimulate growth
with cheaper loans and investment programmes to generate
growth. These arguments were crucial to the decision by the Euro-
pean Council and the Euro Area Summit in June 2012 to move
ahead from the coordination of national banking supervision
towards an integrated system, whereby the large banks within the
euro zone will come under the direct supervision of the ECB,
planned initially for January 2014 and later moved to March 2014.
Ewa Miklaszewska, Katarzyna Mikołajczyk and Małgorzata Pawłowska250The Banking Union will consist of three parts: a common banking
supervisor (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM), a common reso-
lution framework and a common deposit guarantee scheme, the
latter two to be constructed at a later date.
From 2014, the ECB will become responsible for tasks such as
authorizing credit institutions compliance with capital, leverage,
and liquidity requirements and carrying out supervision of
financial conglomerates. The ECB will be able to take early
intervention measures by requiring bank to take remedial action.
Initially there was a proposal that the ECB should be directly
responsible for all 6,000 euro zone banks, on the principle that
during a financial crisis, even a relatively small bank may threaten
the entire financial system. Under a compromise forged with
national regulators, the ECB will now oversee large banks with
more than 30 bn euros in assets, or with 20% of national GDP
(around 200 of the biggest European banks). In addition, the
Single Supervisory Mechanism is a precondition for allowing the
possibility of a direct recapitalization of banks by the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) – the euro zone's permanent bailout
fund. Consequently, the Banking Union confers strong powers on
the ECB, with an option for non-euro countries to join it on a
voluntary basis. In contrast to the European Banking Authority,
which affected EU banks indirectly, setting the rules and
harmonising standards, the ECB will be able to impose its will
directly on the largest banks within the euro zone. 
The idea of a Banking Union has sometimes been depicted as
the result of a choice between either “returning to the past”, where
banks focus their activities on their countries of origin, or estab-
lishing a Banking Union, where banks would be encouraged to
diversify across the EU and where supervision would be at the
European level (Avaro and Sterdyniak, 2014). However, this alter-
native disregards the diverse structures of the EU banking systems
and overlooks the challenges and threats which are created to
smaller banks. That is why, although EU states outside the euro
area may sign up to the Banking Union, in most non-euro based
countries they hesitate to do this.
The stability of the financial sector depends on the ability to
establish independent, strong and respected supervision. CEE
countries are host markets to global banks, hence the national
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decision-making powers to new European centres may further
weaken domestic supervision in CEE countries. Before the crisis,
there was a discussion as to whether banking supervision in the EU
should be centralized in the ECB. After the crisis, one of the argu-
ments for placing it within an independent institution (EBA) was
that national supervisors in the EU follow very diverse models:
independent integrated institution, supervision centralized in the
central bank, or the so called “twin peaks” model with partial
centralization in two independent authorities. The composition of
the EBA supervisory board illustrates it well: out of a total of
27 EBA supervisory board members, 14 are national central banks
and 13 are independent authorities (EBA, 2011). 
All CEE-5 countries have adopted an integrated supervisory
regime, although differently placed (Apinis et al., 2010). In the
Czech Republic, financial market supervision has been integrated
into the central bank (NCB), since 2006. While the NCB has tradi-
tionally been involved in banking supervision since its
establishment in 1993, the supervision of other financial market
sectors (capital markets, insurance and cooperative banking) was
initially carried out by separate supervisors. In order to provide
synergies, the Czech Government carried out a supervisory reform
which resulted in the institutional integration of the financial
market supervision authorities from 2006. Further internal reorga-
nization of supervisory departments took effect on 1 January 2008,
when sector supervision was abandoned and replaced with the
functional model, with a Financial Market Committee (FMC) being
established as a new advisory body in matters of financial market
supervision. Also in Slovakia on the 1st January 2006 the Financial
Market Authority was dissolved and its powers and responsibilities
were transferred to the National Bank of Slovakia. The NBS thus
conducts the entire financial market supervision covering banking,
capital market, insurance and pension saving.
Integrated supervision took effect in Hungary in 2000, when
the Hungarian Banking and Capital Market Supervisory Authority
and the Supervisory Authority responsible for the Supervision of
Insurance Companies were merged and the Hungarian Financial
Supervisory Authority (HU-FSA) was created. Similarly, in Poland
since 2006 the Polish FSA has been the single body responsible for
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funds, capital market, insurance institutions and electronic money
institutions, as well as the supplementary supervision of financial
conglomerates) and from 2008 also encompassed the banking
market. The reasons for this trend towards building an integrated
supervisory system in some CEE countries are unclear. The most
frequent justification was to point out to the creation of synergies,
but the financial markets in CEE are relatively small, without much
scope for a synergy effect. 
3. Banking sector in CEE-5 countries: main characteristics
CEE-5 countries are at a similar stage of institutional develop-
ment, financial and macroeconomic reform, and banking sector
depth. They share a number of common characteristics: they are
open economies with exports contributing 60-80% of GDP (with
the exception of Poland, which has the largest domestic market),
they have already well established EU legal rules and standards,
low wages and educated workforce and relatively fast economic
growth, particularly in the pre-crisis period. The gap between these
countries and developed European economies is narrowing. CEE
countries were before the crisis among the top most attractive
regions for foreign investment, with the share of foreign investors
in the banking sector exceeding on average 80%, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia (Ernst & Young, 2007). The process of
fundamental bank reforms, economic restructuring and privatiza-
tion has now largely been completed in these countries. After EU
accession in 2004, CEE countries enjoyed rapid economic and
banking sector growth. The global crisis of 2007-2009 had a nega-
tive effect on the assessment of this region as economic growth
collapsed (Figure 2). The first and most seriously affected country
was Hungary; the sharpest decline in output was in Slovenia, while
Poland managed to keep in positive GDP and credit growth
throughout the crisis. 
Before the crisis, CEE countries enjoyed dynamic banking sector
growth and high bank profitability (average ROE above 20% till
2007). Despite numerous gloomy projections, the macro-economic
and profitability figures remained good throughout the crisis and
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than in the old EU countries.
A relatively liberal financial sector combined with large foreign
ownership has been another distinguishing feature. Poland has the
largest and low concentrated banking sector (the lowest C5 ratio in
Table 2) with low dependence on sophisticated financial instru-
ments and relatively low leverage: total loans to total deposits
around 100%. Also in the Czech Republic banks are characterized
by a very conservative funding structure, based on domestic
deposits. On the other spectrum, Hungarian banks display the
highest degree of risk, stemming not only from high non-deposi-
tory financing, but also from high dependence on foreign currency
loans: 70% of banking sector loans to the private sector in Hungary
has been denominated in foreign currencies (EBRD, 2010).
In CEE-5 countries banks have remained small, following a
traditional model of banking intermediation, and not presenting a
significant systemic risk (Table 3). Foreign banks invested heavily
in the CEE region right from the beginning of the transition period
and only in Poland and Slovenia some large banks are still
controlled by the State or domestic private capital.
    
Figure 2. Real GDP growth rates
Percentage change on previous year
Source: Eurostat.
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Total loans 
as % of GDP
Total loans 
as % of total deposits C5 Ratio
Bank 
assets
(bil. EUR)
% Share 
of foreign 
banks
2006 2009 2006 2009 2009 2009 2009
CZE 45 58 67 75 62 160 87
HUN 63 79 119 130 55 126 91
POL 35 57 79 102 44 274 63
SVK 48 49 110 142 72 54 94
SVN 69 101 119 146 60 53 37
EU 27 146 162 143 113 44 42 144 –
Source: ECB (2010) and  Raiffeisen Research (2011).
Table 3. The largest banks by assets in CEE-5 countries, 2009
Bank/Country
Bank 
assets 
mln.EUR
Bank assets  
as % of 
country 
GDP
Main shareholder
Czech Republic
1. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka A.S.
    (CSOB)
32 462 23.7 KBC (BE)
2. Ceska Sporitelna a.s. 32 317 23.5 ERSTE Group  (AT)
3. Komercni Banka 26 268 19.1 Societe Generale (FR)
Hungary
1. OTP Bank Plc 36 006 38.7 Private global investors
2. MKB Bank Zrt 11 466 12.3 Bayerische Landesbank (DE)
3. K&H Bank Zrt 11 311 12.2 KBC (BE)
Poland
1. PKO BP SA 38 109 12.3 State
2. Bank Pekao SA 31 810 10.3 Unicredit (IT)
3. BRE Bank SA 19 732 6.4 Commerzbank (DE)
Slovenia
1. NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. 19 606 56.2 State (33%), KBC (30%)
2. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. 5 786 16.6 State
3. Abanka Vipa dd 4 557 13.1
Domestic private 
investors
Slovakia
1. Slovenska sporitel'na as-Slovak
    Savings Bank 11 485 18.1 ERSTE Group  (AT)
2. Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. 9 852 15.6 Intesa Sanpaolo (LU)
3. Tatra Banka a.s. 9 014 14.2 Raiffeisen (AT)
Source: Own calculations, based on Bankscope database.
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remained profitable and well-capitalized, except for Slovenia. On
average, the Polish and Czech Republic top banks were least
affected by the crisis, while the Hungarian ones were quickest in
regaining stability and recapitalization. Austrian banks were
among the first to enter CEE, followed by Italian, and later Belgian
and French banks. Consequently, UniCredit, Raiffeisen and Erste
are the largest CEE players (UniCredit, 2010). The investment in
CEE-5 banks turned out to be very profitable, not only from pre-
crisis, but also from the post-crisis perspective, and allowed mother
companies to regain much of their initial investments. However,
investment in CEE carried also potential risks, mainly connected
with macroeconomic imbalances, exchange rate volatility and
credit risk. As a result, major global players, such as Citigroup or
HSBC, had a much lower level of involvement in the region than
banks from neighbouring countries.
Foreign currency borrowing constitutes a significant risk in all
East European countries. Before the crisis, many foreign-owned
CEE banks refinanced themselves abroad and then passed on the
currency risk to their clients. Macro-economic stability and expec-
tation of currency appreciation after EU accession stimulated
demand for such loans. However, FX exposure differs among CEE
countries: in 2007, un-hedged foreign currency borrowing consti-
tuted more than 70% of all private sector loans in Estonia, Latvia,
and Serbia; it exceeded domestic borrowing in Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Romania, but was relatively low in comparison to GDP in
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Bank lending to un-
hedged borrowers exposed CEE economies to systemic risk, but at
the same time functioned as an engine for dynamic growth (Brown
and De Haas, 2012). 
4. CEE-5 banks’ efficiency: DEA results 
Efficiency is a broad concept which can be applied to many
dimensions of bank activities. To analyse how the efficiency of CEE
banks was affected by the pre- and post-crisis environment, tech-
nical and scale efficiency in the period 2002-09 has been
investigated, using DEA technique, based on the Bankscope data-
base. Only commercial and savings banks were analysed. DEA is a
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comparative ratio of outputs to inputs for each unit, which is
reported as the relative technical efficiency score (Charnes et al.,
1998). All non-parametric methods generally yield slightly lower
mean efficiency estimates and seem to have a greater dispersion
than the results of parametric models (Berger and Humphrey,
1997). Technical efficiency is related to the ability of a firm to
produce outputs with given inputs: a production plan is techni-
cally efficient if there is no way to produce the same output(s) with
less input(s) or to produce more output(s) with the same inputs.
Technical efficiency considers scale and scope economies. Among
a number of DEA models, the most popular are the CCR and BCC-
models. The CCR model (Charnes et al., 1978) yields an objective
evaluation of overall efficiency and identifies inefficiencies. It esti-
mates efficiency on the assumption of constant return to scale
(CRTS). The BCC model (Banker et al., 1984) estimates efficiency
on the assumption of variable return to scale (VRTS). It distin-
guishes between technical and scale inefficiencies by estimating
pure technical efficiency at the given scale of operation. 
Technical efficiency has been analysed assuming constant, vari-
able and non-increasing returns to scale. The following symbols
have been applied: 
— E_crs – measure of technical efficiency under constant
returns to scale assumption, 
— E_vrs - measure of technical efficiency under variable returns
to scale assumption,
— E_n – measure of technical efficiency under non-increasing
returns to scale assumption. 
For the above three efficiency measures (E_crs, E_n, E_vrs), the
following property also holds: 0 < E_crs ≤ E_n ≤ E_vrs 1. We
should notice that VRTS technical efficiency scores are greater than
or equal to CRST technical efficiency scores.
Following the scale properties of the two major DEA models
(CCR and BCC-models) we have the definition of scale efficiency:
E_s = E_crs/E_vrs. If 0 < E_crs < E_vrs ≤ 1, this means that scale effi-
ciency e_s < 1 and the given bank/firm is scale inefficient (but we
do not know if it is too big or too small). Based on scale efficiency
measure (E_s) only, it is not possible to distinguish in which region
≥
Do safe banks create safe systems? 257the given bank/firm is operating: increasing or decreasing returns
to scale. To make this distinction, these measures must be
compared with E_n measure. If E_crs = E_n this means that bank/
firm is not scale efficient and is operating with increasing returns
to scale. If E_n > E_crs, this means that bank/firm is operating with
decreasing return to scale.
In order to test how bank efficiency changed over the period
2002-2009, an efficiency analysis has been carried out for the
banking sectors in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary
and Poland. The model chosen for estimation of efficiency is the
expanded BCC model, output-oriented. In the technical efficiency
analysis according to the DEA method, we have applied the classi-
fication of input and output based on value added approach (VAA)
proposed by Grigorian and Manole (2002), were the input was:
(x1) – personnel expenses, (x2) – total fixed assets, (x3) – interest
expense. The output was: (y1) – total loans net, (y2) – liquid assets,
(y3) – total deposits. The results of the efficiency analysis according
to DEA method of E_crs and E_vrs measures in the period 2002-
2011 are presented in Table 4.
The results of the analysis have confirmed that the accession of
CEE-5 countries to the EU has boosted the efficiency of commer-
cial banks in the analysed period, particularly between 2004-2006.
Table 4. Efficiency measures of CEE-5 countries
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 No. of banks
E_crs
Czech Rep. 0.55 0.74 0.84 0.68 0.81 0.79 0.66 0.80 0.66 0.83 27
Poland 0.49 0.59 0.71 0.65 0.68 0.32 0.66 0.42 0.79 0.73 41
Slovakia 0.65 0.96 0.70 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.91 0.87 0.55 0.95 17
Slovenia 0,44 0.95 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.42 0.71 0.83 19
Hungary 0.30 0.20 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.68 0.59 0.30 0.73 0.76 32
E_vrs
Czech Rep. 0.67 0.88 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.92 27
Poland 0.80 0.86 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.56 0.85 0.87 0.93 0.92 41
Slovakia 0.81 0.97 0.78 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.81 0.97 17
Slovenia 0,78 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.73 0.91 0.94 19
Hungary 0.64 0.52 0.67 0.76 0.82 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.87 0.92 32
Source: Own calculations, Bankscope database.
Ewa Miklaszewska, Katarzyna Mikołajczyk and Małgorzata Pawłowska258However, efficiency in all analysed countries decreased in 2008-
2009, most dramatically for Hungarian banks. In 2010-2011, effi-
ciency increased, especially in Poland.
The process of changes of scale efficiency was also analyzed by a
comparison of technical efficiency measures (E_crs, E_vrs, E_n) and
scale efficiency measures (E_s) (Figure 3). The result of comparison
in 2011 showed that the majority of examined banks in Poland
and the Czech Republic were operating with increasing or constant
returns to scale region (for the majority of banks E_n = E_crs). The
Figure 3. DEA indicators for banking sectors of CEE-5 countries (2002-11 means)
Source: Own analysis, BankScope database.
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Do safe banks create safe systems? 259results of the analysis showed that the efficiency of CEE-5 banking
sectors increased after EU accession and decreased due to the finan-
cial crisis. The majority of banks in Poland were operating with
increasing returns to scale, which means that there is still room for
new M&A.
5. Banking market competitive conditions in CEE-5
Anayiotos et al. (2010), researching the relative efficiency of
East European banks using DEA technique, showed that DEA effi-
ciency scores before the recent crisis were strongly linked to the
host country level of development. Miklaszewska and Mikolajczyk
(2011) pointed to the importance of bank home-country govern-
ance model: better efficiency results were recorded by banks
controlled by foreign institutions govern by shareholder model
(i.e. US) than those controlled by European capital (area with the
stakeholder model). Lensink et al. (2008) indicated that domestic
institutional structure did matter for bank efficiency. Thus,
assuming the importance of host country conditions, our next step
was to compare the competitive environment in CEE-5 countries.
The level of competition of CEE-5 was evaluated using the H-
statistic based on the reduced form of revenue equation of the
firms (Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Claessens and Laeven, 2004;
Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Bikker and Bos, 2008). 
In order to estimate the H-statistic for the Polish banking sector,
we used the reduced form of revenue equation, where the
dependent variable IRit is the natural logarithm of interest income
ln(II)it or the natural logarithm of interest income divided by total
assets ln(II/TA)it of bank i in time t, explanatory variables were
defined for each bank i in period t, as follows: w1it – price of funds
(relation of interest expenses to total liabilities); w2it – price of labor
(personnel expenses, relation of pay and pay-related cost to net
assets); w3it – price of physical capital (relation of depreciation to
fixed assets), othit – relation of loans to deposit, where: eit – error,
a1, a2, a3, d – regression coefficients
2:
ln(IRit) = ci +a1*lnwlit + a2*lnwpit + a3*lnwkit + d*othit+eit                 [1]
2. The sum of regression ratios (a1+a2+a3) determines the value of H statistic for the sector of
commercial banks. 
Ewa Miklaszewska, Katarzyna Mikołajczyk and Małgorzata Pawłowska260The panel data for this analysis comprises data from BankScope
and cover the period from 2002 to 2009 and two variants of
reduced form of revenue equation were estimated (Pawłowska,
2011). The first variant explains the natural logarithm of interest
income divided by total assets ln(II/TA) as a dependent variable,
whereas the second model explains the natural logarithm of
interest income ln(II). In order to analyse changes in the level of
competition in the banking sectors the value of H statistic function
was calculated for the entire period and for two sub-periods: 2002-
2007 (H1) and 2008-2009 (H2) (Table 5). We also made additional
estimation for the period from 2010 to 2011, for the two variants
of reduced form of revenue equation.
The empirical results with respect to the H-statistic in the period
2002-2009, have shown that the values of H statistics were higher
when the dependent variable was scaled by assets. The results of
the empirical analysis demonstrated that between 2002 and 2007
(before the financial crisis) commercial banks in CEE-5 operated in
the environment of monopolistic competition (values of H statistic
were between 0 and 1). By estimating the different regression equa-
tions with interaction terms for two periods, significant changes
Table 5. Value of H statistic for CEE-5
Estimations results with time 
interaction terms for overall 
sample:
Dependent variable: Interest Income
Czech R. Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Poland
H1 2002-2007 0.28 0.34 0.19 0.27 0.30
H2 2008-2009 0.07 0.003 0.11 -0.012 0.09
p (F-test) H0: H1 = H2 (0.037) (0.000) (0.612) (0.034) (0.002)
H3 2002-2009 -0.25 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.16
H4 2010-2011* -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.45 0.07
Estimations results with time 
interaction terms for overall 
sample:
Dependent variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets
Czech R. Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Poland
H1 2002-2007 0.48 0.85 0.85 0.44 0.83
H2 2008-2009 0.38 0.98 0.76 0.39 0.44
p (F-test) H0: H1 = H2 (0.290) (0.526) (0.276) (0.851) (0.003)
H3 2002-2009 0.43 0.55 0.70 0.53 0.68
H4 2010-2011* 0.15 0.30 0.01 0.07 0.19
* Tentative results.
Source: Own analysis, BankScope database.
Do safe banks create safe systems? 261over time were found for the two sub-periods in the overall sample,
which was confirmed by the test for significance of the differences
between the two periods (H1 = H2) for the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, mainly when dependent variable
was based on the natural logarithm of interest income ln(II). In the
period between 2010 and 2011 competition decrease in the CEE-5
banking sectors.
The level of competition in the Polish banking sector was
similar to the euro zone countries level (Bikker and Spierdijk,
2008). A strong driver for an increase in competition in the CEE-5
banking sectors was the accession to the European Union. In the
period 2008-2009, the slight decrease in competition resulted from
the financial crisis’ consequences.
6. CEE-5 bank soundness
In the post-crisis period, bank risk/return preferences have
shifted towards risk minimizing, both globally and in the CEE
countries. However, assessing bank safety is even more difficult
than assessing its efficiency. In this section, the Z-Score index of
bank sensitivity to default has been adopted as a proxy measure of
bank soundness. The index is based on the volatility of returns and
the lack of adequate capital as the main sources of risk. The Z-Score
is calculated as the sum of equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) and
return on assets ratio (ROA), divided by standard deviation of ROA.
Thus the value of the Z-Score is determined by the level of capital-
ization and by the level and stability of profits, and can be
interpreted as the distance from a default, measured by standard
deviation of profits. A high level in the Z-Score denotes bank
stability, which means it has enough equity capital to cover poten-
tial losses. The key element, which has a considerable influence on
the Z-Score, is the denominator. If the level of profitability is
stable, it contributes to the high value of the index, but during
unstable times (increase or decrease in profits) it causes a sudden
decline in the Z-Score. 
                                          ROA + CAR
                   Z – Scoret =                                                                     [2]
                                               
σ (ROA)
Ewa Miklaszewska, Katarzyna Mikołajczyk and Małgorzata Pawłowska262The Z-Score is calculated in two different ways. Firstly, it is
calculated for two 4-year periods: 2004-2007 and 2008-2011. That
allows to compare the average results in two different macroeco-
nomic conditions, pre-crisis credit-boom vs. crisis and post-crisis
downturn (Figure 4a). However, in order to analyze the impact of
growing instability on financial markets, the average Z-Score was
also calculated in 3-year rolling windows, starting from 2004-2006
period and terminating in 2009-2011 (Figure 4b). The banks data
were extracted from the Bankscope database. The original data set
comprised all CEE-5 banks categorized as commercial or saving
banks, but to prevent distortion banks with assets lower than 0.5%
of the total domestic banking sector assets were excluded. That
reduced the number of banks from 130 to 97. 
When calculated for two sub-periods, Z-Score indices substan-
tially diminished, on average from 64 to 36. The decrease could be
observed in all countries, especially for the Slovak and Hungarian
banks. This resulted mainly from changes in their profitability,
both the lower level and higher volatility. The average return on
assets for all banks included in this study was gradually rising from
1.32% in 2004 to 1.47% in 2007, then diminished to its lowest
level 0.39% in 2009, and slowly increased thereafter. However,
after 2009 there are two different paths for CEE-5 countries:
gradual recovery for Polish, Czech and Slovak banks, and deep
decrease for Slovenian and Hungarian banks (Figure 5).
Figure 4. Z-Score for banks in CEE-5 countries
     a) Calculated for two 4-year sub-periods             b) Averaged for 3-year y rolling windows
Source: Own calculations, based on Bankscope database.
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Do safe banks create safe systems? 263Calculations in 3-year rolling windows allow to see gradual
character of changes in the Z-Sore level. Thus our results indicate a
sharp decline in bank safety in CEE-5 countries in the 2007-2009
period, triggered by the crisis. Its main reason was not only a fall in
profitability, which remained much higher than in most devel-
oped economies, but the high volatility of ROA, resulting from the
excessive profitability in pre-crisis period. However, the restored
profitability in most banks accompanied by the higher capitaliza-
tion ratios after 2009 resulted in the increase of the Z-Score for the
final sub-periods.
7. Rethinking bank regulation: concluding remarks
From the data presented in the empirical part of the paper, it is
evident that the 2008 crisis affected CEE banks to a lesser degree
than those in highly developed countries, although a short-term
bank efficiency loss was clear. CEE banks entered the crisis in good
shape, after their successful restructuring in the 1990s and
dynamic economic growth following EU accession. Because of the
high profitability generated by the traditional bank intermediary
model, many global risk areas had not developed there. Conse-
quently, the CEE-5 banks emerged from the 2008 crisis relatively
unscathed and not in need of fundamental restructuring. During
Figure 5. Return on assets (%) for banks included in the study, by countries
Source: Own calculations, based on Bankscope database.
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from depleting bank capital, although M&A did intensify as a
result of restructuring carried out by bank foreign owners. 
In the light of the 2008 crisis, the traditional business model of
banking intermediation, which dominates in Central and Eastern
Europe, turned out to be the safest and it can be concluded that in
CEE, strong banks create sound systems, which have survived the
global financial crisis relatively well. Nevertheless, CEE banks will
have no choice but to participate in the new European regulatory
and supervisory architecture, centered on the prevention of
systemic risk posed by large global banks. The newest EU proposals
of creating a banking union will strengthen it even further, by
giving strong supervisory powers to ECB and creating a mechanism
of shared bank rescue burden for the euro zone members. More-
over, this step will weaken the current European supervisory
structure based on EBA governance, before it managed to demon-
strate its performance. The banking union, instead of deleveraging
big banks, will create another rescue vehicle for them, increasing
moral hazard behavior. For CEE banks, with small and competitive
banking sectors, it may increase the tendency for bank concentra-
tion, away of the healthy and competitive banking model. 
To conclude, the post-crisis complex regulatory and supervisory
model, which has emerged in the EU, based on a number of new
regulatory bodies with overlapping competencies and a central
stabilizing role play for large banks by the ECB, may not produce
the desired more efficient and stable banking system, particularly
in the peripheral countries with competitive banking markets,
such as the CEE.
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EURO – HOW BIG A DIFFERENCE
FINLAND AND SWEDEN IN SEARCH OF MACRO STABILITY
Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä1
ETLA 
The different monetary regime choices of two strikingly similar economies
Finland and Sweden have created a particularly interesting testing ground for
the benefits of the EMU. We assess the effects of the regime choice by simu-
lating the behaviour of the Swedish economy with National Institute’s Global
Econometric Model (NiGEM) on the assumption that Sweden had joined the
EMU in 1999. The simulation exercise suggests that the independent monetary
regime reduced the impact of the global shock on Sweden, but cannot explain
the growth gap between Sweden and Finland since 2012. Our results suggest
that the different choices with regard to the EMU have not affected the macro-
economic outcomes very much.
Keywords: Finland, Sweden, EMU, simulation, counter factual.
The euro crisis has rekindled questions about the advantages
and disadvantages of membership in the European Monetary
Union. While a rather wide consensus exists that a monetary
union with appropriate institutions is an overwhelmingly positive
thing for the tightly integrated core countries of the European
Union, there is much less agreement about whether being part of
monetary integration is beneficial for EU’s peripheral economies.
Many people would now argue that Greece should never have
joined or been allowed to join the euro.
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Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä272In the Northern periphery of the EU, the different monetary
regime choices of Finland and Sweden have created a particularly
interesting testing ground for the benefits of the EMU. While
Sweden is somewhat bigger and its economy is more versatile than
that of Finland, the countries have many similarities. In both
countries manufacturing is important, highly developed and glob-
ally oriented. The core of the euro area accounts for roughly the
same share for the countries’ foreign trade. Both have extensive
social safety nets and the associated high tax levels. Labour unions
are strong and play an important role in wage formation.
Importantly, both Finland and Sweden have a history of mone-
tary instability. Periods of rapid inflation and devaluations to
restore external competitiveness have been recurrent. The boom
following financial liberalisation in the late 1980s and the subse-
quent financial crisis and deep recession in the early 1990s in both
countries underlined the difficulty of monetary management with
fixed but adjustable exchange rates and free capital movements. In
both countries, monetary policy proved to be impotent in
preventing the unsustainable boom. Similarly, both countries were
forced to float their currencies after a period of costly defence of
their exchange rates with very high interest rates. In both countries
the quest for monetary stability accentuated at the same time as
EMU membership was on the political agenda. 
In Sweden, a key study, the influential Calmfors report, about
the benefits and costs of joining the EMU came to the conclusion
that the Swedish economy would not adjust smoothly to asym-
metric shocks without an independent monetary policy and
exchange rate flexibility, at least not without important institu-
tional changes. The political cost of staying out from the
beginning of monetary union with small influence on the develop-
ment of the EMU was seen smaller than the benefits from staying
out (SOU, 1996). In Finland, the economic risks were recognised,
but it was assumed that wage formation and fiscal policies would
evolve in ways which would ensure sufficient adjustment capacity
(EMU-asiantuntijaryhmä, 1997). In addition, there was a strong
political will to be in the core of the European Union. As a result,
Sweden decided not to seek EMU membership while Finland
decided to join from the beginning.
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performance of the two economies since the creation of the EMU,
including a major economic recession. It is therefore interesting to
compare how the two countries have fared and speculate how they
would have developed had they chosen different monetary
regimes. In this paper we do this by first documenting the evolu-
tion of some key macroeconomic variables and then by simulating
with a macroeconomic model what might have happened in
Sweden had it chosen to join the EMU in 1999.
1. Much similarity in the real economy
The evolution of GDP and its main components in the first years
since the beginning of the EMU does not differ much between the
two countries. GDP grew by the same 3.2 per cent a year on average
from 1998 to 2006 in both Finland and Sweden (Figure 1.a).2
In 2007 and 2008 Finland grew faster than Sweden, driven by
rapidly expanding exports in the midst of the global boom. The
strong Finnish export performance reflected the specialisation of
the Finnish manufacturing in investment goods which were high
in demand during the global boom. Correspondingly, the crash of
global demand that started in the fourth quarter of 2008 hit
Finland harder: Finland lost 8.5% of GDP in 2009 against Sweden’s
loss of 5.0%. Taken together, there was no difference in the cumu-
lative GDP growth of the two countries in the first decade of the
EMU until 2009. Both countries grew at the average rate of 2.2%.
Also the initial recovery from mid-2009 to mid-2010 was fairly
similar in the two countries.
However, since 2010 Sweden has grown faster, at least until the
third quarter of 2012. The better growth performance has been
driven by both stronger exports and stronger domestic demand.
Over the past three years Swedish exports have continued to grow
moderately, while Finnish exports have been more or less flat
(Figures 1.b and 1.c). As a result of the better performance over the
last few years, Sweden has grown somewhat faster than Finland in
the EMU area as a whole, 2.6% vs. 2.1%. In per capita terms, the
difference has been smaller, 2.1% vs. 1.8%. 
2. Finnish and Swedish economies are compared at length in Korkman and Suvanto (2013). 
Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä274Figure 1a. GDP in Finland and Sweden, quarterly data 
1999/1 = 100
Figure1b. Exports of goods and services in Finland and Sweden, quarterly data
1999/1 = 100
Figure 1c. Total domestic demand in Finland and Sweden, quarterly data
1999/1 = 100
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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reap from joining the EMU in terms of reduced transaction costs
and increased competition have not been large enough to compen-
sate for other factors that have affected growth in the last 14 years.
This is also consistent with the observation that Finland’s trade
with the (rest of the) euro area has not developed more favourably
than that of Sweden. In fact, for both countries, the share of euro
area exports out of total goods exports has declined by roughly the
same amount in the euro period, reflecting the rapid growth of
trade with the emerging economies. 
Economic theory suggests that monetary policy should have
little if any impact on medium-term growth but could have a more
pronounced effect on output variability. Comparing the 13-year
EMU period (1999-2012) with the preceding 13-year period (1985-
1998), however, suggests that the change in the monetary regime
was not very important in this respect, either. The standard devia-
tion of the difference of quarterly GDP from its linear trend was
almost identical for Finland (0.062 vs. 0.064) in these two periods
containing a major slump each. In the case of Sweden, the stan-
dard deviation increased somewhat (from 0.032 to 0.044), but
remained smaller than in Finland reflecting most likely the more
diversified production structure of the Swedish economy.
2. Monetary stability has improved in both countries, 
but more so in Sweden
The inflation performance has also been pretty similar. Infla-
tion was marginally faster in Finland than in Sweden in the EMU
period until the third quarter of 2012 (Figure 2). Inflation was on
average 1.8% in Finland and 1.5% in Sweden measured by the
consumer price index and 2.0% and 1.5%, respectively, measured
by the private consumption deflator.
Compared to a similar 13-year period before the EMU member-
ship, the price stability of both countries improved. The decline in
consumer price inflation was bigger in Sweden. Also the variability
of inflation has declined in both countries although the degree of
the decline depends on the exact inflation measure. The standard
deviation of the consumer price index is almost identical in the
Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä276two countries in the EMU period while that of the private
consumption deflator is higher for Finland (Table 1).  
A similar overall picture emerges when looking at the external
value of money. The standard deviation of the effective nominal
exchange rate declined markedly in both countries from the pre-
EMU period to the EMU period. Again, as with price stability, the
decline was greater in Sweden.
The behaviour of the effective exchange rate is nevertheless
interesting. While the overall variability as measured by standard
deviation is smaller in Sweden, there is less cyclical variation in
Finland. The Finnish effective exchange rate appreciated in the
beginning of the EMU period quite substantially until 2004, and
has remained relatively stable ever since. Coinciding with the
Table 1. Price and exchange rate stability before and after the start of EMU
1985/1-1998/4
Sweden        Finland
1999/1-2012/4
Sweden        Finland
Inflation (national concept, 
annual change, per cent)
Mean
Stdev
4.3
3.2
3.2
2.1
1.5
1.2
1.8
1.3
Private consumption deflator 
(annual change per cent)
Mean
Stdev
4.9
3.3
3.4
2.0
1.5
0.7
2.0
1.3
Effective exchange rate, level Stdev 6.6 6.3 4.3 4.8
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
Figure 2. Inflation, annual CPI change in Finland and Sweden, quarterly data
In %
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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exchange rate appreciated somewhat while the Swedish exchange
rate depreciated substantially to recover more than fully in two
years’ time (Figure 3).
The effective exchange rate of Sweden has in fact followed very
closely the bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro since the end
of 2003. This suggests that the decision to remain outside the EMU
has had indeed a major impact on the effective exchange rate. 
3. What if Sweden had been in the EMU?
The comparison of the actual performances of the two econo-
mies above suggests that while average growth rates have been
rather similar, Sweden has grown faster since the global crisis
started. In terms of price and exchange rate stability Sweden seems
to have fared better than Finland in the EMU period. Sweden’s
price and exchange rate stability also increased compared to that
prevailing in the pre-EMU period.
If all other factors except the monetary regime had been the
same for the two countries, one could conclude that EMU member-
ship has not improved monetary stability or growth performance
Figure 3. Effective exchange rate in Finland and Sweden, quarterly data
   Index 1999/1 = 100*
* Currency strengthens, when index numbers rise. 
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä278of a peripheral Nordic country but perhaps weakened it. However,
despite the many similarities all other factors cannot be assumed to
have been precisely the same. One way to assess the importance of
the monetary arrangement is to simulate the behaviour of the
Swedish economy assuming that Sweden had joined the EMU. In
what follows we do simulation exercises using the NiGEM model; a
brief description of the model is provided in an Appendix 1.
Simulating Swedish EMU membership is easier and more reli-
able than simulating what might have happened in Finland had
Finland chosen to stay outside the EMU. In a Swedish simulation,
the alternative monetary policy and exchange rate reactions are
fairly well known, as the likely impact of a Swedish EMU member-
ship on both the monetary policy decisions of the ECB and the
behaviour of the euro exchange rates can be assumed to be negli-
gible. On the other hand, if we assumed that Finland had been
outside the EMU, we would have to specify the monetary policy
rule of the Bank Finland, make assumptions about how the markka
exchange rate would have behaved and also assumptions about
changes in risk premiums. None of these is straightforward. 
In the simulation of the Swedish EMU-membership we fixed the
Swedish central bank rate at the same level as the ECB steering rate
and euro exchange rate at the value prevailing in the beginning of
1999 (about 9.5 kroner per one euro). Money market rates were
equalised with those of the rest of the euro area. On the other
hand, we did not make any adjustments to the long-term rates;
Swedish long rates have already stayed close to the German ones
implying no potential for reduced risk premiums. As the exchange
rates in the NiGEM are USD rates, we calculated the respective
counter factual USD rate of krona by using the actual krona
exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD and the fixing of the euro rate.
Naturally, the evolution of Sweden’s effective exchange deviates
from that of Finland and other euro area countries to the extent
Swedish trade patterns differ. 
The simulation period was from the first quarter of 1999 to the
third quarter of 2012, when we assumed backward looking
economic agents. As a robustness check we also run the model with
forward looking expectations, in which case the simulation period
extended to 2020. Most of the reported results are based on the
simulation with backward looking expectations. Using forward-
Euro – How big a difference: Finland and Sweden in search of macro stability 279looking expectations would, in general, smooth the evolution of
the economy as e.g. long-term interest rates change less. Consumers
are on the other hand myopic at their best, which implies relatively
small differences in consumption by expectations.
The counter factual suggest that tying the Swedish monetary
policy to that of the euro area had allowed Sweden to grow some-
what faster in the first years of the EMU. The cumulative “growth
gain” as a member of the monetary union is 6.6% of 2011 GDP by
the first quarter of 2006, i.e. 0.8% per year, assuming backward
looking expectations (Figure 4). 
The rest of the period (after the first quarter of 2006) had been
less successful for the EMU membership. The cumulative loss since
1999 was 7.7%, i.e. 1.2% per year. EMU membership had reduced
GDP particularly in the midst at the global crisis in 2009–2010.
Thus over the whole EMU period the EMU-Sweden had grown at
almost the same rate as it did in reality. Assuming forward-looking
expectations would smoothen the development, but the results
remain qualitatively the same.
Looking at the simulated GDP and baseline GDP in levels high-
lights the role of the independent monetary regime (Figure 5).
Retaining the krona appears to have mitigated the impact of the
Figure 4. Simulated GDP level and deviation from the baseline in Sweden, 
quarterly data
In %
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä280global shock in 2009 somewhat and allowed Sweden to recover at a
higher GDP level in 2010 and 2011. At the same time, comparing
the Swedish simulated and baseline trajectories with the Finnish
GDP baseline scenario suggests that other factors than the mone-
tary regime have been the primary cause of the weaker GDP
developments in Finland since mid-2010: Sweden does better in
this period than Finland irrespective of the monetary regime, and
the positive impact of the independent monetary regime on the
Swedish GDP disappears completely by the second quarter of 2012.  
A plausible explanation for the weaker Finnish growth is the
decline of the Nokia cluster and the weakening income generation
capacity of the forest industry, compounded by high wage agree-
ments just when the global crisis hit. Neither Nokia’s difficulties
nor the secular decline of demand for the types of paper in which
the Finnish industry has specialised have much to do with the
monetary regime. 
Inflation had also been the same on average under the EMU
scenario as with independent monetary policy; the average simu-
lated inflation rate (private consumption deflator) in Sweden is the
same 1.5% as it is in the baseline scenario. As with GDP, inflation
Figure 5. Simulated and baseline GDP for Sweden and baseline GDP for Finland, 
quarterly data
   1999/1 = 100
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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of the global crisis had Sweden been part of the EMU (Figure 6). 
The simulated effective exchange rate is stronger than the
actual one for almost the whole period (Figure 7). A particularly
wide gap emerges in the fourth quarter of 2008 and remains there
until mid-2010. The only significant periods of a weaker simulated
exchange rate are in 1999-2000 and in late 2012. On the other
hand, the euro rates adopted as Swedish short-term interest rates
have been in several periods both below and above the actual
Swedish rates with a difference typically less than 1 percentage
point (Figure 8). A membership in EMU had implied both the fixed
euro exchange rate and short-term EMU interest rates.
These growth patterns suggest that the stronger simulated
growth until 2005/2006 is due to lower EMU interest rates. From
2006 onwards until 2011 both higher interest rates and a stronger
currency contributed to the weaker growth in the counter factual.
The weaker growth performance of the EMU-Sweden in 2009
through early 2011 would seem to be associated at least as much
with the exchange rate appreciation as with the interest rate devel-
opment.   
Figure 6. Simulated and baseline inflation rate* in Sweden, 
quarterly data
In %
* Private consumption deflator. 
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä282This last observation is important as the monetary authorities
probably have less influence on the exchange rate than on short-
term interest rates. It is quite plausible that the weakness of the
krona from late 2008 until 2010 reflected mainly market reactions
to bad news on the Swedish economy, such as the state of the car
Figure 7. Calculated and baseline effective exchange rate in Sweden, 
quarterly data
   1999/1 = 100*
* Currency strengthens, when index numbers rise. 
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
Figure 8. Three-month interest rates in the euro area and in Sweden
In %
Sources: NiGEM, ETLA.
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Riksbank itself argued at the time that the weakening reflected the
general tendency of small currencies to weaken in times of finan-
cial turbulence, and denied any attempts to target any given level
of the exchange rate (Riksbank, 2009). The evolution of the krona
helped to stabilise the economy on this particular occasion but it is
not obvious that expectations would always work in this way. 
While the simulated GDP and inflation patterns look rather
sensible, the evolution of the key demand and supply components
is less plausible. Exports deviate very little from the baseline
scenario; they are very insensitive to the significant exchange rate
changes in 2008–2010. The weak growth in the simulated counter
factual in 2009–2011 is associated with both weaker domestic
demand and a weaker current account. A relative increase in
imports is thus associated with a weaker growth. The asymmetry of
export and import reactions to the change in the effective
exchange rate is doubtful and warns against drawing too far-
reaching conclusions on the basis of this particular simulation. 
An advantage of NiGEM over a single country model is that it
allows analysing interactions between different countries. The
Swedish EMU membership obviously has potential repercussions
for the Finnish economy through trade reactions. The simulated
impacts turned out to be modest, however. In the slump that
started in late 2008, Finland had benefitted somewhat from the
stronger Swedish imports.
4. Concluding remarks 
The Swedish and Finnish GDP data do suggest that the different
choices on the monetary regime have not been very important
from a macroeconomic perspective. Until 2009 the average growth
was almost identical. In 2009 and 2010, the independent mone-
tary regime buffered the impact of the global shock on Sweden.
The different monetary regimes cannot, however, explain the
steadily increased growth gap anymore in 2012. Other factors,
such as the decline of the Nokia cluster, are needed for that. 
Our simulation exercise suggests that the stabilisation of
Swedish output in 2009 and 2010 emanates at least as much from
the reaction of the exchange rate as from the movements of the
Paavo Suni and Vesa Vihriälä284short-term rates. It is not obvious that the foreign exchange market
reactions would always be stabilising. 
In any case, Sweden had achieved a lower average inflation rate
in the EMU period and in fact improved its price stability more
than Finland did, if compared to the years prior to the EMU. Thus,
as a whole, monetary independence has not been detrimental to
macroeconomic stability in Sweden. If anything, Sweden has fared
somewhat better than it had done in the EMU and definitely better
than Finland. As the Swedish economy is bigger and more versatile
than that of Finland, this is not yet conclusive evidence that
Finland would have achieved a similar outcome outside the EMU.
Also, the proximity and closer economic links to Russia could
make financial market conditions in a non-euro Finland more
volatile than those in Sweden. Nevertheless, our observations do
not support the argument that being part of the EMU is necessary
for the macroeconomic stability of a small EU country with sound
fiscal policies and resilient economic structures. 
Interestingly, public opinions in both countries seem to support
the monetary regime choices. In Sweden the support for joining
the euro has declined strongly since the start of the Great Reces-
sion and has remained at around 10 per cent only since November
2011 (SCB 2013). In Finland, the support for the euro has at the
same time been near all-time-high (Haavisto, 2013). One interpre-
tation is that, as in the 1990s, economic arguments are
predominant in Sweden and the euro crisis has added to the suspi-
cions about the EMU, while political arguments continue to
dominate in Finland. 
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National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM)
National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) is a New
Keynesian structural model describing economies in national
accounts framework. It is based on estimated behavioural equa-
tions with a number of exogenous variables and identities.
Demand determines production in the short-term.
Consumption is based on the real disposable income and real
net housing and other wealth including foreign net assets. Invest-
ments consist of housing and business. Both depend on output,
user costs, capital stock and changes in working-age population in
forecasting, while in simulation it’s past values.
The trade equations are function of competitiveness and
demand. Exporters compete against each other via relative prices,
while demand is given by the weighted world imports. Imports
depend on import prices relative to domestic prices and on total
demand. The trading system is closed so that the world trade
balance sums to about zero.
Interaction between economies takes place through trade and
competitiveness, interacting financial markets and international
stocks of assets. Shifts in the domestic price level or the exchange
rate feed into relative trade prices, allowing net trade to offset
shifts in domestic demand.
The model provides number of options on expectation forma-
tion from backward-looking to forward-looking expectations on
the USD exchange rate, long-term interest rates, wages and infla-
tion. Consumption is either backward-looking or myopic looking
only one quarter forward. 
The model description of the Swedish and Finnish economies is
similar to that of bigger economies, although less detailed.  
More: http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/
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 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr288The global financial crisis had pronounced effects on all Euro-
pean economies from as early as 2008, leading to substantial
output losses in most EU countries. In a short time the crisis meta-
morphosed into a debt crisis as lending dried up and growth
prospects deteriorated. Governments in the geographical periphery
had to seek assistance from the IMF, the European Commission
and other official lenders. Given this background, European
economic governance structures came under scrutiny and a host of
reforms were adopted with the aim of reducing the probability of
future crises occurring in individual countries. Among the reforms
adopted were Europe 2020, a new growth strategy; the Euro Plus
Pact, in part to ensure financial stability; and the Fiscal Compact,
setting new fiscal targets.2 This paper discusses the core component
of the Euro Plus Pact and seeks to assess its likely effectiveness. 
The preparation of the Euro Plus Pact can be traced back to the
autumn of 2010 when the diverging economic fortunes of Euro-
pean countries in the euro area became very noticeable (The
Economist, 2011; Groll and van Roye, 2011). Consultations
between the German and French governments led to the Competi-
tiveness Pact, which was unveiled in February 2011. After some
alterations had been made and a new name given, the Euro Plus
Pact was adopted at a European Council meeting on 25 March
2011 (European Council, 2011).3 All the euro area countries and
the other EU countries except the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Sweden and the United Kingdom signed up to the pact. 
The goal of the Euro Plus Pact is to foster competitiveness and
convergence among the participating countries with the aim of
avoiding the build-up of financial and economic imbalances. The
Pact stipulates a number of policy measures which should be
applied for these goals to be reached, including a review of wage
setting arrangements, indexation schemes, public sector wages and
structural reforms to enhance productivity. There are also
2. The webpage http://www.ecb.int/mopo/eaec/ecopolicy/html/index.en.html depicts the
many reforms and provides links to source material. 
3. The word plus in the Euro Plus Pact is presumed to have two meanings. First, the Pact
imposed new governance structures in addition to those in place at the time of its inception.
Second, while participation in the Pact is compulsory for the euro area countries, other EU
countries are also able to join. 
The Euro Plus Pact: Competitiveness and External Capital Flows 289measures to foster employment, enhance the sustainability of
public finances and improve financial stability. The measures of
the Pact must be applied by individual countries, but the open
method of coordination entails the “naming and shaming” of coun-
tries that fall behind. The European Commission has been put in
charge of monitoring and to that end collects and publishes
various indicator variables, including movements in unit labour
costs, which capture the progress of individual countries. 
The rationale behind the Euro Plus Pact is evident in its original
name, the Competitiveness Pact, and also in its current subtitle:
“Stronger economic policy coordination for competitiveness and
convergence” (European Council 2011, p. 13). Deteriorating
competiveness in individual countries is seen as a source of
economic and financial instability. This view is directly stated in
the conclusions from the European Council meeting at which the
Euro Plus Pact was adopted (European Council 2011, p. 5):
The Euro Plus Pact […] will further strengthen the economic
pillar of EMU and achieve a new quality of policy coordination,
with the objective of improving competitiveness and thereby
leading to a higher degree of convergence […]. 
The core of the Pact is the obligation of each participating
country to retain competitiveness in order to avoid the build-up of
financial imbalances, chiefly in the form of large current account
deficits. This underlying economic “philosophy” is spelt out in
Marzinotto (2011, p. 93):
Implicit to the design of the recent economic governance
reform is the idea that southern European countries have accu-
mulated large current account deficits because poor price
competitiveness impeded them to export abroad.
The same point has been made by other commentators and
analysts.4 The policy-making process meant that the Euro Plus Pact
ended up including a large number of policy commitments
regarding flexicurity, pension sustainability, health care, social
benefits and tax policy coordination, but these measures are seen
4. One example is the succinct account in Gros (2011, p. 1): “The (relative) unit labour costs of
GIP(S) countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have increased: this is the fundamental
cause of their problems as export performance must have been bad, pushing them into current
account deficits.”
 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr290as instruments for improving competitiveness in individual
member countries.
The Euro Plus Pact has been subject to several policy-oriented
analyses, especially in the months prior to and right after its adop-
tion in March 2011. The policy discussion has brought up many
important points relating to its underlying economic philosophy
and to its practical implementation. Groll and van Roye (2011)
argue that it is the level of unit labour costs, not changes in these
costs, which provides the most appropriate measure of the conver-
gence that has been achieved. Gros and Alcidi (2011) make a
similar point and explain that the indices of relative unit labour
costs can convey very different messages depending on the base
year and the length of the sample used. They also argue that
important issues have been left out of the Euro Plus Pact because
measures to address the issues are politically inconvenient for the
core countries in the euro area. 
Gros (2011) argues that the Euro Plus Pact is based on flawed
economics as competitiveness indicators are weak predictors of
future export performance; Estonia, for example, has had rapidly
increasing relative unit labour costs but also strong export growth
over extended periods of time. Wyplosz (2011) argues that it is
inappropriate to focus on unit labour costs relative to euro area
countries as more informative competitiveness measures would
include all trading partners. Marzinotto (2011) is also critical of the
underlying rationale of the Euro Plus Pact, but points out that a
solution to the economic problems in the peripheral countries
must include measures to strengthen their competitiveness. 
Holinski et al. (2012) find that the capital flows from North Euro-
pean to South European countries in the period 1992–2007 led to
the accumulation of imbalances as they cannot be explained by
fundamentals such as differentials in productivity growth. De
Grauwe (2011) argues that monetary unions are especially suscep-
tible to fiscal crises as governments do not have access to
inflationary financing and are therefore exposed to sudden changes
in capital flows. Krugman (2012) states that “the roots of the euro
crisis lie not in government profligacy but in huge capital flows from
the core (mainly Germany) to the periphery during the good years.
These capital flows fuelled a peripheral boom, and sharply rising
wages and prices in the [recipient] countries relative to Germany”. 
The Euro Plus Pact: Competitiveness and External Capital Flows 291In the context of the Euro Plus Pact the question is whether weak
competitiveness leads to capital inflows (current account deficits) or
whether capital inflows lead to weak competitiveness. Obviously
the policy conclusions differ depending on the answer to this ques-
tion. We establish the direction of the relationship through the
time dimension using Granger causality tests and vector autoregres-
sive models comprising the two variables in question, i.e. changes
in the relative unit labour cost and changes in the current account
balance. In this way the paper can be seen to address the question:
“What comes first, competitiveness or capital flows?”
The empirical analyses are undertaken using a panel dataset
comprising approximately 15 years of data for 27 EU countries.
The use of panel data makes reliable estimations possible in spite of
the short time frame. The panel data estimations assume homoge-
neity of the slope coefficients across the countries in the sample,
and the estimated slope coefficients or marginal effects may thus
be seen as average values for all the countries in the sample. The
Euro Plus Pact has been adopted by almost all EU countries and it is
therefore reasonable to base assessments of the Pact on estimates of
the average effects for 27 EU countries or different subsets of the
27 countries in the dataset. 
This paper is the first to assess the contents of the Euro Plus Pact
using an econometric analysis of the main causal assumption
underlying the Pact. As such the paper contributes to the
important discussion of economic governance in the euro area and
the European Union at large. The issue discussed in the paper is,
however, also of importance in its own right. The linkages between
capital flows and the real exchange rate or other measures of
competitiveness are widely debated, and there is a large literature
that provides quantitative estimates of these linkages, particularly
for emerging market economies (see the literature survey in
Section 1). The paper contributes to this literature by providing
estimates for the European Union and for different subsets of EU
countries. The paper is also testing for linkages in both directions,
not only in one direction as typically seen in the literature. Finally,
the use of VAR models allows a more complete modelling of the
dynamics, but is relatively unusual within this literature. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1 discusses
the existing literature on the links between competitiveness and
 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr292capital flows. Section 2 presents the dataset, time series properties
and various crossplots. Section 3 shows the results of simple
Granger causality tests. Section 4 presents different VAR models
and their impulse responses. Finally, Section 5 summarises the
paper and draws some policy conclusions. 
1. Competitiveness and external capital flows 
This section reviews and discusses contributions to the litera-
ture on the linkages between external capital flows and
competitiveness. The linkage from competitiveness to capital flows
is discussed first, the linkage from capital flows to competitiveness
afterwards. In each case some theoretical underpinnings are
reviewed, followed by brief surveys of empirical and policy-
oriented studies. 
It is evidently a simplification to consider the linkages between
competitiveness and external capital flows in isolation. There may
for instance be factors that affect both the current account balance
and the real exchange rate, e.g. the net foreign asset position,
energy prices or economic policies (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995;
Ostry, 1988; Lartey 2008).5 In the discussion below it is argued,
however, that there will likely be many cases in which either
competitiveness or external capital flows are affected by largely
exogenous or autonomous factors. 
1.1. From competitiveness to capital flows
The theoretical starting point is the standard Keynesian model
of an open economy in which net export is assumed to be a nega-
tive function of the real exchange rate, where the real exchange
rate is defined as the price of domestic production relative to the
price of foreign production measured in the same currency unit
(Krugman and Obstfeld 2003, Ch. 16). The underlying assumption
is that both domestic demand and export demand depend nega-
tively – and strongly – on price. The Marshall-Lerner condition
states that if the trade balance is initially in balance, the sum of the
5. The interaction between the two variables may also depend on the characteristics of the
shocks affecting the economy, such as whether shocks are temporary or permanent and
whether they are anticipated or unanticipated (Agenor, 1998).
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demand must exceed one in order for a real depreciation to
improve the trade balance and hence the current account balance.
The numerical elasticities might be small in the short term because
of long-term contracts and sluggish substitution, which implies
that the trade balance deteriorates in the short term and only
improves in the longer term, the celebrated j-curve effect. 
Changes in the real exchange rate, unit labour costs or other
measures of competitiveness can be autonomous or independent
in the sense that they are not influenced by changes in external
capital flows. This would be the case when factors like nominal
exchange rates, productivity and nominal wage rates change
because of exogenous factors. An example of this is changes in
trade union power or labour market institutions that may affect
nominal wages and/or productivity without any impetus from
external capital flows. 
The link from competitiveness to the current account balance is
also at the core of many concepts of an equilibrium exchange rate
(Williamson 1985, 1994). The equilibrium exchange rate is then
taken to be the real exchange rate – or another suitable competi-
tiveness indicator – that is compatible with a desired current
account balance. This is the idea behind the Macroeconomic Balance
Framework developed by the International Monetary Fund to
access misalignment of the real exchange rate (Isard et al., 2001;
Isard, 2007). The real exchange rate is seen to be misaligned if it
differs markedly from the estimated equilibrium value over a
period of time. The real exchange rate is overvalued if it is associ-
ated with excessive current account deficits. 
A large number of studies have tested the hypothesis of a link
from competitiveness to current account developments, using
datasets from both developed and developing economies. The
overall conclusion is that the effect is non-existent or very subdued
in the short term, but that the effect might be more pronounced in
the longer term. There seems to be some heterogeneity across the
sample countries. 
Rose (1991) finds that the hypothesis of a link from the real
exchange rate to the trade balance gains little support in a sample
of five OECD countries and conjectures that the numerical import
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measures of competitiveness have very little explanatory power for
the current account balance in the USA. Bahmani-Oskooee and
Kara (2003) estimate co-integration models for nine industrialised
countries and reach the conclusion that there is no consistent
finding; the reaction of trade flows to changes in import and
export prices varies substantially across the countries. Boyd et al.
(2008) use a sample of eight OECD countries and find that there is
an effect from the real exchange rate on the trade balance in most
of the sample countries, but the effect occurs after a substantial
delay, providing support for the j-curve effect. 
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, many studies
have discussed a possible link from competitiveness to the trade
balance or current account balance. The results are mixed and
occasionally difficult to interpret. Zemanek et al. (2009) argue that
a lack of competitiveness led to large current account deficits in
some euro area countries prior to the global financial crisis. The
empirical analysis suggests that structural reforms in the deficit
countries may help strengthen the current account balance.
Belke and Dreger (2011) investigate the relative importance of
competiveness and income convergence for the current account in
11 euro area countries. The current account balance, the relative
real effective exchange rate and the relative income level are all
found to exhibit unit roots and to be co-integrated. An apprecia-
tion of the relative real effective exchange rate is associated with a
worsening of the current account balance. 
Some analytical studies have drawn attention to deteriorating
competitiveness in countries in the geographical periphery of
Europe. Fischer (2007) uses various concepts of real equilibrium
exchange rates and finds that Germany gained competitiveness
and several South European countries lost competitiveness
between the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and the end
of 2005. It is concluded that these developments to some extent
reversed previously existing disparities. Dullien and Fritsche (2008)
find that several South European countries experienced rapid
increases in unit labour costs and, furthermore, that deviations
from a long-term equilibrium level only closed very slowly.
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) find that the real exchange rate
in the South European euro countries was substantially overvalued
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crisis. The finding results, however, from current account balances
being above levels deemed sustainable, and the analysis does not
detect the direction of the linkage. 
1.2. From capital flows to competitiveness
The direction from capital flows to competiveness has a long
history in the literature, starting with Böhm-Bawerk’s (1924) famous
statement that the capital balance rules the trade balance and not
vice versa. Keynes emphasised the destabilising effects of external
capital flows. In the Keynes-Ohlin controversy on wartime repara-
tions, Keynes referred to a transfer paradox: the reparations to be paid
by Germany after World War I, would worsen the competitiveness
of the recipient countries through an appreciation of the real
exchange rate, i.e. a negative terms-of-trade effect (Keynes, 1929).6 
A similar effect may also be the result of increased prices or
production of export products. The increased export revenue may
lead to a real exchange appreciation, which worsens competitive-
ness in other export industries and in import-competing sectors
(Corden, 1984). The mechanisms underlying this Dutch Disease are
parallel to those of the transfer paradox as the export revenue
amounts to a capital inflow. 
This paper uses the term the transfer effect about the short-term
phenomenon that increased capital inflows lead to real exchange
rate appreciation and increased capital outflows lead to real
exchange rate depreciation. The main theory explaining the
transfer effect is based on short-term changes in demand for non-
traded products (Sy and Tabarraei, 2009; Edwards, 1988; Corden
and Neary, 1982). 
The models typically assume two traded goods, an import good
and an export good, and one non-traded good. Inflow of capital
implies ceteris paribus that additional traded resources are available
for domestic absorption, while outflow of capital implies that less
traded resources are available. Consider an inflow of capital caused
by an independent factor such as lower interest rates abroad. The
6. In the early 1940s, Keynes proposed a common currency, the Bancor, plus a clearing union
in order to deal with excessive debit balances (Keynes, 1942, p. 20).
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absorption such as consumption and investment, and the
increased demand will typically be directed towards both traded
and non-traded goods. While the prices of the traded goods are
determined from abroad, the increased demand for the non-traded
good drives up the price of the product and of production factors
such as labour. The result of the capital inflow is an appreciation of
the real exchange rate (the price of traded goods relative to the
price of non-traded goods) or deteriorating competitiveness as
measured by higher unit labour costs. A capital outflow will have
the opposite effect as lower demand for non-traded goods will lead
to a real depreciation or lower unit labour costs. 
The effect of a capital inflow will reflect the characteristics of
the economy. It will depend on how the increased demand is
divided between traded and non-traded goods and it may also
depend on the distribution between consumption and investment
and the distribution of investment between the traded and non-
traded sectors. Ceteris paribus, the real appreciation is likely to be
smaller if the capital inflow is spent on productivity-enhancing
investments in the non-traded sector. 
It is possible that capital flows are autonomous and indepen-
dent of the state of competitiveness of the economy. The financial
fragility hypothesis by Minsky (1982, pp. 117-162) suggests that
boom-bust cycles in financial markets can be the result of
“euphoric expectations”. This may be particularly relevant in the
European case, where the introduction of the euro and integration
of Central and Eastern Europe can be seen as triggers for the build-
up of euphoric expectations in the Minsky sense. Gabrisch (2011)
points out that the euphoric expectations may lead to capital
inflows directed toward financial assets and real estate and, thus,
set in motion an asset price boom. This can spread to the invest-
ment sector and other industries and also to unit labour costs,
depending on how the labour market functions. 
The empirical evidence is mixed. Calvo et al. (1993) show that
countries in Latin America at different times experienced episodes
of substantial capital inflows and the result was real appreciations.
The capital inflows occurred in countries with very diverse
economic conditions, suggesting that the capital flows were in
large part driven by events outside the region. Calvo et al. (1996)
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tries in the late 1980s and early 1990s were consistent with the
transfer effect. The papers did not apply any econometric testing.
Rajapatirana (2003) uses data for the period 1985-2000 and reaches
the same conclusion as Calvo et al. (1996), but also finds that the
real appreciation following net capital inflows was much larger in
Latin American countries than in Asian countries, possibly because
of different compositions of the capital flows. 
Bakardzieva et al. (2010) found for a panel of emerging market
economies (including Eastern European countries) that net total
capital inflows led to an appreciation of the real effective exchange
rate. The effects, however, differed depending on the type of
capital flow. For most types of capital (portfolio investment, loans,
foreign aid, remittances or income transfers), a capital inflow led to
a real appreciation, but this was generally not the case for capital
stemming from foreign direct investments. 
Saborowski (2009) use a broad sample of 84 countries during the
period 1990-2006 to investigate the effect of capital flows on the
real exchange rate. The study finds that capital inflows in the form
of FDI generally lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Importantly, the tendency towards real appreciation is attenuated
if the recipient country has a highly developed financial sector. 
Morande (1988) tests whether real appreciation came before
foreign capital inflows or vice versa in Chile. The analysis is based
on small VAR models estimated on monthly data for the period
1977-1983. The conclusion is that the direction of the linkage is
from capital inflows to real exchange rate appreciation. 
The importance of capital flows on competitiveness has
received only little attention in the debate on European gover-
nance reform. Perez-Caldenty and Vernengo (2012) argue that the
large current account surpluses in the core euro countries contrib-
uted to the misalignment of real exchange rates within Europe.
Schnabl and Zemanek (2011) similarly highlight current account
trends within Europe and the possible destabilising consequences. 
1.3. Direction of relationship
The literature on international competitiveness and the current
account balance includes simple and straightforward theories
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ascertain the direction of the linkage; only empirical studies on a
concrete sample can provide such information. There are empirical
studies that find a link from competitiveness to the current
account balance and numerous other studies establishing a link in
the opposite direction. It is noticeable, however, that very few
empirical studies include tests that allow for linkages in both direc-
tions – a notable exception is Morande (1988) – and this omission
limits the policy conclusions of the studies.
2. Data and time series properties 
The dataset used in the empirical analysis is a panel of annual
data from 1995 until 2012 for 27 EU countries (all except Croatia
which joined in 2013). 
The variables used in the empirical analysis follow directly from
the discussion of the Euro Plus Pact in introduction. The Pact aims
to restrain the growth of unit labour costs in order to prevent
current account imbalances. The analyses therefore focus on these
two variables. To keep the analyses simple and easily comprehen-
sible, no other variables except country fixed effects are used. The
parsimonious specifications should be seen as reduced form
models. Section 5 discusses extensions of the analyses including
the use of additional variables. The panel is unbalanced as observa-
tions of unit labour costs at the beginning of the sample are
missing for some countries. All data were downloaded from the
Eurostat database on 4 November 2013. 
As is customary in the literature, the capital flow variable is
taken to be the current account balance (Reinhart and Reinhart
2009). By definition, the sum of the current account balance, the
financial account balance and the reduction in official reserves is nil
(in the absence of errors and omissions), where the financial
account balance is the sum of net foreign direct investment, net
portfolio investment and net other investment (loans etc.). The
current account balance is typically measured more precisely and
more consistently than the financial balance and its components.7
7. A current account deficit is financed through a financial account surplus and/or a reduction
in official reserves. Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) argue that the measure of capital flows should
ideally be computed as the current account balance plus the reduction in official reserves. One
argument for removing changes in official reserves is that that they are the result of
administrative, non-private, decision making. 
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CA (classifier bop_q_gdp). A current account surplus, CA > 0, is
tantamount to a net capital outflow and indicates the accumula-
tion of net foreign assets. A current account deficit, CA < 0, shows a
net capital inflow and implies a deterioration of the net foreign
asset position. In the baseline specifications, the change in the
current account, DCA = CA – CA(-1), is used. 
The variable GRULC denotes the percentage growth of the unit
labour cost in the individual EU country relative to the percentage
growth of the unit labour cost in the EA12, i.e. the 12 first euro area
countries, with the unit labour cost is expressed in terms of
common currency units (ECU/EUR). The index of the nominal
unit labour cost is defined as the ratio between the nominal
compensation per employee and the productivity per employee
(Eurostat classifier nama_aux_ulc8). The unit labour cost is
converted to common currency units (ECU/EUR) using market
exchange rates.9 An increase in the relative unit labour cost,
GRULC > 0, signifies a worsening of competitiveness relative to the
EA12, while a decrease in the relative unit labour cost, GRULC < 0,
signifies an improvement in competitiveness relative to the EA12. 
It is noticeable that the GRULC variable is a variable depicting
changes in competitiveness relative to the EA12, not the entire
group of EU and non-EU trading partners of a country. The CA
variable, meanwhile, refers to the total current account balance of
a country, not only towards to EA12. To examine the importance
of the asymmetry in the country coverage of the two variables, we
include real effective exchange rate indices, deflated using unit
labour costs or consumer prices from the 37 largest trading part-
ners of each country. The variable is GREER_ULC, which is the
percentage change in the real effective exchange rate against
8. The unit labour cost is not available for Greece and Malta for 1996–2000 and for Romania
for 1996–1999 due to missing source data. A few data points for early parts of the sample are
downloaded from earlier versions of the Eurostat database. 
9. For the euro area countries Eurostat expresses the nominal unit labour cost as “euro fixed”
values for the years prior to the introduction of the euro, i.e. data in the national currency
values are converted to EUR/ECU values using the irrevocably fixed exchange rate at the time of
the introduction of the euro. The use of fixed conversion factors rules out comparison across
countries and the euro fixed values are therefore converted into EUR/ECU values using the
market exchange rates of the national currencies against EUR/ECU (classifier ert_bil_conv_a). For
the 10 countries outside the euro area, the nominal unit labour cost is converted to ECU/EUR
using the nominal exchange rates (classifier ert_bil_eur_a). 
 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr30037 trading partners deflated using the unit labour cost in the total
economy (classifier: ert_eff_ic_a). The variable is GREER_CPI which
is the percentage change in the real effective exchange rate against
37 trading partners deflated using consumer price indices (classi-
fier: ert_eff_ic_a). 
The time series properties of the data series are important for
the choice of empirical methodology. Table 1 shows the results of
panel data unit root tests, with common and with country-specific
roots, for the data series GRULC, CA and DCA. The result is that
GRULC is panel stationary while CA has a unit root (although the
PP-Fisher test suggests a borderline case), and DCA, the first differ-
ence of CA, is panel stationary. The analyses in this paper generally
use the two stationary variables GRULC and DCA, but the possible
borderline result for CA suggests that it is judicious to use this vari-
able in robustness analyses. 
Figure 1 shows crossplots of the growth in the relative unit
labour cost GRULC and the current account balance CA or the
change in the current account balance DCA for 27 EU countries for
the period 1995–2012, the scales being chosen so that a few
extreme observations have been left out. Both crossplots exhibit
weak negative correlations, but no clear patterns are apparent.
Moreover, the possible directions of any possible linkages cannot
be ascertained without econometric analysis.
 
Table 1. Tests of unit roots of panel data series, 1997–2012
Levin, 
Lin, Chua
Im, Pesaran 
and Shinb
ADF-
Fisherb 
PP-
Fisherb 
GRULC -12.388[0.000]
-9.198
[0.000]
192.688
[0.000]
249.950
[0.000]
CA -0.940[0.174]
-0.932
[0.176]
64.896 
[0.147]
57.0726
[0.339]
DCA -7.901[0.000]
-7.902
[0.000]
165.069
[0.000]
309.707
[0.000]
a. The test assumes a common unit root across the countries.
b. The test allows for different unit roots across the countries.
Notes: The null hypothesis is in all cases that the variable has a unit root. The tests allow for country-specific intercepts
in the test regressions. The values in square brackets are p-values.
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The discussion in Section 1 suggests that the possible effect of
competitiveness on the current account is likely to occur with a
time lag (j-curve effect) and, conversely, the possible effect of the
current account on competitiveness may also appear with a time
lag, especially in cases with a fixed exchange rate. It is therefore
reasonable to identify the direction of causality using the time
dimension, i.e. causality is associated with the lagged values of a
variable having explanatory power over the other variable.10 
This section presents the results of the Granger causality tests,
which ascertain the time-based relationship between the two vari-
ables of interest, in this case between GRULC, the percentage
growth in the relative unit labour cost, and DCA, the change in the
current account balance in percentage points of GDP. The tests are
carried out for a large number of specifications and for different
country groups in order to examine the robustness of the results.
The baseline Granger causality tests include annual changes in the
relative unit labour costs and annual changes in the current
account balance. The results therefore relate to the short or
medium term horizon, while the long-term relation between the
variables is not modelled. 
Figure 1. Crossplots GRULC and CA or DCA; annual data 1997–2012, 
27 EU countries
Note: GRULC is the change in the relative unit labour cost as a percentage, CA is the current account balance as a
percentage of GDP, DCA is the change in the current account balance in percentage points of GDP. A small number
of observations for which GRULC is below -20 percent or above 20 percent or CA is below -20 percent of GDP or
above 20 percent of GDP have been omitted.
10. Morande (1988) also tests for time-based (Granger) causality using different VAR models
including variables such as the real exchange rate and external capital flows. The methodology
is also related to the co-integration analysis in Belke and Dreger (2011) although the latter does
not seek to identify the direction of causality. 
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dependent variable is explained both by one or more lags of itself
and one or more lags of an independent explanatory variable (and
possibly control variables). The Granger causality test is a standard
Wald test with the null hypothesis that the coefficient or coeffi-
cients of the lagged independent explanatory variable are zero. The
test statistic follows an F-distribution or, in the case of the System
GMM estimation, asymptotically a χ2-distribution. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, the lagged variable is said to Granger cause
the other variable. Granger causation implies that an independent
explanatory variable precedes and helps to explain the dependent
variable, but no fundamental causation can be ascertained as the
independent explanatory variable will typically not be exogenous. 
To avoid that outliers affect the results unduly, a few extreme
observations have been trimmed from the dataset. Observations in
which GRULC is below -20 percent or above 20 percent and obser-
vations for which CA is below -20 percent of GDP or above
20 percent have been omitted. These observations typically relate
to episodes of extreme economic or financial instability. In total,
10 observations have been omitted due to this trimming of the
dataset. The results are generally not very sensitive to the specific
choice of cut-off points; the results only change marginally if
instead the low cut-off point is taken to be -15 percent and the
high cut-off point to be 15 percent. 
Table 2 shows the results of panel data estimations used to test
whether lags of DCA have explanatory power towards GRULC
when one or more lags of GRULC are included, i.e. to test whether
GRULC Granger causes DCA. Column (2.1) shows a simple estima-
tion with country fixed effects and one lag of both variables. The
null hypothesis of no explanatory power of GRULC cannot be
rejected. The same applies in Column (2.2) in which the fixed
effects are omitted and the model is estimated using ordinary least
squares. It is noteworthy that the estimation results in Columns
(2.1) and (2.2) are so similar. This is the result of the country fixed
effects generally be very small, ranging from -0.46 to 0.54. A Wald
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are
redundant (i.e. all 0) as the F-distributed test statistic is 0.159
(p-value = 1.000).
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lead to biased estimates when the model is estimated with OLS or
fixed effects OLS (Nickell bias). This should not be a major problem
in the present model as the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable is small and the country fixed effects are anyway economi-
cally and statistically insignificant. To assess this issue the model is
estimated using the two-step System GMM methodology devel-
oped by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
The two-step System GMM estimations are undertaken using
the Stata command xtabond2. The lagged dependent variable is
instrumented, while the lagged independent explanatory variable
is not instrumented. In the difference equation the instruments of
the lagged dependent variable are, inter alia, expanding lags of its
level lagged 2 and 3 years (truncated); in the level equation the
instrument is the lagged difference of the dependent variable. The
weighting is based on the h(2) weighting matrix. 
The estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar to those
obtained using fixed effects least squares. The hypothesis of no
Table 2. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = DCA
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6)
DCA(-1) 0.125(0.069)
0.133
(0.099)
0.222
(0.071)
0.116
(0.088)
-0.032
(0.123)
0.188
(0.117)
DCA(-2) .. .. .. -0.221(0.045)
0.101
(0.043)
-0.273
(0.054)
GRULC(-1) 0.053(0.047)
0.056
(0.038)
0.083
(0.044)
0.047
(0.038)
-0.016
(0.045)
0.053
(0.044)
GRULC(-2) .. .. .. 0.036(0.032)
-0.046 
(0.021)
0.055
(0.039)
Granger causalitya
1.20
[0.270]
2.21
[0.138]
3.65 
[0.056]
0.88
[0.427]
2.56
[0.113]
1.15
[0.359]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 408 408 408 383 220 138
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a. The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent variable do(es)
not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the System GMM estimation in
which case it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values. 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
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coefficient of GRULC(-1) is positive, which taken at face value indi-
cates that higher unit labour costs are followed by an increase in
(an “improvement” of) the current account balance. Qualitatively
similar results are attained with different truncations of the instru-
ments and if the lagged independent variable is also instrumented.
This confirms a possible bias due to inclusion of the lagged depen-
dent variable is little importance. 
The conclusion at this stage is that changes in relative unit
labour costs do not appear to precede changes in the current
account balance and, if any effect is present, then the higher unit
labour costs may be followed by an improvement of the current
account balance. Moreover, inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable and possibly endogeneity of the lagged independent vari-
able does not appear to bias the fixed effect results unduly so fixed
effect estimation appears to be appropriate in this case. 
The next step is to allow a richer dynamic structure of the
model. Column (2.4) shows the results when two lags of both vari-
ables are introduced as explanatory variables. In this case Granger
causality entails the rejection of the joint hypothesis that the coef-
ficients of GRULC(-1) and GRULC(-2) are 0. The hypothesis cannot
be rejected (p-value = 0.427), suggesting that the inclusion of two
lags of changes in the unit labour cost does not change the results
obtained previously. Column (2.5) shows the results when the
sample is restricted to the EU15 countries, i.e. the first 15 EU coun-
tries from Western Europe. The result is that the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected even at the 10 percent level, but it is noticeable
the estimated coefficient of GRULC(-1) and GRULC(-2) in this case
that are negative although numerically small. Column (2.6) shows
the results when the sample is restricted to the 10 CEE countries
and the overall picture is as for the full sample and the EU15 coun-
tries. The conclusion of the models with lags up to two years is
again that changes in relative unit labour costs have no apparent
effect on changes in the current account in the short term. 
Table 3 shows the results when the opposite direction of
Granger causality is investigated. To this end, the change in the
relative unit labour cost, GRULC, is explained by autoregressive
terms and lagged changes in the current account balance, DCA.
Column (3.1) shows the results when one lag is included and the
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balance has substantial explanatory power; an increase in the
change of the current account balance (“capital outflow”) of one
percentage point of GDP is associated with 0.392 percent lower
growth in the unit labour cost the following year, i.e. a consider-
able improvement in international competitiveness. By the same
token, a capital inflow leads to deteriorating competitiveness the
following year. Similar results follow from the OLS estimation in
Column (3.2) and the System GMM estimation in Column (3.3). 
Column (3.4) shows the results when two lags are included. The
coefficients of the two lags of the current account variable are both
negative. They are highly significant in both economic and statis-
tical terms. The null hypothesis of no explanatory power of the
two lags of the current account is rejected, i.e. changes in the
current account Granger cause changes in the relative unit labour
costs. Column (3.5) shows the results when the sample comprises
the EU15 countries and Column (3.6) shows the results for the
sample of CEE countries. In these samples too, the estimated coef-
Table 3. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = GRULC
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
DCA(-1) -0.392(0.104)
-0.381
(0.086)
-0.315
(0.139)
-0.289
(0.105)
-0.340
(0.116)
-0.312
(0.150)
DCA(-2) .. .. .. -0.285(0.079)
-0.344
(0.115)
-0.356
(0.104)
GRULC(-1) 0.097(0.059)
0.129
(0.059)
0.159
(0.053)
0.088
(0.045)
0.184
(0.073)
0.057
(0.053)
GRULC(-2) .. .. .. -0.127(0.051)
-0.058
(0.042)
-0.150
(0.066)
Granger causalitya
14.24
[0.001]
19.71
[0.000]
5.13 
[0.024]
10.29
[0.001]
5.62
[0.016]
9.60
[0.006]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 408 408 408 383 220 138
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a. The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent variable do(es)
not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the System GMM
estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values. 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
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negative; changes in current account balance are found to Granger
cause changes in the relative unit labour cost. 
The conclusions from the Granger causality tests in Tables 2
and 3 are clear. Lags of GRULC do not help explain DCA in estima-
tions in which lags of DCA are included. In other words, changes
in the relative unit labour cost do not Granger cause changes in the
current account balance. This holds across different samples of
countries and across a number of estimation methodologies. In
contrast to these results, lags of DCA appear in most cases to have
substantial explanatory power over changes in GRULC in models
where lags of GRULC are included. In other words, changes in the
current account balance Granger cause changes in the relative unit
labour cost. This implies that for instance an increasing inflow of
capital (a deteriorating current account balance) leads to deterio-
rating competitiveness. 
The estimations presented in Tables 2 and 3 were carried out
using the change in the relative unit labour cost, GRULC, and the
change in the current account balance, DCA. As argued earlier, it
may also be of interest to test for Granger causality between
GRULC and the level of the current account balance, CA. Tables A1
and A2 in Appendix A show the results when the estimations in
Tables 2 and 3 are made using the level of the current account
balance, CA, instead of its change, DCA. 
In qualitative terms most of the results remain unchanged.
Table A1 shows the results of estimations in which changes in the
current account balance are explained by autoregressive terms and
lagged changes in the relative unit labour cost. Lagged changes in
the relative unit labour cost do not Granger cause the current
account balance, irrespective of the sample or estimation method.
Table A2 presents the results of estimations where the dependent
variable is the change in the relative unit labour cost. In all specifi-
cations the level of the lagged current account balance is found to
Granger cause changes in the relative unit labour cost at least at
the 10 percent level of statistical significance. The rejection is
stronger for the CEE countries than for the EU15 countries. 
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tive unit labour cost, GRULC, by other measures of changes in
competitiveness. Two measures are available, i.e. the change in the
real effective exchange rate computed using the unit labour cost as
deflator (GREER_ULC) and the change in the real effective
exchange rate based on the consumer (GREER_CPI). The three vari-
ables are closely correlated; the correlation coefficient is 0.86
between GRULC and GREER_ULC and 0.64 between GRULC and
GREER_CPI. 
Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B show the results when the
GREER_ULC is the measure of changes in competiveness. The
results are qualitatively the same as when GRULC is used, i.e.
competitiveness does not Granger cause changes in the current
account, but changes in the current account do seem to Granger
cause the competitiveness measure. The group of EU15 countries
emerge as a partial exception to this picture, cf. the results in
Column (B1.5), but it is noticeable that the estimated coefficients
of the two lags of GREER_ULC are numerically small and take on
different signs. 
Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C provide the results when the
GREER_CPI is the measure of changes in competiveness. The
results are again qualitatively as when GRULC is used although the
results are less clear for the group of EU15 countries. The results in
Column (C2.5) suggest a negative relationship between lags of
changes in the current account balance, but the individual coeffi-
cients are not statistically significant and the Granger causality test
of the coefficients both being equal zero cannot be rejected.
Further analysis (not reported) shows that the imprecisely esti-
mated coefficients is largely attributable to events in five euro area
crisis countries in 2012; the results change markedly if these five
observations are excluded from the sample. 
The upshot of the robustness analyses reported in Appendices B
and C is that the specific choice of competitiveness measure gener-
ally is of little importance when assessing the relation between
competitiveness and external capital flows. This result is in line with
other studies. Dieppe et al. (2012) find that different measures of
competitiveness are closely correlated within the euro area. Ca’ Zorzi
and Schnatz (2007) find that different measures of competitiveness
are equally suitable for forecasting of export performance.
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This section extends the analysis in Section 3 by modelling
changes in relative wage cost competitiveness and the current
account balance in a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. This
allows a deeper investigation of the interactions between the two
variables over time. In particular, the reaction of the two variables
to shocks can be computed using different assumptions for the
temporal relation between the variables, including no lag between
the change in one variable and the resulting change in the other
variable. We will focus on changes in the relative unit labour cost,
GRULC, and changes in the current account balance, DCA. Both
variables are panel stationary.
Even allowing for simultaneous dependence between the two
variables GRULC and DCA, the system can be reduced so as to
contain only lags of the two variables as explanatory variables.
Estimations are made using two lags and considering three
different country samples: 27 EU countries (all except Croatia), the
EU15 countries and the 10 CEE countries. The results of the system
estimations, presented in Table 4, correspond to the results in
Columns (2.4)-(3.4), (2.5)-(3.5) and (2.6)-(3.6). The panel VAR
systems are estimated using fixed effect least squares as the method
Table 4. Estimation of panel VAR models, GRULC and DCA
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3)
DCA GRULC DCA GRULC DCA GRULC 
DCA(-1) 0.116(0.053)
-0.289
(0.077)
-0.032
(0.078)
-0.340
(0.124)
0.188
(0.085)
-0.312
(0.130)
DCA(-2) -0.221(0.052)
-0.285
(0.075)
0.101
(0.080)
-0.344
(0.127)
-0.273
(0.082)
-0.356
(0.125)
GRULC(-1) 0.047(0.027)
0.088
(0.039)
-0.016
(0.040)
0.184
(0.063)
0.053
(0.040)
0.057
(0.060)
GRULC(-2) 0.036(0.025)
-0.127
(0.036)
-0.046 
(0.036)
-0.058 
(0.058)
0.0555
(0.037)
-0.150
(0.056)
Time sample 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 383 220 138
Notes: Standard errors are shown in round brackets. Country fixed effects are included in all estimations but are not
reported.
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(Canova and Ciccarelli 2013). The estimations are undertaken in
Eviews which does not allow for clustering of the standard errors;
the ordinary standard errors are generally somewhat smaller than
the clustered standard errors which entails that the confidence
intervals of the presented impulse responses are relatively small.
The coefficient estimates are identical to those of the corre-
sponding estimations in Tables 2 and 3 and the standard errors
only differ slightly. Across all three country samples, the lags of
GRULC exert little explanatory power on DCA, while lags of DCA
exert substantial explanatory power on GRULC, both in statistical
and economic terms.
This paper seeks to ascertain the most probable direction of the
linkages between the two main variables of interest, GRULC and
DCA. The VAR model allows a more sophisticated identification of
cause and effect than the Granger causality tests in Section 3 which
assumed very simple dynamic linkages between the two variables.
We will consider three different identification schemes of the VAR
models, which entail different causal dynamics between the two
variables of interest. 
a) There are no contemporaneous effects between the two
variables, only lagged effects. This is a case of over-identifica-
tion as all off-diagonal elements in the variance-covariance
matrix are zero (non-orthogonalisation). 
b) GRULC can affect DCA contemporaneously, while DCA can
only affect GRULC with a lag. This is a case of exact recursive
identification based on Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix. 
c) DCA can affect GRULC contemporaneously, while GRULC
can only affect DCA with a lag. This is another case of
Cholesky decomposition but with the opposite direction of
temporal effects from those in b). 
Figures 2-3 present impulse responses for model (4.1) estimated
on the full sample of 27 EU countries using the three different
identification schemes a)-c).  
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses for identification scheme
a) in which there are no contemporaneous effects. The upper left
plot shows the impulse response of DCA to a one standard devia-
 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr310tion shock in DCA in period 1. The effect of the shock dies out
relatively quickly but with some overshooting in the third and
fourth years. The upper right plot shows the effect on DCA of a one
standard deviation increase in GRULC. It follows that the effect is
very subdued in both statistical and economic terms, and possibly
with the “wrong” sign, i.e. a shock implying higher growth in rela-
tive unit labour cost has a positive effect on the change in the
current account balance (an “improvement”).
The lower left plot shows the impulse response of GRULC to a
shock in DCA amounting to a one standard deviation in period 1.
The result is a reduction of GRULC for two periods of approxi-
mately one percentage point in each period. The effect on GRULC
accumulated over all 10 periods is -1.3 percentage points. In other
words, a one percentage point increase in net capital outflows
(increased capital outflow or reduced capital inflow) leads to a
Figure 2. Response of DCA and GRULC to innovations in GRULC and DCA, 
non-factorised innovations, 27 EU countries
Note: The solid line depicts the impulse response and the dashed lines ± two standard deviations. The standard
deviation of GRULC is 4.4 percentage points and the standard deviation of DCA is 2.9 percentage points.
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Response of DCA to DCA
Response of GRULC to DCA
Response of DCA to GRULC
Response of GRULC to GRULC
(a) Non-factorised innovations
The Euro Plus Pact: Competitiveness and External Capital Flows 311decrease of approximately 0.5 percent in unit labour costs over
time. The magnitudes also seem to be significant in an economic
sense. Finally, the lower right plot shows the impulse response of
GRULC to a one standard deviation shock in GRULC.
Figure 3 presents impulse responses for each of the three identi-
fication schemes, a)-c), facilitating easy comparison across the
identification schemes. To save space the autoregressive impulse
responses are omitted as they resemble those shown in the upper
left and lower right plots in Figure 2 in all cases. The upper panel
depicts impulse responses for identification scheme a) in which
there are no contemporaneous effects. These are the same impulse
responses that were presented in upper right and lower left panels
in Figure 2. 
The centre panel presents the impulse responses for identifica-
tion scheme b) in which GRULC can affect CA immediately, while
the reverse is ruled out. The left plot depicts the response of DCA
to a one standard deviation increase in GRULC in period 1. In this
case the immediate response is negative, although the effect is not
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the response is
positive in periods 2 and 3 and subsequently dies out. Thus, a
possible negative effect on DCA of a one-deviation-increase in
GRULC is imprecisely determined and is anyway reversed already
from the following period. The right plot shows the response of
GRULC to a shock in DCA; the dynamics resemble the dynamics of
the corresponding impulse responses in the non-orthogonalised
model. 
The bottom panel shows the impulse responses for identifica-
tion scheme c), which assumes that DCA can affect GRULC
immediately while effects in the opposite direction take place with
a lag. It follows from the left plot that GRULC has little effect on
DCA and the previously observed “wrong sign” also appears with
this orthogonalisation. It follows from the right plot that a shock
in DCA now has an immediate negative effect on GRULC,
although not one that is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, and then negative effects the following two years as also
observed with identification schemes a) and b). 
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irrespective of the identification scheme, the main results from
Section 3 also apply in the VAR model. First, changes in the relative
unit labour cost generally have little effect on the current account
balance. In most cases the effect appears to be positive, implying
that improved competitiveness leads to larger net capital inflows,
Figure 3. Response of DCA and GRULC to innovations in GRULC and DCA, different 
identification schemes, 27 EU countries
Note: The solid line depicts the impulse response and the dashed lines ± two standard deviations. The standard
deviation of GRULC is 4.4 percentage points and the standard deviation of DCA is 2.9 percentage points.
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The Euro Plus Pact: Competitiveness and External Capital Flows 313i.e. a “worsening” of the current account balance.11 The exception
is identification scheme b) where GRULC can affect CA contempo-
raneously, but the negative effect is short-lived and not statistically
significant. Second, changes in the current account balance seem
to affect the relative unit labour cost. Increasing current account
deficits, signifying increasing capital inflows, are followed by dete-
riorating competitiveness in the form of the unit labour cost
increasing faster than it does in the core euro area countries. 
The results obtained are robust not only to the choice of identi-
fication scheme, but also to the sample of countries, the time
sample and the measure of capital flows. We will briefly discuss
some of the robustness analyses we have undertaken.
Country samples. The impulse responses for the sample of EU15
countries and for the sample of CEE countries take the same shape
as those for the full sample presented in Figures 2 and 3. This point
is illustrated in Figure D1 in Appendix D in which the impulse
responses for the CEE countries, cf. Column (4.3) in Table 4, are
shown. It is noticeable that the effect of a one standard deviation
DCA shock on GRULC is somewhat larger for the sample of CEE
countries than for the full sample. 
Time samples. We have re-estimated the VAR models in Table 4
using the time sample 1998-2007, i.e. the sample end before the
outbreak of the global financial crisis. The lower number of obser-
vations reduces the precision with which the coefficients are
estimated, but otherwise the changes are small. The impulse
responses depict the previously observed pattern of directions (not
shown).12 
Measures of capital flows. We estimated a VAR model with
GRULC and the current account balance CA (instead of changes in
the current account balance, DCA). The impulse responses using
identification schemes a)–c) are reproduced in Figure E1 in
Appendix E. The results are essentially as before; changes in the
11. The impulse responses with the “wrong” sign would be consistent with an improvement in
competitiveness making the country more attractive as an investment destination and leading
to capital inflows. The effect is, however, statistically insignificant in all three identification
schemes. 
12. A further reduction of the sample to include only the EU15 countries is a partial exception
as the effect on GRULC of changes in DCA is slower and less pronounced than when the full
sample is used. 
 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr314relative unit labour cost have no or counter-intuitive effect on the
current account balance, whereas innovations in the current
account balance affect changes in the relative unit labour cost. The
use of real effective exchange rate indices as measures of competi-
tiveness also leads to impulse responses entailing the same
qualitative results. 
5. Final comments
The Euro Plus Pact adopted in March 2011 establishes moni-
toring by the European Commission of a number of variables
presumed to predicate financial imbalances in individual EU coun-
tries. The chief target variable of the Pact is the development of
competitiveness as measured by changes in the relative unit labour
cost in common currency terms. 
The paper uses Granger causality tests and VAR models to
analyse the short-term dynamics between changes in the relative
unit labour cost and the current account balance. The conclusions
of the empirical analyses are robust to a number of sample and
specification changes and can be summarised in two points. First,
there is little or no effect from changes in the relative unit labour
cost on changes in the current account balance (or the level of the
current account balance). Second, there is a relatively strong and
statistically significant link from changes in the current account
balance on changes in the growth of the relative unit labour cost
within a horizon of 1–3 years. 
These conclusions are consistent with a situation in which
capital flows in large part depend on events outside the individual
country, i.e. capital flows exhibit a substantial exogenous compo-
nent. The results are thus in line with findings on other datasets,
cf. Calvo et al. (1996), Kim (2000), Lipschitz et al. (2002) and
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010). A country may experience a
positive “confidence shock” and become a major recipient of
capital inflows. An inflow of capital leads to a nominal apprecia-
tion if the country has a floating exchange rate or drives up
domestic wages and prices. The net result, irrespective of exchange
rate regime, is a real exchange rate appreciation or deteriorating
international wage cost competitiveness. The opposite may be a
negative confidence shock that leads to a capital outflow, which
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prices and/or a depreciating nominal exchange rate. The interpre-
tation is consistent with findings based on other dataset, cf.
Saborwoski (2009) and Bakardzieva et al. (2010). 
The finding that capital flows are likely to entail changes in
competitiveness in the short term while the reverse effect is
subdued or non-existent suggests that current account develop-
ments may be an important indicator of future macroeconomic
performance. The same conclusion is reached by Giavazzi and
Spaventa (2010) and Jaumette and Sodsriwiboon (2010). The find-
ings, however, raise the question of whether the Euro Plus Pact
targets the messenger of economic imbalances rather than (one of)
the underlying causes. Countries subject to large capital inflows
experience upward pressure on relative unit labour costs, while
countries with large capital outflows will experience downward
pressure on relative unit labour costs. The developments in unit
labour costs are endogenous and partly determined by capital
flows. This may suggest that the Euro Plus Pact may have limited
ability to impact unit labour costs and even if it is possible, this
may have little effect on the accumulation of current account
imbalances. 
The results of this paper should not be taken to imply that
competitiveness does not matter for economic performance in the
longer term. The relative unit labour cost or other measures of
competitiveness may still signal the emergence of “imbalances” in
individual economies. The argument of this paper is merely that
competitiveness is an endogenous variable, which is determined
by a whole range of factors in the individual economy and the
surrounding economic environment. One such factor is interna-
tional capital flows, proxied in this paper by the current account
balance, and this factor seems to have substantial explanatory
power in the sample of EU countries (see also De Grauwe, 2011;
Holinski et al., 2012). 
The analysis in this paper provides clear results that are largely
robust to different samples and specifications. Even so, the analysis
may be substantiated or extended in a number of ways. First, addi-
tional variables could be included in the VAR model in order to
model the adjustment processes in more detail. A richer specifica-
tion of the VAR may also be a way to investigate the underlying
 Hubert Gabrisch and  Karsten Staehr316economic mechanisms behind the identified linkages between the
two variables. Second, quarterly data might make it easier to estab-
lish the direction of the linkages and estimate the adjustment
patterns for different innovations. Third, it might be possible to
ascertain the linkages between international competitiveness and
capital flows using other means of identification such as instru-
mentation and event studies. Fourth, it could be useful to divide
capital flows into different components, including foreign direct
investment, portfolio investment and loans etc., as this would
provide information on whether different components affect
competitiveness in different ways (Bakardzhieva et al. 2010). It
may also be expedient to consider a measure of capital flows in
which changes in the official reserves are eliminated (Reinhart and
Reinhart 2009). Finally, it may be possible to undertake analyses of
linkages between competitiveness and capital flows in individual
countries in cases where long data series are available. 
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Table A1. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = CA
(A1.1) (A1.2) (A1.3) (A1.4) (A1.5) (A1.6)
CA(-1) 0.125(0.069)
0.133
(0.099)
0.222
(0.071)
0.116
(0.088)
-0.032
(0.123)
0.188
(0.117)
CA(-2) .. .. .. -0.221(0.045)
0.101
(0.043)
-0.273
(0.054)
GRULC(-1) 0.053(0.047)
0.056
(0.038)
0.083 
(0.044)
0.047
(0.038)
-0.016
(0.045)
0.053
(0.044)
GRULC(-2) .. .. .. 0.036(0.032)
-0.046
(0.021)
0.055
(0.039)
Granger causalitya
1.20
[0.270]
2.21
[0.138]
3.65 
[0.056]
0.88
[0.427]
2.56
[0.113]
1.15
[0.359]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 408 408 408 383 220 138
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a. The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent explanatory
variable do(es) not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the
System GMM estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values. 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
Table A2. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = CGRULC
(A2.1) (A2.2) (A2.3) (A2.4) (A2.5) (A2.6)
CA(-1) -0.243(0.080)
-0.123
(0.040)
-0.136
(0.057)
-0.477
(0.108)
-0.293
(0.125)
-0.713
(0.111)
CA(-2) .. .. .. 0.199(0.095)
0.324
(0.150)
0.151
(0.096)
GRULC(-1) 0.090(0.062)
0.119
(0.057)
0.183 
(0.069)
0.086
(0.047)
0.209 
(0.065)
0.017 
(0.045)
GRULC(-2) .. .. .. -0.128(0.049)
-0.044 
(0.042)
-0.170
(0.062)
Granger causalitya
9.23
[0.005]
9.39
[0.002]
5.61 
[0.018]
10.00
[0.001]
2.74
[0.099]
24.10
[0.000]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 408 408 408 382 220 138
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a. The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent explanatory
variable do(es) not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the
System GMM estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values. 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
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Table B1. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = DCA
(B1.1) (B1.2) (B1.3) (B1.4) (B1.5) (B1.6)
DCA(-1) 0.090(0.070)
0.098
(0.097)
0.183
(0.077)
0.088
(0.086)
-0.002
(0.116)
0.177
(0.118)
DCA(-2) .. .. .. -0.235(0.043)
0.113
(0.041)
-0.283
(0.051)
GREER_ULC(-1) 0.041(0.048)
0.045
(0.037)
0.065
(0.046)
0.032
(0.038)
0.041
(0.018)
0.046
(0.049)
GREER_ULC(-2) .. .. .. 0.030(0.036)
-0.073 
(0.022)
0.067
(0.047)
Granger causalitya
0.73
[0.401]
1.54
[0.215]
2.05 
[0.152]
0.42
[0.660]
11.58
[0.001]
1.02
[0.399]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 410 410 410 388 222 139
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent explanatory variable
do(es) not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the System
GMM estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values. 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
Table B2. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = GREER_ULC 
(B2.1) (B2.2) (B2.3) (B2.4) (B2.5) (B2.6)
CA(-1) -0.344(0.107)
-0.335
(0.077)
-0.275
(0.145)
-0.291
(0.108)
-0.234
(0.129)
-0.332
(0.162)
CA(-2) .. .. .. -0.206(0.077)
-0.258
(0.144)
-0.288
(0.099)
GREER_ULC(-1) 0.122(0.059)
0.153
(0.058)
0.163
(0.067)
0.139
(0.052)
0.259
(0.052)
0.083
(0.063)
GR EER_ULC(-2) .. .. .. -0.121(0.049)
-0.054
(0.032)
-0.155
(0.072)
Granger causalitya
11.38
[0.003]
19.18
[0.000]
3.60 
[0.058]
7.77
[0.002]
2.88
[0.090]
9.06
[0.007]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 410 410 410 388 222 139
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent explanatory variable
do(es) not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the System
GMM estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values.
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
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Table C1. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = DCA
(C1.1) (C1.2) (C1.3) (C1.4) (C1.5) (C1.6)
DCA(-1) 0.082(0.069)
0.089
(0.096)
0.173
(0.074)
0.091
(0.085)
-0.008
(0.122)
0.196
(0.109)
DCA(-2) .. .. .. -0.250(0.042)
0.128
(0.045)
-0.328
(0.032)
GREER_CPI(-1) 0.021(0.047)
0.034
(0.043)
0.028
(0.045)
0.018
(0.046)
0.068
(0.016)
0.010
(0.063)
GREER_CPI(-2) .. .. .. -0.018(0.028)
-0.095
(0.029)
0.017
(0.037)
Granger causalitya
0.20
[0.661]
0.65
[0.422]
0.39 
[0.532]
0.25
[0.782]
19.85
[0.000]
0.13
[0.876]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 410 410 410 388 222 139
Estimation FE OLS SystemGMM FE FE FE
a The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent explanatory variable
do(es) not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the System
GMM estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values. 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
Table C2. Panel data Granger causality tests. Dependent variable = GREER_CPI
(C2.1) (C2.2) (C2.3) (C2.4) (C2.5) (C2.6)
DCA(-1) -0.181(0.049)
-0.177
(0.053)
-0.193
(0.061)
-0.194
(0.046)
-0.102
(0.114)
-0.226
(0.052)
DCA(-2) .. .. .. -0.116(0.047)
-0.035
(0.092)
-0.165
(0.068)
GREER_CPI(-1) 0.029(0.105)
0.140
(0.094)
0.137 
(0.067)
0.122
(0.055)
0.225
(0.039)
0.051
(0.082)
GREER_CPI(-2) .. .. .. -0.099(0.035)
-0.081
(0.041)
-0.113
(0.059)
Granger causalitya
13.88
[0.001]
11.07
[0.001]
9.86
[0.002]
9.32
[0.001]
0.40
[0.679]
10.07
[0.005]
Time sample 1997-2012 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012 1998-2012
Countries EU27 EU27 EU27 EU27 EU15 CEE
Observations 410 410 410 388 222 139
Estimation FE OLS System GMM FE FE FE
a The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the lagged value(s) of the independent explanatory variable
do(es) not Granger cause the dependent variable. The test statistic is F-distributed except in the case of the System
GMM estimation in which it is χ2-distributed; the values in square brackets are p-values.
Notes: Standard errors are clustered along the cross section and are shown in round brackets. A constant term is
included in all estimations but not shown.
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Figure D1. Response of DCA and GRULC to innovations in GRULC and DCA, 
different identification schemes, CEE countries
Notes: The solid line depicts the impulse response and the dashed lines ± two standard deviations. The standard
deviation of GRULC is 6.2 percentage points and the standard deviation of DCA is 3.9 percentage points. 
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Figure E1. Response of CA and GRULC to innovations in GRULC and CA, 
different identification schemes, all countries
Notes: The solid line depicts the impulse response and the dashed lines ± two standard deviations. The standard
deviation of GRULC is 4.4 percentage points and the standard deviation of CA is 5.8 percentage points. 
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REFORM OPTIONS FOR THE EU’S SYSTEM 
OF OWN RESOURCES
Margit Schratzenstaller1
Austrian Institute of Economic Research
In the negotiations on the EU’s budget for 2014 to 2020 member countries
almost exclusively focused on individual direct benefits in terms of net financial
positions. Indirect benefits from EU membership, EU enlargement and introduc-
tion of the euro as well as benefits from EU expenditures other than direct
transfers to member states (i.e. expenditures with “European value added”, which
indirectly benefit all member states and the EU as a whole, e.g. expenditures for
research and development, education, green technologies and energy) were
neglected. As a result potential indirect benefits from expanding the overall
volume of the EU budget volume, to adjust it to the growing challenges the EU is
facing, played a minor role in individual countries’ views on a desirable EU
budget: as did the “European value added” which could be realised by a shift of
expenditures away from expenditure categories mainly benefiting individual
countries directly (e.g. common agriculture payments) to expenditure categories
which indirectly benefit member states and the EU as a whole (e.g. expenditures
for research and development, education, or green technologies and energy).
A fundamental reform of EU expenditures towards a sustainable structure
requires a fundamental reform of the EU’s system of own resources. Only by
replacing a substantial part of national contributions by own EU taxes can the
narrow focus on financial flows to and from the EU budget be broadened to include
also indirect benefits for individual member countries and the EU as a whole. After
reviewing the most important deficits of the EU’s current system of own resources,
the paper establishes criteria for “good” EU taxes and applies these to a number of
candidates for EU taxes (e.g. a tax on financial transactions or on carbon dioxide
emissions) to assess their suitability as new revenue sources for the EU.
Keywords: EU budget, EU taxes, EU system of own resources, European public goods
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Margit Schratzenstaller328The EU Treaty foresees an annual budgetary procedure for the
EU budget. For several reasons, such as securing budgetary disci-
pline, expenditure control or to support the implementation of
longer-term spending priorities, the multi-annual financial frame-
work (MFF), a multi-annual planning process into which annual
budgets are embedded, was introduced in 1988. A unanimously
adopted Council Regulation after obtaining consent of the Euro-
pean Parliament establishes the financial framework within which
annual budgets will be set up. This procedure not only aims at
facilitating budgetary planning over the longer term, but also at
reining in recurrent political debates on the allocation of
expenditure.
The negotiations on the EU’s MFF for the period 2014 to 2020
appeared – considering, inter alia, the veto threats uttered by several
member states at relatively early stages of the negotiation process –
to be even more conflict-ridden than those on the preceding four
MFFs, which were already increasingly tedious and protracted.
Starting point of the negotiations was the European Commission’s
proposal presented in the end of June, 2011. This draft envisaged
for the whole seven-years-period a total volume of commitment
appropriations of € 1.025 billion (in constant 2011 prices) or 1.05
percent of EU27-GNI. This proposal was updated in July 2012,
primarily to account for the accession of Croatia mid-2013, to
€ 1,045 billion (1.08 percent of GNI). In relation to GNI, the
proposed volume of the MFF 2014-2020 would have fallen short of
the preceding one for the period 2007 to 2013, which for the whole
period foresaw commitment appropriations of 1.12 percent of GNI.
After several negotiation rounds in the Council of Ministers in
the European Union and in the European Council a special EU
summit exclusively dedicated to the EU budget, which was sched-
uled for the end of November 2012, should bring about the desired
compromise between the European Council, the European
Commission and the European Parliament. This summit, however,
was interrupted without results and the negotiations were post-
poned to another special EU summit scheduled to the beginning of
February 2013. This new negotiation round was based an alterna-
tive proposal presented by the President of the European Council,
Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 329Herman Van Rompuy, immediately before the beginning of the
meeting of the European Council in November 2012 which
included cutting the original European Commission’s Proposal to
€ 80 billion. In June 2013 finally a compromise acceptable for the
European Commission as well as the European Parliament could be
reached. It was agreed on a total volume of commitment appropri-
ations of € 960 billion (1.0 percent of EU-GNI) for the next MFF
period. Thus, in relation to GNI, the volume of the next MFF is
significantly lower than that for the period 2007 to 2013.
Most prominent and debated issues in the negotiations up to
now in particular are the overall budget volume, the structure of
expenditures, and the continuation of the rebates for (some) net
contributor countries. Hereby fundamental need for reform
concerning the composition of expenditures as well as the system
of rebates is acknowledged in academia and to a large extent also in
the EU institutions (European Commission, European Parliament,
European Council). At the same time, however, this need for
reform is ignored by many representatives of EU member countries
in the European Council against the background of their country-
specific interests in the concrete negotiations.
In contrast to the reform areas mentioned above, the system of
own resources of the EU hardly seems to have been addressed seri-
ously in the negotiations. It is, however, one of the most important
obstacles to reform. A fundamental redesign is a central precondi-
tion to achieve a negotiation results from which individual
member countries as well as the EU as a whole will benefit. In face
of weak economic growth and particularly of surging youth unem-
ployment, however, member states’ agreement on a future-
oriented EU budget would be an important economic impulse as
well as an urgently needed signal for European policy’s capacity to
act to fight the current crisis.
1. The EU’s expenditures: challenges and shortcomings2
Without doubt there is an increasing need to support national
policies by effective measures on the EU level. The overall EU
budget volume at least should be held constant, if not be increased
2. See for this section Schratzenstaller (2013a).
Margit Schratzenstaller330compared to the preceding MFF – in any case, a decrease of total
expenditures, as finally agreed on, is inappropriate considering the
increasing challenges the EU is facing, in particular, recent and
imminent enlargement rounds, structural problems of the
Southern peripheral countries, the financial and economic crisis
and its consequences (record youth unemployment, debt crisis in
some highly indebted member states), and the increasingly
pressing long-term challenges (climate change and energy transi-
tion, demographic change, increasing income and wealth
inequality and risk of poverty). Already the last MFF’s 2007-2013
volume fell short of the preceding one. The volume of the available
funds thus cannot keep up with the long-term increase of tasks and
the corresponding financing needs. In this context the European
Commission’s top-down approach to keep the EU budget’s overall
volume below about 1 percent of EU GNI at the outset in their orig-
inal proposal for the MFF 2014-2020 must be regarded as
problematic, as it renders an agreement on a higher overall budget
volume highly improbable.
Moreover restructuring expenditures is required to support a
more dynamic, inclusive and ecological growth and development
path for the EU (socio-ecological transition)3 more effectively than
the new MFF does. Within the last MFF 2007-2013, common agri-
cultural policy and structural funds together accounted for almost
80 percent of total expenditures (see Table 1). Common agricul-
tural policy (42 percent of total expenditures) predominantly
preserved existing (production) structures and pursuing social
goals (income support) within the so-called first pillar. Structural
and cohesion policy (36 percent of total expenditures) focused too
strongly on a traditional infrastructure policy favouring material
(large-scale) infrastructure. Less than 10 percent of the last EU
budget was dedicated to competitiveness (i.e. research and innova-
tion) and infrastructure. As “richer” member countries to a
substantial extent benefit from subsidies within common agricul-
tural policy and cohesion policy, funds were not redistributed to
the “poorer” member states in a focused and targeted way.
3. The analytical foundations of a more dynamic, socially inclusive and ecologically
sustainable growth and development path for Europe are elaborated in the WWWforEurope
project (www.foreurope.eu).
Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 331In its original proposal for the MFF 2014 to 2020, which in the
updated version from July 2012 foresees commitment appropria-
tions of € 1,045 billion or 1.08 percent of EU-GNI, the European
Commission envisaged a slight reduction of the share of common
agricultural policy in overall expenditures from about 42 percent
in the MFF 2007-2013 to about 37 percent and a slight shift from
the first pillar to the potentially more sustainable second pillar
(rural development). A slightly shrinking share of total expendi-
tures (32 percent) should be reserved for structural and cohesion
funds. Thus common agricultural policy and cohesion policy were
planned to still reach about 70 percent of total expenditures. The
share of funds explicitly reserved for research and innovation
according to this proposal should have remained below 10 percent
of total expenditures; total expenditures for competitiveness and
infrastructure should be increased to over 14 percent.
The new MFF for 2014 to 2020, which was agreed on in June
2013, dedicates 13 percent of the total sum to competitiveness and
infrastructure, 34 percent to cohesion policy and another
39 percent to agricultural policy, which implies only minor shifts
in the current composition of expenditures. In contrast, strength-
Table 1. Expenditure structure – MFF 2007 to 2013 and MFF 2014 to 2020 
(Commitment appropriations, in current prices 2011)
MFF 
2007-2013
European 
Commission 
Proposal
Van Rompuy 
Proposal 
November 2012
Agreement June 
2013
In 
billion € In %
In 
billion € In %
In 
billion € In %
In 
billion € In %
Competitiveness 
and Infrastructure 91.5 9.2 164.3 15.7 139.5 14.4 125.6 13.1
Cohesion Policy 354.8 35.7 339 32.4 320.1 32.9 325.1 33.9
Sustainable Growth: 
Natural Resources 
(CAP)
420.7 42.3 390 37.3 372.2 38.3 373.2 38.9
Security and 
Citizenship 12.4 1.2 18.8 1.8 16.7 1.7 15.7 1.6
Global Europe 56.8 5.7 70 6.7 60.7 6.2 58.7 6.1
Administration 56.5 5.7 63.2 6.0 62.6 6.4 61.6 6.4
Compensation 0.9 0.0 0.003 0.0 0.003 0.0 0.003 0.0
Total in € billion 993.6 100.0 1 045.3 100.0 971.9 100.0 960 100.0
Total in % of GNI 1.12 – 1.08 – 1.01 – 1.0 –
Source: Own compilation.
Margit Schratzenstaller332ening the EU budget’s role as an instrument to support socio-
ecological transition in the EU, which goes beyond the Europe
2020 strategy and is targeted more intensely on combining
economic dynamics with ecological and social goals, requires the
following key elements:
— Stronger reduction of the expenditure share of common agri-
cultural policy, reinforcing the shift of agricultural
expenditures to a second pillar of common agricultural
policy which is based on ecological and employment goals;
— Reinforcement of “greening” of direct payments within the
first pillar of common agricultural policy, i.e. linking a
significant part of direct payments to the fulfilment of
certain ecological conditions by the receiving farmers and
cutting direct payments if these conditions are not fulfilled;
— Stronger focus of cohesion funds on “poorer” member coun-
tries and corresponding reduction of funds for “richer”
member countries (Aiginger et al., 2012);
— Stronger coupling of cohesion funds with climate objectives
and employment goals.
Linking cohesion funds with efforts to improve competitiveness
and with the indicators applied within the EU’s new economic
governance (macroeconomic imbalances), to create a link between
the Euro crisis and the EU budget (Becker, 2012).
Stronger increase of expenditure share for research and innova-
tion with a specific focus on ecological and social aspects.
2. Alternative revenue sources for the EU
Against the background of this reform debate, which dates back
to before the current financial negotiations, some long-term trends
of the level and composition of EU revenues and potential
inherent problems are of immediate interest. This leads to the
question of how to assess the most substantial reform proposal in
the current debate, which has been advocated for years notably by
the European Commission, namely to attribute own tax revenues
to the EU and to finance part of the EU budget through dedicated
EU taxes and to review particular taxes in the light to their possible
qualification as EU taxes.
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The EU, lacking tax sovereignty, does not have the right to raise
taxes or contributions in order to finance its own tasks. Rather, tax
sovereignty within the EU is assigned to the member countries at
the national level or in some cases the sub-national level. Some
(very small) part of national tax revenues that member states raise
for the financing of their own budgets is transferred to the EU. The
EU currently has essentially three revenue sources: traditional own
resources (agricultural tariffs, sugar customs duties, general tariffs),
VAT-based own resources and GNI-based own resources.4 EU
expenditure must be financed exclusively from own resources,
with the option of running a budget deficit being excluded by the
EU Treaty. 
The financing system of the EU has been changed six times
through own resources decisions by the European Council and the
European Parliament since 1970. Since then ad hoc national contri-
butions by member states were increasingly replaced by a system of
own resources and vanished completely in 1982 (European
Commission, 2011a). These own resources accrue to the EU
directly, without any further decisions required at the national
level. Total revenues are limited by a ceiling for EU own resources.
Until 1980, the traditional own resources, which were intro-
duced in 1968, were the only financial source of the EU. They are
collected by member states on behalf of the EU and directly trans-
ferred to the EU budget (minus a discount of 25 percent remaining
with member states to cover the cost of revenue collection5). VAT-
based own resources were introduced in 1979, originally as a
residual financing source with a uniform call rate from a harmo-
nised tax base which is limited to 50 percent of national GNI
(capping). At its introduction, the (maximum) call rate was fixed a
1 percent. In 1985 it was raised to 1.4 percent and between 1995
and 1999 reduced in steps to 1 percent again. For 2002 and 2003 it
was cut to 0.75 percent and for the years from 2004 to 2006 to
0.5 percent. The MFF 2007 to 2013 provides for a call rate of
4. This revenue source was originally calculated on the basis of GNP (gross national product),
but since 2002 it is determined on the basis of GNI (gross national income).
5. This flat-rate deduction was 10 percent until 2000. One of the European Commission’s
proposals for reforming the system of own resources is to reduce the rate from its current level
of 25 percent to the original level again (European Commission, 2010).
Margit Schratzenstaller3340.3 percent. In the context of financing the “UK rebate”, some net
contributors have been granted for the period 2007 to 2013 only a
reduction of the call rate (Germany 0.15 percent, Sweden and the
Netherlands 0.1 percent, Austria 0.225 percent). The GNI-based
own resource exists since 1988. As a residual financing source they
serve to balance the budget subject to the own resources ceiling; as
a consequence, the call rates (which are identical for all member
states) are updated each year. Both the kind and the scope of the
generation of own resources as well as the taking over of own tasks
by the EU have to be voted by unanimity by the European Council
and by all member states according to their respective constitu-
tional provisions. The current EU expenditure ceiling, which is
equal to the revenue ceiling, is set at 1.29 percent of aggregate EU
GNI (commitment appropriations) and 1.23 percent (payment
appropriations), respectively. In practice, this ceiling is never
reached. As a rule, actual payments by member states fall markedly
below the ceiling: In 2010, for example, they amounted to
0.97 percent of GNI; in the second half of last decade they fluctu-
ated around 0.9 percent of GNI.
Since the end of the 1970s a remarkable structural shift can be
observed for the composition of the EU’s own resources (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Composition of EU revenues from own resources
Source: European Commission, 2012.
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Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 335Traditional own resources received directly by the EU have
greatly lost in importance due to the fall of custom revenues in the
course of trade liberalisation and EU enlargement: whereas in 1980
they accounted for almost 50 percent of total revenues, their share
has since fallen steadily, declining to about 20 percent in the mid-
1990s to about 15 percent since 2005. Thus the financing of the EU
budget is increasingly resting on direct contributions from
member states’ national budgets. The share of revenues from the
VAT-based own resource reached its peak at 70 percent in 1986 and
1990, to shrink steadily afterwards to 12 percent in 2011. In
parallel, the share of revenues from the GNI-based own increased
continuously from 10 percent in 1988 to 74 percent in 2011.
This development is caused by two Council Decisions, from
1992 (effective as of 1995) and 1999 (effective as of 2002), which
have shifted the bulk of financing from the VAT-based towards the
GNI-based own resource component. Part of this move were the
above-mentioned stepwise cuts in the call rate for the VAT-based
own resource to meanwhile 0.3 percent of the harmonised VAT
base which itself had been reduced to 50 percent of national GNI
over the same period. One motive of this move from VAT-towards
GNI-based own resources was to widen the financial scope of the
EU budget, the easing of the financial burden for the economically
weaker member states another: while contributions on the basis of
VAT have a tendentially regressive effect, the contributions linked
to GNI better reflect a country’s economic capacity (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1999).
Whether in this way the economically weaker member states
have actually been exonerated cannot be examined and evaluated
in detail here. However, the trend of GNI per capita is not neces-
sarily parallel to that of national contributions per capita, as can be
illustrated by the example of “old” member states (Figure 2): For
8 old member states, per capita incomes compared to the EU15
average increased (decreased), while their own resources contribu-
tions per capita decreased (increased) in 2011 compared to 1995.
Until 2011, the EU budget rose to a total of € 120 billion,
compared to € 67.8 billion in 1995. Since 1995, Germany’s share in
total own resources fell from 31.4 percent to about 20 percent,
partly because the country’s share in aggregate EU GNI declined,
but partly also due to a reduction of the contribution burden
Margit Schratzenstaller336through various correction mechanisms (see below). Also the
contribution by France and the UK to total own resources
payments have slightly fallen during the last 15 years. At the same
time, the share of “poorer” countries as Spain, Italy and Portugal
has (slightly) risen.
The gross contribution, i.e. total payments made to the EU, is
the most straightforward measure of a country’s contribution to the
financing of the EU budget. Deducting traditional own resources
delivers the national contribution, consisting of VAT- and GNI-
based own resources. The national contribution (Figure 3) is more
appropriate than the gross contribution for comparisons between
member states, since it reflects the resources actually raised by indi-
vidual member states. Figure 3 shows national contributions as
percent of GNI (including the UK rebate) for 2011. The national
contribution is lowest in Germany, with 0.74 percent of GNI, and
highest in the Czech Republic (0.95 percent of GNI) in 2011.
In the political debate and in EU budget negotiations, the net
contribution position, as recorded in the national balance of
payment statistics, plays a more important role than the national
contribution. As the balance of financial transfers (VAT- and GNI-
Figure 2. GNI and national contributions of EU member states, per capita
Sources: European Commission (2012), own calculations.
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Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 337based own resources) paid to the EU and transfers received from
the EU budget, it expresses a member state’s financial net benefit
or cost from the EU budget.
Apart from the fact that the net contribution position alone
cannot by far capture the entire economic impact of European
integration upon member states – beyond direct transfers from the
EU budget, EU membership carries a number of indirect economic
effects, such as potential access to new markets –, the calculation of
this indicator is subject to a certain margin of uncertainty.6
Since its introduction, the “UK rebate” has been a topical issue
in the context of the net contribution position. In 2011, the rebate
amounted to € 3.6 billion. Following a decision of the European
Council of Fontainebleau in 1984, the UK is reimbursed two thirds
of its annual net contribution. The special provision was success-
fully negotiated by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at a
time when the UK had a relatively low per capita income within
the EU. Due to its comparatively small agricultural sector, the
Figure 3. VAT- and GNI-based own resources (national contributions) of EU member 
states in 2011, as percent of GNI
Source: European Commission, 2012.
6. See Clemens and Lemmer (2006) for details.
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Margit Schratzenstaller338country received considerably less in EU agricultural payments
than, for example, France. The adjustment in favour of the UK is
financed by the other member states according to their levels of
GNI. Since 2001, a special clause applies for the traditionally most
important net contributor countries Germany, Austria, Sweden
and the Netherlands, which pay only 25 percent of their normal
financing share of the UK rebate (Clemens and Lemmer, 2006).
The impact of the UK rebate on the distribution of own resource
payments in absolute terms is shown in Figure 4. The rebate moves
the UK down from the second to the fourth largest contributor.
In relative terms, the UK’s national contribution of 0.84 percent
of GNI is on rank 14 (see Figure 3). The termination or at least
reduction of the UK rebate which has been claimed for some time
by almost all other member states is subject to the UK’s consent
which is unlikely to be obtained without a far-reaching overhaul of
EU common agricultural policy.
In 2011 as well as during the period 2007 to 2011, 11 of the
27 member states were net contributors.7 In the period 2007 to
Figure 4. Own resources payments to the EU in 2011, in billion €
Source: European Commission, 2012, own calculations
7. Cyprus net position amounted to practically zero, with a net contribution of 0.02 percent of
GNI in the period 2007 to 2011 and of -0.04 percent of GDP in 2011.
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Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 3392011, the largest net contributors in relation to their GNI are
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark (Figure 5).
2.2. Problems and need for reform in the current system 
of own resources
The financing system of the EU in the design which has evolved
over more than 60 years since the foundation of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 is characterised by a number
of shortcomings rooted in the low and still decreasing revenue
autonomy of the EU. While the correction of these shortcomings
has been on the political agenda for some time, the required
unanimity vote in financial matters has so far stood in the way of a
fundamental reform. However, the growing resistance notably on
the part of net contributors, which makes negotiations on the MFF
and also on the yearly budgets increasingly tedious, adds to the
pressure to seek alternatives to the existing system of own
resources. This section briefly presents the most important prob-
lematic aspects and effects of the current system of own resources.8
Figure 5. Net contributions by member states, as percent of GNI
Source: European Commission, 2012, own calculations.
8. While their presentation is structured somewhat differently, the aspects elaborated in this
section are mainly those addressed in European Commission (2011a) and several related
academic studies cited there.
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Since the EU can neither raise its own taxes nor (according to
Article 311 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union) incur debt, its revenue autonomy has been curtailed from
the outset. Meanwhile, it has become negligible since the tradi-
tional own resources have greatly lost in importance. As presented
in more detail above, now the own resources of the EU consist
primarily of member states’ contributions paid directly from
national budgets. Thus the EU budget has increasingly become the
subject of political conflict, as most clearly revealed by the “net
contributor debate”. Reaching an agreement on the MFF is
becoming more and more difficult, particularly with economic
divergences widening in the last (and future) enlargement rounds.
This carries the risk of the EU budget becoming chronically under-
financed against the challenges facing the EU in the future. Such
risk is witnessed by the current MFF 2007 to 2013 as well as by the
proposal for the next MFF 2014 to 2020, each setting expenditures
to decline as a ratio of EU GNI, rather than being at least held
constant as warranted by the current and future tasks of the EU.
2.2.2. Increasing neglect of “European value added” and dominance 
of national interests
The predominance of national contributions narrows down the
focus of member states on monetary net returns from the EU
budget, i.e. the relation between national contributions to the
budget and monetary returns from the individual policy areas
(common agricultural policy, structural and cohesion policy,
research and innovation, etc.) (European Commission, 2011a;
Becker, 2012). Benefits of EU membership beyond pure financial
flows related to the EU budget, however, do not play much of a
role as evaluation and decision criteria of member states (Richter,
2013). Within the EU with its increasing divergences and therefore
national interests, such a perspective focusing on individual
country-specific monetary costs and benefits inevitably aggravates
the EU budget’s controversiality and increasingly hinders compro-
mises. It is an essential reason that particularly net contributor
countries, whose gross contributions exceed transfers received
from the EU budget, urge a limitation of the EU budget’s volume.
Moreover it furthers the tendency of member states to support the
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maximise individual country-specific transfers received from the
EU budget, instead of pushing an expenditure structure from
which a maximal benefit for the EU as a whole (what the European
Commission calls “European value added”, see European Commis-
sion, 2011c), may be expected. The focus on individual national
interests is also enforced by the increasing public attention for
questions of EU policy (Becker, 2012). The distributional conflicts
as well as the “net contributor debate” more recently have been
aggravated by the (potential) burden from the EU rescue package
the largest part of which falls upon Eurozone countries.
In this context it should be recalled that the financial resources
at the disposal of the EU also serve to finance various “European
public goods”, i.e. goods or activities with positive cross-border
external effects9 and with European value added (European
Commission, 2011c), respectively. In particular this concerns
expenditures in the areas of research and innovation, education,
transport infrastructure, and climate/energy policy, decided upon
at the EU level. Securing fiscal equivalence (i.e. a correspondence
of revenue and expenditure responsibility) would require assigning
to the EU also the taxes necessary to finance these expenditures.
2.2.3. No contribution by the system of own resources to EU policies
Moreover, the lack of tax autonomy at the EU level runs counter
to the long-term trend of deeper integration. Despite an increase in
negative cross-border externalities (e.g. environmental damage)
caused by ever closer economic integration of member states,
policy refrains from using taxes at the European level to influence
economic agents’ behaviour. Thus potential benefits of a rather
powerful market-based policy instrument are foregone. In general,
the current revenue system hardly contributes or supports EU poli-
cies (European Commission, 2011a).
2.2.4. Increasing complexity of the system of own resources and political 
legitimacy
In addition, the system of own resources is characterised by a
considerable degree of complexity and lack of transparency. While
9. Consider in this context also the evolving debate about “global public goods” (see, e.g.,
Kaul et al., 1999).
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implementation is not. This is mainly caused by the UK rebate and
the various mechanisms for its correction. In addition, the concrete
design of the VAT-based own resource, particularly the determina-
tion of the tax base, is often criticised as rather complicated.
Moreover, the structural adjustments made since the early days
of the European Community are the result of political compro-
mises (such as the correction mechanism for the financing of the
“UK rebate”). Apart from the resulting administrative burden, this
trend also undermines political credibility and the legitimacy for
national financial contributions, since the population of the indi-
vidual member states is less and less able to identify its own
contribution to the financing of the EU budget and the relation-
ship between revenue and expenditure. 
2.2.5. Equity concerns
Not least, within the group of net contributing countries which
in the period from 2007 to 2011 included 11 member states, a
“rebate from the rebate” for the UK was granted to the 4 countries
which traditionally are the most important net contributors only,
despite the fact that these are not necessarily – in relative terms –
carrying the largest net contribution burdens (see Figure 5). There-
fore the complete elimination of the correction mechanism for the
UK rebate is an important element of a more simple, transparent
and equitable system of financing the EU budget: The more, as the
initial reason to grant a rebate to the UK in the first place – relatively
low economic prosperity and high net contributions – has disap-
peared during the last 30 years (Economic Commission, 2011a).
From an equity perspective it may also be considered problem-
atic that the poorer member states which are on the one hand
benefiting from cohesion policy over-proportionately contribute
to financing the various correction mechanism to alleviate the net
contribution burden of the richer countries on the other hand
(European Commission, 2011a). It may also be criticised that
capping individual VAT-based resource payments by limiting the
part of the harmonised VAT base on which the call rate is applied
to 50 percent of GNI does not necessarily alleviate the burden for
the poorer countries, as there is no clear relationship between a
country’s GNI and and the size of the VAT base.
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resources of the EU
2.3.1. Current state of the political discussion
The MFF 2007 to 2013 has not brought about any fundamental
changes for the system of own resources. The own resources ceiling
was confirmed to 1.24 percent of GNI (for payment appropriations)
and 1.31 percent of GNI (for commitment appropriations), respec-
tively. Also the “UK rebate” was maintained, as well as the
correction mechanisms for its financing in favour of Germany,
Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands (“rebate from the rebate”).
The UK therefore in principle continues to benefit from its rebate.
The call rate for the VAT-based own resource was generally reduced
from 0.5 to 0.3 percent, with several net contributors benefiting
from a lower rate in the period 2007 to 2013 only (Austria
0.225 percent, Germany 0.15 percent, the Netherlands and Sweden
0.10 percent). In addition, Sweden and the Netherlands may reduce
their GNI-based annual gross contributions by € 150 million and
€ 605 million (in constant 2004 prices), respectively in the period
from 2007 to 2013 only.
In December 2005, the European Commission has been invited
by the European Council to undertake a revision of the EU budget
in the form of a “mid-term review”, which should also include a
review of the system of own resources, and to report to the Euro-
pean Council by 2008/09. This review should feed into the
preparations for the next MFF. In this way, the need for reform of
the EU financing system, generally felt across member states and
the European institutions, has been taken up, without however an
actual announcement or commitment to such reform being given.
The European Commission’s publication of its Communication on
the EU Budget Review (European Commission, 2010) as one core
principle of the EU budget puts forward a reformed financing
system. According to the European Commission, new own
resources could substitute the VAT-based own resource and a part
of the GNI-based resource.
In its proposal for the own resources decision (part of the whole
package related to the MFF) the European Commission (2011b and
2011d) suggests three elements of the reform of the current system
of own resources: firstly the simplification of member states’
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compensated secondly by the introduction of new own resources
(preferably a financial transaction tax and a new VAT resource),
and thirdly the reform of correction mechanisms by implementing
a new system of lump sums to replace all pre-existing correction
mechanisms.
The European Parliament, which according to the Lisbon Treaty
for the first time has a right to co-decision on the MFF and which
only after lengthy negotiations only agreed to the new MFF 2014-
2020 has been demanding for some time now a reform of the
system of own resources which includes the reform of the existing
VAT-based own resource and the introduction of an EU tax, i.e. a
genuine own resource (particularly a financial transaction tax). Up
to now, however, the European Council refuses to negotiate about
a reform of the system of own resources and about the introduc-
tion of an EU tax in particular.
In the longer-term perspective, budgetary leeway is to be
created for the financing of tasks ranking high in the Europe 2020
strategy through further shifts in the expenditure structure,
notably the already initiated restraint on agricultural spending.
Given the conflicting interests of member states it is nevertheless
doubtful whether such shifts will progress at sufficient speed in
order to create the necessary budgetary room for manoeuvre. All
the more so, since agricultural spending will (have to) remain a
major responsibility for the EU, albeit with substantial adjustments
towards organic farming, preservation and development of rural
areas and promotion of tourism, reflecting the changing role of
agriculture. Against this background, conferring a certain degree of
tax autonomy upon the EU appears to be an option worth
exploring, by substituting own EU tax revenues for part of national
financial contributions which face growing resistance, particularly
with net contributors.
2.3.2. Key elements of a reform of the system of own resources
Starting from the above criticism of the EU system of own
resources, reform options have been considered for some time at
the EU level. Following up on agreements reached in the context of
the last few financial frameworks, the European Commission in
the meantime has submitted several reports on the functioning of
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2004); the most recent one in 2011 (European Commission,
2011a). These documents also discuss the pros and cons of various
financing alternatives. In principle, two alternative reform strate-
gies to address the existing shortcomings of the system of own
resources may be envisaged (European Commission, 2004):
— Reforms within the existing system of own resources with
the aim of streamlining it (in practice, this would lead to the
elimination of the VAT-based own resource so that, given
the ongoing loss in importance of traditional own resources,
the budget would in the long run be financed almost entirely
by GNI-based own resources);
— Introduction of dedicated EU taxes, as a (partial) compensa-
tion for the existing revenue sources. This option, favoured
by the European Commission, would assign some degree of
tax autonomy to the EU.
The criticism advanced against the current system of own
resources advises in favour of the latter reform strategy conferring
to the EU some degree of tax autonomy in combination with a
reform of key features of the existing system of own resources
along the following lines:10
— Elimination of VAT-based own resources;
— Attribution of dedicated taxes to the EU to compensate for
the abolition of VAT-based own resources and in recognition
of the arguments in favour of EU tax autonomy;
— Reinforcement of own EU tax revenues through GNI-based
own resources;
— Reform of the correction mechanism to finance the UK
rebate.
2.3.3. Evaluation of potential EU taxes as a central pillar of a fundamental 
reform of the system of own resources
Starting from these key elements, the following considerations
are devoted to a crucial aspect in the debate on alternative revenue
sources for the EU budget, i.e. the question what kind of taxes
10. These key features are also mentioned by the European Commission who nevertheless
pleads in favour of the revenue-neutral introduction of a now own revenue source which should
cover up to 50 percent of total expenditure (European Commission, 2004).
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sovereignty (or as a supplementary or alternative revenue source)
(see also Richter, 2006). 
One basic assumption is that financing the EU budget entirely
or at least primarily through own taxes is for the time being
neither meaningful nor possible under the existing framework
conditions. One argument against is the existing ban on incurring
debt, which requires an additional revenue source to balance the
budget in case actual tax revenues fall short of projections. In addi-
tion, financing all EU responsibilities entirely by own taxes would
require much deeper integration of the EU member states than is
presently the case, leading more towards a federal state.
Weighing up between dedicated EU taxes on the one hand and
GNI-based own resources on the other hand is an issue beyond
pure economic reasoning: It is rather a political decision of
member states to what extent they see the Community eventually
moving towards a federal state that in the end needs its own legal
framework for fiscal relations and an own tax sovereignty. This is
also a crucial factor for the degree and factual implementation of
the tax autonomy conferred to the EU.11 It may either be confined
to the power to decide on how to allocate its own resources, or it
may extend to legislative powers in tax matters. In the first case,
the EU would receive a certain fraction of national tax revenues or
be granted the right to levy a supplementary rate on a given tax
base, with the right of decision on tax bases and national tax rates
essentially remaining with the member states. In the second case
the EU would acquire the right to determine tax base and rate, with
member states possibly having the right to levy a supplement.
In its reports on the operation of the EU own resources system,
the European Commission establishes seven criteria for the evalua-
tion of own resources (European Commission, 2004):
— visibility and simplicity;
— financial autonomy;
— contribution towards an efficient allocation of economic
resources;
— yield;
11. For elaboration of this point, see Becker (2005).
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— revenue stability;
— equitable gross burden.
These criteria may be applied only partially or in modified form
for the following assessment of the suitability of different taxes as
financial sources for the EU budget. They will be supplemented by
further criteria developed by the theory of fiscal federalism as a
yardstick for assigning different taxes to the different levels of
government (see, e.g., Musgrave, 1983; Gordon, 1983; Inman and
Rubinfeld, 1996; McLure, 2001). Thus, for the assessment of
whether a certain tax may qualify as EU tax, the following criteria
may be formulated (see also European Commission, 1998 and
2004):
— Degree of regional attribution: the lower the possibility to
determine the share of individual member states in the tax
base/tax revenues, or the lower the identity between the
country where tax revenues accrue and the country of resi-
dence of tax subjects, the higher the suitability as EU tax.
— Cross-border negative externalities: the higher they are, the
higher the qualification as EU tax, since the optimal tax rate
from the national perspective is below the one from the
European perspective.
— Mobility of the tax base: the higher it is, the higher in prin-
ciple the qualification as EU tax, since centralisation may
help to prevent a possibly harmful “race to the bottom”.
— Short-term volatility: the higher it is, the lower the qualifica-
tion as EU tax; due to the ban on EU debt, the flow of own
resources should be stable in the short term and as cyclically-
insensitive as possible.
— Long-term yield (revenue elasticity): the higher it is, the
higher the qualification as EU tax, since with European inte-
gration and given the long-term challenges the EU is facing
progressing the range of tasks and therefore the financial
needs will probably rise.
— Visibility: the more visible and perceptible a tax for the tax
subjects, the higher its qualification as EU tax, since the link
between tax payment and return from the EU budget is made
transparent.
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link between the tax base (and therefore the tax burden) and
national income, the higher the qualification as EU tax.
The report on the functioning of the system of own resources by
the European Commission of 1998 discusses eight kinds of poten-
tial own resources: CO2 or energy tax; modified value added tax;
excises on tobacco, alcohol and mineral oil; corporate tax; tax on
transport and telecommunication services; income tax; interest
income tax; and a tax on the ECB gains from seigniorage (Euro-
pean Commission, 1998). The European Commission’s report of
2004 limits itself to three options, namely the combination of
GNI-based own resources with revenues from energy tax, value
added tax or corporate tax. In its latest report on the operation of
the system of own resources (European Commission, 2010), the
European Commission mentions taxes on the financial sector
(financial transaction tax and financial activity tax, revenues form
auctioning under the greenhouse gas Emissions Trading System, a
charge related to air transport, an EU VAT, an EU energy tax and an
EU corporate income tax) as potential candidates for new own
resources; where the preferred options put forward in further docu-
ments and statements related to the MFF package are the financial
transaction tax and an EU VAT. Table 2 gives an overview of the
candidates for new own resources mentioned in the European
Commission’s various reports on the functioning of the system of
own resources and options for its reform.
Table 2. Candidates for new own resources according 
to the European Commission
European Commission 
1998
European Commission 
2004
European Commission 
2010
CO2 or energy tax
modified value added tax
excises on tobacco, alcohol and 
mineral oil
EU corporate income tax
tax on transport and 
telecommunication services
income tax; interest income tax
tax on ECB gains from seigniorage
EU energy tax
EU value added tax
EU corporate income tax
taxes on the financial sector 
(financial transaction tax and 
financial activity tax)
revenues form auctioning 
under the greenhouse gas 
Emissions Trading System
charge related to air transport
EU VAT
EU energy tax
EU corporate income tax
Source: Own compilation.
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candidates (expect revenues from auctioning under the green-
house gas Emissions Trading System) included in the European
Commission’s latest documents on the operation of the system of
own resources and options for its reform. Altogether the potential
revenues of the various candidates may contribute to a consider-
able extent to financing the EU budget.
Table 3. Potential EU taxes
Tax base (tax) Key features
Potential 
revenues 
per year
In % of EU 
expenditures 
per year1
Financial transactions 
(Financial Transaction 
Tax – FTT)
0.1% tax rate on transactions of 
bonds and shares, 0.01% tax rate on 
transactions of derivatives,
0.1% tax rate on transactions of 
bonds, shares and foreign currency, 
0.01% tax rate on transactions of 
derivatives
€ 20 billion 
(by 2020)
€ 50 billion 
(by 2020)
15
36
Sum of profit and
 remuneration of 
financial institutions 
(Financial Activities 
Tax – FAT)
5% tax rate on sum of profit and 
remuneration of financial institutions 
according to the addition-method 
FAT applied at source,
no fully harmonized tax centrally col-
lected at EU level, but revenue-sha-
ring between member states and EU
€ 24.6 billion 
(2009) 18
Charge related 
to air transport
(Departure Tax or 
Flight Duty Tax)
Tax on passengers flying from an EU 
airport, differentiated according to 
distance and class of travel 
(Departure Tax),
tax on flights (Flight Duty Tax)
decentralized or centralized 
collection possible
€ 20 billion 
(by 2020) 15
Consumption 
(EU Value Added Tax 
– VAT)
1% tax rate on goods and services 
subject to standard tax rate,
decentralized collection and transfer 
to EU
€ 20.9 billion to 
€ 50.4 billion 
(2009)
15
Energy consumption
CO2 emissions
(EU Energy Levy, EU 
CO2 Levy)
Single EU tax rate on quantities of 
energy products released for 
consumption based on their energy 
content.
Minimum rate of CO2-related 
taxation defined in revised ETD.
Decentralized or centralized 
collection possible
No estimates 
available –
Profits of incorporated 
firms (EU 
Corporate Income Tax 
– CIT)
Less than 2% tax rate on national 
corporate income tax base
decentralized collection and transfer 
to EU.
€ 15 billion 11
 1. Expenditures per year calculated as average of total expenditures for the period 2014 to 2020.
Sources: European Commission (2010, 2011a, 2011b); Own compilation.
Margit Schratzenstaller350Most revenue could be created by introducing a general Finan-
cial Transaction Tax (FTT) of 0.1 percent on transactions of
bonds, shares and currency and of 0.01 percent on transactions of
derivatives. According to a conservative estimate by the European
Commission, the potential yield may reach about € 50 billion per
year by 2020, which would cover about one third of the EU’s
annual expenditures according to the European Council’s agree-
ment of February 2013. In a version exempting currency
transactions the FTT would still raise about € 20 billion or
15 percent of the EU’s expenditures.
A Financial Activities Tax (FAT) of 5 percent on the sum of
profits and remuneration of financial institutions, as an alternative
tax on the financial sector, is expected to yield about € 25 billion
per year and could thus finance about 18 percent of the EU’s
expenditures.
Revenues from charges related to air transport (a Departure Tax
or Flight Duty Tax) and from an EU Value Added Tax (VAT) of 1
percent on the goods and services subject to the standard tax rate
are estimated to reach a similar size, with about € 20 billion per
year (15 percent of the EU’s expenditures).
An EU corporate income tax (CIT) of less than 2 percent on the
national corporate income tax base may yield about € 15 billion
(11 percent of the EU’s expenditures).
The evaluation of these taxes according to the criteria specified
above (Table 4) gives only rough indications since it does not allow
for a possible fine-tuning of the different criteria, but only distin-
guishes between “rather useful” or “rather less useful” as EU tax.
For further considerations on the actual design of an own resources
system which is based also on EU taxes as genuine own resources,
the analysis of course needs to be refined. It would also have to
consider administrative costs and the question at which level
(national level or EU level) revenues would be collected. None of
the taxes briefly discussed below is deemed an “optimal” EU tax,
since all of them miss one or more of the criteria defined above.
Which of the taxes will actually be selected along these criteria,
and the weight to be attributed to each of them, is a political deci-
sion in the end.
Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 351According to the above criteria, charges on air transport would
qualify best as EU taxes. They may internalise negative cross-
border externalities (in this case climate-damaging emissions) and
thereby reduce air traffic. Assigning these taxes to the EU would
rein in the possibility of tax avoidance caused by tax rate differen-
tials between member states. Their visibility for citizens as well as
short- and long-term revenue stability and tax yield are further
arguments in favour of assigning them to the EU level. In
particular the tax avoidance to be expected speaks in favour of
earmarking charges related to air transport entirely for the EU: a
uniform tax rate should be fixed at the level of the EU and all reve-
nues be channelled into the EU budget.
Main arguments in favour of an FTT to be assigned to the EU are
the impossibility of a regional attribution of such a tax and its
prospective long-term yield. Moreover, unilateral implementation
would be next to impossible, and considering the far-reaching
integration of the European financial market, the FTT may also
internalize negative cross-border externalities. In contrast to an EU
CIT or VAT, differing national tax bases would not be an issue.
Unfortunately, the current negotiations at the EU level about the
introduction of an FTT do not make much progress: Apart from the
fact that only 11 EU member states are willing at all – in principle –
Table 4. Evaluation of options for EU taxes
Regional 
attri-
bution
Negative 
cross-
border 
externa-
lities
Mobility 
of tax 
base
Short-
term 
volatility
Long-term 
yield 
(revenue 
elasticity)
Visibility
Equity of 
gross 
burden at 
national 
level
Financial 
Transaction Tax + + + – + – –
Financial 
Activities Tax + + + – + – –
Departure/Flight 
Duty Tax – + + + + + –
Value Added 
Tax – – – – + + ?
Energy 
Levy/CO2 Levy – + – + + + ?
Corporate 
Income Tax + – + – + – –
+ speaks rather in favour of being used as an EU tax. … – speaks rather against being used as an EU tax.
Source: Own.
Margit Schratzenstaller352to implement an FTT, several of these countries under the pressure
of the financial lobbies are pushing very strongly for a very mini-
malistic (“light”) version of an FTT.
In favour of a partially centralised CIT may be argued that the
growing disconnection between value added and corporate loca-
tion on the one hand, and profit and its taxation on the other,
undermines the possibility of regional attribution of the tax. More-
over, it can be expected that corporate tax competition in the EU
will intensify further due to the high mobility of the tax base. The
CIT is also characterised by a high yield in the longer term.
Taxes on energy consumption have the advantage of low short-
term volatility and a high long-term elasticity. Moreover they can
internalize cross-border externalities and are highly visible to citi-
zens. It may be objected, however, that the use of the CO2 tax is
problematic because there is no link between the desirable growth
of the EU budget and the desirable growth of ecological taxation.
The VAT appears as least suitable candidate. Only its long-term
revenue elasticity and high visibility for citizens speak in its favour.
Altogether the most straightforward option for an own EU tax
is the FTT which as a new tax has the additional advantage that
national revenues would not be affected, which would be the case
for charges on air transport and energy taxes which exist at least in
some member states already. Thus it can be expected that
choosing the FTT as EU tax will meet with less political resistance
than options which imply redirecting national revenues to the
EU budget.
From an administrative point of view, the FTT has the further
advantage that (in contrast to the VAT or the CIT) there are no
nationally differing tax bases that would need to be harmonised
beforehand. It could cover a substantial share of total EU expendi-
tures. If the aim is to extend the contribution of EU taxes even
further, charges related to air transport would be another readily
available solution, considering also that only few member states
levy such charges at all and that they are exposed to permanent
criticism as they are regarded as severe competitive disadvantage
when implemented unilaterally at the national level.12 The same
holds for a CO2 tax which some member states have introduced
rather recently.
Reform options for the EU’s system of own resources 353When designing a new financial framework for the EU resting
on a certain degree of tax autonomy, including institutional
aspects and political decision-making processes, a number of
caveats need to be considered that are often emphasised by the
opponents of EU taxes. A major concern is that an own tax respon-
sibility of the EU would lead to permanent upward pressure on
expenditure, all the more so as the EU budget is dominated by the
goal of redistribution. Moreover, the assignment of (a certain
degree of) tax autonomy to the EU would require to reinforce
democratic legitimacy, i.e., to strengthen the powers of the Euro-
pean Parliament further as well as to tighten expenditure control
and fight against fraud. It can also be expected that the process of
unwinding the UK rebate system will cause considerable political
controversy. Therefore, any major reform is likely to require a
considerable lead time. In this context the problematic role of the
unanimity rule as a major barrier for far-reaching reforms needs to
be emphasised. It is one of the main reasons that member states
prefer to agree on a minimum consensus and for their principally
critical attitude towards ambitious reform proposals (Becker,
2012): By restricting themselves to incremental changes member
states avoid the risk not to reach a final agreement.
3. Conclusions
There are many good reasons to substitute a substantial share of
the existing own resources financing the EU budget by own EU
taxes. Most remarkably, many proponents of a fundamental
future-oriented reform of expenditure structures of the EU budget,
which form the overwhelming majority among experts and politi-
cians as well up to now appear to fail to realise that the current
system of own resources is one – if not THE – most influential cause
for the existing shortcomings of the expenditure side of the EU
budget. Until now attempts to secure an expenditure size and
structure which may more effectively than today support the EU’s
policy priorities as laid down in the Europe 2020 strategy and
beyond has failed primarily because the influence of the design of
the revenue system is widely underrated. However, without a
12. Austria therefore has just reduced the rates of its flight charge which was introduced in
2011 as part of the fiscal consolidation efforts.
Margit Schratzenstaller354reform of the system of own resources a volume and structure of
EU expenditures adequate to cope with the current problems and
future economic and societal challenges the EU is facing appears as
improbable as the radical elimination of the existing system of
rebates. Not the least advantage of those EU taxes which help to
internalize negative externalities is that they would allow reducing
national contributions financed by more distorting taxes levied by
member states. Thus the introduction of such EU taxes may
contribute to current efforts to improve the structures of national
tax systems.
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